

# LA Probation Governance Study

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## LA Probation Department Assessment



Prepared by:

Resource Development Associates

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## Probation Assessment

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### About Resource Development Associates

Resource Development Associates (RDA) is a consulting firm based in Oakland, California, that serves government and nonprofit organizations throughout California as well as other states. Our mission is to strengthen public and non-profit efforts to promote social and economic justice for vulnerable populations. RDA supports its clients through an integrated approach to planning, grant-writing, organizational development, and evaluation.





## Acknowledgements

The following *LA County Probation Department Assessment* could not have been completed without the support and participation of the LA County Probation Department, which made all staff available for interviews and focus groups during work hours, ensured access to all Department facilities and field offices, and provided an extensive array of quantitative data and internal documentation.

In addition, RDA appreciates the contributions of Vincent Schiraldi and David Muhammad. Mr. Schiraldi is the Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard Kennedy School, as well as former Director of Juvenile Corrections in Washington, DC and former Commissioner of the New York City Department of Probation. Mr. Muhammad is the Executive Director of the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform and a leader in the fields of criminal justice, violence prevention, and youth development.



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## Executive Summary

This report provides an in-depth, comprehensive study of the Los Angeles County Probation Department (the Department), documenting its structure and practices, and highlighting factors that influence departmental performance and outcomes. The report employs an organizational assessment framework that recognizes the significant role and impact of organizational elements, such as culture and infrastructure. In addition to examining the Department in its totality, this assessment focuses on four specific functions: staffing, hiring, and training; client service delivery; juvenile facilities; and fiscal operations.

This report, and the larger project of which it is a part, was commissioned to assess and make recommendations to remediate widely expressed concerns about the Department and its operations; therefore, many of the findings presented here are critical. At the same time, there are a number of important strengths that are evidenced throughout this report, as well as some key changes that are currently in process. Recently appointed Chief Probation Officer Terri McDonald and her team have inspired confidence that the Department is on the path toward significant improvement, with a greater focus on client well-being, administrative efficiency, and Department-wide accountability. Key findings from this report are highlighted below.

## Organizational Assessment

Regular transitions in the Chief Probation Officer position, limited succession planning, and insufficient leadership development have resulted in low morale and a “head’s down” approach among many staff across organizational hierarchy. Staff do not report being organized around a common mission or purpose. This is exacerbated by frequent criticism by the Board of Supervisors, media, and advocates. There is, however, significant enthusiasm and optimism about the new leadership and perceived new direction.

The Department’s organizational structure does not support clear accountability, communication, fiscal administration, or roles and responsibilities. The Bureau model, which combines countywide and geographically specific functions as well as both vertical and horizontal responsibilities, is particularly challenging. The move toward an agency model, with one Assistant Chief overseeing juvenile operations and one Assistant Chief overseeing adult operations, is a step in the right direction and should be extended downward throughout the Department.

The Department’s outdated IT infrastructure and limited data capacity is a major barrier to data driven decision-making and accountability. Significant investment is needed in IT as well as in data and evaluation functions.

## Hiring, Staffing, and Training


There are a number of factors that inhibit effective staff recruitment, including insufficient dedicated resources and the need to clearly define who the Department wants to hire and develop job descriptions that can attract appropriate candidates. The Department also loses many high quality



candidates due to a lengthy and sometimes poorly coordinated hiring process. County Human Resources, Department Human Resources, executive management, and line staff all agree that the Department is losing qualified candidates due an unnecessarily extensive background check process and an extremely lengthy hiring process, as well as insufficient communication with job candidates during the process.

**Figure 1. The background check process for sworn staff is lengthy, contributing to a slow hiring process.**

*(Process for non-sworn staff does not include social media review or polygraph)*




There is very low overall turnover or vacancies in staffing. Transfers to new positions or uneven workload distribution, rather than too few staff within the Department, create staffing gaps. There does appear to be uneven distribution in staffing; for example, many administrative and operational functions, such as IT and HR are under-resourced, while sizeable declines in client populations have not resulted in comparable declines in sworn staff. In addition, the Department does not have metrics for assessing workload distribution or mechanics to track those metrics.

The vast majority of staff achieve required training both when they join the Department and on an ongoing basis, and training is consistent with state mandates for their respective positions. While the Department offers a wide range of ongoing training in mandated areas and elective areas, more training is needed for staff who transfer between positions. In addition, more training is needed both in technical functions, such as data systems and writing court reports, as well as in topics related to client wellbeing and supervision, such as mental health, trauma-informed care, and positive youth development.



**Figure 2. Custodial and logistic services represent the highest percentage of non-core training hours for field and facilities staff.**



## Client Service Delivery

The Department is moving toward greater use of structured decision-making based on validated assessments and evidence-based practices. However, much work is needed to fully implement these processes. Challenges with data systems and insufficient training in structured decision-making, assessments, and case management must be addressed to support a more systematic approach to client services. In addition, too many low risk clients are currently supervised, including youth who are not court involved but work with Probation Officers pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 236.

Clients, providers, and Department staff agree that there are not enough services funded to meet the needs of the client population, and that accessing the services that are funded is challenging due to insufficient information about these services, geographic distribution of services that does not align with clients' communities, and communication gaps within the Department and between the Department and providers.

Interviews and focus groups with clients indicate that their relationships with their probation officers vary greatly based on the individual probation officer. Focus groups with DPOs corroborate that different probation officers – and different probation units – have very inconsistent approaches to working with clients. Some officers are clearly rooted in a positive development and social work approach, while others are much more concerned with compliance issues.

The Probation Department has strong partnerships with other county departments and public agencies to support client service delivery, including extensive collaboration with the Department of Mental Health and the LA County Office of Education to support youth in custody and a strong partnership with the Office of Diversion and Reentry (ODR) to provide an array of services to adults on probation. Because ODR is a new Office with a still evolving mission, there is much work ahead to develop a full system of care. In addition, the Department's strong relationships with other county departments is




contrasted by very poor relationships overall with community-based organizations (CBOs). Despite wanting more services for their clients, many DPOs express very little confidence in the efficacy or quality of CBO services. Conversely, many CBO staff convey limited confidence that DPOs are committed to client wellbeing. In addition, CBO leadership expresses great frustration with a lengthy contracting process and arduous monitoring process. More formal opportunities for Department staff and CBO staff to partner at the management level and at the client service level would help improve these tensions.

## Juvenile Facilities

Since 2012, the juvenile population has decreased by 50% in juvenile halls and 60% in camps, declines that have been driven both by reductions in juvenile crime and by changes to Department decision-making and processes related to detention and placement recommendations. As a result, the Department has reduced the total number of juvenile facilities from 19 to the 16 currently operated, and there are plans to reduce them further. Facilities are spread throughout the county. While the juvenile halls are located in the county's urban core and in the western part near Sylmar, the majority of camps are located on the outer edges in less populated areas.

**Figure 3. Juvenile probation facilities are spread throughout the county and tend to be far from where most youth on probation live.**







There is wide variation in the physical infrastructure of different juvenile facilities as well as in the programs and services available. Juvenile halls, in particular, are run down, and many halls and camps are organized in barracks styles that are not consistent with best practices. Youth speak of “prison-like” conditions in many county facilities. Staff in many facilities report very low morale, which impedes their ability to work effectively with young people.

**Figure 4. Central Juvenile Hall is in need of extensive repair and renovation. Its layout and conditions do not support a rehabilitative approach or align with best practices.**



Recently opened Campus Kilpatrick is a strong indicator of the Department's interest in improving the layout, approach, and services in its juvenile facilities, and the camp closure plan also indicates a commitment to shift resources to community-based services.

## Fiscal Operations

The Department's budget has grown by \$75 million between 2012/13 and 2015/16, while several grant-specific fund balances have increased dramatically within that timeframe. The inability to draw down certain funds appears to be at least in part due to limited collaboration between the functions within the Fiscal Service Division, as well as siloes between Fiscal Services functions, program or operational divisions, and the Contracts and Grants Management Division.

The Financial Services Division has separate teams for Budget, Fiscal, and Procurement, and the Contracts Section is within the separate Contracts and Grants Management Division. Each section or team demonstrates ownership and pride over their “piece” in the process, but at the same time line-level staff feel that the “whole” is both opaque and inaccessible to them. While Fiscal Management and Contracts and Grants Management report directly to the Administrative Deputy, and while these teams' leaders attend monthly manager meetings to establish clearer lines of communication, this information sharing is not adequately filtering down to mid-level managers or line staff. While fiscal and budget staff



offer birds-eye-view reporting across juvenile, adult, and administrative operations, neither one delivers program-specific reporting to individual operations within adult and juvenile services.

The separation of budgeting, procurement, contracting, fiscal management, and other administrative functions inhibit the Department's ability to effectively contract for services in the community. Program requests to Budget, Procurement, or Contracts filter up through the chain of command rather than through inclusive and transparent conversations with executive decision-makers. Program directors that are responsible for implementing client-based services, for example, often do not have updated information from the Budget Section, and cannot, therefore, make informed decisions about what services to request through the Contracts Section. There is a wide communication gap between program operations and Contracts, and no effective processes by which fiscal functions collaborate on the back end to deliver client-oriented administrative services. As a result, significant administrative delays and bottlenecks prevent Probation from getting allocated community funds into service contracts. Firewalls between each fiscal area create an environment of dysfunction and bureaucratic loops for employees from every corner of Probation.

## Conclusion

The LA County Probation Department has been the subject of significant scrutiny over the past several years and, as indicated throughout this report, there is still much work to be done to align Department operations with best practices in community corrections, as well as in organizational management more broadly. Moreover, as this assessment demonstrates, challenges in one area of Department operations are not distinct from challenges in others: lack of clarity in organizational mission impacts staff morale, recruitment and hiring efforts, client services, fiscal operations; and limitations in data/IT infrastructure affect accountability, communication, approaches to client services, among others. These issues thus require complex and interrelated strategies to address.

At the same time, it is important not to understate or overlook the efforts currently underway to address these challenges, or that good work that is happening amid them. The Department's SB 678 CORE plan and partnership with ODR indicate a clear commitment to best practices, structured decision-making, community-based services, and partnerships with other organizations. Similarly, Campus Kilpatrick, the new JJCC Community Advisory Body, and the camp closure plan convey a commitment to working with county and community partners to provide the appropriate array of services to the appropriate youth in the appropriate setting.

Subsequent analyses as part of this study will seek to further support this effort by cross-walking the LA Probation Department's practices with those delineated in the research and policy literature as well as those practices in implementation in other jurisdictions in California and the United States.



## Introduction

This report provides an in-depth, comprehensive study of the Los Angeles County Probation Department (the Department), documenting its structure and practices and highlighting factors that influence departmental performance and outcomes. The report employs an organizational assessment framework that recognizes the significant role and impact of organizational elements, such as culture and infrastructure. In addition to examining the Department in its totality, this report focuses on four specific functions: staffing, hiring, and training; client service delivery; juvenile facilities; and fiscal operations.

An upcoming report will compare the Department's overall needs, strengths, and gaps to findings from research to cross-walk best practices knowledge with what is happening on the ground in LA County.

This report, and the larger project of which it is a part, was commissioned to assess and begin to remediate widely expressed concerns about the Department and its operations; therefore, many of the findings in this report are critical. The Los Angeles Board of Supervisors have acknowledged the numerous challenges the Department has faced over the years and the reason Resource Development Associates (RDA) is conducting this governance study is to help the County and the Department make needed improvements. Although the findings in this report can be interpreted as critical, RDA does want to highlight the very promising new direction in which the Department is headed. Recently appointed Chief Probation Officer Terri McDonald and her team have inspired confidence that the Department is on the path toward significant improvement.

The Department recently opened its state-of-the-art youth facility, Campus Kilpatrick. The new campus launches the much-anticipated LA Model, based on a rehabilitation and therapeutic approach. The Department has also developed a Camp Consolidation Plan that proposes closing unnecessary juvenile facilities. This follows a huge decrease in the percentage of youth that the Department decides to detain who are brought to juvenile hall by law enforcement. As referenced in this report, the Department has safely and responsibly reduced the percentage of youth it detains from 90% in 2014 to 29% in 2016.

On the adult side, the Department has developed a SB 678 plan that calls for an increase in community services and a greater focus on higher risk clients. The Department has new partnerships with community-based organizations (CBOs) to provide innovative housing programs for adults on probation as well as an exciting proposal to open a residential fire camp to prepare young adults on probation for employment as fire fighters and paramedics.

The above is a sampling of the many promising initiatives led by the new administration of the Probation Department. While this report details the long-standing, entrenched challenges of the Department, the new leadership provides encouragement that in-depth reform is underway.



## Methods

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the Department's operations and incorporate the on-the-ground experiences of the multitude of stakeholders, the RDA Project Team took a multi-disciplinary, cross-sectional approach to data collection. We employed mixed-methods research of quantitative and qualitative data to maximize validity and triangulate findings across data sources, which included focus groups and interviews with a broad swath of stakeholders and Department case management, hiring, training, and fiscal data.

We conducted face-to-face interviews and focus groups with 384 Department stakeholders. Approximately 70% of interviews and focus groups were with Department staff and 30% were with agencies that work with Probation (e.g., LA County Department of Mental Health, LA County Office of Education, LA County Office of Diversion and Reentry), CBOs and advocates, and clients. See

Table 1 for a catalogue of stakeholders interviewed. (Please see Appendix A for greater detail on the process for coding and analyzing qualitative data.)

**Table 1. A wide variety of individuals and/or stakeholder groups participated in interviews or focus groups.**

Stakeholder Group	Meeting Participants
<b>County Leadership</b>	Board of Supervisors Offices
	Chief Executive Office
<b>Probation Department Management</b>	Interim Chief Probation Officer
	Chief Deputy
	Deputy Chief
	Bureau Chief
	Administrative Deputy
	Chief Information Officer
	Acting Public Information Officer
	Executive Assistant
	Departmental Finance Manager
	Human Resources Manager
	Information Technology Manager
	Administrative Services Manager
	Consultant
	Senior Probation Director
	Director
<b>Probation Staff</b>	Non-Sworn (Secretary, Analyst, Clerk)
	DSO
	DPO I and II
	Supervisor



## Los Angeles County Executive's Office

### LA Probation Governance Study

<b>Clients<sup>1</sup></b>	Adults
	Youth
<b>Unions Representing Probation Department Staff</b>	AFSCME Local 685
	AFSCME Local 1967
	SEUI Local 721
	SEUI Local 721/BU 702
<b>Legal System Agencies</b>	Presiding Judges, Supervising Judges, Court Executive Officers
	Alternative Public Defender's Office
	District Attorney's Office
	Public Defender's Office
<b>Partner Public Departments</b>	City of LA Gang Reduction Youth Development Program (GRYD)
	County Department of Human Resources
	County Office of Child Protection
	County Department of Children & Family Services
	County Office of Diversion and Reentry
	County Office of Education
	County Department of Health Services
	County Department of Mental Health
	County Sheriff's Department
<b>Community-Based Organizations &amp; Service Providers</b>	Anti-Recidivism Coalition
	Arts for Incarcerated Youth Network
	Centinela Youth Services
	HealthRIGHT 360
	Homeboy Industries
	Los Angeles Regional Reentry Partnership
	United Healthcare Housing Partners
<b>Justice Reform Advocates</b>	ACLU of Southern California
	Children's Defense Fund – California
	Urban Peace Institute
	Youth Justice Coalition
	Other
<b>Research Partners</b>	California State University, Los Angeles
	Children's Data Network
	County Executive's Office's Research and Evaluation Services

<sup>1</sup> To recruit current or recent juvenile and adult probation clients for focus groups, RDA worked with five CBOs that serve a large number of probation clients: HealthRIGHT 360, Anti-Recidivism Coalition, A New Way of Life, Homeboy Industries, and Youth Justice Coalition. The RDA project team worked with staff at each organization to recruit a convenience sample of clients who were on probation or had been in the last five years. For youth, we worked with CBOs to recruit client respondents who were between 18-21 years of age, had been on probation or in a LA County juvenile hall or camp in the last five years, and not currently under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Adult client respondents were age 18 and up and current under probation supervision.



RDA also conducted field observations at more than a dozen Probation field sites and institutions. Many sites were visited multiple times and by multiple project team members to ensure consistency of observational data. Table 2 provides a list of all sites observed.

**Table 2. Researchers observed practices in several Probation sites.**

Location Type	Location
<b>Juvenile Institutions</b>	Challenger Camps (Onizuka, McNair, Jarvis, Mendenhall-Munz)
	Camp Scott
	Camp Rockey
	Campus Kilpatrick
	Central Juvenile Hall
	Dorothy Kirby Center
	Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall
<b>Probation Field Offices</b>	Placement Headquarters
	AB 109 Administrative Office
	Firestone Area Office
	Riverview Area Office
	San Gabriel Valley Area Office
	Zev Yaroslavsky Family Service Center
	AB 109 HUB
	SB 678 Field Office

In addition to qualitative data collection, the Project Team submitted a number of data requests to the Department. See Table 3 for an inventory of the client data provided by the Department's case management systems and Table 4 for a list of the documentary data related to training, hiring, contracted programs, and fiscal operations.

**Table 3. A variety of quantitative data were pulled from Department client management systems.**

Type	Source	Information
<b>Adult client data</b>	Adult Probation System (APS)	Demographics, zip code, probation start and end type, probation type, offense code, risk assessment scores for all clients with an active probation case at any point from 2012-2016
<b>Juvenile client data</b>	Probation Case Management System (PCMS)	Demographics, zip code, probation disposition, placement record, probation start and end type, type, offense code, risk assessment scores for all clients with an active probation case at any point from 2012-2016

**Table 4. There are a number of documentary data related to training, hiring, contracted programs, and fiscal operations.**

Type	Source	Information
<b>Training</b>	Professional Standards Bureau	Staff training schedules
		Core training curriculum
		Core training scores and completion rate
		2017-2018 training needs survey results





## Los Angeles County Executive's Office

### LA Probation Governance Study

<b>Hiring</b>	Human Resources	Job descriptions
		Organizational charts
		List of job vacancies from 2012-2016
		Dept. attrition rates from 2012-2016
		MOUs with Unions
		Hiring cycle timeline
<b>Programs</b>	Contracts	CBO contracts
<b>Fiscal</b>	Finance	County budgets and annual reports
		Dept. revenue reports
		Dept. budget, claim, expenditure, and progress reports

### Limitations

There are two key limitations that readers of this report should consider.

First and foremost, it is essential to recognize that this report is a snapshot of Department operations, taken at a particular point in time, from January through June 2017. As noted above, the Department has been undergoing significant change over that same period of time, much of which intends to address many of the findings described below. As of the period of data collection and the writing of this report, however, these changes either had not yet been implemented or were in such early stages of implementation that their impact was not yet discernable by respondents or the research team.

Second, all quantitative client data in this report should be interpreted with caution. As discussed in the section on data capacity (beginning on Page 35), there are significant challenges with the Department's data systems, which limit the reliability of much of the data on individuals under probation supervision. Over the course of several months, RDA spent many hours working with the Department's IT and program staff to review the Department's client data systems and to obtain, analyze, and interpret client data. However, there are still notable discrepancies between our analyses of data provided by the Department and information about clients put forth by the Department in a variety of public reports. The Department's data systems, processes, and capacity are a critical issue that must be addressed so that the Department can understand and address the needs of its client population, as well as to improve other operations and make data-driven decisions more generally.



## Overview of LA Probation Operations

### Department Organizational Structure and Staffing

The Department has approximately 6,600 budgeted positions operating out of more than 80 facilities across the county, including 24 area offices and a number of pretrial service locations, day reporting centers, AB 109 offices, and juvenile halls and camps.<sup>2</sup> The Department spans an area larger than any other probation department within the country and directly oversees more than 70,000 individuals (slightly more than 60,000 adults and approximately 10,000 youth), a number greater than any other probation department both nationally and globally. Staffing a department of this size requires both breadth and depth of employees across and within units, facilities, and area offices. Therefore, the organizational structure of the Department is inherently complex in its needs.

The Department consists of four broad divisions: juvenile and adult field services, field special services, residential treatment services, and administrative services. The Department's field services divide into districts that align with County Board of Supervisors' supervisorial districts, with one district overlapping the second and third districts. Each district operates a variety of juvenile and adult area offices, centers, and programs such as day reporting centers, citation diversion, placement, and the Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA) services. Field special services comprises a number of adult-focused services such as AB 109, special enforcement operations, SB 678, and adult investigation. Administrative services include information systems, quality assurance, financial services, human resources, management services, and contracts. Figure 5 presents a simplified chart of the Department's executive-level organizational structure.


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<sup>2</sup> Los Angeles County Probation Department, "Los Angeles County Probation Department Strategic Plan 2015-2018."





Figure 5. This chart provides a simplified overview of the Department's executive structure.<sup>3</sup>




<sup>3</sup> This organizational chart illustrates the Department's executive leadership structure, as portrayed by the Human Resources Division. As illustrated, four Deputy Chiefs, one Chief Deputy, and two Bureau Chiefs report to the Probation Chief Terri McDonald. Eight additional Bureau Chiefs, one Acting Bureau Chief, four Managers, and one Senior Director report to the four Deputy Chiefs. It is not clear who reports to the one Chief Deputy. This illustrated chain of command does not reflect RDA's understanding of the de facto structure of executive leadership.



Figure 6 provides an overview of all Department facilities and field offices.

**Figure 6. Probation offices, juvenile camps, halls, and placements are spread throughout the county.**





## Overview of LA Probation Client Population

The section below presents an overview of both the current population of individuals under the supervision of the Probation Department, followed by an assessment of population trends over the past five years. All data presented here come directly from data the Department IT staff extracted from the Department's two primary client data systems, the Adult Probation System (APS) and the Juvenile Case Management System (JCMS). As noted above and discussed in greater detail in the next chapter of this report, there are important limitations to both of these data systems; these limitations notwithstanding, we believe it is essential to understand who the Department serves and supervises before delving into a longer assessment of the Department's operations.


### Current Client Population

As of February 2017, there were 67,821 individuals under probation supervision of which 57,900 were in the adult system and 9,921 were in the juvenile system. The average length of stay on probation was 27.6 months for adults and 24.6 months youth.

#### *Demographic Characteristics<sup>4</sup>*

The average age for adults under probation supervision is 38 years of age, with a median age of 35. As illustrated in Figure 7, the largest population group is comprised of individuals between 26 and 35 years of age. The modal age is 27. Sixteen percent of the adult population are between 18 and 25 years of age. For youth under probation supervision, the average age is 16 with a median age of 15.

**Figure 7. One-third of adults under probation supervision are between 26 and 35 years of age.**




As shown in Figure 8, adult and juvenile populations show similar gender distributions with both populations comprised of approximately 80% male.

<sup>4</sup> Demographic characteristics were calculated based on the total number of unique individuals under probation supervision.




**Figure 8. Approximately 80% of individuals on probation supervision are male.**




Data for the current probation population were compared to the Los Angeles County population estimates from the most recent available year (2015) of the American Community Survey. These data are publically available from the United States Census Bureau. As seen in Figure 9, the largest percentage of both the adult and juvenile probation populations are Hispanic/Latino, followed by Black, White, and Other. The distribution of individuals under probation supervision is inconsistent with the racial makeup of Los Angeles County, with both Blacks and Latinos overrepresented in the probation population. This disparity is especially great for Blacks, who make up 28% of the adult probation population, but only 7% of the total adult population of Los Angeles County. As seen in Figure 10, relative to their population, Black adults are under probation supervision at a higher rate (210 per 10,000) than any other racial or ethnic group.

**Figure 9. Almost 50% of adults on probation are Hispanic/Latino, followed by Black, White, and Other. Black and Hispanic/Latino adults make up a larger percentage of the probation population than their percentage of population.**






**Figure 10. Relative to their proportion of the population, Black adults are under probation supervision at a substantially higher rate than other racial/ethnic groups.**




A similar pattern is evident for individuals under juvenile probation supervision. However, as seen in Figure 11 and Figure 12, Black youth are even more likely to be on probation than Black adults relative to their proportion of the county population.

**Figure 11. Over 50% of youth on probation are Hispanic/Latino, followed by Black, White, and Other race groups. Black and Hispanic/Latino youth make up a larger percentage of the probation population than their percentage of population.**

**Juvenile Probation Population**




**County Juvenile Population**





**Figure 12. Relative to their proportion of the population, Black youth are under probation supervision at a substantially higher rate than other racial/ethnic groups.**



### *Offense Type*

Because offense type is unique to the case and an individual can have multiple cases within one year, offense types were calculated based on cases rather than individual counts. Wobblers and misdemeanors are the most common offense types for both adults and youth under probation supervision. The 10 most common offense types for both population are illustrated in Table 5 and Table 6. Wobbler offenses, indicated by a W in the tables below, can be charged as either a misdemeanor (M) or a felony (F), and data from Probation do not indicate whether these offenses were charged or convicted as felonies or misdemeanors. The top 10 offenses make up approximately 37% of all offenses for adults and 44% of all offenses for youth. The most frequent offense type for both adults and youth is burglary. The remaining offense types include violent, property, drug, and motor vehicle offenses.

**Table 5. The most common offenses types for adults are burglary, theft, and assault.**

Offense Code	Offense Description	Offense Type	Cases
PC459	Burglary	W	3235
PC487(A)	Theft	W	2707
PC245(A)(4)	Assault	W	2254
HS11378	Other Drug	M	1993
HS11377(A)	Dangerous Drug	W	1759
PC273.5(A)	Assault	W	1695
VC10851(A)	Motor Vehicle Theft/Joy Riding	W	1665
HS11350(A)	Other Drug	W	1651
PC245(A)(1)	Assault	W	1501
HS11351	Narcotic	M	1446

**Table 6. The most common offense types for youth are burglary and robbery.**

Offense Code	Offense Description	Offense Type	Cases
PC459	Burglary	W	1452
PC211	Robbery	W	1053
PC245(A)(1)	Assault	W	600




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VC10851(A)	Motor Vehicle Theft / Joy Riding	W	458
PC594(B)(1)	Vandalism	W	432
PC484(A)	Theft	W	413
PC242	Assault	W	368
PC422	Criminal Threat	W	266
PC148(A)(1)	Assault and Battery	M	229
PC626.10(A)	Weapons	W	227

*Geographic Distribution*

Higher counts of individuals on probation can be seen in the area to the northeast of Los Angeles near Lancaster, to the south between Los Angeles and Long Beach, and to the south east near Pomona. Figure 13 shows the relative count of adults under probation supervision in Los Angeles County by zip code. Those areas with the darkest shading indicate the highest concentration of individuals under probation supervision. The 10 zip codes with the highest counts are summarized in Table 7.

**Figure 13. The highest numbers of adults under probation supervision are in northeast Los Angeles County and between Los Angeles and Long Beach.**








**Table 7. The highest number of adults under probation supervision live in 90044, 90011, 90003, 90535, and 90037.**

Zip Code	Count
90044	967
90011	867
90003	817
93535	780
90037	737
93550	666
90016	646
90047	616
90002	562
90001	535

Figure 14 illustrates areas where the rate of individuals on probation are highest in darker shades. Highest rates of adults on probation are similar in region to areas with the highest count. However, there is a concentration near Santa Monica that show a relatively low probation count, but higher rate.

**Figure 14. The highest ratio of adults under probation supervision are in the same general regions as the areas with the highest counts.**




Geographic distribution of juvenile probation population show similar patterns to the adult population, as shown in Figure 15. The highest counts of youth under juvenile probation supervision appear in the





area to the northeast of Los Angeles near Lancaster, to the south between Los Angeles and Long Beach, and to the south east near Pomona. The ten zip codes with the highest counts are summarized in Table 8.

**Figure 15. The highest concentration of youth on probation are in the northeast area of Los Angeles County and between Los Angeles and Long Beach.**



**Table 8. The highest number of youth under probation supervision live in 93535, 90044, 93550, 90003, and 90805.**


Zip Code	Count
93535	242
90044	203
93550	186
90003	158
90805	140
90813	135
90011	125
90002	119
90059	100
93534	90

Figure 16 illustrates areas where the rate of youth on juvenile probation are highest in darker shades. Highest rates of youth on probation are similar in region to areas with the highest count. However, there



are concentrations near Santa Monica and near Falling Springs that show a relatively low probation count, but higher rate.

**Figure 16. In some zip codes, there is a substantially higher rate of youth under probation supervision than would be expected by the counts in Figure 15.**



### Probation Population Trends


The total number of individuals under probation supervision declined considerably between 2012 and 2016 for both adults and youth. This decline is present in both individuals continuing on probation from year to year and new individuals entering the probation system in a given year.

Figure 17 illustrates trends in the adult probation population from 2012 through 2016. New individuals refer to unique individuals entering the system for the first time in a given year. Carryover individuals refer to unique individuals that remained in the probation system from the previous year. Total individuals refer to the total number of individuals under probation supervision in a given year.

Beginning in 2012, 57,916 individuals were already active in the adult probation system. Over the course of 2012, 61,551 new individuals entered the adult probation system for a yearly total of 89,467 individuals under probation supervision at some point during 2012.




**Figure 17. The number of adult individuals under probation supervision has decreased since 2012, with a more rapid decline beginning in 2014.**



The total number of adults under probation supervision remained relatively consistent from 2012 to 2014, as did the carryover individuals. The marked decline in total adults under probation supervision from 2014 through 2016 may be attributable to the implementation of Proposition 47 and an associated drop in the number of new individuals entering the probation system. Overall, the total adult probation population has declined by approximately 16% since 2012. Individuals entering the probation system in a given year decreased by 37% while the number of carryover individuals decreased by only 4%. This suggests that the overall decline is associated with fewer new individuals entering the probation system. This finding is further illustrated in Figure 18.




**Figure 18. Because the decline in new cases has been so dramatic, a growing proportion of the adult probation population is comprised of individuals continuing supervision, not starting supervision.**



Likely as a consequence of these trends, the number of individuals from ages of 18-25 and 26-39 has declined steadily since 2012. The number of individuals over the age of 40 spiked in 2014, but then declined to levels similar to other age groups.



**Figure 19. The number of adult individuals over the age of 40 under probation supervision spiked then declined rapidly in 2014. Other age groups have gradually declined.**




As with the adult probation population, the number of individuals under juvenile probation supervision declined substantially from 2012 to 2016, as shown in Figure 20. A prominent decreasing trend is evident from the duration of 2012 to 2016 for new and carryover individuals. New juvenile individuals decreased considerably from 2012 to 2014, but leveled out slightly from 2014 to 2016. Unlike the adult probation population, the Proposition 47 does not appear to have significantly impacted the number of youth under probation supervision.

The total individuals under juvenile probation decreased by almost the 50% from 2012 to 2016. This decline was driven by a decline in carryover individuals of 50% and decline in new cases on 45%.



**Figure 20. The total number of individuals under probation supervision in the juvenile system has declined substantially since 2012.**





## Chapter 1: Organizational Assessment

To understand how the Probation Department operates and the factors that impact performance and outcomes, this study utilized an organizational assessment framework adapted from the Institutional and Organizational Assessment model.<sup>5</sup> It consists of three domains: organizational culture, external environment, and organizational capacity and structure. Below, we provide key findings before moving into deeper discussions about each of these three domains.

### Key Findings

1. Probation managers identify leadership instability as responsible for reducing staff's willingness to adopt new approaches and strategies.
2. Over time, shifting leadership, reactivity to the Board of Supervisors' ongoing policy demands, and limited internal communication inhibit the development of a shared vision and goals and prevents the Department from operating as a mission-driven organization.
3. The tension between rehabilitation and punishment creates a divide across the Department and leads to confusion about the Department's approach to various functions including hiring, training, client relationships, and outside partnerships.
4. Staff do not feel supported or valued by the Department or County, leading to low staff morale.
5. Due to ongoing pressure from CBOs, the media, the Board of Supervisors, and a series of Board-created commissions, staff feel they must spend their time reacting to those pressures and have a limited capacity for strategic planning.
6. The Department's current organizational structure is not aligned with staff roles and responsibilities, information flow, and, in some cases, span of control.
7. The hierarchical structure and siloed nature of the Department complicates information flow throughout the Department.
8. Due to the many barriers across data collection and reporting, the Department has a low capacity for data-driven decision making.

## Organizational Culture

Organizational culture is a system, both explicit and implicit, of shared assumptions, values, and beliefs, which governs how people behave in an organization. This shared culture has a strong influence on the people in the organization and dictates how they act, talk, and perform their jobs.<sup>6</sup> The history, mission, and motivations of any organization help shape the organizational culture.

Over the last ten years, the Department has had five chiefs, including an interim chief on two separate occasions. The frequent leadership changes have destabilized the Department, particularly since a lack of succession planning has resulted in each new chief instituting what staff perceive as a new direction, priorities, and structure. Managers point to these frequent changes as reducing staff's willingness to

<sup>5</sup> Lusthaus, C., Adrien, M.H., Anderson, G., Carden, F., and Montalván, G.P., 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Jon Katzenbach, Carolin Oelschlegel, and James Thomas, "10 Principles of Organizational Culture," Strategy+business, <http://www.strategy-business.com/article/10-Principles-of-Organizational-Culture?gko=71d2f>.



embrace new approaches, since staff assume any new idea will have a limited lifespan. This viewpoint leads to inconsistent implementation of new policies. Many staff simply disregard new goals and initiatives with which they do not agree because they assume they can “wait it out” until new leadership arrives. Even staff who do agree with new policies or initiatives frequently disregard them based on the fear (and experience) that these initiatives will change under new leadership.

The lack of leadership stability inhibits the development of a shared vision and goals resulting in the Department not currently operating as a mission-driven organization. Although the Department’s mission to “Enhance Public Safety, Ensure Victims’ Rights, and Effect Positive Probationer Behavioral Change” is posted throughout offices and facilities, there is little evidence to suggest it is the central organizing principle of operations. Interviews and focus groups with staff across the organizational hierarchy made it clear that staff have different perspectives on the core organizational mission and vision and do not operate from a common set of shared principles. There are few mechanisms in place to measure how the Department meets its mission or accountability structures to establish responsibility for aligning operations with the mission.

The 2015-2018 Strategic Plan, in theory an opportunity to address many of these issues, exacerbated them instead. Staff who participated in the development of the strategic plan found the planning process to be inclusive, thoughtful, and collaborative. However, the plan was never implemented. This experience reinforced a sense of disillusionment across staff about the longevity of Department initiatives, as well as the value of participating in strategy-focused workgroups. One manager reflected:

*“We spent all this time on the strategic plan. We did focus groups, surveys, met with the unions, held town hall meetings, and then the data was gone. It was just put on the shelf... The staff participated and then we put it away. That sends the message that their voice doesn’t matter and it hurts the culture in the line staff.”*

*– Probation Manager*

Another factor impeding a shared Departmental vision is an internal tension regarding whether probation’s focus should be on punishment or rehabilitation. As a whole, the Department has not clearly adopted a rehabilitative approach to working with clients. Although many individual staff do have this mentality and expressed a rehabilitative philosophy, it is not embedded in the language, policies, and practices of the Department. The language that is used to describe the client population, both verbally and in Department documentation, clearly lacks a rehabilitative orientation or positive development approach. The current mission statement, quoted above, refers to clients as “Probationers,” while staff within the Department refer to adults on probation as “defendants,” and youth on probation as “minors.” The research team observed prominent signage in Central Juvenile Hall referring to youth as “arrestees” and overheard staff at Sylmar Juvenile Hall referring to youth charged as adults as “unfits,” short for found unfit for juvenile court. While many of these same staff do convey a commitment to client success and wellbeing, common language in the Department does not express this. Moreover, the tension between rehabilitation and punishment creates a divide across the Department and leads to confusion about the Department’s approach to various functions including hiring, training, client relationships, and outside partnerships.





## Employee Morale and Engagement

Across positions, staff morale is low. This is not a recent development; previous Department reports have related low staff morale to a lack of leadership, poor staff attendance, media coverage, and the promotions process.<sup>7</sup> Though these factors continue to impact staff morale, this assessment found the primary issue to be a deeper perception by many staff that they are not supported or valued by the Probation Department executive management or County Leadership. The workforce lacks positive extrinsic motivation; many employees do not believe they will be rewarded or even recognized for hard work and success.

Lacking positive external motivation, many staff instead are driven by a combination of intrinsic motivation (feeling that they are helping clients) and fear of being blamed for something. The fear-based culture extends across the Department hierarchy and units, which weakens trust and inhibits curiosity. Rather than encourage continuous learning and improvement, staff report worrying that implementing any changes to Department practices will result in questioning and blame, both internally and externally. Therefore, staff across responsibilities and hierarchy report find it “safer” to operate in the same way they always have; several staff described learning early in their careers to “keep their head down” and not ask questions.

Morale is particularly low among line staff in the juvenile institutions. Though there are some variations between facilities, most institution line staff interviewed do not believe that the Department cares about their well-being or safety; instead they feel expendable and “just a number.” They shared frustration that, from their viewpoint, the Department’s executive management and the County leadership’s concern for the well-being of youth outweighs its concern about staff.

The punitive, blame-oriented approach of which many line staff accuse the Department is, in many ways, similar to criticisms from within and outside the Department about how staff interact with clients, particularly youth. Just as outside stakeholders frequently criticized staff for not taking a positive development approach to working with clients, many line staff perceive the leadership as punitive and accuse the Department administration of disciplining staff with little regard to the context and perspective of the staff.

Another key barrier affecting employee motivation is a perceived sense of unfairness around employee discipline and promotions. Accountability processes are viewed as inconsistent, and staff across positions pointed out the Department’s tendency to be lenient on managers. A 2010 report by then-interim chief Cal Remington voiced the staff sentiment that regarding promotions and transfers, “It isn't what you know, but who you know.”<sup>8</sup> While the promotions process has changed since 2010, many staff still see it as disconnected from performance (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of staff promotions).

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7 Altmayer Consulting, “Probation Department Final Report: Restoring Credibility and Integrity to the Department” (Pasadena, CA: Altmayer Consulting, April 2012); Calvin C. Remington, “Back to the Basics: The Steps Required While Moving Forward” (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Probation Department, August 24, 2010).

8 Remington, “Back to the Basics: The Steps Required While Moving Forward,” iii.



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Staff across rank and role also shared a desire for more internal communication around positive achievements. The Department has several mechanisms in place to communicate across the Department, such as Probnets and the monthly online newsletter. These are promising venues to share Department successes (though institution staff have limited access), however, many staff do not appear aware of these tools, with more staff discussing the frequent bereavement emails they receive about employee or employee family deaths than the newsletter or Probnets. This lack of internal communication about successes negatively affects the morale of staff.

Though overall staff morale is low across the Department, there are certain units and operations with high levels of employee morale and engagement. In these units, managers take a very intentional approach to cultivating a positive, collaborative work environment. These tactics include recognizing staff's accomplishments through incentives and offsite teambuilding activities. Most importantly, these managers know the names of all their staff, are familiar with their work, and encourage staff input and feedback.



## External Environment

The external environment of any organization affects its overall operations, opportunities, and barriers to success. The outside environment is particularly influential to Probation, since the Department must constantly respond to outside inquiries and scrutiny. A number of advocacy organizations, Board of Supervisors members, and media outlets are particularly focused on the Department. Additionally, various committees, commissions, and work groups oversee certain operations of the Department and provide recommendations for improvement.

In response to these outside pressures, Department managers spend a large proportion of their time participating in meetings and hearings, compiling data, and assembling reports. Managers share that these frequent requests reduce their ability to strategize and plan. This contributes to a sense within the Department that it does not set its own direction, rather it is constantly shifting to comply with outside demands.

### Political Environment

One key source of outside demands is the Board of Supervisors. The Department's relationship with the Board is strained. Often, staff across the organizational hierarchy perceive Board motions as punishments, which creates a fear of the Board and contributes to the Department's fear-based culture. The Board's heavy involvement in Department operations creates a feeling of disempowerment and frustration across management. Managers spend so much time responding to Board inquiries and motions and oversight/advisory bodies that some feel they have lost sight of the Department's mission:

*"If you were to go around this room and ask us about our mission statement, most of us couldn't tell you. Why? Because it seems to change minute by minute. It is hard to have focus or a mission because it has become [to] please the Board."*

*– Probation Manager*

A stronger, more collaborative relationship with the Board would help to align understanding and interpretation of the Department's mission and vision. Instead of an adversarial approach, one of accountability that includes agreement on goals for change, measurable outcomes, benchmarks, timelines, and a system of reporting out would help strengthen and advance the Department, allowing it to be mission-driven rather than reactive.

### Community

Staff across role and hierarchy identify community advocates as another external pressure point that impacts Department practice and employee morale. Though the relationship between the community and Probation has improved in recent years, distrust remains. Many staff feel misunderstood and overly scrutinized by community advocates. Advocates, in turn, see the community voice as being excluded from the Department's decision making, particularly regarding programming (see Chapter 3 for more detail about service delivery). Each party is frustrated that the other does not value their expertise.



Based on interviews with Department staff and CBOs, both appear to have similar goals for client success and a shared desire for better relationships. Moreover, many staff within the Department do make a clear effort to support relationships with CBOs and other community members. Several Probation staff regularly attend advisory councils, taskforces, coalitions, and committees with community members. Due to community pressure, the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council (JJCC), a body that oversees JJCPA implementation, recently developed a Community Advisory Committee. Department staff who participate in these groups find them to provide useful opportunities to engage with community members and build relationships. Increasing collaboration and dialogue between the Department and different community representatives — including advocates, CBOs, clients, and families — appear to strengthen operations and may also help relieve external pressure on the Department. At the same time, there is a new for more structured partnerships with communities and community-based organizations, via both service contracts and more formal opportunities for communication and engagement.

## Media

The Department's public image is extremely influential in shaping how it is viewed by staff and outside entities. This affects external pressure, employee morale, and the number and type of applicants who seek employment. Media stories generally depict the Department in a negative light, which staff attribute to poor external communication efforts. Staff lament that successes are not proactively shared, which one manager tied to the culture of the Department:

*"We have a culture of not communicating, a culture of not telling our story ... We're caught up in 'it's criminal record offender history – I can't tell you.' And so, we don't tell the stories."*

Capacity is the primary barrier to the Department improving its public image. The acting Public Information Officer is responsible for internal communication, such as the Department newsletter, as well as media relations and public relations. Increased investment in external relations will help the Department publicize positive developments and achievements. Managers spoke very highly of the previous media relations consultant, a position which was not filled after her contract ended. In addition to securing more in-house media relations expertise, client outcome data would also support media coverage. To address this issue, the Department management recently worked with the CEO to develop a Media and Public Relations Unit structure and open an examination for this unit. They are currently interviewing qualified, high-level managers for appointment in order to oversee and develop this area.

Data about positive outcomes can help bolster positive stories, but to do this, the Department will have to increase its data capacity and systematically track outcomes.



## Organizational Capacity and Structure

Organizational capacity refers to an organization's internal resources, processes, and capabilities. This assessment found organizational structure, strategic leadership and planning, internal communication, decision making, and data to be the elements that most critically affect the Department's organizational capacity.

### Organization Structure

The size of Los Angeles County, both in terms of population and geography, results in a large Department workforce spread over a wide area. This size, combined with the range of functions Probation performs, creates challenges in organizing an agency that maintains cohesion, but also allows for adaptability. The Department's current organizational structure is not aligned with staff roles and responsibilities, information flow, and, in some cases, span of control. Moreover, the organizational structure, as it currently exists, is unnecessarily complex and does not support streamlined decision-making or accountability. Since the beginning of 2017, the Department has begun streamlining its executive structure for overseeing client-related functions toward an agency-model. Under this model, responsibilities are divided between Assistant Chief Sheila Mitchell, who oversees juvenile operations, and Interim Assistant Chief Reaver Bingham, who oversees adult operations. Both are overseen by Chief Probation Officer Terri McDonald and supported by a common administrative infrastructure.

Despite these important changes, there remain significant challenges in the larger organizational structure. Executive management at the level below the Chief and two Assistant Chiefs is responsible for oversight of a wide range of functions, some of which are countywide while others are geographically specific, and some of which include both adult and youth populations, while others are population specific. (See Figure 5 on page 13 for an overview of the Department's executive management structure.) The district model, instituted under Chief Jerry Powers, reorganized field services into five districts to match the five supervisorial districts. Under this model, Bureau Chiefs manage all field offices within a district, with almost every district providing juvenile supervision, adult supervision, day reporting centers, and specialized programs such as JJCPA school-based clusters. Only certain adult operations, such as AB 109 and SB 678, exist outside the districts, though these field offices are frequently co-located with district field offices. Under the current configuration, one Assistant Chief oversees the juvenile institutions and another Assistant Chief oversees all field services, both adult and juvenile. One Assistant Chief oversees institutions and Juvenile and Adult Field Services, and one Acting Assistant Chief oversees Adult Special Services.

Many staff describe the benefits and detriments of both the district model and agency model structure. Under the agency model, the Department is structured as a more singular agency with two distinct, separate departments (adult and juvenile), whereas the district model promotes the autonomy of each of the five Board of Supervisors' districts. The tension between these two models highlights the need for a Department structure that is responsive to the needs of the community it serves as well as supportive of the needs of its employees. Overall, interviewees prefer the agency model, stating that the district model "created more silos" or led to loss of "institutional knowledge" given the constant movement of



staff. The district model creates additional challenges for administrative functions to effectively support Department operations. For example, the financial system does not easily map to the district model, creating barriers to budgeting and fiscal accountability.

### Strategic Leadership and Planning

After a decade of turnover in leadership, the Department began to suffer from a lack of strategic leadership and planning. This is explained, in part, by leadership instability, the absence of a shared vision with clearly defined goals, and the high degree of external pressure facing the Department. Additionally, the hierarchical culture centralizes many decisions at the executive level. One Department manager observed:

*"I see good management – making sure the day-to-day gets done, but not very much leadership...This is a chain of command, paramilitary, very hierarchical. That's a function of the folks who have been around for a lot of years."*

As noted above, managers report that the time they spend responding to external pressures prevents the Department from engaging in planning. They are so busy "putting out fires," that they are unable to thoughtfully plan for the future. One manager observed that due to constant external scrutiny, staff are encouraged to focus their efforts on policy compliance, rather than critical thinking and continuous quality improvement. Some units and operations are able to invest more time into strategic planning, particularly if they have a specific funding source associated with their operations, but these plans are generally more narrowly focused and not shared across the Department.

### Internal Communication

The Department relies on hierarchical structure and its different components operate in silos, which hampers information flow throughout the Department. Communication gaps are particularly severe in two areas: between administrative functions and operations and between management and line staff.

Both sworn and non-sworn administrative staff – such as human resources, IT, and finance – describe the administrative staff's role as existing to support the Department's operations. However, the administrative staff are frequently viewed as secondary to operations, rather than a critical component of the Department. For example, non-sworn staff have only recently been invited to join sworn staff trainings, staff newsletters rarely discuss administrative functions, and important decisions that impact administrative functions are frequently made without the input of administrative leadership. These barriers, as well as understaffing and a lack of training, impede administrative staff's ability to effectively and proactively support operations.

As noted previously, interviewees reported that the Department is very guarded with communication – both internally and externally. Both managers and line staff tasked with implementing new policies shared frustration that they are informed about new policies without adequate time for preparation and limited context about the reasons for instituting for the new policy. As highlighted by one probation officer, this is tied to the reactive nature of the Department:



*"There always seems to be a disconnect between headquarters and any area office. It is reactionary... Something happened that we don't know about so we get a directive in response. If they provided training and explained why they're doing something, instead of just needing us to do something and then needing to re-train us when we do it wrong because they didn't teach us why or how to do it correctly the first time."*

These issues, combined with the top-down communication flow within the Department, hinder policy implementation and damage trust between levels of staff. This also further exacerbates the low morale.

The communication gaps within the Department, especially between staff of different hierarchical positions, impact decision making. Staff from all levels and units described instances in which they were not given any opportunity to provide input on matters in which they possessed expertise. Line staff frequently cited that managers are disconnected from the field and, due to frequent manager transfers, do not always have the necessary background in the area they manage:

*"We have a lot of staff working in manager's roles who have never worked in [this operation] field, but they're making decisions. It's discouraging because it might look good in theory or on paper and it is not going to work in practice. If you're making policies, you need to consult the line staff because they know what can work and not work." – Probation Line Staff*

New directives frequently contradict previous policies, leading to confusion about expectations. Many line staff described instances in which they asked their supervisors for clarification about policies but were unable to get an answer. The Department does not regularly utilize employee feedback loops; line staff do not generally receive opportunities to provide feedback to managers about how to make policies easier to implement. There were significant discrepancies between how program staff described their service delivery processes and how the data indicated these processes are implemented.

It is important to note that some Department operations, particularly specialized units, practice collaborative decision making and encourage bidirectional feedback. One line staff shared that in his unit,

*"We meet with our director ... He asks us our ideas, involves us, implements things that we suggest. But this is not a normal practice at all."*

Though these units are not currently the norm, they provide promising examples of effective team communication.

## Data Capacity

As noted in previous reports for this project, the Department's data systems and processes are a major challenge. The Department uses 46 different data systems to manage clients, staff, contracted providers, and a range of other information. Of these 46 systems, 25 are operated by the Department and 21 are systems operated by other county departments or vendors but accessed by Probation. Many of these systems are electronic document systems, not databases from which data can be extracted.





Across data systems, there is a limited ability to link data and limited data sharing with other county departments, which reduces data utility and creates a number of challenges across all levels of staff.

In addition to the lack of extractable data and linked data, the Department's outdated data systems and insufficient resources for IT staff, staff training, and systems upgrades impede its ability to make data-driven decisions. In particular, the Department has a limited capacity to track client outcomes, making it difficult to ascertain whether or not programs are working.<sup>9</sup>

The Department's primary data systems are the Adult Probation Systems (APS) and the juvenile Probation Case Management System (PCMS).<sup>10</sup> These two systems are independent; they contain different screens to input information and do not speak with each other. While both databases have the capacity to collect and report a great deal of information, both also present several challenges that limit usability.

APS is an older, mainframe system that contains a great deal of information, but does not easily support data extraction. It is also very difficult to modify and add features, creating problems when new data must be collected as a result of new legislation. Staff emphasize that neither system is user-friendly, particularly since they do not align with practice. Numerous staff described the rushed launch of PCMS; one manager shared that the system was introduced without any user testing.

As noted above, RDA experienced significant difficulty analyzing and interpreting data from APS and PCMS. In multiple instances, patterns in the data did not reflect how Department staff described their client service and supervision processes. Whenever a discrepancy emerged, understanding the cause of the discrepancy required a multi-step, multi-person process that often took weeks or even months. RDA staff would talk to program staff, who would meet with IT staff, who would then often spend several weeks reexamining the data before providing new information to the program staff, who would communicate it back to RDA. At times, program staff would have to speak to several other program staff as well as to multiple staff from the Department's Information Services Bureau (ISB) before finding someone who could answer questions in a way that aligned with what the data showed. Even after all of these conversations, there are notable discrepancies between the findings in RDA's analyses and those in various Department publications.

Given the myriad challenges with the Department data systems, many operations choose to build their own data tracking tools within Access or Excel to have more control over their data. However, if these systems malfunction, ISB is unable to provide support. In addition, because these tools are not connected to larger Department data/IT infrastructure, the data cannot be shared among staff or used for department assessment and planning processes.

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9 Herz et al., "The Los Angeles County Juvenile Probation Outcomes Study"; Remington, "Back to the Basics: The Steps Required While Moving Forward"; Newell and Salazar, "Juvenile Reentry in Los Angeles County: An Exploration of Strengths, Barriers and Policy Options."

10 Client outcomes, including education, employment, community stabilization, and personal growth and opportunity are tracked for the AB 109 population through a web-based data system, the Treatment, Court, Probation eXchange (TCPX) System.





**Figure 21. The APS system, which is used to track all individuals on adult probation, is outdated system with little flexibility and a long to pull data reports.**

The screenshot displays a terminal window titled "APS - INVESTIGATION CASE DATA" with a timestamp of 12/20/16 14:47:04. The interface is a text-based form for case management. At the top, it shows "ICSD" and "E. MORALES". The form includes fields for "ACTION" (I [I,A,U,D,W,V]), "FILE LOC" (CENTRAL), and "DEF STATUS". Key identifiers include "X-NUMBER: X00001931", "CRT CASE NO.: VA001931", and "PAROLE: 01". Personal information such as "NAME: JONES JOHNNY" and "NAME KNOWN TO COURT: JONES JOHNNY" is entered. The form also tracks "CASE STATUS/DATE", "COURT" (S SE\_ N\_), "JUDGE" (ROBERTS RON), and "CONVICTED BY" (NA NOT APPLIC). It includes dates for "NXT HRG TYPE/DATE" and "NXT DICTATION TYPE/DATE". Legal representation is noted with "PROS ATTY NAME/TYPE: DODGERS LOSANGELES DA DISTRICT ATTORN" and "DEF ATTY NAME/TYPE: ANGELS ANAHEIM PD PUBLIC DEFENDER". The "PRIMARY CHARGE" is listed as "VICTIM(S): \_". Case management details include "REC CASELOAD TYPE: HRD HIGH RISK", "DATE CASE ASSIGNED", and "DA FILE REQUESTED". It also tracks "INITIAL DA REQUEST", "NO. RQSTS", "INV AREA OFFICE: ESSFV", and "CUSTODY DATA". At the bottom, there are fields for "PROP 36: \_ CASC ASSGN: \_", "LAST UPDATE: 12/20/16 E283576 APPICSD2", and "JUMP: \_". A series of function keys (PF1-PF12) are listed for navigation. The bottom status bar shows "Te", "R 3 C 14", and "IPB09143".

More generally, there is no shared understanding, or accountability, regarding where information should be inputted. Staff often put information in case notes, which prevents easy extraction for reporting. Regular booster trainings could help address this issue, as well as a more robust quality assurance. One program analyst suggested making certain fields mandatory to ensure that staff know they are required, another staff member has placed requests with IT to create flags when information is missing or entered incorrectly.

The inconsistency in data entry impacts the quality of reports. Because some data is not consistently entered, reporting is limited and can be unreliable or misleading. Many data fields are text, making data difficult to extract and aggregate. Reports, for the most part, are not standardized and accessible. Managers have difficulty pulling data from the data systems, and many data requests must be submitted to IT. Much of this could be allayed with standardization.

Communication difficulties between IT and operations are especially problematic because IT's data pulls are used to describe and assess Department operations. Units may have differing understandings of data fields from IT or other operations, resulting in divergent results depending on who runs the report. For example, staff referred to reports that contained different counts of the number of individuals "active" on probation. Because staff have different understandings of how to define "active," the reports provide different results depending on who pulls the data. The Department would benefit from greater education between IT and operations, a clear data dictionary, and more staff in liaison roles to aid in translation and foster collaboration.



Figure 22. Most Department data systems lack usable data dictionaries.

LD Name		F	Leng	S	D	Remark
-----						
*	Generation started					
*	at 2007-02-16 15:02:58					
*	by user E266417					
*						
1	AA UPDT-STCK	B	8			
1	AB UPDT-USR-CODE	A	8			
1	AC UPDT-PGM-NAME	A	8			
1	AD DEF-X-NMBR	A	9		D	
1	AF ATP-DEF-SALARY-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AG ATP-WLFR-GR-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AH ATP-SSI-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AI ATP-SPOUSE-INCOME-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AJ ATP-OTH-INCOME-AMNT	P	11.2			
M 1	AK ATP-INCOME-TEXT	A	72			
1	AL ATP-RENT-MORTG-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AM ATP-LOAN-PMNTS-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AN ATP-CAR-PMNTS-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AO ATP-INSRNC-PMNTS-AMNT	P	11.2			
1	AP ATP-UTIL-PMNTS-AMNT	P	11.2			
P 1	AQ ATP-DEPDNT-GRUP					
2	AR ATP-DEPDNT-LST-NAME	A	20			
2	AS ATP-DEPDNT-FRST-NAME	A	15			
2	AT ATP-DEPDNT-SSN-NMBR	A	9			
2	AU ATP-DEPDNT-AGE-QNTY	N	2.0			
2	AE ATP-DEPDNT-BIRTH-CERT-FLAG	A	1		N	
M 1	AV ATP-EXPENSES-TEXT	A	72			
1	AW ATP-HOUSE-VALUE-AMNT	P	11.2			

Due to the various barriers across data collection and reporting, the Department has a low capacity for effective data-driven decision making and does not have a culture of using data and discussing its findings to inform practice. Though there is a Department of Justice (DOJ)/Quality Assurance Services Bureau, this unit has been tasked with program compliance and monitoring, rather than research and evaluation. Overall, managers expressed a desire to capture more data to help inform operations and demonstrate successes. As discussed above, sharing achievements externally and internally can also improve the Department's image with the community and media and improve employee morale.



## Chapter 2: Hiring, Staffing, and Training

The Department has approximately 6,600 budgeted positions and comprises more than 80 facilities across the County. Staffing an organization of this scope and size presents many challenges across a number of domains; below, we first provide key findings and then explore the Department's hiring, staffing, and training practices.

### Key Findings

1. The Department-wide tension between a punitive corrections officer and rehabilitative social worker approach prevents the identification of desired staff qualities and background and therefore impedes strategic recruitment efforts.
2. A lack of investment in recruitment impedes the Department from designing, implementing, and tracking effective recruitment plans.
3. The Department is likely losing many quality candidates due to the extensive and prolonged hiring process, and in particular the background check. This is especially problematic given that background checking is not the lengthiest component of the hiring process.
4. Increased data to provide transparency around the success of the Department's recruitment efforts is needed to improve recruitment and hiring efforts.
5. Uneven workload distribution and vacancies across the Department creates challenges for offices in high-density areas, juvenile institutions, administrative staff, research, and evaluation.
6. While there is complexity to the classifications within the Department and differing rules for promotions processes per MOU requirements, the general consensus among staff is that the promotions process should be a multi-dimensional mix of interviews, testing, and seniority, rather than exclusively dependent upon one singular dimension.
7. Gaps in training, such as court report training, mental health, and trauma-informed care, make it difficult for staff to carry out their job tasks.
8. The absence of official transfer training programs often results in unofficial training from colleagues or supervisors, which takes them away from dedicated workloads and creates inconsistency across different facilities and offices.
9. Staff feel that the training program is improving and voice cautious optimism for its future direction.

## Hiring

### Recruitment

Identifying an ideal probation officer has proven particularly challenging for the Department. Leaders from within, as well as external forces, try to shift the Department's from a "law-enforcement" and "militaristic" approach to one that is focused more on client rehabilitation. Additionally, the Department has yet to identify what kinds of candidates – whether social work, clinical, youth development, and psychology-oriented or criminal justice, law-enforcement, and militaristically-oriented – are best suited



to carry out the work required. Current staff used these specific terms to describe the types of frameworks they thought the Department was seeking in new recruits, even though the Department is not actually a military organization. However, when the LA County Department of Human Resources evaluated the Probation Department's recruiting and hiring practices, it did recommend that the Department include and specifically target recruitment from military organizations as part of its recruiting strategies, since those individuals are more likely to pass the organization's background investigation. This recommendation begs the question of whether the primary quality for an ideal probation officer is to pass a background test, or to possess certain characteristics that would lend themselves to performing the job well. Interviewees from all levels of the Department, intersecting county agencies, and CBOs all voice similar concerns regarding the Department's failure to identify the qualities of an ideal probation officer. Similarly, there is a shared sense that until the Department identifies who the ideal probation officer is, its recruitment efforts will remain unnecessarily unsuccessful.

Current job descriptions for the positions for which the Department recruits (Deputy Probation Officer [DPO] I and DPO II in facilities and the field, and Detention Services Officers [DSO] in facilities) now define the position, identify the required training and experience, include the classification standards, and provide examples of job duties. Generally speaking, the field positions are framed in slightly more rehabilitative terms than the facility positions. Within the facility positions, the lowest on the hierarchy is the DSO, the description of which places the heaviest emphasis on the control and supervision of youth. The description uses language like "maintains order and control of a unit," "maintains institutional security and takes appropriate action to prevent escapes," and "controls and restrains combative or emotionally disturbed juveniles."

This language likely attracts a candidate interested in the custodial and enforcement aspects of the criminal justice system. While this is not a problem in and of itself, the positions to which a DSO then promotes to (whether in facilities or the field) are more focused on case management, recommendations to courts, and communication skills. For example, the DPO I description for a juvenile hall lists such job tasks as "maintaining order and control of minors," but also includes "performs case management and life-skills assessment activities," "conducts recreational activities," and "provides case work services to camp wards." The disparity between the different types of language and framing used in these descriptions is problematic, considering the nature of the Department's promotional process. A DSO will promote to a DPO I, but the listed tasks would seem to attract different types of candidates. Moreover, the staff that work in facilities will promote to the field, which, though still supervision-oriented, emphasizes relationship-building, case management, and collaboration with other officers, outside agencies, and CBOs. These positions that require a desire to relate to others are primarily drawing from a pool of staff that were initially brought into the Department as DSO's and are therefore perhaps more likely to identify with the custodial and law-enforcement aspects of the position. These disparities can potentially have a ripple effect on the qualities that staff possess types of staff filling the positions that, according to their descriptions, should be focused on case management and connection to rehabilitative services.



Despite having 6,600 employees, the Department does not have a designated unit – let alone a single full-time position – dedicated to recruitment. Historically, the job of recruiting has moved between different units, for example the Quality Assurance Bureau and Professional Standards Bureau. As of 2016, these efforts were brought into the Department's Human Resources Bureau (HR), though recruitment tasks were not assigned to a full-time position. Recruitment functions are currently under review and are expected to be moved outside of Human Resources once again. This decision is counter to recommendations from the LA County Department of Human Resources to keep recruitment efforts under the Department's HR bureau and assign two full-time employees dedicated to administrative and staff functions related to recruitment. Human Resources staff acknowledge the issue and in an effort to address this gap, the Department's most recent draft budget request for the Recruitment Unit includes three full-time staff. Distribution of staff and vacancies are Department-wide issues, therefore many staff at different levels are confused by the lack of a dedicated unit for recruitment activities, especially considering its size. One manager expressed this sentiment well:

*"With regards to hiring, we don't have a plan, we have no real recruitment unit. Most counties have a whole unit dedicated to just recruitment...Our failures in hiring are our own fault for not having the foresight and not staffing things correctly."*

The constant relocation of recruitment responsibilities within the Department is problematic. Additionally, the lack of a dedicated full-time recruitment manager position may potentiate unfocused efforts, thereby splitting recruitment tactics into two disparate strategies. The Department either casts a "wide net" to attract potential candidates through billboards, online job postings, social media advertisements, and e-mail blasts, which annually cost approximately \$124,000. Or, the second strategy entails a more targeted approach, such as attending career fairs at colleges and universities – in previous years targeting MSW or BSW programs. These fairs are staffed by a rotating group of DPO I's and DSOs who are trained to effectively recruit, give their first-hand account of the job, and answer questions about the position and application process.

It is imperative for the Department to establish personnel and data systems to track recruitment as it competes with other county agencies or other probation departments for similar candidates. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the County Sheriff's Department actively recruit potential employees from the same pool of candidates as the Probation Department. These competing agencies have already implemented effective mechanisms to collect and track data, which likely allows them to understand what strategies work – and which do not work. These tracking mechanisms help them recognize where their highest qualified or most successful candidates are coming from, which facilitates more effective recruiting.

In addition, the LAPD and the Sheriff's Department are able to offer higher salaries and better benefits than the Probation Department. According to one upper management level Department employee, this difference can amount to approximately \$10,000, which is about 20% of Probation's starting salary. Throughout interviews, several DPO I's remarked that though they generally enjoyed their job, they would recommend friends or family apply to these other agencies precisely because they can offer higher salaries, better pension plans, and more traditional hours. There is an additional concern among



staff that the Department is unable to compete with these other agencies due to the comparatively lengthy hiring process.

A continual theme throughout interviews with Department staff is that there are many good employees across different levels, all performing different functions. These staff work very hard, want to make a positive impact in their clients' transition and rehabilitation, and care about their colleagues. However, these stories are not consistent with the dominant public image of the Department, which consists of predominately negative press about abuses of power, abuse of minors in facilities, and leadership instability. This has not only a negative impact on staff morale, but also on recruitment efforts.

## Hiring

With changes in top-level leadership, negative press, and compliance with the DOJ intervention, the hiring process for the Department has evolved over the past 20 years. The County Board of Supervisors initiated a mandatory background check, pursuant to a 1998 resolution. A little over a decade later, in an effort to hire candidates with "cleaner" backgrounds void of any criminal association or activity, then-Chief Probation Officer Powers instituted additional mandatory background check requirements for all sworn applicants. The background check process led to several consequences – both intended and unintended – for the Department's hiring, staffing, and training operations. This section details the hiring process and discusses the ways in which this process affects the types and qualities of the candidates that are ultimately offered positions with the Department, and what this means for the staffing of the organization as a whole.

There is wide consensus across Department employees at different levels that hiring takes too long to complete, which has far-reaching consequences throughout operations. After candidates apply for positions, they begin a process that can take anywhere from several months to one year. Candidates who meet the minimum qualifications required for the position are contacted by Department Human Resources personnel and provided an exam date on which to report. According to data provided by the Department, exams for Groups Supervisor, Nights (GSN) and DSO positions are conducted continuously throughout the year and candidates are assigned to the next upcoming exam.

After the exams are scored, the Department will send out conditional offer letters with a background interview appointment. At the time of their appointment, candidates are also assigned a Background Investigator, who, according to several recently hired DPO I's, acts as the main point of contact throughout the remainder of the background examination and hiring process. The Backgrounds Investigator begins to conduct the various aspects of the background check, and all candidates who have not gone through the backgrounds procedure in the previous 12-months and receive a passing score on the exam are invited for a background interview. According to 2017 data provided by the Department, the background examination process itself takes an average of 85 days. However, in addition to this examination, candidates undergo a medical examination, a psychological examination, and a credit check. Once the candidate has fulfilled these pre-requisites and is judged to be an appropriate hire, they are offered a position and – should they accept – begin the next upcoming academy training, which run six times annually. One Department staff summed up the effects of this lengthy process:






*"[The hiring process] has become so protracted that individuals who are skilled are not going to sit around twiddling their thumbs. They're only going to wait so long and there are other [agencies] that are interested in them and then we end up losing people."*

In other words, the Department could be losing its highest quality candidates simply because the hiring process takes longer than those of competing agencies. For example, according to Department 2015-2016 hiring records, thousands of candidates expired off of their list without receiving any notice as to the status of their application or notice that they could move on in the hiring process. Recent past practices and current practices may be worth evaluating. Moreover, according to recently hired line staff, there is minimal communication to candidates about the status of and the overall timeline of their individual application, despite the designation of the Backgrounds Investigator as the main point of contact.

**Figure 23. The background check process for sworn staff is lengthy, contributing to a slow hiring process.**

*(Process for non-sworn staff does not include social media review or polygraph)*



The following diagram is adapted from the Department of Human Resources' Probation Department Human Resources Assessment and illustrates an overview of the procedure and timeline of the background process for new hires. It should be noted that many of the specific timeframes were "unknown" and the projected timeline of 90 days is an estimate and the "actual timeframe unknown." Data were not available to validate these timeframes.

In addition, staff and stakeholders shared concerns that the order in which the different components of the hiring process for sworn staff occur is problematic. Most notably, the fact that not all applicants who are under consideration are invited to participate in an in-person interview is seen as a reflection of how the Department prioritizes the desired qualities of candidates: all candidates undergo background



checks, but only some are interviewed. Probation line staff, leadership, and external advocates agree that for a position like a DPO, being able to relate to people, and in particular youth, is critical in one's ability to effectively carry out the job. Many interviewees felt that prioritizing the background check over an interview is not necessarily conducive to hiring appropriate staff for these positions.

## Background Check

The background check for candidates applying for any sworn position with the Department includes: a review of any criminal or drug record, a polygraph test, and a credit check. Staff across all levels, as well as CBO leadership, voiced concerns regarding the extent of the background check, which is apparently more similar to that required for FBI candidates than traditional law-enforcement entities. The Department recognizes that this process may be overly extensive. The executive management is currently reviewing these guidelines and has in fact attempted to streamline the process by eliminating canvassing efforts. Nevertheless, the current thoroughness of the background check lengthens the hiring process as a whole, as some candidates need to take the polygraph more than once. Others go through all other components of the hiring process only to be disqualified for transgressions such as smoking marijuana in college. Additionally, many staff and CBO leadership note that the thoroughness of this process results in a divide between the staff and the population that they serve. Incoming staff are "squeaky clean" and are then expected to supervise a juvenile population that is anything but. Line staff observe that this cultural divide between the two populations is often very challenging to address. Staff who were hired prior to instituting background checks often came from the same neighborhoods and similar backgrounds to the youth and clients with whom they were working.

Consistent with this, staff describe how this common life experience and language is critical to their ability to relate to and supervise youth. Moreover, many youth who had experiences in halls or camps noted that staff would be more effective if they were more relatable. Newly hired staff who do not possess this same life experience identify this cultural gap as one of the biggest challenges they face in doing their jobs effectively. There is widespread concern that this obstacle affects service delivery and staff morale as well. Therefore, as the Department considers what qualities make up ideal candidates, it is important that it also addresses the collateral consequences of its use of extensive background checks.

## Staffing

Many staff, intersecting agencies, and CBO leadership noted the size of the Department and its impact on staffing. Size presents challenges such as staffing facilities in remote locations, variability in the total clients served across offices, operations and units, service availability within the community, and coordination of staffing and service delivery across districts.

One of the key issues affecting the structure of and staffing within the Department is the placement of new hires within juvenile institutions. The Department places new hires within juvenile institutions first, as safety precaution for staff, allowing them to gain more firsthand experience and training prior to subsequent promotions to more potentially dangerous adult field service placements. As noted by





Department staff, this structure creates serious issues with backfill wherein transfers cannot occur until someone is hired, trained, and ready to replace the gap left within the juvenile institution, which is exacerbated by the lengthy hiring process described above. Moreover, from the perspective of the majority of CBO leadership, placing new recruits within the juvenile side of the Department constitutes a profound disservice to youth, as many new hires are not interested in, or equipped for, working with this population. Rather, as a result of the inherent structure of the Department, they are working with youth only for purposes of promotion elsewhere.

Another complicating factor from a structural perspective is the dependence on sworn staff within the Department, which also affects overall staffing. Approximately 70% of the Department constitutes sworn staff, yet the majority of applicants for sworn positions do not pass the background investigation (80% according to the Department's website). Additionally, individuals in sworn positions must complete an academy within their first year. In 2014 and 2015, only 76% of candidates passed the academy, compared to 100% of candidates in benchmark counties. The reliance on sworn staff creates a further bottleneck in staffing processes given the complexity and length of their hiring. Moreover, CBO leadership question the need for sworn staff, noting that dependence on sworn staff promotes a law enforcement perspective and practices rather than rehabilitative or clinical approaches – a sentiment not articulated from within the Department. One CBO director encapsulated this sentiment by stating:

*"These probation officers were saying that they wanted to have guns, because they weren't trained to go into these communities [Watts]. Then I said, well then, you don't need to be doing this work. Not to say that this work isn't dangerous, or isn't challenging, but you don't need no gun. You need a relationship."*

### Staff Workload

Interviewees and focus group participants were asked whether or not there are enough staff within their operation to function effectively. Given the complexity of the Department and its multiple operations, units, and facilities, it is unsurprising that the answer to this question is also complex. Nonetheless, the consensus appears to be that overall, the Department is either understaffed or not appropriately staffed (i.e., not enough administrative staff, thereby sworn staff end up being "pulled off line" and are converted to an administrative role). Both result from overall staff workload or the workload distribution across both offices and units. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the overarching sentiment across staff – from leadership to line staff – is that the Department is staffed by the "hardest working people" and truly dedicated employees. At least according to the internal view, it is not for lack of dedication or hard work that staff workloads are problematic, although employee motivation and engagement are significantly compromised by low morale and frustration around discipline and promotions.

In addition, respondents describe a lack of investment within offices and units that contribute to both staffing and workload issues. Most commonly cited is the lack of administrative positions or support staff to assist with operations. One Department manager describes this lack of administrative support:



*"I think admin is lacking. As you expand, you always want to think about your bread and butter staff which are your DPOs. So, we probably did hire a lot of DPOs. But . . . we forget about administrative staff. We have more contracts to do. HR has more to do, more exams, we need to support staff. That's one area I'd like to see strengthened."*

The lack of administrative support is also a particularly salient issue should the Department make a concerted effort to contract more services to intersecting agencies or CBOs, which will require a more robust contracting capacity but fewer line staff. Also consistently mentioned is the need to invest in research and evaluation, as well as quality assurance. This included investing in data analysts to assess performance trends related to hiring and promotions, as well as analysts to more effectively monitor evidence-based practices and outcomes.

The majority of respondents, from leadership to line staff, describe workloads as varying considerably by unit, office, and position. For example, the Crenshaw and Firestone offices, as well as the South LA AB 109 HUB, are consistently identified as highly trafficked and utilized offices with demanding caseloads and increased workloads compared with other offices. In addition to the distribution of workloads, the overall quantity or type of work that many are engaged in is described as problematic. For example, many note the emotionally and physically taxing nature of probation work. The most frequently cited elements are the changing demographics of the populations that they serve and "wearing too many hats." Both within camps and halls, as well as AB109 and other units, staff note the change in the populations that they serve. In interviews with Department and intersecting agency staff, current populations were described as having "way more mental health problems," "criminogenic," "aggressive," "dangerous," "difficult clientele," or consumers having "multiple issues in one case." According to many staff, providing effective supports for their caseloads, while they are smaller than previous caseloads, requires more effort and can also be emotionally draining. It should be noted that Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency Checkup (LARRC) risk assessment data for youth in camps spanning the previous six years indicate a modest increase in high-risk clients, from 71% in 2012 identified as high-risk to 76% in 2016. At the same time, the total number of clients decreased far more dramatically during this time, indicating that increased client-related workload is primarily a matter of perception, not an actual reflection of client populations or caseloads.

In addition, staff detailed at length how they are often "consumed" by the administrative or clerical burdens of their work and how this takes away from their ability to provide services or focus on responsibilities specific to their position. For example, one Adult Field Director described frustration at having to write statements of work for contracts due to the lack of administrative support. This appears to be an example of a gap in administrative or clerical functions. In other cases – such as a Supervisor's reluctance or frustration at having to train staff – being asked to perform tasks outside of stated job descriptions were more likely an unwillingness among staff to assume responsibility. Despite the frustration of some sworn staff with increased administrative responsibilities, the sizeable decrease in client population over the last several years indicates that it is appropriate for the Department to shift more staff away from client supervision toward administrative or operational roles. The appropriateness



of this shift notwithstanding, any such changes in the organization of staffing or job responsibilities should also be part of a larger Department-wide planning process that involves staff input, rather than a top-down process in which staff feel uninvolved and unvalued.

### Staffing Shortages and Vacancies

Numerous reports pointed to staff vacancies and understaffing, particularly in facility classifications for entry-level positions such as DSO and GSN.<sup>11</sup> In interviews with Department staff, vacancies resulting from multiple reasons – general turnover, work related injuries, investigations, or use of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) – negatively impact operations' ability to effectively function and serve clients.

Turnover, while distinct from but also related to vacancies, is cited as a recurring concern among staff. As a result of the taxing nature of the workload described above, instability in leadership, and the practice of starting in positions within juvenile and promoting to adult, turnover is one of the most frequently cited concerns from Department staff. Moreover, the differential turnover across units and area offices is problematic. For example, one line staff within a high-traffic office noted, "For every new deputy that comes in, we lose two." This turnover is problematic at both management and service delivery levels. Loss of institutional knowledge at the management level forces a staffing shift to accommodate the vacancy. Moreover, turnover among line staff negatively impacts the continuity of care provided to clients.

Many Department employees note the problem of understaffing. For example, within many units, particularly in institutions, there are line staff who are not working and "out" as a result of work injuries, investigations, or FMLA leave. These types of short-term vacancies present staffing problems for both supervisors and line staff in their ability to effectively manage operations. Staff become overburdened having to "pick up the slack" for those who are absent, leading to faster burnout among these employees. One DPO articulated this problem succinctly:

*"We're short staffed, but the job has to get done. So, it falls on the deputies that are here, so we're overworked with extra days and extra caseloads. It's frustrating and it makes sense why people are leaving the office. It's not our fault, not the supervisors' fault, not the director's fault, but it can be difficult....And it falls on us when things don't get done and it's unfair to expect this much from us – there's only so much time in a day."*

Many managers acknowledge that they generally have adequate staffing "on paper" but in reality, due to work injuries or investigations, they have to take line staff "off the line," which creates a staffing

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11 Sjoberg Evashenk Consulting, "Review of the Department of Probation's Hiring and Grant Administration Activities" (Sacramento, CA: Sjoberg Evashenk Consulting, Inc., December 2015); Thompson, Cobb, Bazilio & Associates, PC, "2004-05 Management Audit of the Los Angeles County Probation Department" (Torrance, CA: Thompson, Cobb, Bazilio & Associates, PC, November 28, 2005).



shortage. Interviewees indicate that there is likely fraud within the system, which occurs when staff who are out for industrial accidents are capable of returning to work but stay out for personal benefit.

Additionally, some leadership note that staff who were on medical leave well past what is deemed acceptable. Some describe the inability to effectively monitor fraudulent activity simply because it was yet another task in an environment where staff are already “stretched thin.” It should be noted that according to CEO reports there has been a steady decrease in Salary Continuation Expense (from \$10,193,650 in fiscal year 2010-2011 to \$4,285,078 in fiscal year 2014-2015) and overall Workers Compensation (from \$37,562,376 in fiscal year 2014-2015 to \$33,952,901 in fiscal year 2015-2016). Still, according to many interviewed – in leadership and supervisory positions – the general consensus is that staff experience this as an issue.

Transfers and promotions appear to constitute the bulk of staff shortages mentioned by Department staff. Turnover resulting from employees leaving the Department is relatively small. One interviewee cited an internal report spanning a 5-year period that calculated the rate of turnover at “maybe 4% or less” and only identified 511 vacancies throughout the Department. Moreover, internal reports provided by the Department indicate even less turnover, closer to 2%.

The issue of a “backfill” problem that results from vacancies, promotions, transfers, and turnover is significant. An individual cannot be released from their current position until it can be filled by another employee. Yet, when someone transfers into a vacant position, it creates still another vacancy, creating what one Department staff described as a “domino effect.” This also creates an environment where staff are “frozen” for long periods of time awaiting release. This is a particularly salient point for juvenile operations, as many of the transfers originate from camps and halls. The act of being “frozen” in their position, waiting for a transfer, can contribute to low morale among staff, thereby affecting the care and services that youth receive.

## **Promotions**

Over the last five to seven years, the Department implemented changes to promotions processes. These changes appear to have resulted from the consensus view that promotions were largely nepotistic, while others cited DOJ investigations as the impetus for change. Though well-intentioned, many now feel that these shifts in promotions processes have been too drastic. According to those interviewed, promotions processes have changed from performance reviews or interviews that were perceived as too subjective, to current written testing that is perceived as too objective. For example, staff noted in interviews that results from appraisal promotability forms were mostly contingent upon staff’s relationship with their supervisor: “[Supervisors] give you a low rating if they don’t like you, high if they like you.” These appraisals and interviews were recently replaced with testing, which is perceived by many interviewed, across numerous classifications, as baseless and not representative of actual job expectations. While the Department seems caught between appeasing union and staff expectations as well as staffing needs, it should be recognized for both its willingness and efforts to change promotions processes. Moreover, the complexity of the Department – encompassing approximately 205 distinct classifications, with promotions processes distinct to many per memoranda of understanding (MOU)



requirements – should be acknowledged. However, despite these well-intentioned changes, the general consensus among staff – across many classifications – is that the promotions process should be a multi-dimensional mix of interviews, testing, and seniority rather than exclusively dependent upon one singular dimension.

One of the most frequently cited areas of concern among staff across all levels of the Department is testing for purposes of promotion. Staff acknowledge that testing was part of an earnest effort within the Department to make processes more objective and transparent, but many also believe testing is problematic for a number of reasons. The first concern is that the content of the tests does not accurately assess the knowledge, skills or ability required of the positions. In other words, tests do not align with job requirements. Some cited the tests as too “policy-oriented” or “analytical.” Staff contend that this makes the test biased in a way that favors those with stronger analytical skills, over staff with on-the-job experience in the field. For example, a frequent concern cited was that veteran staff were outperformed by newer, younger staff with stronger test-taking skills, but without knowledge of operations. In conjunction with each other, these two issues contribute to a process that “promotes the wrong people” or people without knowledge of the unit to which they are promoted. Many noted that the Department promotes people that are analytical, but they do not necessarily have the supervisory skills to manage a large workforce. There is a strong belief within the Department that staff should start at the bottom and work their way up. And there is a significant concern that staff who are promoted do not have adequate knowledge of the unit to which they are promoted. It should be noted that per recent feedback from Department leadership, a workgroup was initiated in January of 2016, under the Strategic Planning process, to review, address concerns cited above, and update testing processes.

After staff complete an exam they are allocated to different “bands” based on their score. Highest scoring staff are allocated to Band 1, while lower scoring staff are allocated to lower level bands, from a range of five possible bands. This band system is the foundation of the promotions process, as promotions are allocated in a hierarchical system in which those individuals that place in Band 1 are the pool from which promotions are drawn. Only when the pool of staff becomes exhausted within Band 1 can staff be hired from Band 2. It should be noted, in the Department’s defense, that the County has inherently complicated processes and in particular, the practice of examinations and bands is driven by County Civil Service Rules.

While all promotions are derived from this structure as a way to ensure fairness in the promotions process, staff expressed strong concerns. Many staff, at varying levels throughout the Department, describe the seniority and nepotism that still exists within promotions and the decreased morale of staff who are allocated to lower-level bands within the promotions structure. Hiring and promotions standards have somewhat changed from seniority to merit-based, which one individual describes as a “paradigm shift.” Yet, the issue of seniority continues to be somewhat problematic particularly in light of the Department’s relationship with unions, who value promotions based upon seniority. According to many Department interviews, transfers or promotions for some sworn staff, such as Supervising DPOs, are still based on seniority, a policy which is dictated by union MOUs. According to the Supervising DPO MOU, seniority is defined as “active service in the employee classification” or “previously held higher



level classification.” Moreover, the MOU clearly states that: “In considering requests for reassignments, Management shall select one of the three most senior applicants provided that the last performance evaluation of records is competent or better.” Therefore, within the Department’s band system, staff within Band 1, according to their ranking, must be offered the position based on seniority. One staff described this process and its consequences:

*“If there are 20 people in Band 1, but I know the person who is #6 or #10 has the skillset I need, I have to hope that persons #1-5 will turn down. We hurt ourselves because we are not putting people where the skills are needed and it is more based on seniority. It is a very antiquated way of doing business for sworn staff.”*

It should be noted that no such language exists in the MOU for Probation Directors, which only states that voluntary transfers are initiated through a written request through “their chain of command.” It therefore appears that transfers or promotions for lower-level staff are more clearly delineated based on seniority, whereas higher-level staff are not held to the same restrictions.

In an effort to rid itself of nepotism in promotions and hiring processes, the Department has put many safeguards in place, including testing and the band structure. However, many staff still describe a culture of nepotism. Phrases such as, “it’s not what you know, but who you know,” “sponsorship,” “favoritism,” or “hire who they like or know” were frequent throughout interviews with staff at all levels. One staff describes the Department’s shift: “[Nepotism] hasn’t gone away, it’s just not as blatant.” In fact, some even alluded to the testing process itself as nepotistic, favoring certain populations of staff.

## Training

Department employees at all levels could not overstate the importance that training plays in developing the skills they need to do their job effectively. This is especially true considering the current Departmental shifts in service delivery and understanding of the populations that are being served. All supervisors, managers, and sworn field staff are required to participate in 40 hours of training. The GSN, DSO, Senior DSO series, DPO I, DPO II series in camps are required to participate in 24 hours of annual training. However, new hires and many current staff typically end up attending many more hours of training each year. For example, new hires in entry level, managerial, and supervising positions each attend their respective core trainings after being hired – although some DPOs interviewed noted delays as long as 6 months to one year after promotion – while current staff are usually able to choose which trainings they would prefer to attend. Though there are a variety of trainings offered (documentation provided to the evaluation team indicate over 125 trainings and the Department itself noted over 500 classes), staff often reported feeling inadequately prepared to effectively perform their job. Training within the Department was an area of concern for leadership and line staff alike, yet many remain hopeful about potential improvement.


All Department hires are required to complete the core training program for their specified position at the Department’s new-hire academy, which officers often describe as “military-esque.” According to





internal documents provided by the Department, over the past five years, 81% of new juvenile correctional officers completed their 264 hours of juvenile corrections officer core training (JCOC). Over the same time period, 99% of new field probation officers (juvenile and adult) completed their 240 hours of field probation officer core training (FPOC). Finally, in the last five years, 100% of new managers and supervisors completed their 80 and 88 hours of training, respectively, which focused more on managerial, leadership, and administrative skills. The breakdown of these trainings by category is shown below in Figure 24 according to the amount of hours dedicated to specific training modules' subject matter. Within JCOC training, "Foundations" refers to a range of basic training modules including Ethics, Standard First Aid/CPR, and Gangs and Gang Subcultures; "Physical," refers to the extensive physical training in which new JCOC Officers are required to participate; "Case Management," includes trainings on assessment tools, the intake of new youth, and communication with Parents; "Social Services" refers to trainings that are geared towards serving the general mental and social health needs of the facility population like Substance Abuse and Communication with Suicidal Juveniles; "Custodial Services," includes trainings like Principal Use of Force, Defensive Tactics, and Handcuffing; "Court Practices" refers to trainings on court report writing; and "Data Systems" includes a training on the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003.


**Figure 24. Consistent with state standards, basic training represents the largest percentage of hours in juvenile corrections officer core training.**



The FPOC training breakdown in Figure 25 below is similar. Again, "Foundations" refers to trainings on the Roles and Responsibilities of a Probation Officer, and Adult and Juvenile Justice Systems; "Physical" refers to the physical conditioning training required; "Case Management" includes trainings on Monitoring for Substance Abuse, Sex Offender Legal Mandates, LARRC, and Investigation Interviewing; "Social Services" includes training on Family Violence and Psychological Problems; "Custodial Services" training includes Evasive and Blocking Techniques, Handcuffing, and Searching the Person; and finally, "Court Practices" again focuses on court report writing techniques in addition to court presentations. It is notable that the FPOC training does not include any modules specifically dedicated to data systems, despite the fact that field officers do use several data systems in their work.



**Figure 25. Data and Assessment Tools and Foundations/Basics represent the largest percentage of hours in field probation officer core training.**




Core training for each of these positions is quite general and covers a large breadth of information, without much depth. Perhaps in an effort to address this, there are over 125 trainings currently offered by the Department for new and current staff (complete list provided in Appendix B).

Again, below in Figure 26 is a breakdown of these trainings categorized by general subject matter. Because the number of hours of each of these non-Core trainings is unavailable, the breakdown is according to a simple tally of each training. Similar parameters were used to categorize “Data Systems,” “Custodial Services,” “Social Services,” and “Case Management.” Non-core training also includes modules on “Professional Development,” like How to be a Successful Trainer and Manager’s Leadership Academy. The “Other” category includes trainings on Social Media Investigations and Global Positioning Systems.





**Figure 26. Custodial and logistic services represent the highest percentage of non-core training hours for field and facilities staff.**



These trainings are often taught by outside contractors or subject matter experts and range from safety, de-escalation, and use of force to mental health, ethnic, LGBTQ, and cultural considerations, and vicarious trauma-informed care. Staff are required to take a certain number of hours of these trainings, but are theoretically able to select which trainings they would like to attend. However, many staff have not completed these trainings, for reasons that are unclear. This speaks to the challenges often voiced by managers and supervisors, who must maintain their operations while staff are away at mandatory trainings. For this reason, line staff in facilities – where staffing is strained yet training is necessary – often receive fewer opportunities to attend trainings, simply because current staffing conditions do not always make their attendance possible.

### Training Needs

As is apparent in the above charts, numerous trainings are offered to staff, but there are several notable gaps in the Department's programming. Many of these training gaps are not due to lack of offering, but rather the result of insufficient quality (in terms of curriculum or instruction) or time constraints. Among staff at all levels and within different units, administrative and data system training is cited as a great need. Though all field staff receive training on Level of Service Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI) and LARRC, most feel such instruction is not afforded enough time. Additionally, many staff report receiving this training after having already started their jobs and therefore may have been forced to "unofficially" learn how to use the systems from their colleagues. Similarly, many line staff voice concerns over the minimal amount of court report writing training they received. Mental health training, child development, and dual diagnosis trainings are also all cited as critical and urgent needs by numerous staff and CBO leadership alike. Again, these are subjects on which the Department offers (and even requires) training, but staff do not feel that current trainings in these areas are adequately or appropriately setting them up for success in their positions. For example, a training led by the Department of Mental Health (DMH), called "Mental Health 101," is two hours long and was offered



four times in the 2016-2017 fiscal year. This is compared to Probation's "Active Shooter" training, which is offered multiple times every month in the same period, and is eight hours long. Based on our interviews with officers, the ability to use mental health training would be extremely beneficial in carrying out their jobs on a daily basis. This sentiment is echoed by other stakeholders, including intersecting agencies, advocates, and CBO leadership. Moreover, CBO leadership, advocates and consumers themselves noted the need for Department training concerning the reentry process.

In addition to these specific subject area needs, larger gaps exist as well. For example, the Department does not offer any training on Positive Youth Development for field PO's working with youth. Additionally, apart from those offered for AB 109 staff, there is currently no transfer training program in place for Department staff that either laterally transfer positions (e.g., to a new area office or facility) or transfers via promotion, except for the aforementioned required Core training for staff promoted from institutions to the field. Such trainings previously existed within the Department. This often results in one of two scenarios. The more common scenario is that an employee is ill-equipped to carry out duties in their new position, to the detriment of their colleagues and the population they serve. The second, rarer scenario occurs when the supervisor of the unit develops their own training program in which the new staff are able to shadow experienced employees, ease their way into working with new caseloads and clients, receive feedback from trainers, and generally have a guided transition into their new position over the course of several weeks. Though well-intentioned, this may result in staff with full caseloads having to take time out of their day to train new staff, often without compensation or adequate training to do so. Thus, without transfer trainings in place, many staff who take on new positions usually learn "on the job" which is at best inefficient, and at worst dangerous for staff and clients.

Finally, many staff described the importance of "refresher" trainings on certain perishable skills. Some staff feel they receive rudimentary training only once on a subject and want to be able to take a follow-up training later that year or sometime thereafter. However, current staff do not consistently have the ability to choose which trainings they attend in a given cycle. In an effort to maintain appropriate staffing schedules and avoid the effects of temporary vacancies, supervisors are responsible for organizing and arranging training for their staff. As a result, line staff do not always feel they have agency over their professional development.

It is important to highlight that many of these aforementioned training gaps were not as prevalent in specialized units including SB 678, AB 109, Adult Investigative Services Bureau, and Placement Services Bureau. AB109 staff, for example, consistently voiced appreciation for the breadth and depth of their training programs. In order to serve the needs of this specialized caseload, officers attend trainings on homelessness and reentry, substance abuse and recognition, conflict management, and evidence-based practices in addition to the field probation officer core academy. This focus on rehabilitation and reentry is reflective in some officers' relationships with their clients. When talking with AB 109 clients, many spoke highly of their relationship with their PO, as well as their officers' commitment to their personal reentry process, which will be discussed in detail within the following chapter (Client Service Delivery).



## Training Quality

As mentioned previously, despite certain training needs, many staff and stakeholders feel the Department's training program has improved and report feeling hopeful about continued progress. They cited greater diversity in types of trainings available and increased collaboration between other county Departments as reasons for this improvement. Staff enumerated several key factors that they use to determine a training's level of quality: participants, facilitators, and curriculum.

Recently, partly as a result of the DOJ intervention, the Department has increased its collaboration with intersecting agencies (Los Angeles County Office of Education [LACOE], DMH, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services [DCFS], and the Sheriff's Department) in order to properly coordinate service delivery. This collaboration has perhaps most notably included joint-training, in which LACOE, DMH, and Probation staff all participate in certain relevant trainings together, which, according to staff from each of these agencies, dramatically improves the quality of the training. Joint-trainings are an effective way to bring different perspectives to the table, allowing for diversity of learning not possible through intra-agency trainings.

The quality of a training is also largely dependent on the facilitator. Staff often reported experts from within the county are the best facilitators and that they generally resist trainers from outside of this jurisdiction. Because the Department is unique in its size and impact, there is a sense – among line staff especially – that “outsiders” do not understand and are inherently inferior to someone from within the Department or the county.

Staff discussed training curriculum in terms of relevance to their job tasks. According to staff, the recruit academy and core trainings are largely policy-oriented, and they often feel that because they are starting these trainings without any Probation experience, they do not possess the context necessary to understand or grasp the large number of policies that is expected of them. Therefore, the timing of this training makes it difficult for officers to understand its relevance to their new position. On the other hand, the new addition of the post-academy, month-long residential training program at Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall is almost universally cited as a necessary and strong addition to the New Hire Training Program.

## Professional and Leadership Development

Professional development is an area of potential growth cited by many within the Department. Particularly among interviews with leadership within the Department, staff describe a desire to engage in mentoring, professional development and the importance of these areas in succession planning within the Department. Perhaps unintentionally, these aspects of the job become secondary given the demanding nature of many positions. There is a feeling that staff have only so many hours in the day to “get the job done” that there is little time allocated for professional development. Yet, this also appears to be an area where concrete improvements are in effect. The development of the executive leadership academy, a supervisor's school within CPOC, and a willingness to develop a professional development curriculum are all cited as beneficial. At every promotional level there is a core training program, which



is cited as key for professional development and true succession planning. One management level staff even ventured to say that the Department is experiencing a culture shift when it comes to professional development stating, "we are pushing into a different culture...and the Department is heading in the right direction."



## Chapter 3: Client Service Delivery

The Department serves juvenile clients in both facilities and the community and adults in the community. Consequently, the Department must be able to provide a broad range of services, engage other county agencies, and contract with CBOs to effectively meet the service needs of their clients. Below, we provide key findings before discussing the Department's approach to service delivery, supervision, and collaboration with outside agencies.

### Key Findings

1. The Department utilizes a number of risk screen and assessment tools, but most of these tools are not validated and the Department does not provide ongoing training or quality assurance to support tool implementation.
2. There are few quality assurance mechanisms in place to ensure that services provided by the Department and its contractors are implemented consistently and effectively.
3. Though the Department is shifting to a more rehabilitative-focused approach, there is still a lack of support structure in terms of identifying resources or services.
4. Despite the broad range of available services, there remain notable gaps, particularly for transition-aged youth (TAY), clients with mental health needs, and facility to community transition treatment plans.
5. Communication between the Department and intersecting agencies is generally positive and the relationship between the Department and CBOs is improving.

## Approach to Service Delivery

### Structured Decision Making & Assessment Tools

Structured decision making is a data-driven, research-based approach to inform how individuals move through the justice system and what services — including supervision intensity, sanctions, and rewards — they receive. It is intended to create a more effective, consistent, and fair system. Decision making tools and policies must be formalized and communicated, with accountability mechanisms in place, in order to fully implement this approach. The Department uses a number of tools to assess clients' background, experiences, and needs to inform decision making. These include juvenile and adult risk assessments administered by staff, as displayed in Table 9.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Additional screenings and assessments are administered by the Department's partners that assess specific needs, such as mental health needs.



**Table 9. The Department uses several different risk screens and assessments.**

Population	Tool	Administration	Domains	Intended Impact
<b>Juvenile</b>	Los Angeles Detention Screener (LADS)	Administered by Intake and Detention Control officers to every youth entering the juvenile halls	Drug and alcohol, gang involvement, criminal history, individual	Inform if youth is detained or released from juvenile hall
	Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency Checkup (LARRC)	Administered by probation officers to every youth under probation supervision periodically and after major events	Risk and protective factors across delinquency, education, family, peer, substance abuse	Inform case plan
<b>Adult</b>	Modified Wisconsin (DRAD)	Administered by probation officers to all adults under probation supervision <sup>13</sup>	Criminal history, gang involvement, alcohol and drug abuse	Inform caseload type
	Level of Service Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI)	Administered by probation officer to all adult clients that score medium or high on the Modified Wisconsin & the AB 109 population	Criminal history, education/employment, family, leisure, companions, alcohol/drug, procriminal attitude, antisocial pattern	Inform case plan

Of these assessments, the LS/CMI is the only tool that has been validated in its current form. The other tools have not been assessed to ensure that they accurately assess risk levels.

Probation staff who administer the LARRC and LS/CMI shared concerns about the accuracy and consistency of these tools. One officer who administers the LS/CMI expressed skepticism that clients' risk scores appropriately measure risk because, in his estimation, the officer has to "come up with opinions" about their responses. This perception indicates a lack of training about how to properly administer the tool, an issue that was raised by other Department staff. One line staff reported administering the LARRC for six months before attending the FPOC training to receive training on how to do so.

Staff across the Department noted the need for continuous training about assessment tools to increase quality assurance. The Department does not measure inter-rater reliability to ensure that officers administer the tool consistently. Risk assessment scores provided by the Department also indicate variability. The RDA team compared youths' 2016 scores on the Department's detention screening tool, the Los Angeles Detention Screener (LADS), and on the case management tool, the LARRC, and found that while these scores are highly correlated ( $p < 0.01$ ), 35% of the youth who had low LADS scores (defined as scores between -2 to 3) are scored as high risk in the LARRC Table 10. The Department is in the process of obtaining a new juvenile assessment tool and are considering a new tool for adults. They

<sup>13</sup> The AB 109 population does not get the Modified Wisconsin, but does get the LS/CMI



have been working with RDA to develop a dispositional matrix to establish structured decision making for youth.

**Table 10. While LARRC and LADS scores are highly correlated, 35% of the youth high risk scores in the LARRC were scored as low on the LADS.**

	LARRC Risk Category		
	Low n (%)	Moderate n (%)	High n (%)
LADS Score Category			
Low (-2 to 3)	556(74%)	453(52%)	285(35%)
Medium (4 to 9)	189(25%)	395(45%)	465(56%)
High (10 to 12)	3(1%)	22(3%)	74(9%)
Total	748 (100.0)	870 (100.0)	824 (100.0)

#### Adult Assessment Data<sup>14</sup>


As described above, the Department administers two types of risk assessments to adult clients: the Modified Wisconsin and the LS/CMI. The Modified Wisconsin is used as a screener for all adults under supervision, except AB 109 clients. All individuals that score medium or high on the Modified Wisconsin, in addition to all AB 109 clients, should receive the LS/CMI. As shown in Figure 27, the use of the Modified Wisconsin assessment alone has decreased substantially since 2012. In contrast, the use of the LS/CMI alone and the use of both instruments in coordination has increased. The increased use of the LS/CMI alone and decreased use of the Modified Wisconsin assessment may be attributable to a growth in the AB 109 population.

<sup>14</sup> Limited data on assessed risk scores for youth under field supervision precludes a similar analysis of youth risk level patterns. Risk data for youth in Probation camps is included in the following chapter.





**Figure 27. The number of cases receiving only the Wisconsin assessment has decreased since 2012, while the number receiving the LS/CMI or both assessments has generally increased.**




A total of 28,437 cases, or slightly fewer than half of the adults on Probation supervision, received one or more assessments in 2016. In 2016, 134 cases received scores on the Modified Wisconsin of medium or high, but did not receive the LS/CMI assessment. In contrast, 1,310 cases received a score of low on the Modified Wisconsin and were subsequently assessed with the LS/CMI.

As demonstrated in Figure 28, though there have been decreases in the number of cases that receive the Modified Wisconsin assessment, the risk breakdowns have not changed. This stands in contrast with the LS/CMI. The number of cases that receive the LS/CMI is increasing and Figure 29 shows that both the number and percentage of cases identified as high or very high risk by the LS/CMI has increased since 2012.



**Figure 28. The number of cases receiving the Modified Wisconsin has decreased since 2012, but the risk breakdowns have remained constant each year.**



**Figure 29. The number and percentage of cases identified as high or very high risk by the LS/CMI has increased since 2012.**





Figure 30 illustrates the number of cases per year receiving a score of high on the Modified Wisconsin assessment.




**Figure 30. The number of cases identified as high risk by the Modified Wisconsin assessment declined between 2012 and 2016.**




However, as shown in Figure 31, the number of cases receiving a score of high or very high on the LS/CMI assessment has increased substantially since 2012, a pattern that is further illustrated in Figure 32. However, among cases receiving both assessments, those receiving a high or very high score on the LS/CMI is increasing substantially while those receiving a high score on the Modified Wisconsin is decreasing slightly. This finding is contrary to the intended function of the Modified Wisconsin as a screener for the use of the LS/CMI.



**Figure 31. The number of cases scoring high risk or very high risk on the LS/CMI has increased substantially since 2012.**



**Figure 32. Among cases receiving both assessments, the number of individuals scoring high or very high on the LS/CMI is increasing, while those scoring high on the Modified Wisconsin is decreasing.**





## Case Planning & Management

Case plans are developed differently throughout the Department. One Probation manager reported that while some juvenile operations, such as Placements, Camp Community Transition Program (CCTP), and School-Based Probation, have been using case plans for a long time, a “legitimate” case plan for regular juvenile supervision was only implemented in 2016. These case plans are in different formats, creating challenges when youth move within the system. One Probation manager shared:

*“Here’s the issue, we don’t have a standardized way of developing case plans. We do it differently in fields, camps, and placements. We need a standardized way to develop a case plan. Then it’s easier. If kid goes from field to placement, we can build on what the field has already done without restarting and reassessing.”*

In early 2017, the Department began to integrate case plans in the juvenile case management system, PCMS. PCMS now populates LARRC scores into youths’ case plans, with the intent that LARRC scores will inform case plan goals and services. Numerous staff noted the rushed nature of the transition; one line staff described how a group of officers in his unit worked together to figure out the new PCMS screen since they did not receive any training prior to its implementation.

Though LARRC risk scores are intended to inform youth’s case plans, the staff we spoke with did not know to interpret or use the risk scores. When RDA requested the cutoff scores for low, medium, and high risk, it took several weeks for Department management to locate a staff person who could confirm what scores are associated with what risk levels and we received several different answers from different staff across the organizational hierarchy. On several occasions, we were given incorrect scoring cutoffs, which were easily invalidated by looking at the data. One line staff that administers the LARRC shared that staff do not know how to use the LARRC scores:

*“A lot of things are just given to us without quality training, so how can we provide quality work? And that’s probably why the LARRC is not being used the way it should be – people view it as just another thing to get done. [Managers] won’t answer how to explain this to our client or use the scores to inform or analyze the risk of the minor. We don’t use them at all.”*

## Quality Assurance

As discussed in the Organizational Assessment chapter, the Department does not currently possess the infrastructure or culture to support systematic data collection and analysis of program outcomes. The Department does not calculate recidivism rates for its client population, nor collect data on more intermediary outcomes related to program and supervision goals (e.g., education, family relationships, pro-social behavior, violations of probation).

Across the Department, there is no formalized approach or tools that supervisor and management use to monitor staff interactions and engagement with clients. However, though not standardized across the Department, the SB 678 Alternative Treatment Caseload (ATC) does take a formalized approach to



quality assurance. Its quality assurance team records and monitors DPO interactions with clients to ensure DPOs are meeting motivational interviewing standards and uses a strengths-based approach to coach DPOs.

Though a number of CBO contracts require providers to submit a final report that includes a summary of goals, objectives, and quantifiable accomplishments, it is unclear if providers are held accountable to this condition and, if so, how this information is used. RDA reached out to numerous individuals within the Department to acquire the final year-end reports and neither the Quality Assurance Bureau nor Contracts Division have seen these reports. The Quality Assurance Bureau conducts audits to ensure providers are accurately reporting the number of youth participating and completing in programs, but they do not monitor program quality or outcomes. One manager recounted how the Quality Assurance Bureau initially evaluated programs and services to ensure they were aligned with evidence-based practices, but the Bureau lost that focus when it began ensuring compliance with DOJ conditions.

## Services and Supervision

Based on RDA's analysis of PCMS and APS data, the Department is responsible for providing services for 1,066 juvenile clients in facilities (574 in halls and 492 in camps and the residential placement facility) as well as 9,135 youth and 61,843 adult in the field.<sup>15</sup> In addition to services provided directly by the Department, Probation officers also work in collaboration with CBOs and refer clients to community-based services. In 2016, the Department held 114 contracts with 71 CBOs and also maintained a number of MOUs with other county agencies. The large majority of contracts are for youth through JJCPA, the County Delinquency Prevention Program, and the County-Wide Juvenile Crime and Anti-Gang Strategies Program. There are also a number of specialty courts for youth and adults including drug court, special needs court, teen court, community collaborative courts, and Office of Diversion & Reentry (ODR) mental health housing court. The sections below provide an overview of the range of services provided by the Department, but should not be viewed as an exhaustive list of all of the Department's services.

### Field Services

Supervision for adults within the Department ranges in intensity from low risk/administrative caseloads to high risk/intensive supervision. Individuals with low Modified Wisconsin risk scores are placed on administrative caseloads and report to the Department by kiosk. Probation clients found to be high risk through the Modified Wisconsin then receive the LS/CMI. Those with high LS/CMI risk scores may be eligible for the ATC program through SB 678. The two high-risk caseloads, ATC and AB 109, utilize a number of evidence-based programs and practices. For example, ATC uses cognitive behavioral interventions, Courage to Change (interactive journaling), and motivational interviewing. Breaking Barriers, a community-based rapid rehousing program, serves the AB 109 and SB 678 population, and AB 109 has additional evidence-based programs such as Healing Trauma, a female gender-specific 6-session group adapted from "Beyond Trauma: A Healing Journey for Women;" Back on Track Los Angeles, which

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<sup>15</sup> The population numbers are snapshots on January 1, 2017 and do not include WIC 236 at-risk youth. The numbers may differ from Probation population counts due to missing data in APS and PCMS.



provides in-custody reentry services; the Skid Row Pilot Program, which provides enhanced supervision and service provision near Skid Row; and motivational interviewing. AB 109 clients, which comprise approximately 17% of the adult field population,<sup>16</sup> have access to a number of services, including mental health, substance abuse, housing, and employment.

There are a number of evidence-based programs for youth including Functional Family Therapy, Functional Family Probation, Wraparound Services, and Multi-Systemic Therapy. Specialized youth caseloads include the Gang Intensive Gang Unit Supervision Program and School-based Probation. Through School-based Probation, the Department provides services to a number of at-risk youth, called Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) section 236. This is a substantial population, in March 2016 the Department reported serving 2,864 WIC § 236 youth and an additional 7,751 on active supervision and 2,723 on active investigation. Other programs and services include juvenile day reporting centers and, to assist with camp reentry, CCTP. CCTP meets with youth prior to release and supervises youth during the transition period post-release.

For youth, referrals to community-based services and CBOs are made through the Prospective Authorization Utilization Review (PAUR) system, which is composed exclusively of agencies with Department contracts or MOUs. A list of the contracted referral agencies is available on the Probnets portal. A referral is initiated by Department staff and reviewed by a program analyst, who then sends out the referral to the designated agency if the referral is found to be appropriate. Once the referral is accepted by an agency, PAUR staff notify the DPO about the acceptance. PAUR focuses only on referrals and the unit does not conduct any follow-up with the youth or monitor youth participation.

Probation staff and CBOs identified two key concerns about the PAUR process. First, DPOs shared frustration about the amount of time it can take for the PAUR referral process, which can take as long as a month. Second, the PAUR process only provides referrals to Probation-contracted providers. This limits its scope, since there are other CBOs with the capacity to serve Probation clients that do not have contracts with Probation. Without a systematic way to identify these additional community resources, Department staff become responsible for identifying a program, assessing its quality, and initiating the referral. Department staff described other informal referral processes that are utilized but not systemized. For example, CBOs deliver presentations at offices or conduct outreach at juvenile facilities or Department staff seek out agencies on their own. This results in an official referral list through PAUR, and then an informal set of resources used by probation officers.

Some Department staff praised the use of a DMH referral system, which in comparison to the PAUR system, was described as having the ability to “connect faster.” Others also mentioned the use of the Homeless Outreach Program Integrated Care System (HOPICS) for referrals and the Mobile Team within the Department to identify potential service resources. The patchwork system of utilizing the PAUR system, informal referrals from within the Department, and shared mechanisms from intersecting or outside agencies results in inconsistent service delivery that does not serve client needs and represents an increasing challenge to effective monitoring.

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<sup>16</sup> Data from March 2016 field services population report.





## Facilities

The Department operates three juvenile halls, 12 camps, and one residential placement center. In these facilities, staff from DMH are full-time employees and provide mental health services as part of a youth's case plan. LACOE staff are also full-time employees within the facilities and provide services to youth, who are required to attend school daily. There are a number of specialized unit in the halls, such as the developmental disability unit, CARE unit (for fragile youth), and commercial sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) unit. Camps have different target populations and may have specialized programs, such as the sports program and fire program.

In camps and the residential placement facility, DMH, LACOE, Department line staff, and management regularly meet with each other to discuss treatment plans for youth clients in Multidisciplinary Team (MDT) meetings, which occur when youth first enter camps, as needed when they are in camps, and before youth leave the camps. Additionally, camps and halls are often frequented by a host of different CBOs and partners that provide positive youth development programming. Such programming is generally voluntary and its availability varies across halls and camps.

At halls and camps, mental health, education, family engagement, employment preparedness (through resume workshop and vocational training), and transition services are provided, though inconsistently, across facilities. This can cause problems in continuity of care for youth or staff when either is transferred to a different facility. Additionally, when these services are provided it is often at a very basic level. For example, substance abuse treatment in facilities lasts only 10 weeks, despite the fact that the minimum sentence for youth in camps is approximately five months. During our interviews, both Department and DMH staff agreed that 10 weeks was an inadequate period to truly address addiction. Similarly, many youth clients and CBO partners emphasized the rudimentary nature of the educational programming provided by LACOE within facilities. While youth appreciated the credit recovery system and noted how it helped them graduate, they admitted that classes often consist of worksheets and online courses, none of which are especially rigorous or challenging. Moreover, if a youth graduates from high school while still in camp, they may have access to college courses (e.g., through a Mission College or other community college partnership), but this is not universal across facilities. For camps and halls that did not have the college course option, youth were essentially relegated to reading or watching movies under an officer's supervision. These examples were illustrative of the adequacy of in-custody service delivery that was continually called into question by interviewees from each of the different stakeholder groups.

Moreover, all stakeholder groups agreed that the provision of these services within facilities had little lasting impact if the youth's transition and return to their community was not also supported through the continuation of services in the community. Many Department line staff working in facilities blamed perceived high recidivism rates on the lack of accessible community-based services. There do not appear to be data from the Department to either corroborate or refute rates of recidivism among youth. Nevertheless, accounts by line staff speak to the need to strengthen and standardize the Department's CCTP in order to provide optimal continuity of care for young clients on their path to rehabilitation.



## Needs

Among the different stakeholder groups, including employees from the Department, intersecting agencies, CBOs, and clients themselves, the most frequently cited needs across client populations were mental health services and substance abuse treatment. Within the Department, staff often discuss the changes in the client populations that they serve, saying that many of the youth they work with are “drug babies” and have more mental health needs. Conversely, some within the Department believe that these issues have been present in their clients for decades, but staff are now better able to recognize these needs. In either case, the emphasis on the provision of mental health services and treatment of substance abuse is both indicative of the groups of people who are incarcerated and emblematic of the Department’s cultural shift. Mental health and substance abuse services are available and regularly administered to clients, but clients and staff still continually cite these as unmet needs, indicating that while the service is present, it is not of high enough quality or consistency to effectively treat clients.

In addition to health-focused needs, many clients frequently expressed a need for better employment services. The Probation Department recently begun partnering with the Office of Diversion and Reentry to contract for employment services using SB 678 funds but these services and the larger development of the ODR system of care are still a work in progress. DPOs, clients, and providers still report a need for sheltered employment or subsidized wage employment program for adults on probation to provide immediate employment/income to clients. Youth in some camps had the ability to take culinary arts, health practitioner, or construction classes and obtain certificates. Youth appreciated these courses and they were often cited as one of the most useful tools clients were able to utilize upon their release. However, staffing constraints limit these courses to only a handful of facilities. Many TAY want greater access to these and other opportunities to gain certificates that would improve employment opportunities. Many adult clients also face obstacles in obtaining employment upon their release. They expressed frustration at their probation officers’ lack of support in supplying accurate lists of employers that hire individuals with records and navigating application processes (e.g., accessing transportation to interviews).

Adult clients are also in need of certain services, often distinct from those of juvenile clients. One of the most consistently cited unmet needs was surprisingly basic: clients often wanted greater access to bus tokens or general assistance with transportation to and from check-ins with their officers, job interviews, and treatment services. According to the Department, clients receive bus token based on demonstrated need. However, numerous clients described requiring greater access to public transportation than what is currently provided by the Department. One DPO shared that he does not mention bus tokens to his clients and will only provide them if asked. In his estimation, providing free resources, such as bus tokens, will sap clients’ motivation to get jobs.

Services for homeless clients were also often cited as inappropriate. The Department contracts the majority of its housing services through a state-wide organization, HealthRIGHT 360, which was cited as the only organization that can handle the immense volume of housing services that Department clients need. As with a number of other services for adult probation clients, the Department is currently



working with ODR to contact with more of these services via SB 678 funding. In addition, the Department has made it a priority to find housing for clients as soon as possible – and has succeeded at this, often being able to place individuals within 24 hours of their release from custody. However, many clients, officers, and staff at organizations and agencies alike agree that this housing is often inappropriate. Most notably, much of the housing available is in downtown Los Angeles, a less than ideal location for someone trying to rehabilitate oneself. One AB 109 staff succinctly described this concern:

*“The majority of our housing is located downtown and it’s a joke there. They go back to the environment that put them in custody – homelessness, drugs, prostitution, gang members. It’s like we’re telling them to go back to jail.”*

Transitioning between childhood and adulthood presents a specific challenge for probation clients as well. Certain legal considerations can present challenges for TAY who are in need of housing, education, as well as employment and financial support. For example, a minor who enters camp at age 17 may be released when he or she is or is turning 18, which can disqualify them from housing, health care, and other services afforded youth. The Department and the other stakeholder groups all agree that this population is significantly underserved and is not provided with the basic structure or services necessary for a successful transition into adulthood or their community, which can contribute to instances of recidivism and a trajectory into the adult criminal justice system.

An additional concern cited was program eligibility. Department staff noted that clients “might not fit the criteria” of an agency or program. For example, TAY 18-years-old or older are ineligible for some juvenile programming. One DPO also mentioned the narrow eligibility for Gang Reduction Youth Development programming. The final frequently cited concern was the safety and well-being of clients with programs. As previously noted, many housing options are located in downtown Los Angeles, in the area known as “Skid Row,” fostering concerns about clients’ sobriety, mental health and safety.

### **Relationship Between DPOs and Clients**

Central to the success of any of these programs, particularly community-based programs, is the rapport built between DPOs staff and their clients. The following section describes findings from focus groups and interviews with stakeholders, most notably clients, relating to the relationships between Department line staff and their clients. Leadership within both the Department and CBOs underscore the importance of being responsive and engaging with both youth and adult populations. Relationship building is believed to be central in fostering open communication and trust and creating a level of comfort to effect change and rehabilitation. While this fundamental belief is articulated by many, in practice the relationships between Department line staff and clients can be strained for numerous reasons. First, Department leadership, CBOs, and clients all acknowledge that DPO approaches vary considerably. Some are incredibly engaged and go above and beyond their duties, in some instances remaining involved in clients’ lives long after they complete supervision. Many adults and some youth clients described positive and sometimes transformative relationships with individual line staff. Unfortunately, others are simply “checking the box” or going through the motions without much dedication to the welfare of the clients they serve. CBOs describe positive relationships between the



clients they serve and their assigned Department staff, but just as frequently mention staff who are “indifferent” to clients or note that the emphasis is on “compliance” rather than growth or rehabilitation.

There is a stark difference between two types of line staff: those who are clinically oriented staff and those with a “command and control prison guard mentality.” To further complicate these relationships, Department staff note the need to “wear multiple hats” and act as a “parent,” “therapist,” “nurse,” “nurturer,” “correctional officer,” and “social worker” – sometimes all at the same time. This is a particularly salient finding given research which demonstrates that POs who are able to strike a balance between law enforcement and intervention roles, and who are able to establish clear roles and expectations with clients while modeling prosocial behaviors, demonstrate the most successful relationships and client outcomes.<sup>17</sup>

The different approaches to client engagement were highlighted by AB 109 clients. Many AB 109 clients spoke highly of their relationship with their PO, as well as their officers’ commitment to their personal reentry process. For example, one client described their experience with the Department in the following way:

*“So far, my contact with the Probation Department has been pretty good. It’s not like on parole. I’ve been on and off parole for 20 something years, and they put me on AB 109 probation. It’s different; there are fewer restrictions. My PO is very cordial, she seems to be very understanding and she’s been very helpful to me.”*

Another AB 109 client described his Probation Officer as “awesome,” stating that they help prevent him from “getting into trouble.” Yet another stated, “Probation is more respectful, at least my PO, she’s very respectful. With a parole officer, it was more punitive, he was more eager to violate me. I was in fear of parole instead of respecting it.” It should be noted that the majority of these positive comments were made within the context of a client’s prior experience with the parole system. Moreover, it should also be noted that other clients we spoke with conveyed a very different experience. For example, many described their probation officers as more punitive than helpful, “not trying to hear you out,” or eager to violate for a seemingly trivial infraction, such as wearing sports insignia or having low-hanging pants. One client described their experience:

*“In my case, they never wanted to talk to me. If there were programs, they didn’t want to say it because it takes their PO position into case managing. They are getting a step to become police officers. They don’t want to be case managers, they want to be POs because it’s one more step to become a police officer. They were like ‘Come, drug test, get the f\*\*\* out of here.’”*

Many Department staff have noted that the Department is shifting to a more rehabilitative-focused approach, but there is still a lack of support structure in terms of identifying resources or services. In

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<sup>17</sup> Guevara and Solomon, “Implementing Evidence-Based Policy and Practice in Community Corrections.”



focus groups, the majority of adult clients reported having to identify employment services or opportunities, or referrals to services (e.g., child reunification, legal services, or documentation), without the assistance of their probation officer. For example, one client described seeing a list of possible employers on her probation officer's desk and requesting it, as it was not automatically provided.

Relationships between the Department staff and their clients were also strained by the intrusive nature of compliance checks, staff turnover, and a general lack of respect shown to clients. During focus groups with adult AB 109 clients, many described the intrusiveness of compliance checks, which clients referred to as "check-ins." Clients recounted how during compliance checks, Department staff and/or police officers came to their residences, often at unreasonable times and with multiple cars and staff. This created a spectacle and drew the ire of both family and neighbors, in addition to impacting POs ability to have a good relationship with the clients they service. In fact, more than one client made the decision to not stay with family simply because they did not what their family exposed to the check-ins.

Turnover of Department staff was also a recurring theme from all stakeholder groups. One management-level Department staff described the extent and effect of turnover:

*"As a department, we do things that make sense to us, not that make sense for our clients. Someone can end up having four to five POs in two months because we'll move them around depending on what we think they need, which is too confusing. This happens a lot and can affect our population."*

It is important to note that during the focus groups with juvenile clients, many described physical and verbal abuse by staff, both as victims and observers. Physical and emotional abuse were not isolated incidents. Some described having pictures and letters from family, often their only attachment to family, thrown away as a form of punishment. A majority of youth described how Department staff would say "see you next time" when they left camp, alluding to recidivism and indicating a lack of investment in positive youth development approaches and other best practices. Multiple youth described witnessing, and in a few cases, experiencing physical abuse in a camp setting.

## Collaboration Between Probation, CBOs, and Other Departments

As noted in RDA's *Review of Best Practices in Probation Report*, effective service delivery – from case planning, diversion, and reentry planning and support – requires authentic collaboration and coordination among CBOs and multiple public agencies. Best practices indicate that structured partnerships which support the needs of adults and youth under the care of the Department will result in better outcomes and reduced costs associated with treatment, housing, health, educational, or employment services. Yet, authentic collaboration is often difficult to achieve and requires mutual engagement and a foundation that fosters effective communication and data sharing. Findings from focus groups and interviews with Department staff, clients, other County departments, and CBOs highlight the difficulty in achieving authentic collaboration and the potential benefits to service delivery when collaboration is realized.



## Collaboration Between the Department and Intersecting Agencies

As noted previously, the diverse range of clients and their needs served by the Department requires multi-faceted engagement across many different service areas. Although the Department is vast, with several staff in different units, it is not capable of providing the necessary services to all its clients. Therefore, it partners with other county or intersecting agencies that specialize in specific types of service provision. The “language” as well as resources shared by these county entities allow for this partnership to be quite strong both in facilities and in the community. A large number of the individuals we interviewed— both from the Department and intersecting agencies—consistently cited the Department’s ability to effectively collaborate and communicate with these intersecting agencies as a major strength and took great pride in their ability to use this strength to facilitate service delivery and client treatment plans.

Existing channels through county bureaucracy (both official and unofficial) make it possible for staff to consult one another about clients, treatment processes, or other decision making. Although this ease of contact does not extend to the referral process, the ability to communicate with county partners benefits staff and clients alike because this communication allows staff to assess and treat their clients with a more holistic approach.

There are several established structures that allow for effective communication, which in turn facilitates increased collaboration. In facilities, DMH, LACOE, and Department line staff and management regularly meet with each other to discuss treatment plans for youth clients in MDT meetings. Additionally, consistent communication is ingrained in the disciplinary and incentive systems at camps and halls, which is integrated between the school and residence. In addition to these official means of communication, Department staff and those at intersecting County agencies report feeling comfortable engaging in more informal means of communication. For example, some Department staff will cold-call colleagues at DMH for advice on a client’s treatment plan (without violating confidentiality agreements) or insights about a certain training.

Communication between staff at intersecting agencies and the Department is generally perceived as positive. However, some Department line staff express frustration at the legal barriers that prohibit the sharing of some information between DMH, DCFS, and the Department (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). Although they understand the necessity of client confidentiality agreements, some felt that they are not able to provide the level of service possible because of these legal restrictions. Similarly, bureaucratic processes can often slow down the delivery of services to clients. So, while they may have positive communication and collaborative structures in place on a personal or individual level, the county system and its rules or procedures often undermine these efforts. Nevertheless, staff within both the Department and intersecting agencies express positive sentiments about and take pride in the quality of their communication and collaboration. This consistency is particularly impressive, given the combined size and scope of the Department and intersecting agencies.





## Collaboration Between the Department and CBOs

Many staff within the Department described encouraging collaboration with CBOs, particularly within juvenile settings. For example, CBOs and clients noted the positive collaboration and mutual engagement with CBO program staff and DPOs within Camp Gonzales and praised multiple programs, including InsideOUT Writers and New Roads. While several Department staff, particularly those at leadership levels, spoke of effective partnerships with specific CBOs, others both within and outside the Department spoke of distrust. From the point of view of CBO leadership, their skepticism stems from the fundamental belief that the Department is not equipped to provide services “in-house” but also lacks systems and processes to contract for and link clients to needed services in the community. Moreover, there is a perception across CBO leadership that the services they provide are undervalued by Department staff. Numerous Department staff shared that CBOs are not held accountable for their clients’ outcomes. These underlying perceptions from both parties often foster an adversarial, “us versus them” approach that hinders authentic collaboration.

From the perspective of CBOs, the lack of engagement on the part of the Department is exemplified by the lack of referrals and programming dollars spent on community-based services. The dramatic decrease in referrals from the Department was noted in nearly every CBO interview. Staff from one CBO recounted how they received 600 fewer referrals than seven years ago and currently only receive 45. Speculation for the lack of referrals ranged from the dramatic decrease in overall number of youth served within the Department to the claim that the Department has perverse incentives to keep adults and youth under their supervision as a means of self-preservation. Nearly every CBO also mentioned the Department’s lack of spending on CBO programming. Specifically, many noted that JJCPA dollars earmarked for CBOs have gone unspent within the community, amounting to more than a \$30 million divestment in community-based services. This is interpreted by CBOs as a genuine unwillingness to act as an engaged partner to more effectively address the needs of the populations that are served. For example, one CBO described effect of the unspent funding:

*“There is no good reasoning for why that money is sitting there rather than going to programs, community services, etc. There is no accountability for this money not going to better use. This creates a trust issue. The Department does a good job distancing themselves from partnership.”*

Much of the distrust that Department staff expressed towards CBOs stems from the belief that CBOs should be accountable for facilitating improved outcomes among clients. However, without clear metrics to define “success” or concerted investment and collaboration between CBOs and Probation, it will be difficult for CBOs to demonstrate their effectiveness. While Department staff state that they want effective, evidence-based programs, there are no concrete practices in place to identify quality services provided by CBOs or the types of services from which their clients would stand to benefit.

Another recurring theme was the generally inconsistent quality of communication between the Department and CBOs. Both the Department and CBO leadership described nearly equal instances of effective and poor communication. They both noted very little “clinical collaboration” that serves to





improve service delivery for clients. Particularly when clients are referred for services, there is little in the way of information about their assessments or risks – information that would be useful for CBOs trying to house clients or better attend to their “holistic needs.” While a handful of Department staff describe reaching out to CBOs to obtain progress reports, more CBOs consistently describe a lack of engagement or communication on behalf of the Department. One CBO noted that they would “offer up more data than they asked for.” In other words, the structures that appear to facilitate communication and data sharing between the Department and intersecting agencies, such as MDTs, is not present between the Department and CBOs.

Perhaps magnifying the lack of communication or coordination is the perspective – held by both the Department and CBO leadership – that data systems within the Department are cumbersome, antiquated, and difficult to maintain. External stakeholders see the Department’s reluctance to share data and guarded communication as a lack of transparency that impedes their ability to collaborate as true partners.

Overall, many staff and leadership from within the Department are hopeful that relationships with CBOs are improving. Some conceded that the sometimes “adversarial” climate resulted from “isolated pockets” of CBOs and overall the Department is collaborating more effectively with CBOs. Moreover, the Department mentioned increased funding through SB 678 that will allow for more effective referral to treatment or housing services. A small number of Department staff at leadership levels also noted that more JJCPA funds should be spent within the community, but described the burdensome nature of the contracting process as a significant barrier.



## Chapter 4: Juvenile Facilities

The Los Angeles County Probation Department operates three juvenile halls, 12 camps, and one residential placement facility. Below, we provide key findings before exploring the processes, policies, geography, and conditions of the County's Probation-run juvenile facilities.

### Key Findings


1. The number of youth in County juvenile halls and camps has steadily decreased from 2012 to 2015, due in part to Department efforts and in part to larger trends in juvenile trends.
2. Many juvenile halls and camps are in desperate need of repairs, furthermore, the layout of most is not aligned with best practices that are conducive to client rehabilitation.
3. The majority of the camps are in rural parts of the county away from areas populated by youth on probation.
4. Halls and camps lack consistent and targeted rehabilitative programming to address the specific needs of youth detained.
5. Staff are utilizing the LADS with greater fidelity than in the past to make decisions about which youth to detain in the juvenile halls.
6. Staff morale in the camps is low in part because staff feel they have lost tools they previously used to minimize conflicts without being trained in alternative de-escalation techniques.
7. The living conditions in the camps vary widely and some youth have greater access to services in certain camps as compared to others.
8. The reopening of Camp Kilpatrick as Campus Kilpatrick and its redesign in alignment with best practices, indicates the Department has made progress changing some of their facilities to be more rehabilitative and less punitive.

### Location

Since 2012, the juvenile population has decreased by 50% in juvenile halls and 60% in camps. As a result, the Department has reduced the total number of juvenile facilities from 19 to the 16 currently operated. Figure 33 below shows how the remaining facilities are spread throughout the county. While the juvenile halls are located in the county's urban core and in the western part near Sylmar, the majority of camps are located on the outer edges in less populated areas. There are five independent camps in the Challenger complex, located in Lancaster.



**Figure 33. Juvenile probation facilities are spread throughout the county and tend to be far from where most youth on probation live.**




## Juvenile Halls

When law enforcement arrests youth who are unable to be released to their parents or legal guardians, the officer takes the youth to one of the three County juvenile halls. Once in custody, Probation's Intake and Detention Control (IDC) officers assess the youth to determine their risk level. The youth's risk level indicates either a) that the youth does not need to remain in juvenile hall and can be released to his/her parents or legal guardian with only a citation to appear in juvenile court; or b) the youth should remain in secure detention at the hall until his/her court date. The number of youth who enter and are processed at the juvenile halls has decreased each year since 2012, as shown below in Figure 34.



**Figure 34. The number of youth entering and processed by juvenile halls has decreased since 2012.**




IDC officers use the LADS to measure the risk that will inform their recommendation as to whether a youth should remain in juvenile hall or be released. The LADS is a brief, one-page assessment tool designed to measure a youth's risk of recidivating prior to their initial Juvenile Court appearance. The LADS produces a score from 1-12. Scores of 10 or higher indicate that the youth should be detained and scores 1-9 indicate the youth should be released to their family or guardian.

However, IDC officers also factor other elements into their final decision, including youths' offense type and the danger the youth may pose to themselves, family members, or the community, from the IDC officer's perspective. As a result, some youth are detained when the LADS score recommends they be released and some are released when the LADS score recommends detain. A large majority of the youth assessed by the LADS receive a score indicating they should be released. For example, of the 4,872 youth assessed by IDC in Department juvenile halls in 2016, only 4% received scores indicating they should be detained and 96% received a score indicating the youth be released into the community. Despite this, Probation data shows that many youth who receive scores indicating they should be released are detained as nearly one-third of all youth assessed by the LADS are detained (see Figure 35).

At the same time, this is a marked improvement from the earlier estimate found by the Department of Justice in its Twelfth Monitoring Report (2015). That 2015 DOJ report found that in 2014, Probation detained 90% of youth brought into the juvenile halls before their first court appearance. The decrease from 90% in 2014 to 29% in 2016 indicates that Intake and Detention Control have effectively changed their policies and procedures as a result of the DOJ monitoring.



**Figure 35. In 2016, IDC detained 29% of youth brought to juvenile halls before their first court appearance, down from 90% in 2014. (N= 4,872)**



The DOJ report showed that Probation detained 80% of youth who should have been released, according to their LADS risk score. Our analysis found that IDC has clearly changed their policies and procedures because the Department detained 27%, rather than 80%, of youth who received a LADS score indicating release (see Figure 36).

Alternatively, in 2016 nearly one-quarter of youth who should have been detained (according to their LADS risk score) were released (see Figure 37). Taken together, the data suggest that IDC staff adhere more to the recommendations of the LADS screener than they did in the past, but they still do not adhere to the recommendations of the tool with complete fidelity.

**Figure 36. In 2016, of youth that received “release” LADS scores, one in four were detained (27% of 4,717).**



**Figure 37. In 2016, of youth that received “detain” LADS scores, one in four were released (25% of 155).**




The Department has reported that that youth stay in juvenile hall for an average of 17 days. However, this is only the case for youth who stay in the juvenile hall for less than 90 days. In many circumstances, RDA has found that youth stay in juvenile halls much longer. RDA found that of the 2,149 youth who entered juvenile hall in 2016, many youth stayed in the juvenile hall for an extended period of time, with the actual average length of stay being 48 days. Figure 38 shown below displays the distribution of youth length of stays in juvenile halls for all youth that entered the juvenile halls in 2016. As shown below, of the youth who entered juvenile hall in 2016, 59% of youth stayed in juvenile hall for less than one month, 24% for 30 to 90 days, 10% for 90-180 days, and 7% remained in juvenile hall for between six months and one year. The determination for how long a youth remains in juvenile hall is not



determined solely by the Department; in most cases, it is also impacted by decisions made by judges and the availability of appropriate placement facilities for detained youth.

**Figure 38. The majority of youth stay in juvenile hall for less than 30 days, but a small minority stays for up to a year. (N=2,149)**



Challenges finding a suitable placement, when the family or guardian is not an option, can cause the youth to be detained much longer than the average. Probation staff shared that the following groups often experience much longer stays in detention: 1) youth awaiting out-of-state placements, 2) youth with developmental disabilities, and 3) youth under the care of DCFS. These vulnerable youth face longer periods of detention because of the challenges finding alternate placements for them. As we discuss in the section below, the conditions of juvenile detention are less than ideal.

### Physical Layout and Conditions of Juvenile Halls

Prior reports indicate that there are concerns regarding the physical layout, structure, and conditions of the County's juvenile halls. RDA's own observations and interviews with staff, community members, and youth formerly detained in the juvenile halls corroborated this point. As we included in our 120-day report, one Probation staff member noted that "our newest operational facility is nearly 30 years old, everything needs a facelift." Both Department staff and community partners that provide services within the juvenile halls agree that Central Juvenile Hall is the most in need of repair and renovation. This facility opened in 1912, over a century ago, and is the oldest detention facility in the county. When RDA staff visited this location in February 2017, we noted that some of the ceilings were in disrepair, posing safety risks to the youth, Probation staff, and service providers.

*"I would describe it as neglect. I mean, you have parts of the Central where the roof leaks and you have 10-12 buckets there collecting the water. It's not safe at all and it has been like that for many months. I would describe the facility as neglected. That's the best word to describe it." – Probation Staff*





The other two halls are the Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall, built in 1957, and the Barry J. Nidorf Juvenile Hall, built in 1965. Probation employees described these facilities to be less physically dangerous than Central, but both lack physical structure that would facilitate youth rehabilitation or reflect trauma-informed design. Due to the old age of all these facilities, Department staff believed all three facilities require repairs, renovations, and remodeling. RDA's own observations revealed that youth held at Central Juvenile Hall were required to move between spaces as if they were held in an adult prison or jail, as they were required to walk in straight single-file lines with restricted movement. A youth we spoke with who had previously been detained in the Central Juvenile Hall stated "juvenile hall was like a prison, it's like being a prisoner in there."

**Figure 39. Central Juvenile Hall is in need of extensive repair and renovation. Its layout and conditions do not support a rehabilitative approach or align with best practices.**



Staff we spoke with and youth formerly detained in the halls agreed few opportunities exist to receive rehabilitative programming or education in the juvenile halls. Educators we spoke with stated that due to the relatively short period of time youth spend in the halls, staff are frequently unable to obtain education records and as a result, are unable to provide youth with a quality individualized educational curriculum while they stay in the juvenile halls.

### Juvenile Hall Safety and Staff Morale

Department staff and youth described the juvenile halls as unsafe environments for everyone inside them. Some staff who have worked in the juvenile halls for decades stated that the reduction in the number of youth who enter the halls has not translated into improved safety conditions. Although our data reflect that between 2012-2016 the number of youth entering juvenile halls decreased by 50%, which is likely attributable to a decline in youth arrests and the Department's decision to keep low risk





youth in the community as opposed to the juvenile halls, staff assert detained youth are now higher risk and have more severe mental health needs than they did in the past.

As indicated in Chapter 2, the juvenile halls have faced inconsistent staffing levels due to a high number of staff under investigation, staff that are injured, or staff that call out sick. Both the Department's line staff and leadership acknowledged in interviews that newer staff in the halls feel underprepared to face day-to-day challenges. Many told us that the Department's training academy focuses too much content on policy and procedures, and not enough on preparation for field work and real-life situations. Staff reported they felt unprepared to deal with conflicts and other challenges they face during their workday, and some expressed frustration they are no longer allowed to use certain disciplinary techniques to manage conflict. In recent years, regulation changes have required juvenile halls to halt the use of pepper spray for controlling violent conflicts and also to end the use of the secure housing unit (SHU). While these changes were designed to increase safety for the youth in detention, without these disciplinary tools some staff feel more at-risk because of insufficient training to support the transition.

Youth we spoke with who had previously been detained in the juvenile halls also described the halls as violent places with few opportunities for programming. One youth we spoke with stated:

*"When I was coming up through the hall, we didn't have any resources besides the church. All I learned in the hall was fighting and gangbanging, and the same with the school. Nothing went on but fighting and gangbanging."*

Staff in juvenile halls largely concurred that there were inadequate opportunities for positive, rehabilitative engagement with youth.

As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, limited opportunities for staff working in juvenile halls to advance into positions outside of the juvenile halls were a major concern raised by DSOs and DPOs during interviews. As a result, RDA heard that veteran staff who have worked in the juvenile halls for many years feel undervalued throughout the Department, and that those feelings are imposed onto newer staff within the halls. RDA's interviews revealed that common factors affecting staff morale include unsafe working conditions, limited training, and few opportunities for advancement.

## Juvenile Camps

Youth who receive a court disposition to a camp community placement (CCP or simply "camp") are sent to one of the 12 camps throughout the county. Youth are sent to the camps for either three, six, or nine months, depending upon their disposition. The DMH, LACOE, Juvenile Court Health Services (JCHS), and Probation participate in the County's Multi-Disciplinary Assessment (MDA) process to determine the most appropriate camp for the youth. During the MDA process, partner agencies consider the youth's medical and mental health needs based on the youth's medical and mental health history, substance use history, educational needs, and the youth's personal interests. Based on the results of the MDA, the Probation Department recommends the appropriate camp placement for the youth. Prior to being




transported to camp, DMH and JCHS must provide clearances indicating the youth can be housed at the recommended camp.

When youth arrive at a camp, probation officers administer the LARRC to identify the young person's service needs and develop a case plan. Results from the LARRC are intended to inform the individual's case plan that is developed collaboratively between LACOE, DMH, and Probation. As was indicated in Chapter 3, however, the extent to which the Department staff understand how to incorporate LARRC scores into case planning remains unclear. Youth in camps are required to follow the conditions of their case plans while completing the terms of their disposition, and Department staff review and update these case plans on an as-needed basis.

Similar to the decline in the number of youth entering juvenile halls between 2012-2016, the number of youth sent to camps has decreased by over 60% since 2012 (see Figure 40). As a result of this reduction, Probation has closed three camps Camp Miller, Camp Munz, and Camp Scott since 2012.

**Figure 40. The number of youth sent to probation camps has declined since 2012.**



### Physical Layout and Location of Juvenile Camps

Compared to the aging juvenile halls, the Department's camp facilities are newer and in need of fewer repairs and renovations. At the same time, the physical layout of the camps is not conducive to youth rehabilitation and safety. As reported by the DOJ and within RDA's 120-day report, there are a range of concerns regarding youth safety, hygiene, and behavior management. Probation staff identify the "open bay" living and sleeping area as a chief source of problems for youth. This "open bay" style consists of large rooms with lines of beds. Probation line staff confirmed findings from previous audits and reports, stating that the open layout makes it difficult to monitor youth or to prevent gang conflicts. In our interviews, both staff and leadership agreed that the "Missouri Model," consisting of several smaller partitioned living units that house between 9-12 youth, would be more appropriate and conducive of youth rehabilitation.




Youth we spoke with regarding their prior experiences in the camps commonly complained about being treated inhumanely by staff and also felt they were not given the appropriate opportunities to maintain good hygiene. Although RDA could not verify this, multiple youth referred to restrictions on bathing:

*"It's weird. Even with showering they punish you, they say you have a minute to shower and they are yelling at you saying we need to get the next people in there. Everything feels like punishment inside the camps." – Youth Formerly Detained in Juvenile Camp*

In addition, the far-away locations of these camps prevent the youth from having the developmentally essential support from families that would foster rehabilitation and would reduce isolation. As shown in Figure 41 below, nearly all the camps are on the farther outlying areas of LA County, often not close to youths' homes and families. As the map indicates, a high number of youth placed in facilities are from Southern Los Angeles, easily a 1.5-2 hour drive from the majority of camps, making it extremely difficult for family members or other indigenous support systems to visit them in camp.

**Figure 41. Most camps are located in outlying areas farther away from the youth's homes and families.**






## Camp Safety and Morale

Youth who are in camps generally have higher risk scores and more profound needs than youth sentenced to probation. While the overall population has decreased, RDA's analysis of LARRC scores for youth sent to camp since 2012 indicates that overall "risk level" has increased slightly over the past five years. It should be noted that the LARRC tool has not been scientifically validated for accuracy in Los Angeles County and when RDA compared individuals LARRC scores to LADS scores we found the tools inconsistently assess individuals' level of risk. For example, of individuals who received the lowest LADS score (-2 to 0) the LADS assessed 30% of those same individuals as "high risk." Since 2012, roughly 75% of all youth placed in camps are "high risk" according to the LARRC. Only 20% of the youth are moderate risk, and a very small proportion (2%-4%) are "low risk" which is consistent with the Department's goal of keeping low risk youth in the community.

**Figure 42. The majority of youth in camp are high-risk based on the LARRC.**



Staff from the camps also expressed concerns about insufficient training, similarly to staff from the halls. The removal of disciplinary and control tools, such as pepper spray and SHU, even though mandated, did not coincide with adequate training in alternative disciplinary tools such as de-escalation or positive behavioral approaches.

*"I don't understand why our leadership would not want us to be safe. That is what it feels like sometimes. They have made decisions and it has put us at risk. It is one thing to want to protect youth and their rights but it doesn't have to be at the expense of our safety. It needs to be both. You can both empower youth and protect your staff but that is not what it feels like has happened." - Camp Staff*

Feeling exposed to additional safety risks, without adequate support or training, contributes to problems with staff morale. One positive change made to the camps at the end of 2016, however, has been the transition of older locked housing units to HOPE Centers. HOPE Centers are large open rooms



that contain comfortable furniture and are designed to be relaxing areas where agitated youth can go to calm themselves down, while being temporarily separated from other youth. Director-level Department staff we spoke with believed HOPE Centers were an effective alternative to locked housing units and indicated that use of HOPE Centers has helped deescalate volatile situations.

## Camp Improvements

The remodel of Camp Kilpatrick and its renaming to Campus Kilpatrick indicates the Department's plan to transition camps to facilities that better rehabilitate youth. Campus Kilpatrick has been designed in a way that is consistent with best practices. It follows the "Missouri Model" and will house youth in eight-person cottages, each with its own showers, recreation area, and counselors, as opposed to the other facilities which house youth in open dormitories. Another way that Campus Kilpatrick will differ from other facilities is that youth at Campus Kilpatrick will be allowed to wear their own clothes as opposed to the uniforms worn by youth at other detention facilities. The Department has emphasized that staff at Campus Kilpatrick will create a school-like atmosphere and the focus will be on learning and rehabilitation. The redesign of Camp Kilpatrick and the creation of HOPE Centers exist as multiple examples of how the Department is currently working to make the atmosphere in the facilities more rehabilitative and less punitive.

**Figure 43. The redesigned Campus Kilpatrick creates a school-like atmosphere and focuses on learning and rehabilitation.**





## Chapter 5: Fiscal Operations and Financial Management

This chapter focuses on the overarching processes, structures, and management of the Departments' fiscal functions, including contracts management, budgeting, procurement, and accounting. First, this chapter outlines several grant awards that the Department has not been able to completely spend down, as evidenced by recent documents, press reports, and audits. Then we report on the structure and organizational culture within the Financial Services Division and how it affects the Department's ability to further its mission to serve clients and communities.

### Key Findings

1. While the Department's budget has grown \$75 million between 2012/13 and 2015/16, several grant-specific fund balances have increased dramatically within that timeframe. RDA contracted with the County Executive's Office to complete this assessment due, in part, to concerns regarding excess spending of the County's General Fund while other funding streams remain unspent.<sup>18</sup>
2. The Financial Services Division's siloed functions do not collaborate toward a common purpose or mission, hindering the Department's ability to establish efficient fiscal and administrative practices that support services, programs, clients, and communities.
3. Administrative and fiscal staff do not have an understanding of broader Departmental goals, objectives, or challenges, and therefore cannot proactively address procedural issues before they arise.
4. Fiscal and administrative policies are not aligned with the delivery of services, and as a result, the administrative divisions have not established effective processes for working with each other, program staff, operations staff, or the community.
5. The Department has not dedicated contracting, or administrative staff positions, to the development of new or evidence-based programs and services. Therefore, contract staff and program staff are unable to contract community services as budgeted within specific federal and state grants.
6. As a result of bureaucratic separation and inefficient organizational cultural norms, the Department's fiscal functions inhibit the ability to partner with communities and deliver client services.

### Fiscal Overview

Between Fiscal Year 2012-2013 and Fiscal Year 2015-2016, the Department's budget increased \$75 million from \$821 million to \$896 million. For this period of time, the RDA evaluation team reviewed a variety of external audits and internal budget documents to determine the Department's main sources of revenues, inventory keys expenditures, and also quantify unspent funds.

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<sup>18</sup> The Probation Department reported that excess spending of the County's General Funds, as noted here, are the result of under-realization of other revenues rather than the under-spending of specific grant funds.





Without undertaking a complete financial audit, it was a challenge to determine the precise amounts spent per funding stream for each of the four fiscal years, and to compare those values to the budgeted (or adopted) amounts. Using the documentation made available to this project, and through triangulation of multiple sources, RDA calculated differences between specific funding allocations and actual expenditures as a means to contextualize the magnitude of the issues surrounding the management of funds within the Department.

The Department's total budget is around \$820 million annually, funded about two-thirds from the County's General Fund in both flexible and non-flexible dollars, and about one-third from specific state and federal funding streams, listed below.

### Youth Offender Block Grant (YOBG)

**Table 11. Over the last four years, there has been consistent overspending for YOBG-funded activities.**

	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16
<b>Budget</b>	\$ 20.8 M	\$ 22.8 M	\$ 22.8 M	\$ 21.7 M
<b>Actual</b>	\$ 30.0 M	\$ 30.2 M	\$ 34.0 M	\$ 30.8 M
<b>Variance</b>	\$ 9.2 M	\$ 7.4 M	\$ 11.1 M	\$ 9.1 M
<b>Var %</b>	<b>+44%</b>	<b>+32%</b>	<b>+49%</b>	<b>+42%</b>

YOBG-funded programming consistently underspent the salaries and benefits line items (personnel) for needs assessment (about \$125,000 annually), aftercare and reentry services (from \$1.7 million to \$500,000), and administration and evaluation (about \$125,000 annually). At the same time, the Department consistently overspent between \$7 million and \$11 million on personnel at the juvenile camps. As seen in Table 11, this created overspending between \$9 million and \$11 million for YOBG-funded activities.<sup>19</sup>

### Juvenile Justice Crime Prevention Act (JJCPA)

**Table 12. There has been consistent underspending of JJCPA allocated dollars over the past four years.**

	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16
<b>Budget</b>	\$ 25.2 M	\$ 30.9 M	\$ 30.9 M	\$ 38.9 M
<b>Actual</b>	\$ 23.8 M	\$ 26.1 M	\$ 28.0 M	\$ 27.3 M
<b>Variance</b>	\$ -1.4 M	\$ -4.8 M	\$ -2.9 M	\$ -11.6 M
<b>Var %</b>	<b>-6%</b>	<b>-16%</b>	<b>-9%</b>	<b>-30%</b>

Probation's growing fund balance for JJCPA funds and consistent underspending of allocated dollars has been a topic scrutinized by both auditors and the media (see Table 12). The Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller report released in March of 2017 revealed that there is a fund balance of \$36.7 million for JJCPA. In the following line items, Probation varied from the budget drastically:

<sup>19</sup> The Probation Department reports that the YOBG budget was aligned in FY 16/17.





- **Screening, Assessment, and Treatment.** Underspent between 9%-17%, or between \$392,000 and \$659,000 annually.
- **Multi-Systemic Therapy.** Underspent 26% to 60%, with unspent funds growing from \$120,000 to \$311,000 annually.
- **Special Needs Court Program.** Underspent 45% (\$500,000) in FY 12/13, but then on-target in FY13/14 to FY 15/16.
- **School-Based Probation Supervision.** Overspent 19% or \$1.6M in FY 12/13, but more than made up for the difference by underspending \$1.9 million in FY 13/14, \$200,000 in FY 14/15, and \$1.2 million in FY 15/16 (15%, 1%, and 9%, respectively).
- **Gender-Specific Services.** Underspent 35%-53% annually, between \$490,000 and \$798,000 each year.
- **After-School Enrichment & Supervision.** Slightly overspent in 12/13 by 2%, but underspent 8%-19% in following years, or between \$146,000 and \$347,000 each year.
- **Housing-Based Day Supervision.** Underspent 8%-35% annually, or between \$101,000 and \$423,000 each year.
- **High Risk/High Needs Programming.** Underspent 6%-20% annually, or between \$329,000 and \$1.2 million each year.
- **Inside Out Writing.** Underspent 1%-16%, but improved from FY 12/13. This is a smaller program, and the underspent amount went down from \$31,000 in 12/13 to \$14,000 in 15/16.
- **New Directions Program.** The program did not spend 87% of its budget in its inaugural year 15/16. This totaled \$2.6 million in 15/16.
- **Enhanced School & Community-Based Services (Board of Supervisors Allocated).** The program did not spend 97% of its budget in its inaugural year 15/16. This totaled \$4.6 million in 15/16.

## AB 109 Realignment

**Table 13. The Department has been able to spend down the small surplus of funds generated in realignment's early years.**

	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16
<b>Budget</b>	\$ 73.9 M	\$ 80.8 M	\$ 75.8 M	\$ 81.6 M
<b>Actual</b>	\$ 69.7 M	\$ 76.8 M	\$ 84.8 M	\$ 83.1 M
<b>Variance</b>	\$ -4.1 M	\$ -4.0 M	\$ 9.0 M	\$ 1.6 M
<b>Var %</b>	-6%	-5%	+12%	+2%

Los Angeles County has worked with a contractor to implement the majority of services provided to the AB 109 population. Because of this successful partnership and contract, and because the Department re-assigned sworn staff from SB 678 to meet the pressing needs of serving the AB 109 population, Probation was able to ramp up operations to spend down the small surplus generated in realignment's early years (see Table 13).



SB 678

**Table 14. The Department has been unable to spend the funds allocated for evidence-based programs.**

	12/13	13/14	14/15	15/16
<b>Budget</b>	\$ 52.2 M	\$ 35.1 M	\$ 43.8 M	\$ 43.4 M
<b>Actual</b>	\$ 6.0 M	-	\$ 12.5 M	\$ 24.0 M
<b>Variance</b>	\$ -46.5 M	\$ -35.5 M	\$ -32.1 M	\$ -20.5 M
<b>Var %</b>	<b>-89%</b>	<b>-101%</b>	<b>-73%</b>	<b>47%</b>

The Department has not been able to spend the majority of funds allocated for evidence-based programs to provide services to new clients and people who violate probation (see Table 14). The recent Auditor-Controller's audit shows that in 2017, the SB 678 fund balance was at \$167.6 million. Probation staff indicated that the prioritization of implementing the infrastructure for AB 109 impacted its ability to develop programs and spend down the SB 678 allocated funds.

## Culture of Fiscal and Administrative Management

Although staff within the Department's Administrative Services Bureau generally indicate a commitment to client well-being and rehabilitation, our data show that management practices do not always support this rehabilitative orientation toward service delivery. The siloed organizational practices and lack common purpose among staff, which hinders the Department's ability to establish effective fiscal and administrative collaboration. Instead, administrative and fiscal staff orient their work inwardly, remaining focused on delivering only what they believe to within their specific—and siloed—spans of authority.

Throughout our conversations, staff emphasized their fear of stepping outside their realm of delegated responsibility, often saying "that's not my job" or "I don't have the authority to..." This narrow approach to work and job responsibility stems from the organizational culture that may be a result of leadership changes and other cultural challenges mentioned earlier. Instead of working toward a common goal, staff are instilled with the fear of making a mistake or being blamed for something. This precludes them from collaborating with each other, and prevents them from feeling empowered to initiate new and better administrative and fiscal practices. Without collaboration and a mission focus, the Department suffers the consequences of fragmented financial management processes, creating an administrative bureaucracy that is difficult for all staff to navigate.

At the time of publication, the Department's leadership reported that the Financial Services Division was undergoing an internal reorganization that aimed to tackle these organizational culture challenges through consistent engagement with operational staff. At the same time, the aforementioned challenges with Fiscal's organizational culture have been in existence for many years. For any change management effort within a large-scale operation to be successful, and for those changes to be reflected among mid-level managers and line staff, the Department's leaders will need to maintain consistent attention to nurturing those change management efforts.



Additionally, it is widely understood internally and externally that leadership turnover has greatly affected the administrative services within the Department. As chiefs have come and gone, staff reported that the priorities of the organization are inconsistent and do not stick. An unintended consequence of leadership change is that staff at all levels of the organization fear a punitive environment in which taking initiative is not rewarded but rather puts one at risk.

Administrative and fiscal staff reported feeling undervalued and disconnected to the impact of their work. They repeatedly referenced a lack of acknowledgement of their work and also stated that leadership should provide stronger directives to effect change. Their comments illustrate that staff feel disconnected from both change management and process improvement. At the same time, Department staff have been the only stable force through leadership churn. Their feelings of being disconnected from the "whole" affects their morale, and as a result creates low levels of staff engagement. Staff do not proactively address administrative concerns as they arise, but rather engage reactively when pressured to do so by outside forces (such as auditors, the press, etc.).

Similar to other law enforcement agencies, the Department has a strong adherence to the chain of command. However, this adherence to structure leads staff from every level to keep the chain of command central to their decision-making. The fear of not disrupting this chain contributes to a *de facto* fear-based mentality in which individual staff are dis-incentivized from participating in change efforts that would either improve their own working conditions or further the mission of the larger agency. Shifting toward a more participatory management structure would allow the Department to implement strategies that enable greater focus on clients, rehabilitation, and community, while at the same time proactively engaging administrative and fiscal staff.

## Structure of Fiscal Management

Within the Department, each fiscal function operates as a separate team, without established pathways for collaboration and information sharing. The Fiscal Section operates under an accounting system that aligns with the Auditor-Controller's processes and other County agencies, but that system does not reflect the Department's programs and practices. This makes it difficult for fiscal staff to collaborate with program staff and also makes reconciliation with the budget difficult. There is no existing process by which fiscal and budget staff coordinate financial data, and program managers find themselves running communication between the two sections in order to move forward with program operations. While fiscal and budget staff offer birds-eye-view reporting across juvenile, adult, and administrative operations, neither one delivers program-specific reporting to individual operations within adult and juvenile services. As one employee put it, "there are issues with the feedback loop" between fiscal and budget, and program directors do not understand the nuances of their own activities. The reorganization of the Financial Services Division will allow for a more service-oriented staff that engages with programs and provide line item budget details.

While program managers feel that "Budget is not aligned with how programs operate," the Budget Section named the lack of resources that would be necessary to partner directly with programs. Budget staff hesitate to communicate directly with program staff because they have no ability to prioritize



requests at a programmatic or granular level. In a broader sense, the Department does not have a consolidated process by which it prioritizes programmatic budget requests, and the Budget Section also does not share program-specific budgets with operations managers. As an example of the disconnect between administrative functions, the Budget Section has not initiated collaboration protocols, does not utilize a transparent budget planning process, and does not share program budgets with the managers of those programs.

At the time of writing, RDA learned that programs do receive monthly reports provided to programs for the status of their program expenditures, and also that programs meet regularly within the context of a workgroup with the Financial Services Division. However, programs still do not have insight into overarching financial decisions made at the top level, and often do not have information regarding overhead expenses that may be distributed throughout programs without explanations from on high. During publication, RDA also learned that additional budget analysts have been requested in order to provide more direct analytical support for specific grant programs, indicating an awareness of the need for additional analytic resources required to help support programs.

These two sections illustrate systemic problems within how the Administrative Services Bureau does business. One of the most visible and politically charged examples of the Department's collaboration issues is in contracting. Throughout our interviews with staff and stakeholders, we repeatedly heard about the frustrations experienced with contracting. Many cited the length of the contracting process, which can take 12-18 months, as a major bottleneck to providing needed (and already allocated) community services. On the one hand, some of this blame is unfairly directed at the Contracts Section, which adheres to the same processes required of all county departments. The process, which includes a period for contest and other additions, gives "everyone who feels qualified an opportunity to bid, and makes the process as equitable as possible." Still, 18 months is a long time between requesting a service and awarding a contract. Moreover, while county contracting rules may be outside of the Department's control, many respondents—including those who work in county departments that partner with Probation and those who work for organizations that contract with other county departments—noted that the Probation's Contracts Section interprets these rules significantly more stringently than do other LA County Departments. Further complicating this, one current contractor pointed out that there does not appear to be coordination of required contract documents within the Department's administrative teams; the contractor reported having to repeatedly answer the same questions from different teams within the Department and also reported needing to facilitate coordination between those teams. More generally, Contracts Section staff and program operations staff do not have efficiently coordinated teams with the right skills, knowledge, or expertise required to effectively and quickly write scopes of work (SOWs) for new programs and services.

Other stakeholders reported that the Department's stringent adherence to a specific interpretation of background check rules prevents contracting with partners or individuals that may be ideal in many ways barring their legal backgrounds, no matter how brief, how serious, or how distant. Some reported that requests for provisional clearance for individuals to address outstanding non-serious legal issues were denied.



*"It's just a parking ticket, everything else in the record is clean. Can I have provisional clearance and give the individual six months to pay it off? [Probation] won't agree to that. They just won't cooperate, or engage in a way to make it doable. We don't have felons working for us, either, but actually, we do want felons. We want folks who have reformed. Plus, in the neighborhoods that we are working in we want engagement. We're talking about over-policed communities where everybody has got a record." – CBO leadership*

Other partners noted that one way the Department has successfully implemented community services is through the use of inter-agency fund transfers. Other public agencies may be better equipped to contract with community providers, and to the extent that Probation has developed MOUs and transferred funds, the Department has created successful agency-to-agency partnerships that are able to be more nimble with providers and contracts.

Government contracts, and especially contracts within the county, require input from many stakeholders: subject-matter experts, legal, risk management, executive leadership, and more. With so many parties involved, the process of writing SOWs might be the actual bottleneck in the contracting process. Some public agencies have contract staff dedicated to building new programs and services. These staff specialize in developing SOWs for new programs, understand evidence-based programming, and have expertise in bringing the right collaborators to the table. The Department may bring subject-matter experts into SOW development once an idea has been established, but Contracts Section staff believe that program staff should have ultimate responsibility for developing SOWs.<sup>20</sup> This is an inappropriate expectation, even if it is the established policy within the agency. Developing new evidence-based programs and services is a highly specialized skill unto itself, and the Contracts Section does not currently have staff dedicated to this purpose. Contracts Management require program staff to develop SOWs, but program managers do not have the qualifications to develop new programs or SOWs.

Again, blame is tossed across the operations-administration divide, and neither side has the right staff at the right time to move forward. More importantly, neither side feels empowered to "own" the problem or its resolution. This disconnect causes bottlenecks in the contracting process. Also, another result of the wrong people developing contract language is that Probation's contracts are process-driven and focused on measuring services and "widgets" rather than understanding if services are having the intended impact. Other stakeholders suggested that the writers do not understand non-profit services and therefore do not understand how to develop scopes of work.

Said one community partner:

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<sup>20</sup> At the time of writing, Department leaders referenced internal policy regarding the division of responsibilities for SOW development. They reported that the Contracts Section's role is to specifically pay for services rendered once programs have approved billing, and that program operations are responsible for developing SOWs. As illustrated above, this reference back to existing policies is, in and of itself, one of the barriers to effectively contracting with community providers in an efficient and timely way.



*"If they want to work on authentic partnerships, they have to get out of the comfort zone, become visible, and create spaces in the community for conversations with CBOs. These are the CBOs' and the community's kids, and they want the best for them. They want a voice in how their youth are being served."*

Regarding the Department's internal accounting processes, staff complained about the lengthy and difficult processes required to request reimbursement for expenses incurred while in the field. As a result of the cumbersome policies, DPOs end up fronting money for client services and often do not request or receive reimbursement. For example, one staff member illustrated a regular situation in which he pays for client meals but never requests reimbursement because the effort required outweighs the \$15 spent. But, over time, these small expenditures add up and affect staff morale.<sup>21</sup>

Additionally, line-staff have no vehicle by which they can make requests of Procurement. Through interviews, RDA learned that Procurement operates at the 30,000-foot level and determines Department-wide policies. For example, individual requests for hand sanitizer are rejected outright because Procurement is overly focused on equitable processes to the extent that if the budget will not allow all staff to have hand sanitizer on a regular basis, no staff can ever have hand sanitizer. The inability to be flexible and adaptable to the individual priorities of distinct programs is a barrier to effective delivery of services, and also takes a toll on morale. The overwhelming feeling at the staff level is that the Department is inflexible and unwilling to provide for their needs, and, as a result, staff operate within a mentality of scarcity.<sup>22</sup>

## Ability to Partner with Communities

Staff from the administrative divisions to the program divisions understand that CBOs struggle to "do business" with the Department because of bureaucratic and financial challenges. This limits the Department's ability to partner with the community in which it is embedded, because it cannot contract the funds out to provide the services that clients need. We spoke with staff who recognize nonprofits and CBOs are frustrated with the Department's ability to get funding into the community and to pay for client services. The separation of budgeting, procurement, contracting, fiscal management, and other administrative functions compounds this barrier.

The Financial Services Division has separate teams for Budget, Fiscal, and Procurement, and the Contracts Section is within the separate Contracts and Grants Management Division. Each section or team demonstrates ownership and pride over their "piece" in the process, but at the same time line-level staff feel that the "whole" is both opaque and inaccessible to them. While Fiscal Management and Contracts and Grants Management report directly to the Administrative Deputy, and while these teams'

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21 Department leaders reported that prior audits found "egregious practices" within purchasing, leading the Auditor-Controller to remove purchasing resources from the agency. The Financial Services Division reported that, at the time of publication, it is seeking ways to meet employee's purchasing needs.

22 Again, Department leaders reported that purchasing and procurement policies were adjusted based on "egregious prior practices" and the existing policies, while cumbersome, are intended to ensure staff requires align with the Department's mission.





leaders attend monthly manager meetings to establish clearer lines of communication, this information sharing is not adequately filtering down to mid-level managers or line staff. There are no vehicles by which staff regularly collaborate or share information, and so there is insufficient communication between functions that inherently depend on each other. For example, Budget staff do not have the ability share program-specific budget information with program managers that are tasked with implementing services, and therefore do not know how much they have spent toward their allocation, and are frequently asked to request information from Fiscal and deliver that back to Budget in order to determine if they can move forward.<sup>23</sup>

Program requests to Budget, Procurement, or Contracts filter up through the chain of command rather than through inclusive and transparent conversations with executive decision-makers. Program directors that are responsible for implementing client-based services, for example, often do not have updated information from the Budget Section, and cannot, therefore, make informed decisions about what services to request through the Contracts Section. There is a wide communication gap between program operations and Contracts, and no effective processes by which fiscal functions collaborate on the back end to deliver client-oriented administrative services.<sup>24</sup> As a result, significant administrative delays and bottlenecks prevent Probation from getting allocated community funds into service contracts. Firewalls between each fiscal area create an environment of dysfunction and endless bureaucratic loops for employees from every corner of Probation.

Processes and procedures for operating within the Probation Department are not clear, and staff express feelings of fatigue due to ongoing change in direction. It is difficult to take new things on when protocols are unclear, and even more difficult to make suggestions when there is no clear venue for feedback. Changes in leadership contribute to the perception that decisions are being made behind closed doors, without strategic input from staff. Because decisions seem opaque, programs blame each other for problems or budget shortfalls. For example, staff from SB 678 suggested that when Probation implemented AB 109, AB 109 took their staff. On the flip side, AB 109 staff asserted that Special Services took their staff.

The lack of direct, clear, and unified communication leads Department staff to criticize each other. Said one employee, "There is no acknowledgement of middle-level management. That discourages people who work in silos." When taken within the context of the Department's fiscal management, the structural disconnect between fiscal functions and the lack of clear direction leads to disengagement from process improvement, and contributes to the "managed chaos" that prevents adequate planning to get funding into the community-based system of care. The inability to get funding into the community precludes the Department from developing meaningful partnerships with community organizations and from improving client services.

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<sup>23</sup> At the time of writing, the Financial Services Division reported that it is working toward a more collaborative zero-based allocation budget.

<sup>24</sup> Despite an array of qualitative evidence suggesting that there is a collaboration failure between program operations and Contracts, the Contracts Section reported that it requires program staff to utilize an approval form to verify communication among all parties. While this form may have the intention of facilitating collaboration, staff do not experience the process as intended.





## Conclusion

The LA County Probation Department has been the subject of significant scrutiny over the past several years and, as indicated throughout this report, there is still much work to be done to align Department operations with best practices in community corrections, as well as in organizational management more broadly. Moreover, as this assessment demonstrates, challenges in one area of Department operations are not distinct from challenges in others: lack of clarity in organizational mission impacts staff morale, recruitment and hiring efforts, client services, fiscal operations; and limitations in data/IT infrastructure affect accountability, communication, approaches to client services, among others. These issues thus require complex and interrelated strategies to address.

At the same time, it is important not to understate or overlook the efforts currently underway to address these challenges, or that good work that is happening amid them. The Department's SB 678 CORE plan and partnership with ODR indicate a clear commitment to best practices, structured decision-making, community-based services, and partnerships with other organizations. Similarly, Campus Kilpatrick, the new JJCC Community Advisory Body, and the camp closure plan convey a commitment to working with county and community partners to provide the appropriate array of services to the appropriate youth in the appropriate setting.

Subsequent analyses as part of this study will seek to further support this effort by cross-walking the LA Probation Department's practices with those delineated in the research and policy literature as well as those practices in implementation in other jurisdictions in California and the United States.



## Appendix A: Qualitative Methods

Face-to-face interviews or focus groups with 384 LA County Probation stakeholders (70% interviews/focus groups with Department staff and 30% agencies working with probation – DMH, LACOE, ODR, CBOs, advocates, and clients).

All levels of department staff engaged:

- Interim Chief Probation Officer
- Chief Deputy
- Deputy Chief
- Bureau Chief
- Administrative Deputy
- Chief Information Officer
- Acting Public Information Officer
- Executive Assistant
- Departmental Finance Manager
- Human Resources Manager
- Information Technology Manager
- Administrative Services Manager
- Consultant
- Senior Probation Director
- Director
- Non-sworn (secretary, analyst, clerk)
- DSO
- DPO I and II
- Supervisor

Data collection, coding, and analysis efforts:

- Interviews/focus groups were attended by two RDA/Leap staff (one lead facilitator and one note-taker).
- Majority (more than 90%) were recorded and transcribed. The small number that were not recorded electronically were recorded by multiple note-takers to obtain transcription-quality notes.
- Protocols were used for specific target populations with overarching questions to help triangulate responses. For example, RDA developed separate protocols for Field Directors, line staff, those in facilities, budget and fiscal, DMH, LACOE and CBOs, but all with overlapping questions spanning the five domains of interest (organizational culture, fiscal operations, facilities, client service delivery, and staffing/hiring/training).



- There was consistency in interviewers – the same individuals conducted the Department interviews and focus groups – with the same note-taker to maintain consistency; the only exception was Dr. Jorja Leap's interview with Sheila Mitchell.
- Researchers debriefed after interviews and focus groups to discuss major findings/themes and talk through the process if any clarification was needed or to ensure both researchers identified similar themes.
- Researchers were in contact regularly to discuss specific and cross-cutting themes. After approximately 200 interviews were conducted, a brief report of major findings was disseminated to the larger research team.
- After all department interviews and focus groups were conducted, researchers compiled a list of more than 55 categories/themes. They also uploaded all transcripts into Atlas TI. Two researchers (one from RDA and one from Leap) were responsible for coding all transcripts using these 55 categories/themes. The initial coding process took two weeks. First, each coder coded the same transcript and then we worked through similarities or differences. Then, we continued to compare coding of different transcripts to ensure inter-rater reliability. We also maintained an ongoing log of questions about codes or themes that would be answered on future calls or in the actual log/document.
- After all transcripts were coded, we performed queries in Atlas that pulled together all the quotes that were coded for each theme. For example, for the theme "relationship between probation and CBOs" the query was a 45-page document. We then read the queries numerous times and identified major findings that were most consistently cited by a broad range of interviews. We then developed a system of color-coding to go through all the quotes in the query document and highlighted (via color-coding) all the direct quotes that pertained to a specific finding. We continually checked in with the team member(s) who had been present at the interviews to validate our findings.



## Appendix B. List of Department Trainings

Field Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traffic Accident Reporting Procedures</li> <li>• GPS Training</li> <li>• Social Media: Investigations, Threats, and Solutions</li> <li>• Active shooter for Probation</li> <li>• Homelessness and Reentry</li> <li>• ATC Responsivity</li> <li>• ATC 2.0</li> <li>• Overview of Adult Field Supervision</li> <li>• EBP Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intro to EBP</li> <li>• Implementing EBP</li> <li>• Conflict Management</li> <li>• FOSTT (Phase 1+2)</li> <li>• Synthetic Drugs</li> <li>• Bias vs performance</li> <li>• Prob. Supervision of Adult Clients with MI</li> <li>• Field Contact: Situational Awareness</li> <li>• Police and Probation in Schools</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Armed Academy</li> <li>• County Jail Gang Investigations</li> <li>• Determinate Sentencing Law Advanced</li> <li>• Supervision of Juvenile Sex Offender</li> <li>• SEO Academy</li> <li>• Juvenile Field Policy Meeting</li> </ul>
Facilities Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhance Supervision T4T</li> <li>• Suicide Prevention</li> <li>• Soft Restraints</li> <li>• Child Abuse Prevention and Reporting</li> <li>• SCM T4T</li> <li>• ART</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DOJ Telecommunications Training</li> <li>• SCM Recertification</li> <li>• JBI Web Based Training</li> <li>• RTSB HOPE Center</li> <li>• Hope Center Policy Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ART Booster</li> <li>• Lifeguard Training</li> <li>• Water Safety Pool Supervision</li> <li>• ES/SP</li> <li>• LA Model Training</li> </ul>
Data Systems Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LS/CMI</li> <li>• PEMRS</li> <li>• LS/CMI Implementation</li> <li>• LS/CMI Booster</li> <li>• PEDMS 2.0</li> <li>• MS Project *</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• APS Fundamentals</li> <li>• Adult Systems</li> <li>• PCMS Overview</li> <li>• Microsoft Advance</li> <li>• Outlook 365</li> <li>• LARRC</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Microsoft Excel Advanced</li> <li>• Learning Portal System Update</li> <li>• Microsoft Excel Essentials</li> <li>• PREA</li> </ul>
Custodial Services Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhanced Supervision</li> <li>• Active Shooter</li> <li>• Soft Restraint</li> <li>• Standard First Aid</li> <li>• GPS Training</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First Aid/CPR</li> <li>• FOSTT (handcuffing)</li> <li>• Promoting Safe Environments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• De-Escalation</li> <li>• Field Contact: Situational Awareness</li> <li>• RTSB HOPE Center</li> </ul>
Leadership Development Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DPO I</li> <li>• PO Educational Advocacy Training</li> <li>• Manager's Leadership Academy (CPOC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DBT Manager's Training</li> <li>• Secrets to Being a Great Trainer</li> <li>• Persuasive Communication Skills</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lesson Plan Development</li> <li>• Department of Workforce Development: Aging</li> </ul>



Core Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• FPOC</li><li>• JCOC</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• DBT</li><li>• Supervisor</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• FPOC</li></ul>
Social Services Trainings		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Child Abuse Prevention and Reporting</li><li>• Homelessness and Reentry</li><li>• Suicide Prevention</li><li>• Think Trauma Implementation</li><li>• ART</li><li>• DBT Core</li><li>• CSEC</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• RTSB/DSB Child Abuse T4T</li><li>• Substance Abuse and Recognition</li><li>• Embracing the diversity of GLBTQ Youth</li><li>• Anger Management</li><li>• Integration of Care (PSB)</li><li>• Prob. Supervision of Adult Clients with MI</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Police and Probation in Schools</li><li>• ART Booster</li><li>• Mental Health 101</li><li>• Strength Based Probation Case Management</li><li>• Mental health Simulations</li></ul>



## Appendix C. Fiscal Allocations and Expenditures for Key Funding Streams

### County General Fund

YEAR	REVENUES				EXPENDITURES/APPROPRIATIONS			
	Adopted	Actual	Variance	VAR %	Adopted	Actual	Variance	VAR %
<b>General Operations</b>								
2012-13	\$335,380,000	\$278,134,202	\$57,245,798	17%	\$813,552,000	\$756,112,031	\$57,439,969	7%
2013-14	\$342,914,000	\$302,840,618	\$40,073,382	12%	\$837,572,000	\$773,330,458	\$64,241,542	8%
2014-15	\$340,634,000	\$317,216,463	\$23,417,537	7%	\$862,033,000	\$821,875,916	\$40,157,084	5%
2015-16	\$350,661,000	\$312,244,944	\$38,416,056	11%	\$895,954,000	\$861,140,797	\$34,813,203	4%
<b>Juvenile Court Wards</b>								
2012-13	\$-	\$-	\$-		\$2,891,000	\$1,273,054	\$1,617,946	56%
2013-14	\$-	\$-	\$-		\$2,391,000	\$1,576,213	\$814,787	34%
2014-15	\$-	\$9,107	\$(9,107)		\$2,641,000	\$2,514,281	\$126,719	5%
2015-16	\$-	\$(5,464)	\$5,464		\$3,291,000	\$3,243,768	\$47,232	1%
<b>Field Services</b>								
2012-13	\$141,324,000	\$106,370,016	\$34,953,984	25%	\$235,509,000	\$194,506,752	\$41,002,248	17%
2013-14	\$148,338,000	\$105,774,782	\$42,563,218	29%	\$245,193,000	\$208,881,659	\$36,311,341	15%
2014-15	\$110,676,000	\$101,685,813	\$8,990,187	8%	\$247,496,000	\$222,971,274	\$24,524,726	10%
2015-16	\$149,023,000	\$122,524,757	\$26,498,243	18%	\$254,314,000	\$236,886,374	\$17,427,626	7%
<b>Juvenile Institutions</b>								
2012-13	\$76,972,000	\$64,374,001	\$12,597,999	16%	\$337,003,000	\$333,124,575	\$3,878,425	1%
2013-14	\$77,319,000	\$92,234,182	\$(14,915,182)	-19%	\$355,653,000	\$339,201,085	\$16,451,915	5%
2014-15	\$86,766,000	\$100,992,930	\$(14,226,930)	-16%	\$363,373,000	\$359,288,496	\$4,084,504	1%
2015-16	\$89,811,000	\$100,789,347	\$(10,978,347)	-12%	\$371,422,000	\$360,363,999	\$11,058,001	3%
<b>Special Services</b>								
2012-13	\$100,869,000	\$93,340,728	\$7,528,272	7%	\$119,303,000	\$112,540,405	\$6,762,595	6%
2013-14	\$101,042,000	\$90,287,837	\$10,754,163	11%	\$103,535,000	\$97,884,913	\$5,650,087	5%
2014-15	\$94,403,000	\$97,809,885	\$(3,406,885)	-4%	\$111,102,000	\$103,639,711	\$7,462,289	7%
2015-16	\$94,053,000	\$83,137,205	\$10,915,795	12%	\$124,467,000	\$118,786,022	\$5,680,978	5%
<b>Support Services</b>								
2012-13	\$16,215,000	\$14,049,457	\$2,165,543	13%	\$126,267,000	\$114,667,245	\$11,599,755	9%
2013-14	\$16,215,000	\$14,543,818	\$1,671,182	10%	\$130,800,000	\$125,786,559	\$5,013,441	4%
2014-15	\$16,215,000	\$4,900,402	\$11,314,598	70%	\$137,421,000	\$133,462,154	\$3,958,846	3%
2015-16	\$17,774,000	\$5,799,099	\$11,974,901	67%	\$142,460,000	\$141,860,635	\$599,365	0%
<b>CBO Contracts</b>								
2012-13	\$-	\$-	\$-		\$4,211,000	\$3,235,888	\$975,112	23%
2013-14	\$-	\$-	\$-		\$3,855,000	\$2,520,569	\$1,334,431	35%
2014-15	\$-	\$-	\$-		\$5,437,000	\$3,466,177	\$1,970,823	36%
2015-16	\$-	\$-	\$-		\$4,899,000	\$2,571,447	\$2,327,553	48%
<b>TOTALS</b>								
2012-13	\$670,760,000	\$556,268,404	\$114,491,596	17%	\$1,638,736,000	\$1,515,459,951	\$123,276,049	8%
2013-14	\$685,828,000	\$605,681,236	\$80,146,764	12%	\$1,678,999,000	\$1,549,181,455	\$129,817,545	8%
2014-15	\$648,694,000	\$622,614,600	\$26,079,400	4%	\$1,729,503,000	\$1,647,218,009	\$82,284,991	5%
2015-16	\$701,322,000	\$624,489,888	\$76,832,112	11%	\$1,796,807,000	\$1,724,853,042	\$71,953,958	4%



## JJCPA

YEAR	BUDGET	SPENT	VARIANCE	VAR%
<b>Screening, Assess, and Treatment</b>				
2012-13	\$3,886,997	\$3,241,856	\$645,141	17%
2013-14	\$4,494,000	\$4,102,047	\$391,953	9%
2014-15	\$4,494,264	\$4,076,282	\$417,982	9%
2015-16	\$4,527,514	\$3,868,734	\$658,780	15%
<b>Multi-Systemic Therapy</b>				
2012-13	\$468,108	\$347,147	\$120,961	26%
2013-14	\$513,011	\$288,378	\$224,633	44%
2014-15	\$512,829	\$256,008	\$256,821	50%
2015-16	\$516,623	\$206,074	\$310,549	60%
<b>Special Needs Court Program</b>				
2012-13	\$1,154,181	\$636,812	\$517,370	45%
2013-14	\$1,264,893	\$1,264,351	\$542	0%
2014-15	\$1,264,492	\$1,263,361	\$1,131	0%
2015-16	\$1,273,847	\$1,273,838	\$9	0%
<b>School-Based Probation Supervision</b>				
2012-13	\$8,628,715	\$10,229,979	\$(1,601,264)	-19%
2013-14	\$12,727,334	\$10,781,481	\$1,945,853	15%
2014-15	\$12,727,849	\$12,555,270	\$172,579	1%
2015-16	\$12,822,015	\$11,651,378	\$1,170,637	9%
<b>Abolish Chronic Truancy Expansion</b>				
2012-13	\$375,413	\$375,414	\$(1)	0%
2013-14	\$411,425	\$375,198	\$36,227	9%
2014-15	\$411,187	\$411,187	\$-	0%
2015-16	\$414,229	\$414,229	\$-	0%
<b>Youth Substance Abuse Intervention</b>				
2012-13	\$952,438	\$667,522	\$284,916	30%
2013-14	\$1,043,797	\$1,043,797	\$-	0%
2014-15	\$1,043,883	\$1,043,883	\$-	0%
2015-16	\$1,051,606	\$1,051,606	\$-	0%
<b>Gender Specific Services</b>				
2012-13	\$1,508,804	\$711,267	\$797,537	53%
2013-14	\$1,419,375	\$803,989	\$615,386	43%
2014-15	\$1,419,384	\$929,479	\$489,905	35%
2015-16	\$1,429,886	\$796,081	\$633,805	44%
<b>After-School Enrichment &amp; Supervision</b>				
2012-13	\$1,683,963	\$1,717,088	\$(33,125)	-2%
2013-14	\$1,845,489	\$1,567,050	\$278,439	15%
2014-15	\$1,846,362	\$1,700,722	\$145,640	8%
2015-16	\$1,860,022	\$1,513,492	\$346,530	19%
<b>Housing-Based Day Supervision</b>				
2012-13	\$1,092,871	\$739,312	\$353,559	32%
2013-14	\$1,197,699	\$774,820	\$422,879	35%
2014-15	\$1,197,585	\$981,482	\$216,103	18%
2015-16	\$1,206,445	\$1,105,730	\$100,715	8%
<b>High Risk/High Needs Program</b>				
2012-13	\$5,245,722	\$4,916,902	\$328,820	6%
2013-14	\$5,748,901	\$4,894,171	\$854,730	15%





**Los Angeles County Executive's Office**  
LA Probation Governance Study

<b>2014-15</b>	\$5,749,302	\$4,598,314	\$1,150,988	20%
<b>2015-16</b>	\$5,791,839	\$4,681,458	\$1,110,382	19%
<b>Inside Out Writing</b>				
<b>2012-13</b>	\$198,986	\$167,838	\$31,148	16%
<b>2013-14</b>	\$218,075	\$199,618	\$18,457	8%
<b>2014-15</b>	\$217,863	\$215,676	\$2,187	1%
<b>2015-16</b>	\$219,475	\$204,991	\$14,484	7%
<b>New Directions Program</b>				
<b>2012-13</b>	\$-	\$-	\$-	
<b>2013-14</b>	\$-	\$-	\$-	
<b>2014-15</b>	\$-	\$-	\$-	
<b>2015-16</b>	\$2,966,250	\$397,091	\$2,569,159	87%
<b>Enhanced School and Community-Based Services (BOS Allocated)</b>				
<b>2012-13</b>	\$-	\$-		
<b>2013-14</b>	\$-	\$-	\$-	
<b>2014-15</b>	\$-	\$-	\$-	
<b>2015-16</b>	\$4,820,000	\$156,459	\$4,663,541	97%
<b>JJCPA TOTALS</b>				
<b>2012-13</b>	\$25,196,198	\$23,751,138	\$1,445,060	6%
<b>2013-14</b>	\$30,883,999	\$26,094,901	\$4,789,098	16%
<b>2014-15</b>	\$30,885,000	\$28,031,665	\$2,853,335	9%
<b>2015-16</b>	\$38,899,751	\$27,321,160	\$11,578,591	30%



## YOBG

YEAR	BUDGET	SPENT	VARIANCE	VAR %
<b>Risk and Needs Assessments</b>				
2012-13 Salaries & Benefits	\$243,000	\$124,180	\$118,820	49%
2012-13 Total	\$347,000	\$124,180	\$222,820	64%
2013-14 Salaries & Benefits	\$243,000	\$109,252	\$133,748	55%
2013-14 Total	\$550,000	\$109,252	\$440,748	80%
2014-15 Salaries & Benefits	\$243,000	\$109,734	\$133,266	55%
2014-15 Total	\$550,000	\$109,734	\$440,266	80%
2015-16 Salaries & Benefits	\$243,000	\$125,905	\$117,095	48%
2015-16 Total	\$550,000	\$125,905	\$424,095	77%
<b>Camps: CEO/CGR/CDG/CRM (data come from different sources; variance reflects actual expenditures on camps not only YOBG-approved values)</b>				
2012-13 Salaries & Benefits	\$15,424,657	\$24,141,026	\$(8,716,369)	-57%
2012-13 Total	\$16,794,657	\$28,066,054	\$(11,271,397)	-67%
2013-14 Salaries & Benefits	\$16,462,000	\$23,264,621	\$(6,802,621)	-41%
2013-14 Total	\$17,832,000	\$27,734,379	\$(9,902,379)	-56%
2014-15 Salaries & Benefits	\$17,832,000	\$26,037,041	\$(8,205,041)	-46%
2014-15 Total	\$17,982,000	\$30,942,149	\$(12,960,149)	-72%
2015-16 Salaries & Benefits	\$17,812,000	\$29,284,039	\$(11,472,039)	-64%
2015-16 Total	\$17,832,000	\$27,734,379	\$(9,902,379)	-56%
<b>Aftercare and Reentry Services</b>				
2012-13 Salaries & Benefits	\$2,972,000	\$1,304,678	\$1,667,322	56%
2012-13 Total	\$3,367,000	\$1,629,927	\$1,737,073	52%
2013-14 Salaries & Benefits	\$2,972,000	\$1,603,447	\$1,368,553	46%
2013-14 Total	\$3,167,000	\$2,204,677	\$962,323	30%
2014-15 Salaries & Benefits	\$2,972,000	\$2,252,004	\$719,996	24%
2014-15 Total	\$3,017,000	\$2,753,148	\$263,852	9%
2015-16 Salaries & Benefits	\$2,972,000	\$2,448,832	\$523,168	18%
2015-16 Total	\$3,017,000	\$2,753,148	\$263,852	9%
<b>Program Administration and Evaluation</b>				
2012-13 Salaries & Benefits	\$297,000	\$192,893	\$104,107	35%
2012-13 Total	\$297,000	\$192,893	\$104,107	35%
2013-14 Salaries & Benefits	\$297,000	\$183,345	\$113,655	38%
2013-14 Total	\$297,000	\$183,345	\$113,655	38%
2014-15 Salaries & Benefits	\$297,000	\$181,501	\$115,499	39%
2014-15 Total	\$297,000	\$184,667	\$112,333	38%
2015-16 Salaries & Benefits	\$297,000	\$167,657	\$129,343	44%
2015-16 Total	\$297,000	\$167,657	\$129,343	44%
<b>Life Skills Contract</b>				
2012-13 Salaries & Benefits	\$-	\$-	\$-	
2012-13 Total	\$-	\$-	\$-	
2013-14 Salaries & Benefits	\$1,000,000	\$-	\$1,000,000	
2013-14 Total	\$1,000,000	\$-	\$1,000,000	
2014-15 Salaries & Benefits	\$1,000,000	\$-	\$1,000,000	
2014-15 Total	\$1,000,000	\$-	\$1,000,000	
2015-16 Salaries & Benefits	\$-	\$-	\$-	
2015-16 Total	\$-	\$-	\$-	
<b>YOBG TOTALS</b>				
2012-13	\$20,805,657	\$30,013,054	\$(9,207,397)	-44%
2013-14	\$22,846,000	\$30,231,654	\$(7,385,654)	-32%
2014-15	\$22,846,000	\$33,989,698	\$(11,143,698)	-49%
2015-16	\$21,696,000	\$30,781,089	\$(9,085,089)	-42%



## AB 109

ONGOING COSTS	BUDGET	SPENT	VARIANCE	VAR %
<b>Salaries &amp; Employee Benefit</b>				
2012-13	\$46,393,000	\$42,123,166	\$4,269,834	9%
2013-14	\$50,901,000	\$52,422,448	\$(1,521,448)	-3%
2014-15	\$53,583,000	\$61,670,263	\$(8,087,263)	-15%
2015-16	\$58,026,000	\$65,274,912	\$(7,248,912)	-12%
<b>Services &amp; Supplies</b>				
2012-13	\$24,858,000	\$21,996,272	\$2,861,728	12%
2013-14	\$23,290,000	\$17,896,915	\$5,393,085	23%
2014-15	\$19,052,000	\$12,828,469	\$6,223,531	33%
2015-16	\$19,052,000	\$14,038,964	\$5,013,036	26%
<b>Commitments</b>				
2012-13	\$-	\$-	\$-	
2013-14	\$-	\$-	\$-	
2014-15	\$-	\$6,731,660	\$(6,731,660)	
2015-16	\$-	\$2,007,808	\$(2,007,808)	
ONE-TIME COSTS	BUDGET	SPENT	VARIANCE	VAR %
<b>Programs</b>				
2012-13	\$-	\$2,347,694	\$(2,347,694)	
2013-14	\$6,586,000	\$5,159,779	\$1,426,221	22%
2014-15	\$3,170,000	\$3,170,000	\$-	0%
2015-16	\$3,600,000	\$1,634,227	\$1,965,773	55%
<b>Capital Assets</b>				
2012-13	\$2,628,000	\$3,258,749	\$(630,749)	-24%
2013-14	\$-	\$1,287,629	\$(1,287,629)	
2014-15	\$-	\$381,686	\$(381,686)	
2015-16	\$900,000	\$176,561	\$723,439	80%
<b>AB 109 TOTALS</b>				
2012-13	\$73,879,000	\$69,725,880	\$4,153,120	6%
2013-14	\$80,777,000	\$76,766,771	\$4,010,229	5%
2014-15	\$75,805,000	\$84,782,078	\$(8,977,078)	-12%
2015-16	\$81,578,000	\$83,132,471	\$(1,554,471)	-2%