AGENDA

Members of the Public may address the Public Safety Cluster on any agenda item by submitting a written request prior to the meeting. Two (2) minutes are allowed per person in total for each item.

1. CALL TO ORDER

2. GENERAL PUBLIC COMMENT (15 Minutes)

3. INFORMATIONAL ITEM(S): [Any Information Item is subject to discussion and/or presentation at the request of two or more Board offices with advance notification]:

   A. Board Letter:
      SUBRECIPIENT AGREEMENT WITH THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES FOR SECURING THE CITIES SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM
      Speaker(s): Eric Fox (Sheriff's)

   B. Board Letter:
      APPROVAL OF EXPENDITURE INCREASE TO CONTRACT NO. 78641 WITH HELICOPTER SUPPORT, INC., DBA SIKORSKY COMMERCIAL, INC.
      Speaker(s): Theresa Barrera and Jon O'Brien (Fire)

4. PRESENTATION/DISCUSSION ITEM(S):

   A. Board Letter:
      APPROVE SOLE SOURCE AMENDMENT NUMBER TEN TO EXTEND AGREEMENT 77655 WITH PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INCORPORATED, FOR INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM AND SERVICES
      Speaker(s): Kimberly Unland and Irma Santana (Sheriff's)

   B. Board Briefing:
      CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT COMMISSION (COC) MONTHLY BRIEFING
      Speaker(s): Brian Williams (COC)
C. Board Briefing:
DIVISION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (DJJ) TRANSITION COMMITTEE BRIEFING
Speaker(s): Adam Bettino (Probation)

D. Board Briefing:
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF SECRET SHERIFF’S DEPUTY SUBGROUPS
Speaker(s): Sam Peterson (RAND)

5. PUBLIC COMMENTS

6. ADJOURNMENT

CLOSED SESSION

CS-1 CONFERENCE WITH LEGAL COUNSEL-EXISTING LITIGATION
(Subdivision (a) of Government Code Section 54956.9)

Joseph Charles Evans v. County of Los Angeles, et al.
United States District Court Case No. 2-19-CV-00793-MWF

Department: Sheriff’s

CS-2 CONFERENCE WITH LEGAL COUNSEL-EXISTING LITIGATION
(Subdivision (a) of Government Code Section 54956.9)

Sarkis Kazaryan; Kristine Avetisyan; HK., a Minor by and through Sarkis Kazaryan, Parent and Guardian v. County of Los Angeles, et al..
Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 20AVC00702

Department: Sheriff’s

7. UPCOMING ITEM(S):

A. Board Briefing:
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION (ATI) BRIEFING
Speaker(s): Songhai Armstead (ATI)

B. Board Briefing:
PROBATION OVERSIGHT COMMISSION (POC) MONTHLY BRIEFING
Speaker(s): Wendelyn Julien (POC)

C. Board Letter:
APPROVE AMENDMENT NUMBER TWO TO AGREEMENT NUMBER 79015 WITH DATAWORKS PLUS, LLC TO PROVIDE AN ENHANCED PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR THE DEPARTMENT’S CRIMINAL BOOKING SYSTEM
Speaker(s): Derek Sabatini, Christian Hai and Angelo Faiella (Sheriff’s)
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO EMAIL A COMMENT ON AN ITEM ON THE PUBLIC SAFETY CLUSTER AGENDA, PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING EMAIL AND INCLUDE THE AGENDA NUMBER YOU ARE COMMENTING ON:

PUBLIC_SAFETY_COMMENTS@CEO.LACOUNTY.GOV
October 12, 2021

The Honorable Board of Supervisors
County of Los Angeles
383 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California  90012

Dear Supervisors:

SUBRECIPIENT AGREEMENT WITH THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES FOR SECURING THE CITIES SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM (ALL DISTRICTS) (3 VOTES)

SUBJECT

The Los Angeles County (County) Sheriff’s Department (Department) seeks approval to execute Subrecipient Agreement (Agreement) with the City of Los Angeles (City) for the Securing the Cities Program, accepting a grant award in the amount of $140,625.00 for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021-22. As a participating agency in the Securing the Cities Sustainment Program (STC Program), the Department assists the City, through the Mayor’s Office, in developing a regional structure of law enforcement and first responder organizations to identify, prevent, and respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the Los Angeles/Long Beach Urban Area.

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE BOARD:

1. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, or his designee, as an agent for the County, to execute an Agreement, substantially similar to the attached Agreement, with the City for the STC Program for the term from September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2030.

2. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, or his designee, as an agent for the County, to execute any and all amendments to the Agreement that are necessary for participation in the STC Program, including but not limited to those that extend the
period of performance and accept future FY funding during the term of Agreement Number.

3. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, as an agent for the County, to execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), substantially similar to the attached Los Angeles/Long Beach UASI Region Securing the Cities Sustainment Program MOU, with various local agencies for participation in the STC Program for the term from September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2030.

4. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, as an agent for the County, to execute any and all amendments to the MOU that are necessary for continued participation in the STC Program.

PURPOSE/JUSTIFICATION OF RECOMMENDED ACTION

As an STC Program participating agency, the Department assists the City in developing a regional structure of law enforcement and first responder organizations to identify, prevent, and respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the Los Angeles/Long Beach Urban Area. The City, through the Mayor’s Office, is the primary applicant and recipient of the grant funds for the STC Program. The Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles Airport Police Department, Los Angeles Port Police Department, Los Angeles County Fire Department, Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, Orange County Sheriff’s Department, and California Highway Patrol are also identified as participating agencies that receive STC Program grant funding.

Implementation of Strategic Plan Goals

Approval of the Agreement relates to the County Strategic Plan suggests the provision of Strategy Plan, Goal 3, Integrated Services Delivery. Participation in the STC Program leverages resources from the Department, City, and other local agencies to enhance public safety throughout the County by interdicting illicit radiation.

FISCAL IMPACT/FINANCING

The Department will ensure designated representatives attend all training and exercise as required by the Grantor and as set forth in the STC Program’s Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP). The Department shall be reimbursed for personnel expenses associated with the attendance and participation of the Department’s designated representatives in any MYTEP training and/or exercise. Reimbursement shall be strictly limited to backfill overtime and overtime costs directly resulting from the Department’s designated representatives’ attendance and participation at such MYTEP
training and/or exercise, and shall be reimbursed at a rate and amount as approved by the Mayor’s Office and the Grantor.

The City will reimburse the Department using grant funds to defray the Department’s personnel expenses associated with the STC Program training and exercise activities. Reimbursement claims for expenses will be submitted monthly. Future grant funds to be allocated to the Department are currently unknown, and will be agreed upon by the participating agencies each year. Therefore, in each subsequent FY, the Department seeks the Board’s approval to execute future amendments, as required by the City, for grant funds specific to that future FY.

The grant award in the amount of $140,625.00 for FY 2021-22 will be used for salary and employee benefits (overtime).

FACTS AND PROVISIONS/LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to the STC Program, the Mayor’s Office provides the Department with radiation detection equipment, which shall be used by trained personnel on a daily basis. Department personnel participating in the STC Program will receive appropriate training in radiation interdiction. Reimbursement for this training will be funded by the Mayor’s Office under the Agreement through backfill overtime. All grant funds will continue to be utilized in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

The Department seeks delegated authority to execute both the Agreement and the MOU, and amendments thereto, related to the Department’s participation in the STC Program.

The attached Agreement and MOU have been approved as to form by County Counsel.

IMPACT ON CURRENT SERVICES (OR PROJECTS)

None. The Department will receive training and equipment to conduct radiation safety operations to safeguard the operational area against dirty bombs and nuclear weapons.
CONCLUSION

Upon Board approval, it is requested that the Executive Officer-Clerk of the Board return one original executed copy of the Board letter to the Department’s Special Operations Division.

Sincerely,

ALEX VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF

TIMOTHY MURAKAMI
UNDERSHERIFF
CERTIFICATION REGARDING
DEBARMENT, SUSPENSION, INELIGIBILITY AND VOLUNTARY EXCLUSION
LOWER TIER COVERED TRANSACTIONS

This certification is required by the regulations implementing Executive Order 12549, Debarment and Suspension, 44 CFR Part 17, Participants' responsibilities.

(READ ATTACHED INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERTIFICATION BEFORE COMPLETING)

1. The prospective recipient (or subrecipient) of Federal assistance funds certifies that it or its principals:

   (a) Are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, sentenced to a denial of Federal benefits by a State or Federal court, or voluntarily excluded from covered transactions by any Federal department or agency;

   (b) Have not within a three-year period preceding this Agreement been convicted of or had a civil judgment rendered against them for commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public (Federal, State, or local) transaction or contract under a public transaction; violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes or commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, or receiving stolen property;

   (c) Are not presently indicted for or otherwise criminally or civilly charged by a governmental entity (Federal, State, or local) with commission of any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph 1(b) of this certification; and

   (d) Have not within a three-year period preceding this Agreement had one or more public transactions (Federal, State, or local) terminated for cause or default.

2. Where the prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds is unable to certify to any of the statements in this certification, such prospective participant shall attach an explanation to this proposal.

__________________________
AGREEMENT NUMBER

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

__________________________
RECIPIENT/SUBRECIPIENT/CONTRACTOR/BORROWER/AGENCY

__________________________
NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

__________________________
SIGNATURE DATE

__________________________
08/25/21
INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERTIFICATION

1. By signing and submitting this document, the prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds is providing the certification as set out below.

2. The certification in this clause is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when this transaction was entered into. If it is later determined that the prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds knowingly rendered an erroneous certification, in addition to other remedies available to the Federal Government, the department or agency with which this transaction originated may pursue available remedies, including suspension and/or debarment.

3. The prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds shall provide immediate written notice to the person to which this agreement is entered, if at any time the prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds learns that its certification was erroneous, when submitted or has become erroneous by reason of changed circumstances.


5. The prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds agrees by submitting this proposal that, should the proposed covered transaction be entered into, it shall not knowingly enter into any lower tier covered transaction with a person who is debarred, suspended, declared ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from participation in this covered transaction, unless authorized by the department or agency with which this transaction originated.

6. The prospective recipient of Federal assistance funds further agrees by submitting this proposal that it will include the clause titled "Certification Regarding Debarment, Suspension, Ineligibility and Voluntary Exclusion - Lower Tier Covered Transactions," without modification, in all lower tier covered transactions and in all solicitations for lower tier covered transactions.

7. A participant in a covered transaction may rely upon a certification of a prospective participant in a lower tier covered transaction that it is not debarred, suspended, ineligible, or voluntarily excluded from the covered transaction, unless it knows that the certification is erroneous. A participant may decide the method and frequency by which it determines the eligibility of its principals. Each participant may, but is not required to, check the List of Parties Excluded from Procurement or Non-Procurement Programs.

8. Nothing contained in the foregoing shall be construed to require establishment of a system of records in order to render in good faith the certification required by this clause. The knowledge and information of a participant is not required to exceed that which is normally possessed by a prudent person in the ordinary course of business dealings.

9. Except for transactions authorized under Paragraph 5 of these instructions, if a participant in a covered transaction knowingly enters into a lower tier covered transaction with a person who is suspended, debarred, ineligible, or voluntary excluded from participation in this transaction, in addition to other remedies available to the Federal Government, the department or agency with which this transaction originated may pursue available remedies, including suspension and/or debarment.
CERTIFICATION REGARDING LOBBYING
Certification for Contracts, Grants, Loans
and Cooperative Agreements

The undersigned certifies, to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that:

1. No Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid, by or on behalf of the
undersigned, to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee
of an agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of
a Member of Congress in connection with the awarding of any Federal contract, the making
of any Federal grant, the making of any Federal loan, the entering into of any cooperative
agreement, and the extension, continuation, renewal, amendment, or modification of any
Federal contract, grant, loan or cooperative agreement.

2. If any funds other than Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid to any
person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a
Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of
Congress in connection with this Federal contract, grant, loan, or cooperative agreement, the
undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form-LLL "Disclosure Form to Report
Lobbying" in accordance with its instructions.

3. The undersigned shall require that the language of this certification be included in the award
documents for all subawards at all tiers (including subcontracts, subgrants, and contracts
under grants, loans, and cooperative agreements) and that all subrecipients shall certify and
disclose accordingly.

4. This certification is a material representation of fact upon which reliance was placed when
this transaction was made or entered into. Submission of this certification is a prerequisite
for making or entering into this transaction imposed by Section 1352 Title 31, U.S. Code.
Any person who fails to file the required certification shall be subject to a civil penalty of not
less that $10,000 and not more than $100,000 for each such failure.

AGREEMENT NUMBER
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

SUBRECIPIENT/CONTRACTOR/BORROWER/AGENCY

TIMOTHY MURAOKA UNDERSHERIFF

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

SIGNATURE DATE
08/25/21
CERTIFICATION REGARDING DRUG FREE WORKPLACE ACT REQUIREMENTS

(Capitalized terms herein shall have those meanings set forth in the Agreement to which this Certification is attached as an Exhibit)

The Contractor/Subrecipient certifies that it will or will continue to provide a drug-free workplace, in accordance with the federal Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. 701 et seq.), 28 CFR Part 67; and the California Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1990, Government Code §§ 8350-8357, by:

1. Publishing a statement notifying employees that the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the Contractor’s workplace and specifying the actions that will be taken against employees for violation of such prohibition.

2. Establishing an on-going drug-free awareness program to inform employees about:
   a. The dangers of drug abuse in the workplace;
   b. The Contractor’s policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace;
   c. Any available drug counseling, rehabilitation and employee assistance programs; and
   d. The penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse violations occurring in the workplace.

3. Making it a requirement that each employee to be engaged in the performance of the program be given a copy of the statement required by paragraph 1. above.

4. Notifying the employee in the statement required by paragraph 1. that, as a condition of employment under the Grant program, the employee will:
   a. Abide by the terms of the statement, and
   b. Notify the Contractor in writing of his or her conviction for a violation of a criminal drug statute occurring in the workplace no later than five calendar days after such conviction.

5. Notifying the City and Grantor, in writing, within 10 calendar days after receiving notice under subparagraph 4. b. from an employee or otherwise receiving actual notice of such conviction. Employers of convicted employees must provide notice, including position title, to:
   Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs
   ATTN: Control Desk
   633 Indiana Avenue, N.W.
   Washington, D.C. 20531

6. Taking one of the following actions, within 30 calendar days of receiving notice under subparagraph 4.b. with respect to any employee who is so convicted:
   a. Taking appropriate personnel action against such an employee, up to and including termination, consistent with the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended; or
   b. Requiring such employee to participate satisfactorily in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program approved for such purposes by a Federal, State, or local health, law enforcement, or other appropriate agency.

7. Making a good faith effort to continue to maintain a drug-free workplace through implementation of the provisions of this certification.

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

SUBRECIPIENT/CONTRACTOR/BORROWER/AGENCY

NAME AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE

AGREEMENT #

DATE
2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions

The 2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions apply to all new federal financial assistance awards funded in FY 2020. These terms and conditions flow down to subrecipients, unless an award term or condition specifically indicates otherwise. The United States has the right to seek judicial enforcement of these obligations.

Assurances, Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, Representations and Certifications

DHS financial assistance recipients must complete either the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Standard Form 424B Assurances – Non-Construction Programs, or OMB Standard Form 424D Assurances – Construction Programs, as applicable. Certain assurances in these documents may not be applicable to your program, and the DHS financial assistance office (DHS FAO) may require applicants to certify additional assurances. Applicants are required to fill out the assurances applicable to their program as instructed by the awarding agency. Please contact the DHS FAO if you have any questions.

DHS financial assistance recipients are required to follow the applicable provisions of the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards located at Title 2, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 200, and adopted by DHS at 2 C.F.R. Part 3002.

DHS Specific Acknowledgements and Assurances

All recipients, subrecipients, successors, transferees, and assignees must acknowledge and agree to comply with applicable provisions governing DHS access to records, accounts, documents, information, facilities, and staff.

1. Recipients must cooperate with any compliance reviews or compliance investigations conducted by DHS.

2. Recipients must give DHS access to, and the right to examine and copy, records, accounts, and other documents and sources of information related to the federal financial assistance award and permit access to facilities, personnel, and other individuals and information as may be necessary, as required by DHS regulations and other applicable laws or program guidance.

3. Recipients must submit timely, complete, and accurate reports to the appropriate DHS officials and maintain appropriate backup documentation to support the reports.

4. Recipients must comply with all other special reporting, data collection, and evaluation requirements, as prescribed by law or detailed in program guidance.

5. Recipients of federal financial assistance from DHS must complete the DHS Civil Rights Evaluation Tool within thirty (30) days of receipt of the Notice of Award or, for State Administering Agencies, thirty (30) days from receipt of the DHS Civil Rights Evaluation Tool from DHS or its awarding component agency. After the initial submission for the first award under which this term applies, recipients are required to provide this information once every two (2) years if they have an active award, not every time an award is made. Recipients should submit the completed tool, including supporting materials, to CivilRightsEvaluation@hq.dhs.gov. This tool clarifies the civil rights obligations and related reporting requirements contained in the DHS Standard Terms and Conditions. Subrecipients are not required to complete and submit this tool to DHS. The evaluation tool can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-civil-rights-evaluation-tool.
2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions

6. The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties will consider, in its discretion, granting an extension if the recipient identifies steps and a timeline for completing the tool. Recipients should request extensions by emailing the request to CivilRightsEvaluation@hq.dhs.gov prior to expiration of the 30-day deadline.

Standard Terms & Conditions

I. Acknowledgement of Federal Funding from DHS
Recipients must acknowledge their use of federal funding when issuing statements, press releases, requests for proposal, bid invitations, and other documents describing projects or programs funded in whole or in part with federal funds.

II. Activities Conducted Abroad
Recipients must ensure that project activities carried on outside the United States are coordinated as necessary with appropriate government authorities and that appropriate licenses, permits, or approvals are obtained.

III. Age Discrimination Act of 1975
Recipients must comply with the requirements of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Public Law Number 94-135 (1975) (codified as amended at Title 42, U.S. Code § 6101 et seq.), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.

IV. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

V. Best Practices for Collection and Use of Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
Recipients who collect personally identifiable information (PII) are required to have a publicly available privacy policy that describes standards on the usage and maintenance of the PII they collect. DHS defines PII as any information that permits the identity of an individual to be directly or indirectly inferred, including any information that is linked or linkable to that individual. Recipients may also find the DHS Privacy Impact Assessments: Privacy Guidance and Privacy Template as useful resources respectively.

VI. Civil Rights Act of 1964 – Title VI
Recipients must comply with the requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.), which provides that no person in the United States will, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. DHS implementing regulations for the Act are found at 6 C.F.R. Part 21 and 44 C.F.R. Part 7.

VII. Civil Rights Act of 1968
Recipients must comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, as amended through Pub. L. 113-4, which prohibits recipients from discriminating in the sale, rental, financing, and advertising of dwellings, or in the provision of services in connection therewith, on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, disability, familial status, and sex (see
2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions

42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.), as implemented by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development at 24 C.F.R. Part 100. The prohibition on disability discrimination includes the requirement that new multifamily housing with four or more dwelling units—i.e., the public and common use areas and individual apartment units (all units in buildings with elevators and ground-floor units in buildings without elevators)—be designed and constructed with certain accessible features. (See 24 C.F.R. Part 100, Subpart D.)

VIII. Copyright
Recipients must affix the applicable copyright notices of 17 U.S.C. §§ 401 or 402 and an acknowledgement of U.S. Government sponsorship (including the award number) to any work first produced under federal financial assistance awards.

IX. Debarment and Suspension
Recipients are subject to the non-procurement debarment and suspension regulations implementing Executive Orders (E.O.) 12549 and 12689, which are at 2 C.F.R. Part 180 as adopted by DHS at 2 C.F.R. Part 3002. These regulations restrict federal financial assistance awards, subawards, and contracts with certain parties that are debarred, suspended, or otherwise excluded from or ineligible for participation in federal assistance programs or activities.

X. Drug-Free Workplace Regulations

XI. Duplication of Benefits
Any cost allocable to a particular federal financial assistance award provided for in 2 C.F.R. Part 200, Subpart E may not be charged to other federal financial assistance awards to overcome fund deficiencies, to avoid restrictions imposed by federal statutes, regulations, or federal financial assistance award terms and conditions; or for other reasons. However, these prohibitions would not preclude recipients from shifting costs that are allowable under two or more awards in accordance with existing federal statutes, regulations, or the federal financial assistance award terms and conditions.

XII. Education Amendments of 1972 (Equal Opportunity in Education Act) — Title IX
Recipients must comply with the requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318 (1972) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.), which provide that no person in the United States will, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. DHS implementing regulations are codified at 6 C.F.R. Part 17 and 44 C.F.R. Part 19.

XIII. Energy Policy and Conservation Act
Recipients must comply with the requirements of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. 94-163 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq.), which contain policies relating to energy efficiency that are defined in the state energy conservation plan issued in compliance with this Act.
2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions

XIV. False Claims Act and Program Fraud Civil Remedies
Recipients must comply with the requirements of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, which prohibit the submission of false or fraudulent claims for payment to the federal government. (See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3812, which details the administrative remedies for false claims and statements made.)

XV. Federal Debt Status
All recipients are required to be non-delinquent in their repayment of any federal debt. Examples of relevant debt include delinquent payroll and other taxes, audit disallowances, and benefit overpayments. (See OMB Circular A-129.)

XVI. Federal Leadership on Reducing Text Messaging while Driving
Recipients are encouraged to adopt and enforce policies that ban text messaging while driving as described in E.O. 13513, including conducting initiatives described in Section 3(a) of the Order when on official government business or when performing any work for or on behalf of the federal government.

XVII. Fly America Act of 1974
Recipients must comply with Preference for U.S. Flag Air Carriers (air carriers holding certificates under 49 U.S.C. § 41102) for international air transportation of people and property to the extent that such service is available, in accordance with the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 40118, and the interpretative guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the United States in the March 31, 1981, amendment to Comptroller General Decision B-138942.

XVIII. Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990

XIX. Limited English Proficiency (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI)
Recipients must comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) prohibition against discrimination on the basis of national origin, which requires that recipients of federal financial assistance take reasonable steps to provide meaningful access to persons with limited English proficiency (LEP) to their programs and services. For additional assistance and information regarding language access obligations, please refer to the DHS Recipient Guidance: https://www.dhs.gov/guidance-published-help-department-supported-organizations-provide-meaningful-access-people-limited and additional resources on http://www.lep.gov.

XX. Lobbying Prohibitions
Recipients must comply with 31 U.S.C. § 1352, which provides that none of the funds provided under a federal financial assistance award may be expended by the recipient to pay any person to influence, or attempt to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with any federal action related to a federal award or contract, including any extension, continuation, renewal, amendment, or modification.
2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions

XXI. National Environmental Policy Act
Recipients must comply with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (NEPA)) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA, which require recipients to use all practicable means within their authority, and consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to create and maintain conditions under which people and nature can exist in productive harmony and fulfill the social, economic, and other needs of present and future generations of Americans.

XXII. Nondiscrimination in Matters Pertaining to Faith-Based Organizations
It is DHS policy to ensure the equal treatment of faith-based organizations in social service programs administered or supported by DHS or its component agencies, enabling those organizations to participate in providing important social services to beneficiaries. Recipients must comply with the equal treatment policies and requirements contained in 5 C.F.R. Part 19 and other applicable statutes, regulations, and guidance governing the participations of faith-based organizations in individual DHS programs.

XXIII. Non-Supplanting Requirement
Recipients receiving federal financial assistance awards made under programs that prohibit supplanting by law must ensure that federal funds do not replace (supplant) funds that have been budgeted for the same purpose through non-federal sources.

XXIV. Notice of Funding Opportunity Requirements
All instructions, guidance, limitations, and other conditions set forth in the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for this program are incorporated here by reference in the award terms and conditions. All recipients must comply with any such requirements set forth in the program NOFO.

XXV. Patents and Intellectual Property Rights
Recipients are subject to the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200 et seq., unless otherwise provided by law. Recipients are subject to the specific requirements governing the development, reporting, and disposition of rights to inventions and patents resulting from federal financial assistance awards located at 37 C.F.R. Part 401 and the standard patent rights clause located at 37 C.F.R. § 401.14.

XXVI. Procurement of Recovered Materials
States, political subdivisions of states, and their contractors must comply with Section 6002 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. 89-272 (1965), (codified as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6962.) The requirements of Section 6002 include procuring only items designated in guidelines of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 C.F.R. Part 247 that contain the highest percentage of recovered materials practicable, consistent with maintaining a satisfactory level of competition.

XXVII. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Recipients must comply with the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112 (1973), (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794,) which provides that no otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in the United States will, solely by reason of the handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions

XXVIII. Reporting of Matters Related to Recipient Integrity and Performance

1. General Reporting Requirements
If the total value of any currently active grants, cooperative agreements, and procurement contracts from all federal awarding agencies exceeds $10,000,000 for any period of time during the period of performance of this federal award, then the recipients during that period of time must maintain the currency of information reported to the System for Award Management (SAM) that is made available in the designated integrity and performance system (currently the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) about civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings described in paragraph 2 of this award term and condition. This is a statutory requirement under Pub. L. 110-417, § 872, as amended 41 U.S.C. § 2313. As required by Pub. L. 111-212, § 3010, all information posted in the designated integrity and performance system on or after April 15, 2011, except past performance reviews required for federal procurement contracts, will be publicly available.

2. Proceedings about Which Recipients Must Report
   Recipients must submit the required information about each proceeding that:
   a. Is in connection with the award or performance of a grant, cooperative agreement, or procurement contract from the federal government;
   b.Reached its final disposition during the most recent five-year period; and
   c. One or more of the following:
      1) A criminal proceeding that resulted in a conviction, as defined in paragraph 5 of this award term and condition;
      2) A civil proceeding that resulted in a finding of fault and liability and payment of a monetary fine, penalty, reimbursement, restitution, or damages of $5,000 or more;
      3) An administrative proceeding, as defined in paragraph 5, that resulted in a finding of fault and liability and the recipient's payment of either a monetary fine or penalty of $5,000 or more or reimbursement, restitution, or damages in excess of $100,000; or
      4) Any other criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding if:
         a) It could have led to an outcome described in this award term and condition;
         b) It had a different disposition arrived at by consent or compromise with an acknowledgment of fault on the recipient's part; and
         c) The requirement in this award term and condition to disclose information about the proceeding does not conflict with applicable laws and regulations.

3. Reporting Procedures
   Recipients must enter the information that SAM requires about each proceeding described in paragraph 2 of this award term and condition in the SAM Entity Management area.
   Recipients do not need to submit the information a second time under financial assistance awards that the recipient received if the recipient already provided the information through SAM because it was required to do so under federal procurement contracts that the recipient was awarded.
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4. Reporting Frequency
During any period when recipients are subject to the main requirement in paragraph 1 of this award term and condition, recipients must report proceedings information through SAM for the most recent five-year period, either to report new information about any proceeding(s) that recipients have not reported previously or affirm that there is no new information to report. Recipients that have federal contract, grant, and cooperative agreement awards with a cumulative total value greater than $10,000,000 must disclose semiannually any information about the criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings.

5. Definitions
For the purpose of this award term and condition:

a. Administrative proceeding: means a non-judicial process that is adjudicatory in nature to decide of fault or liability (e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission Administrative proceedings, Civilian Board of Contract Appeals proceedings, and Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals proceedings). This includes proceedings at the federal and state level but only in connection with performance of a federal contract or grant. It does not include audits, site visits, corrective plans, or inspection of deliverables.

b. Conviction: means a judgment or conviction of a criminal offense by any court of competent jurisdiction, whether entered upon a verdict or a plea, and includes a conviction entered upon a plea of nolo contendere.

c. Total value of currently active grants, cooperative agreements, and procurement contracts includes—
   1) Only the federal share of the funding under any federal award with a recipient cost share or match; and
   2) The value of all expected funding increments under a federal award and options, even if not yet exercised.

XXIX. Reporting Subawards and Executive Compensation

1. Reporting of first-tier subawards.

a. Applicability. Unless the recipient is exempt as provided in paragraph 4 of this award term, the recipient must report each action that obligates $25,000 or more in federal funds that does not include Recovery funds (as defined in Section 1512(a)(2) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5) for a subaward to an entity (See definitions in paragraph 5 of this award term).

b. Where and when to report.
   1) Recipients must report each obligating action described in paragraph 1 of this award term to the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act Subaward Reporting System (FSRS.)
   2) For subaward information, recipients report no later than the end of the month following the month in which the obligation was made. For example, if the obligation was made on November 7, 2016, the obligation must be reported by no later than December 31, 2016.
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c. What to report. The recipient must report the information about each obligating action that
the submission instructions posted at http://www.fsrs.gov.

2. Reporting Total Compensation of Recipient Executives.

a. Applicability and what to report. Recipients must report total compensation for
each of the five most highly compensated executives for the preceding completed
fiscal year, if—

1) The total federal funding authorized to date under this award is $25,000 or more;

2) In the preceding fiscal year, recipients received—

   a) 80 percent or more of recipients' annual gross revenues from federal
procurement contracts (and subcontracts) and federal financial assistance
subject to the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act
(Transparency Act), as defined at 2 C.F.R. 170.320 (and subawards); and

   b) $25,000,000 or more in annual gross revenues from federal procurement
contracts (and subcontracts) and federal financial assistance subject to the
Transparency Act, as defined at 2 C.F.R. 170.320 (and subawards); and

   c) The public does not have access to information about the compensation of
the executives through periodic reports filed under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a), 78o(d)) or Section
6104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (See the U.S. Security and
Exchange Commission total compensation filings at
http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm. to determine if the public has
access to the compensation information.)

b. Where and when to report. Recipients must report executive total compensation
described in paragraph 2.a. of this award term:

1) As part of the recipient’s registration profile at https://www.sam.gov.

2) By the end of the month following the month in which this award is made, and annually
thereafter.

3. Reporting of Total Compensation of Subrecipient Executives.

a. Applicability and what to report. Unless recipients are exempt as provided in
paragraph 4. of this award term, for each first-tier subrecipient under this award,
recipients shall report the names and total compensation of each of the
subrecipient's five most highly compensated executives for the subrecipient's
preceding completed fiscal year, if—

1) In the subrecipient's preceding fiscal year, the subrecipient received—

   a) 80 percent or more of its annual gross revenues from Federal procurement contracts
(and subcontracts) and Federal financial assistance subject to the Transparency
Act, as defined at 2 C.F.R. 170.320 (and subawards); and
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b) $25,000,000 or more in annual gross revenues from Federal procurement contracts (and subcontracts), and federal financial assistance subject to the Transparency Act (and subawards); and

c) The public does not have access to information about the compensation of the executives through periodic reports filed under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a), 78o(d)) or Section 6104 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. (See the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission total compensation filings at http://www.sec.gov/answers/execomp.htm. to determine if the public has access to the compensation information.)

b. Where and when to report. Subrecipients must report subrecipient executive total compensation described in paragraph 3.a. of this award term:

1) To the recipient.

2) By the end of the month following the month during which recipients make the subaward. For example, if a subaward is obligated on any date during the month of October of a given year (i.e., between October 1 and 31), subrecipients must report any required compensation information of the subrecipient by November 30 of that year.

4. Exemptions
If, in the previous tax year, recipients had gross income, from all sources, under $300,000, then recipients are exempt from the requirements to report:

a. Subawards, and

b. The total compensation of the five most highly compensated executives of any subrecipient.

5. Definitions For purposes of this award term:

a. Entity: means all of the following, as defined in 2 C.F.R. Part 25:
   1) A governmental organization, which is a state, local government, or Indian tribe.
   2) A foreign public entity.
   3) A domestic or foreign nonprofit organization.
   4) A domestic or foreign for-profit organization.
   5) A federal agency, but only as a subrecipient under an award or subaward to a non-federal entity.

b. Executive: means officers, managing partners, or any other employees in management positions.

c. Subaward: means a legal instrument to provide support for the performance of any portion of the substantive project or program for which the recipient received this award and that the recipient awards to an eligible subrecipient.
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1) The term does not include recipients’ procurement of property and services needed to carry out the project or program.

2) A subaward may be provided through any legal agreement, including an agreement that a recipient or a subrecipient considers a contract.

d. Subrecipient: means an entity that:

1) Receives a subaward from the recipient under this award; and

2) Is accountable to the recipient for the use of the federal funds provided by the subaward.

e. Total compensation: means the cash and noncash dollar value earned by the executive during the recipient’s or subrecipient’s preceding fiscal year and includes the following (See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c)(2)):

1) Salary and bonus.

2) Awards of stock, stock options, and stock appreciation rights. Use the dollar amount recognized for financial statement reporting purposes with respect to the fiscal year in accordance with the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (Revised 2004) (FAS 123R), Shared Based Payments.

3) Earnings for services under non-equity incentive plans. This does not include group life, health, hospitalization or medical reimbursement plans that do not discriminate in favor of executives and are available generally to all salaried employees.

4) Change in pension value. This is the change in present value of defined benefit and actuarial pension plans.

5) Above-market earnings on deferred compensation which is not tax-qualified.

6) Other compensation, if the aggregate value of all such other compensation (e.g. severance, termination payments, value of life insurance paid on behalf of the employee, perquisites or property) for the executive exceeds $10,000.

XXX. SAFECOM
Recipients receiving federal financial assistance awards made under programs that provide emergency communication equipment and its related activities must comply with the SAFECOM Guidance for Emergency Communication Grants, including provisions on technical standards that ensure and enhance interoperable communications.

XXXI. Terrorist Financing
Recipients must comply with E.O. 13224 and U.S. laws that prohibit transactions with, and the provisions of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with terrorism. Recipients are legally responsible to ensure compliance with the Order and laws.
XXXII. **Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA)**

Trafficking in Persons.

1. **Provisions applicable to a recipient that is a private entity.**
   
   a. Recipients, the employees, subrecipients under this award, and subrecipients' employees may not—
   
      1) Engage in severe forms of trafficking in persons during the period the award is in effect.
   
      2) Procure a commercial sex act during the period that the award is in effect.
   
      3) Use forced labor in the performance of the award or subawards under the award.
   
   b. DHS may unilaterally terminate this award, without penalty, if a recipient or a subrecipient that is a private entity —
   
      1) Is determined to have violated a prohibition in paragraph 1.a of this award term; or
   
      2) Has an employee who is determined by the agency official authorized to terminate the award to have violated a prohibition in paragraph 1.a of this award term through conduct that is either—
   
         a) Associated with performance under this award; or
   
         b) Imputed to recipients or subrecipients using the standards and due process for imputing the conduct of an individual to an organization that are provided in 2 C.F.R. Part 180, "OMB Guidelines to Agencies on Government-wide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement),” as implemented by our agency at 2 C.F.R. Part 3000.

2. **Provision applicable to recipients other than a private entity.**

   DHS may unilaterally terminate this award, without penalty, if a subrecipient that is a private entity—

   a. Is determined to have violated an applicable prohibition in paragraph 1.a of this award term; or

   b. Has an employee who is determined by the agency official authorized to terminate the award to have violated an applicable prohibition in paragraph 1.a of this award term through conduct that is either—

      1) Associated with performance under this award; or

      2) Imputed to the subrecipient using the standards and due process for imputing the conduct of an individual to an organization that are provided in 2 C.F.R. Part 180, "OMB Guidelines to Agencies on Government-wide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement),” as implemented by our agency at 2 C.F.R. Part 3000.
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3. Provisions applicable to any recipient.
   
   a. Recipients must inform DHS immediately of any information received from any source alleging a violation of a prohibition in paragraph 1.a of this award term.
   
   b. It is DHS’s right to terminate unilaterally that is described in paragraph 1.b or 2 of this section:
      
      1) Implements TVPA, Section 106(g) as amended by 22 U.S.C. 7104(g)), and
      
      2) Is in addition to all other remedies for noncompliance that are available to us under this award.
   
   c. Recipients must include the requirements of paragraph 1.a of this award term in any subaward made to a private entity.

4. Definitions. For the purposes of this award term:

   a. Employee: means either:
      
      1) An individual employed by a recipient or a subrecipient who is engaged in the performance of the project or program under this award, or
      
      2) Another person engaged in the performance of the project or program under this award and not compensated by the recipient including, but not limited to, a volunteer or individual whose services are contributed by a third party as an in-kind contribution toward cost sharing or matching requirements.

   b. Forced labor: means labor obtained by any of the following methods: the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.

   c. Private entity: means any entity other than a state, local government, Indian tribe, or foreign public entity, as those terms are defined in 2 C.F.R. § 175.25. It includes:
      
      1) A nonprofit organization, including any nonprofit institution of higher education, hospital, or tribal organization other than one included in the definition of Indian tribe at 2 C.F.R. § 175.25(b).
      
      2) A for-profit organization.

   d. Severe forms of trafficking in persons, commercial sex act, and coercion are defined in TVPA, Section 103, as amended in 22 U.S.C. § 7102.

XXXIII. Universal Identifier and System of Award Management

1. Requirement for System for Award Management

   Unless the recipient is exempted from this requirement under 2 C.F.R. § 25.110, the recipient must maintain the currency of their information in the SAM until the recipient submits the final financial report required under this award or receive the final payment, whichever is later. This requires that the recipient review and update the information at least annually after the initial registration, and more frequently if required by changes in the recipient’s information or...
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another award term.

2. Requirement for unique entity identifier
   If recipients are authorized to make subawards under this award, they:

   a. Must notify potential subrecipients that no entity (see definition in paragraph 3 of this
      award term) may receive a subaward from the recipient unless the entity has provided its
      unique entity identifier to the recipient.

   b. May not make a subaward to an entity unless the entity has provided its unique entity
      identifier to the recipient.

3. Definitions
   For purposes of this award term:

   a. System for Award Management (SAM): means the federal repository into which an
      entity must provide information required for the conduct of business as a recipient.
      Additional information about registration procedures may be found on SAM.gov.

   b. Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): means the identifier required for SAM registration to
      uniquely identify business entities.

   c. Entity: means all of the following, as defined at 2 C.F.R. Part 25, Subpart C:

      1) A governmental organization, which is a state, local government, or Indian Tribe;
      2) A foreign public entity;
      3) A domestic or foreign nonprofit organization;
      4) A domestic or foreign for-profit organization; and
      5) A federal agency, but only as a subrecipient under an award or subaward to a non-
         federal entity.

   d. Subaward: means a legal instrument to provide support for the performance of any
      portion of the substantive project or program for which a recipient received this award
      and that the recipient awards to an eligible subrecipient.

      1) The term does not include the recipient's procurement of property and services
         needed to carry out the project or program. (See 2 C.F.R. § 200.330.)

      2) A subaward may be provided through any legal agreement, including an
         agreement that a recipient considers a contract.

   e. Subrecipient means an entity that:

      1) Receives a subaward from the recipient under this award; and

      2) Is accountable to the recipient for the use of the federal funds provided by the
         subaward.
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XXXIV. **USA PATRIOT Act of 2001**
Recipients must comply with requirements of Section 817 of the *Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001* (USA PATRIOT Act), which amends 18 U.S.C. §§ 175–175c.

XXXV. **Use of DHS Seal, Logo and Flags**
Recipients must obtain permission from their DHS FAO prior to using the DHS seal(s), logos, crests or reproductions of flags or likenesses of DHS agency officials, including use of the United States Coast Guard seal, logo, crests or reproductions of flags or likenesses of Coast Guard officials.

XXXVI. **Whistleblower Protection Act**
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT TERMS AND CONDITIONS
GRANTS AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE DIVISION (GFAD)

In addition to the DHS Standard Terms and Conditions as outlined here: http://www.dhs.gov/publication/ty15-dhs-standard-terms-and-conditions, the following Terms and Conditions apply specifically to this award as administered by the Grants and Financial Assistance Division (GFAD):

ARTICLE I. GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE TERMS AND CONDITIONS

A. AWARD SPECIFIC TERMS AND CONDITIONS
   There are no award specific terms and conditions

B. DHS PROGRAMMATIC INVOLVEMENT
   1. Closely coordinate planning, operations, and information exchange between regional partners, CWMD, and other Federal agencies.
   2. Conduct training and exercises to further the nuclear detection mission in the region and gain proficiency in detection operations.
   3. Develop a robust mobile architecture and equipment set for both land and maritime pathways focused on steady-state operations that is flexible enough to surge to enhanced detection postures.
   4. Execute an information exchange methodology so that multiple STC regions may exchange data amongst each other, CWMD, and other Federal partners.
   5. Achieve better integration of Federal, State, and local capabilities allowing regional support to national operations, in accordance with the Domestic Detection CONOPS. CWMD will provide the Domestic Detection CONOPS to grant recipients along with templates for regional and local operational plans and procedures.

C. AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
   1. Budget Revisions
      a. The Recipient shall obtain prior written approval from the DHS Grants Officer for transfers of funds between direct cost categories in the approved budget when such cumulative transfers among those direct cost categories exceed ten percent of the total budget approved.
      b. The Recipient shall obtain prior written approval from the DHS Grants Officer for any budget revision that would result in the need for additional resources/funds.
      c. The Recipient is not authorized at any time to transfer amounts budgeted for direct costs to the indirect costs line item or vice versa, without prior written approval of the DHS Grants Officer.
   2. Extension Request
a. Extensions to the Period of Performance can only be authorized in writing by the DHS Grants Officer.

b. The extension request shall be submitted to the DHS Grants Officer sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date of the performance period.

c. Requests for time extensions to the Period of Performance will be considered, but will not be granted automatically, and must be supported by adequate justification in order to be processed. The justification is a written explanation of the reason or reasons for the delay; an outline of remaining resources/funds available to support the extended Period of Performance; and a description of performance measures necessary to complete the project. In addition, extension requests shall not be processed without up-to-date performance and financial status reports.

d. DHS has no obligation to provide additional resources/funding as a result of an extension.

D. EQUIPMENT

1. Title to equipment acquired by the Recipient with Federal funds provided under this Award shall vest in the Recipient, subject to the conditions pertaining to equipment in the 2 CFR Part 200.

2. Prior to the purchase of Equipment in the amount of $5,000 or more per unit cost, the recipient must obtain the written approval from DHS.

submit an inventory that will include a description of the property; manufacturer model number, serial number or other identification number; the source of property; name on title; acquisition date; and cost of the unit; the address of use; operational condition of the property; and, disposition data, if applicable. This report will be due with the Final Progress Report ninety (90) days after the expiration of the Project Period, and shall be submitted via GrantSolutions using the using the help/Support guidance entitled, "Quicksheet: Add a Grant Note" guidance found here: https://www.grantsolutions.gov/support/granteeUsers.html

E. FINANCIAL REPORTS


F. PAYMENT
The Recipient shall be paid in advance using the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/Payment Management System, provided it maintains or demonstrates the willingness and ability to maintain procedures to minimize the time elapsing between the transfer of the funds from the DHS and expenditure disbursement by the Recipient. When these requirements are not met, the Recipient will be required to be on a reimbursement for costs incurred method.

Any overpayment of funds must be coordinated with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services/Payment Management System.

G. PERFORMANCE REPORTS

1. Quarterly Performance Reports – the Recipient shall submit performance reports into the GrantSolutions system no later than thirty (30) days after the end of the reporting period end date. Reports are due on April 30th, July 30th, October 30th and January 30th. The report shall be submitted via GrantSolutions using the using the help/support guidance entitled, "Quicksheet: Add a Grant Note" found here: https://www.grantsolutions.gov/support/granteeUsers.html. Please remember to include the program name, report type (ie 1st Quarter program) and award number in the note subject line.

   a. Performance reports must provide information on the overall progress by quarter. These reports shall include:

      * A comparison of actual accomplishments with the goals and objectives established for the period.
      * Reasons why established objectives were not met, if applicable.
      * Other pertinent information including, when appropriate, analysis and explanation of cost overruns.

   b. If the performance report contains any information that is deemed proprietary, the Recipient will denote the beginning and ending of such information with asterisks (******)

   c. For submission of this information, complete the Performance Progress Report (PPR) found at: http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/29485.OMB #0970-0334.

2. Final Performance Report – the Recipient shall submit the Final Performance Report into the GrantSolutions system no later than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the Project Period. The Final Performance Report shall be submitted via GrantSolutions using the help/support guidance entitled, "Quicksheet: Add a Grant Note" found here: https://www.grantsolutions.gov/support/granteeUsers.html. Please remember to include the program name, report type (ie, 1st Quarter Program) and award number in the note subject line.
For submission of this information, complete the Performance Progress Report (PPR) found at: http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/29485 OMB #0970-0334.

H. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

The approved Project and Budget Periods for the supported activity is contingent upon the following:

1. Acceptable performance of the project as determined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS);

2. If applicable, acceptance and approval of each non-competing continuation application by the DHS;

3. Subject to the availability of annual DHS appropriated funds.

I. PRIOR APPROVAL REQUIRED

The Recipient shall not, without the prior written approval of the DHS, request reimbursement, incur costs or obligate funds for any purpose pertaining to the operation of the project, program, or activities prior to the approved Budget Period.

ARTICLE II. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS

A. ACCESS TO RECORDS.

The Recipient shall retain financial records, supporting documents, statistical records, and all other records pertinent to this Award for a period of three years from the date of submission of the final expenditure report. The only exceptions to the aforementioned record retention requirements are the following:

1. If any litigation, dispute, or audit is started before the expiration of the 3-year period, the records shall be retained until all litigation, dispute or audit findings involving the records have been resolved and final action taken.

2. Records for real property and equipment acquired with Federal funds shall be retained for three (3) years after final disposition.

3. The DHS Grants Officer may direct the Recipient to transfer certain records to DHS custody when he or she determines that the records possess long term retention value. However, in order to avoid duplicate recordkeeping, the DHS Grants Officer may make arrangements for the Recipient to retain any records that are continuously needed for joint use.

DHS, the Inspector General, Comptroller General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, have the right of timely and unrestricted access to any books, documents, papers, or other records of the Recipient that are pertinent to this Award, in order to make audits, examinations, excerpts, transcripts and copies of such documents. This right also includes timely and reasonable access to Recipient’s personnel for the purpose of interview and discussion related to such documents. The rights of access in this award term are not limited to the required retention period, but shall last as long as records are retained.
With respect to sub-recipients, DHS shall retain the right to conduct a financial review, require an audit, or otherwise ensure adequate accountability of organizations expending DHS funds.Recipient agrees to include in any sub-award made under this Agreement the requirements of this award term (Access to Records).

B. COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM OFFICE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The Compliance Assurance Program Office (CAPO) is comprised of the DHS Treaty Compliance Office (TCO), Export Control Group (ECG), and the DHS Regulatory Compliance Office (RCO). The Compliance Assurance Program Manager (CAPM) is the DHS official responsible for overseeing CAPO and implementing procedures to ensure that the Recipient and any Recipient institutions/collaborators under this Award comply with international treaties, federal regulations, and DHS policies for Arms Control Agreements, Biosafety, Select Agent and Toxin Security, Animal Care and Use, the Protection of Human Subjects, Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, and Export Controls.

CAPO collects and reviews relevant documentation pertaining to this Award on behalf of the Compliance Assurance Program Manager. Additional guidance regarding the review process is provided in the following sections, along with contact information for the TCO, RCO, and ECG. This guidance applies to the Recipient and any/all Recipient institutions involved in the performance of work under this Award. The Recipient is responsible for ensuring that any/all Recipient institutions and collaborators comply with all requirements and submit relevant documentation, as outlined in sections C – G below, for work being performed under this Award.

C. TREATY COMPLIANCE FOR BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE EFFORTS
The Recipient and any Recipient institution shall conduct all biological and chemical defense research, development, and acquisition projects in compliance with all arms control agreements of the U.S., including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). DHS Directive 041-01, Compliance With, and Implementation of, Arms Control Agreements, requires all such projects to be systematically evaluated for compliance at inception, prior to funding approval, whenever there is significant project change, and whenever in the course of project execution an issue potentially raises a compliance concern.

1. Requirements for Initial Treaty Compliance Review. To ensure compliance with DHS Directive 041-01, for each new biological and/or chemical defense-related effort (including paper and modeling studies) to be conducted under this Award, the Recipient must submit the following documentation for compliance review and certification prior to funding approval: a completed Treaty Compliance Form (TCF), which includes a Project Summary; a BWC Checklist; and/or a CWC Checklist.
2. Requirements for Ongoing Treaty Compliance Review. To ensure ongoing treaty compliance for approved biological and/or chemical defense-related efforts funded through this Award, the Recipient must submit the following documentation for review and approval prior to any significant project change and/or whenever in the course of project execution an issue potentially raises a compliance concern: an updated Treaty Compliance Form and an updated Statement of Work detailing the proposed modification. The proposed project modification must receive written approval from CAPO prior to initiation. Examples of project modifications include—but are not limited to—the addition of agents, a change in performer, modifications to the scope of work, and changes to the technical approach.

The Recipient should contact the Treaty Compliance Office (TCO) at treatycompliance@hq.dhs.gov to obtain the TCF template, submit the completed Form, or request additional guidance regarding TCO documentation and review requirements, as applicable to (1) new biological and/or chemical defense-related efforts, or (2) modifications to previously approved efforts. The TCO will review all submitted materials and provide written confirmation of approval to initiate work to the Recipient once the treaty compliance certification process is complete. The Recipient and any Recipient institution shall not initiate any new activities, or execute modifications to approved activities, until receipt of this written confirmation.

D. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE FOR BIOLOGICAL LABORATORY WORK

The Recipient and any Recipient institution shall conduct all biological laboratory work in compliance with applicable federal regulations; the latest edition of the CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories; DHS Directive 066-02, Biosafety; and any local institutional policies that may apply for Recipient institution facilities performing work under this Award. The Regulatory Compliance Office (RCO) will review the submitted Treaty Compliance Form (TCF) for planned work under this Award to determine the applicability of the requirements outlined in this section. The Recipient must contact the RCO at regulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov for guidance on the requirements, and then submit all required documentation based on RCO guidance, prior to the initiation of any biological laboratory work under this Award.

1. Requirements for All Biological Laboratory Work. Biological laboratory work includes laboratory activities involving: (1) recombinant DNA or 'rDNA'; (2) Biological Select Agents and Toxins or 'BSAT'; or (3) biological agents, toxins, or other biological materials that are non-rDNA and non-BSAT. Each Recipient and any Recipient institution to be conducting biological laboratory work under this Award must submit copies of the following documentation, as required by the RCO after review of the TCF(s), for review prior to the initiation of such work:

   a. Research protocol(s), research or project plan(s), or other detailed description of the biological laboratory work to be conducted;
   b. Documentation of project-specific biosafety review for biological laboratory work subject to such review in accordance with institutional policy;
   c. Institutional or laboratory biosafety manual (may be a related plan or program manual) for each facility/laboratory to be involved in the biological laboratory work;
d. Biosafety training program description (should be provided as available in existing policies, plans, and/or manuals for all relevant facilities/laboratories where work is conducted;

e. Documentation of the most recent safety/biosafety inspection(s) for each facility/laboratory where the biological laboratory work will be conducted;
f. Exposure Control Plan, as applicable;
g. Documentation from the most recent Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or State Occupational Safety and Health Agency inspection report; a copy of the OSHA Form 300 Summary of Work Related Injuries and Illnesses or equivalent, for the most recent calendar year; and documentation of any OSHA citations or notices of violation received in the past five years; and

h. Documentation from the most recent U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) inspection report; and documentation of any DOT citations or notices of violation received in the past five years.

2. Requirements for Research Involving Recombinant DNA (rDNA). Laboratory activities involving rDNA research are defined by the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, “NIH Guidelines”. Each Recipient and any Recipient institution shall conduct all rDNA work in compliance with the NIH Guidelines. In addition to the documentation referenced in Section B.1 above, each facility conducting research activities involving rDNA under this Award must submit copies of the following documentation to the RCO for review prior to the initiation of such activities:

   a. Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) Charter, and/or other available documentation of IBC policies and procedures;
   b. Most recent Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) acknowledgement letter of the annual IBC Report;
   c. IBC-approved rDNA research protocol(s); and
   d. Documentation of final IBC approval for each rDNA research protocol and all subsequent renewals and amendments as they occur.

3. Requirements for Activities Involving Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT). Planned activities involving the possession transfer, and/or use of BSAT must be reviewed by the RCO prior to initiation. This requirement also applies to activities involving select toxins that fall below the Permissible Toxin Limits, both at facilities registered with the National Select Agent Program and at unregistered facilities. Each Recipient and any Recipient institution shall conduct all BSAT work in compliance with all applicable regulations, including 42 CFR § 73, 7 CFR § 331, and 9 CFR § 121, related entity- and laboratory-specific policies and procedures, and DHS Directive 026-03, Select Agent and Toxin Security. In addition to the documentation referenced in Section B.1 above, each facility conducting activities involving BSAT under this Award must submit copies of the following documentation to the RCO for review prior to the initiation of such activities:

   a. Current APHIS/CDC Certificate of Registration;
   b. Most recent APHIS/CDC inspection report(s), response(s), and attachment(s);
   c. Current versions of the Biosafety, Security, and Incident Response Plans required and reviewed under the Select Agent Regulations; and
d. Documentation of the most recent annual BSAT facility inspection, as required of the Responsible Official under the Select Agent Regulations.

The Recipient should contact the CAPO at regulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov to obtain the RCO Documentation Request Checklist, submit documentation, or request more information regarding the DHS RCO documentation and compliance review requirements. The CAPO will provide written confirmation of receipt of all required documentation to the designated Point(s) of Contact. The CAPO will evaluate the submitted materials, along with available documentation from any previous reviews for related work at the Recipient and Recipient institution. Additional documentation may be required in some cases and must be submitted upon request. The CAPO will review all submitted materials and provide written confirmation to the Recipient once all requirements have been met.

CAPO review of submitted materials may determine the need for further compliance review requirements, which may include documentation-based and on-site components. The Recipient, and any Recipient institutions conducting biological laboratory work under this Award, must also comply with ongoing CAPO compliance assurance and review requirements, which may include but are not limited to initial and periodic documentation requests, program reviews, site visits, and facility inspections.

The Recipient must promptly report the following to the CAPO, along with any corrective actions taken: (1) any serious or continuing biosafety or BSAT program issues as identified by the APHIS/CDC National Select Agent Program, other compliance oversight authorities, or institutional-level reviews (e.g., IBC or equivalent, laboratory safety/biosafety inspections); (2) any suspension or revocation of the APHIS/CDC Certificate of Registration; and (3) any for-cause suspension or termination of biological, rDNA, or BSAT activities at the laboratories/facilities where DHS-sponsored work is conducted.

Foreign Contractors/Collaborators and U.S. Institutions with Foreign Subcomponents. Foreign organizations (including direct Contractors, Subcontractors, Grant Recipients, Sub-recipients, and subcomponents or collaborating partners to U.S. Recipients) are subject to applicable DHS requirements for biological laboratory activities. All entities involved in activities under this Award must comply with applicable national and regional/local regulations, and standards and guidelines equivalent to those described for U.S. institutions (e.g., BMBL and NIH Guidelines). The Recipient must provide CAPO documentation sufficient to illustrate this compliance. The CAPO will evaluate compliance measures for these institutions on a case-by-case basis. The Recipient must not initiate work nor provide funds for the conduct of biological laboratory work under this Award without CAPO’s formal written approval.

E. RESEARCH INVOLVING ANIMALS
The Recipient and any Recipient institution shall conduct all research involving animals under this Award in compliance with the requirements set forth in the Animal Welfare Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-544), as amended, and the associated regulations in 9 C.F.R., Chapter 1, Subchapter A; the Public Health Service (PHS) Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (which adopts the “U.S. Government Principles for the Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals used in Testing, Research, and Training”, 50 FR 20864, May 20, 1985); the National Research Council (NRC) Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals; the Federation of Animal Science Societies (FASS) Guide for the Care and Use of Agricultural Animals in Agricultural Research and Teaching; and any additional requirements set forth in the DHS Directive for the Care and Use of Animals in Research (026-01). Each Recipient and any Recipient institution planning to perform research involving animals under this Award must comply with the requirements and submit the documentation outlined in this section.

1. Requirements for Initial Review of Research Involving Animals. Research Involving Animals includes any research, experimentation, biological testing, and other related activities involving live, vertebrate animals, including any training for such activities. Each facility conducting research involving animals under this Award must submit copies of the following documentation to the CAPO for review prior to the initiation of such research:

   a. Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC)-approved animal research protocol(s), including documentation of IACUC approval, any protocol amendments, and related approval notifications;
   b. Public Health Service (PHS) Animal Welfare Assurance, including any programmatic amendments, and the most recent NIH Office of Laboratory Animal Welfare (OLAW) approval letter for each Recipient and Recipient institution; OR DHS Animal Welfare Assurance, if the Recipient is not funded by the PHS and does not have a PHS Assurance on file with OLAW. Any affiliated IACUCs must be established under the same requirements as set forth in the PHS Policy;
   c. Most recent IACUC semiannual program review and facility inspection reports covering all relevant facilities/laboratories involved in DHS-funded work; and
   d. Most recent Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC) inspection report(s) for AAALAC-accredited institution(s) housing and/or performing work involving animals under this Award.

All documentation, as well as any questions or concerns regarding the requirements referenced above, should be submitted to the CAPO at STregulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov. Additional documentation may be required in some cases and must be submitted upon request. The CAPO will review all submitted materials and provide written confirmation to the Recipient once all documentation requirements have been met. Upon receipt of this written confirmation, the Recipient may initiate approved animal research projects under this Award, but must address any potential compliance issues or concerns identified by the CAPO. Research involving the use of nonhuman primates or international collaborations involving animal research will require more extensive review prior to approval, and must not begin under this Award without first obtaining a formal certification letter from the CAPO.
The Recipient, as well as any Recipient institution and partner institutions conducting animal research under this Award, shall also comply with ongoing CAPO compliance assurance functions, which may include but are not limited to periodic site visits, program reviews, and facility inspections.

2. Requirements for Ongoing Review of Research Involving Animals. For ongoing animal research activities, each Recipient and any Recipient institutions must submit updates to the CAPO regarding any amendments or changes to (including expiration, renewal, or completion of) ongoing animal protocols as they occur, and may be required to submit annual updates regarding the ACU program at Recipient and Recipient institutions. Annual updates may include, but are not limited to, the IACUC semiannual (program review and facility inspection) reports, the USDA inspection report, and the most recent AAALAC inspection report, as applicable.

The Recipient must promptly report the following to the CAPO, along with any corrective actions taken: (1) any serious or continuing noncompliance with animal care and use regulations and policies adopted by DHS (as referenced above); (2) any change in AAALAC accreditation status; (3) any USDA Notice of Violation; and (4) IACUC suspension of any animal research activity conducted under this Award.

Foreign Contractors/Collaborators and U.S. Institutions with Foreign Subcomponents. Foreign organizations (including direct Contractors, Subcontractors, Grant Recipients, Sub-recipients, and subcomponents or collaborating partners to U.S. Recipients) are subject to all DHS requirements for work involving animals. All entities involved in activities under this Award must comply with applicable national and regional/local regulations, and standards and guidelines equivalent to those described for U.S. institutions (e.g., Title 9, C.F.R., Chapter 1, Subchapter A; Public Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals; the Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals; and the Guide for the Care and Use of Agricultural Animals in Agricultural Research and Teaching). The Recipient must provide CAPO documentation sufficient to illustrate this compliance. The CAPO will evaluate compliance measures for these institutions on a case-by-case basis to determine their sufficiency. The Recipient must not initiate nor provide funds for the conduct of work involving animals at foreign institutions under this Award without formal written approval from the CAPO.

F. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN (DURC)

The Recipient and any Recipient institutions shall conduct all research involving agents and toxins identified in sections III.1 and 6.2.1 of the USG Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and USG Policy for the Institutional Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern, respectively, in accordance with both policies referenced above and in accordance with any additional requirements set forth in related DHS policies and instructions. Each Recipient and any Recipient institutions planning to perform

1. Requirements for Research Using DURC Agents and Toxins. To ensure compliance with the USG DURC Policies, each facility conducting research involving the agents and toxins identified in sections III.1 and 6.2.1 of the USG DURC Policies under this Award must submit the following documentation for compliance review by CAPO prior to the initiation of such activities.
a. Institutional Review Entity (IRE) charter, and/or other available documentation of IRE policies and procedures, to include the contact information for the Institutional Contact for DURC (ICDUR);

b. Institution’s project-specific risk mitigation plan, as applicable;

c. DURC training or education program description;

d. Formal annual assurance of compliance with the USG Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern;

e. A completed iDURC form and a Statement of Work.

2. Required Notifications to DHS:

a. Within 30 calendar days of initial and periodic reviews of institutional review of research with DURC potential, notify CAPO of the results, including whether the research does or does not meet the DURC definition.

b. Report, in writing, any instances of noncompliance and mitigation measures to correct and prevent future instances of noncompliance within 30 calendar days to CAPO.

3. Flowdown Requirements: The Recipient shall include the substance of this section in all sub-awards/contracts at any tier where the sub-Recipient is performing work with agents or toxins identified in sections III.1 of the USG Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and 6.2.1 of the USG Policy for the Institutional Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern.

The Recipient should contact CAPO at stregulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov to submit documentation or to request more information regarding the DHS regulatory documentation and compliance review requirements. CAPO will provide written confirmation of receipt of all required documentation to the designated Points of Contact. CAPO will evaluate the submitted materials. Additional documentation may be required in some cases and must be submitted upon request. CAPO will review all submitted materials and provide written confirmation to the Recipient once all requirements have been met. Upon receipt of this written confirmation, the Recipient may initiate approved projects under this award.

In order to meet the reporting requirements set forth in section IV.2 of the 2012 USG Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (the biannual DURC Data Call), the Recipient and any Recipient institution shall submit documentation regarding all active, planned or recently completed (within twelve months of the submission) unclassified intramural or extramural activities on Federally-funded or conducted life science research projects biannually on the first Monday in May and November. The Recipient should contact CAPO at stregulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov to submit documentation. Documentation should include an update on all listed activities, including status, all agents or toxins incorporated by strain or surrogate name, performers, contract information, and sites of activities. Documentation should also include any changes to existing or completed projects since the most recent submission, including—but not limited to—the addition of agents, a change in performer, modifications to the scope of work, and/or changes to the technical approach. A supplemental report detailing all work involving low pathogenic avian influenza virus H7N9 (LPAI H7N9) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV).
Foreign Contractors/Collaborators and U.S. Institutions with Foreign Subcomponents. Foreign organizations (including direct Contractors, Subcontractors, Grant Recipients, Sub-recipients, and subcomponents or collaborating partners to U.S. Recipients) are subject to the iDURC policy. The Recipient must provide CAPO documentation sufficient to illustrate this compliance. CAPO will evaluate compliance measures for these institutions on a case-by-case basis. The Recipient must not initiate work nor provide funds for the conduct of biological laboratory work under this Award without CAPO’s formal written approval.

G. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

The Recipient and any Recipient institutions shall conduct all Research Involving Human Subjects in compliance with the requirements set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46, Subparts A-D, DHS Directive 026-04, Protection of Human Subjects, and any related DHS policies and instructions prior to initiating any work with human subjects under this Award. Each Recipient and any Recipient institutions planning to perform research involving human subjects under this Award must submit the documentation outlined in this section for CAPO review.

1. Requirements for Research Involving Human Subjects. Each facility conducting work involving human subjects under this Award is required to have a project-specific Certification of Compliance letter issued by the CAPO. Each Recipient must submit the following documentation to the CAPO for compliance review and certification prior to initiating research involving human subjects under this Award:

   a. Research protocol, as approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB), for any human subjects research work to be conducted under this Award;
   b. IRB approval letter or notification of exemption (see additional information below on exemption determinations), for any human subjects research work to be conducted under this Award;
   c. IRB-approved informed consent document(s) (templates) or IRB waiver of informed consent for projects involving human subjects research under this Award; and
   d. Federal-wide Assurance (FWA) number from the HHS Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP), or documentation of other relevant assurance, for all Recipient institutions (including Sub-recipients) involved in human subjects research under this Award.

2. Exemptions for Research Involving Human Subjects. Exemption determinations for human subject research to be conducted under this Award should only be made by authorized representatives of (1) an OHRP-registered IRB, or equivalent, or (2) the CAPO. Exemption determinations made by an OHRP-registered IRB, or equivalent, should be submitted to the CAPO for review and record-keeping. Program managers, principal investigators, research staff, and other DHS or institutional personnel should not independently make exemption determinations in the absence of an IRB or CAPO review. DHS program managers (or institutions conducting human subjects’ research under this Award) seeking an exemption determination from the CAPO should submit a request to STregulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov that includes the following:
a. Research protocol or detailed description of planned activities to be conducted under this Award.

b. Identification of the exemption category that applies to the project(s) to be conducted under this Award and explanation of why the proposed research meets the requirements for that category of exemption.

All documentation, as well as any questions or concerns regarding the requirements referenced above, should be submitted to the CAPO at STregulatorycompliance@hq.dhs.gov. The submitted documentation will be retained by the CAPO and used to conduct a regulatory compliance assessment. Additional documentation may be required in some cases to complete this assessment. The Recipient must provide this documentation upon request, and address in writing any compliance issues or concerns raised by the CAPO before a certification letter is issued and participant enrollment can begin under this Award. The CAPO will review all submitted materials and provide written confirmation to the Recipient once all documentation requirements have been met.

The Recipient and any Recipient institution shall submit updated documentation regarding ongoing research involving human subjects, as available and prior to the expiration of previous approvals. Such documentation includes protocol modifications, IRB renewals for ongoing research protocols (“Continuing Reviews”), and notifications of study completion.

The Recipient must promptly report the following to the CAPO, along with any corrective actions taken: (1) any serious or continuing noncompliance with human subjects research regulations and policies adopted by DHS (as referenced above); and (2) suspension, termination, or revocation of IRB approval of any human subjects research activities conducted under this Award.

Foreign Contractors/Collaborators and U.S. Institutions with Foreign Subcomponents. Foreign organizations (including direct Contractors, Subcontractors, Grant Recipients, Sub-recipients, and subcomponents or collaborating partners to U.S. Recipients) are subject to all DHS and CAPO requirements for research involving human subjects. All entities involved in activities under this Award must comply with applicable national and regional/local regulations, and standards and guidelines equivalent to those described for U.S. institutions (e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46, including all Subparts, as relevant). The CAPO will evaluate compliance measures for these institutions on a case-by-case basis to determine their sufficiency. The Recipient must not initiate nor provide funds for the conduct of work involving human subjects at foreign institutions under this Contract without formal written approval from the CAPO.

H. COMPLIANCE WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS
Activities performed by the Recipient and any Recipient institution under this Award may or may not be subject to U.S. export control regulations. The Recipient and any Recipient institution shall conduct all such activities, to include any and all DHS-funded research and development, acquisitions, and collaborations in full compliance with U.S. export controls—to include the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Regulations. The Recipient and any Recipient institution will ensure that all legal requirements for compliance with U.S. export controls are met prior to transferring commodities, technologies, technical data, or other controlled information to a non-U.S. person or entity. Upon DHS request, the Recipient and any Recipient institution must provide to CAPO documentation and any other information necessary to determine satisfaction of this requirement.

All documentation, as well as any questions or concerns regarding export controls, should be submitted to the CAPO at exportcontrols@hq.dhs.gov.

I. CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
The parties understand that information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this Award may be export controlled, sensitive, for official use only, or otherwise protected by law, executive order or regulation. The Recipient is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Nothing in this Award shall be construed to permit any disclosure in violation of those restrictions.

J. PATENT RIGHTS AND DATA RIGHTS

Patent rights.

The Recipient is subject to applicable regulations governing patents and inventions, including government-wide regulations issued by the Department of Commerce at 37 CFR Part 401, “Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations and Small Business Firms Under Government Grants, Contracts and Cooperative Agreements.” The clause at 37 CFR 401.14 is incorporated by reference herein. All reports of subject inventions made under this Award should be submitted to DHS using the Interagency Edison system website at http://eohq.dhs.gov.

Data rights.

1. General Requirements. The Recipient grants the Government a royalty free, nonexclusive and irrevocable license to reproduce, display, distribute copies, perform, disseminate, or prepare derivative works, and to authorize others to do so, for Government purposes in:

   a. Any data that is first produced under this Award and provided to the Government;
   b. Any data owned by third parties that is incorporated in data provided to the Government under this Award; or
   c. Any data requested in paragraph 2 below, if incorporated in the Award.

“Data” means recorded information, regardless of form or the media on which it may be recorded.
2. **Additional requirement for this Award.**
   a. **Requirement:** If the Government believes that it needs additional research data that was produced under this Award, the Government may request the research data and the Recipient agrees to provide the research data within a reasonable time.
   b. **Applicability:** The requirement in paragraph 2.a of this section applies to any research data that are:
      i. Produced under this Award, either as a Recipient or sub-recipient;
      ii. Used by the Government in developing an agency action that has the force and effect of law; and
      iii. Published, which occurs either when:
         1) The research data is published in a peer-reviewed scientific or technical journal; or
         2) DHS publicly and officially cites the research data in support of an agency action that has the force and effect of law
   c. **Definition of “research data.”** For the purposes of this section, “research data:”
      i. Means the recorded factual material (excluding physical objects, such as laboratory samples) commonly accepted in the scientific community as necessary to validate research findings.
      ii. Excludes:
         1) Preliminary analyses;
         2) Drafts of scientific papers;
         3) Plans for future research;
         4) Peer reviews;
         5) Communications with colleagues;
         6) Trade secrets;
         7) Commercial information;
         8) Materials necessary that a researcher must hold confidential until they are published, or similar information which is protected under law; and
         9) Personnel and medical information and similar information the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as information that could be used to identify a particular person in a research study.
   d. **Requirements for sub-awards:** The Recipient agrees to include in any sub-award made under this Agreement the requirements of this award term (Patent Rights and Data Rights) and the DHS Standard Terms and Conditions award term (Copyright).

**K. PROGRAM INCOME**

**Post-award program income:**

In the event program income becomes available to the recipient post-award, it is the recipient’s responsibility to notify the DHS Grants Officer to explain how that development occurred, as part of their request for guidance and/or approval. The Grant Officer will review approval requests for program income on a case-by-case basis; approval is not automatic. Consistent with the policy and processes outlined in §200.307, pertinent guidance and options, as determined by the type of recipient and circumstances involved, may be approved by the Grant Officer.
If approval is granted, an award modification will be issued with an explanatory note in the remarks section of the face page, concerning guidance and/or options pertaining to the recipient’s approved request. All instances of program income shall be listed in the progress and financial reports.

L. PUBLICATIONS
1. All publications produced as a result of this funding which are submitted for publication in any magazine, journal, or trade paper shall carry the following:
   a. Acknowledgement. “This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Grant Award Number, [insert Award Number as outlined in Item #4 on Notice of Award cover page].”
   b. Disclaimer. “The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.”
Recipient agrees to include in any sub-award made under this Agreement the requirements of this award term (Publications).

2. Enhancing Public Access to Publications. “DHS Policy explicitly recognizes and upholds the principles of copyright. Authors and journals can continue to assert copyright in DHS-funded scientific publications, in accordance with current practice. The policy encourages authors to exercise their right to give DHS a copy of their final manuscript or software before publication. While individual copyright arrangements can take many forms, DHS encourages investigators to sign agreements that specifically allow the manuscript or software to be deposited with DHS for public posting or use after journal publication. Institutions and investigators may wish to develop particular contract terms in consultation with their own legal counsel, as appropriate. But, as an example, the kind of language that an author or institution might add to a copyright agreement includes the following: “Author (or Software recipient) acknowledges that the Author retains the right to provide a final copy of the final manuscript or software application to DHS upon acceptance for Journal publication or thereafter, for public access purposes through DHS’s websites or for public archiving purposes.”

M. SITE VISITS
The DHS, through authorized representatives, has the right, at all reasonable times, to make site visits to review project accomplishments and management control systems and to provide such technical assistance as may be required. If any site visit is made by the DHS on the premises of the Recipient, or a contractor under this Award, the Recipient shall provide and shall require its contractors to provide all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safety and convenience of the Government representatives in the performance of their duties. All site visits and evaluations shall be performed in such a manner that will not unduly delay the work.

N. TERMINATION
Either the Recipient or the DHS may terminate this Award by giving written notice to the other party at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to the effective date of the termination. All notices are to be transmitted to the DHS Grants Officer via registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The Recipient’s authority to incur new costs will be terminated upon arrival of the date of receipt of the letter or the date set forth in the notice. Any costs incurred up to the earlier of the date of the receipt of the notice or the date of termination set forth in the notice will be negotiated for final payment. Closeout of this Award will be commenced and processed pursuant to 2 CFR §200.339.

O. TRAVEL
Travel required in the performance of the duties approved in this Award must comply with 2 CFR § 200.474.

*Foreign travel must be approved by DHS in advance and in writing.* Requests for foreign travel identifying the traveler, the purpose, the destination, and the estimated travel costs must be submitted to the DHS Grants Officer sixty (60) days prior to the commencement of travel.

P. CLASSIFIED SECURITY CONDITION
1. "Classified national security information," as defined in Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended, means information that has been determined pursuant to EO 12958 or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.
2. No funding under this award shall be used to support a contract, sub-award, or other agreement for goods or services that will include access to classified national security information if the award recipient itself has not been approved for and has access to such information.
3. Where an award recipient has been approved for and has access to classified national security information, no funding under this award shall be used to support a contract, sub-award, or other agreement for goods or services that will include access to classified national security information by the contractor, sub-awardee or other entity without prior written approval from the DHS Office of Security, Industrial Security Program Branch (ISPB), or an appropriate official within the Federal department or agency with whom the classified effort will be performed.
4. Such contracts, sub-awards, or other agreements shall be processed and administered in accordance with the DHS "Standard Operating Procedures, Classified Contracting by State and Local Entities," dated July 7, 2008; EOs 12829, 12958, 12968, as amended; the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM); and/or other applicable implementing directives or instructions. All security requirement documents are located at: http://www.dhs.gov/xopabiz/grants/index.shtm
5. Immediately upon determination by the award recipient that funding under this award will be used to support such a contract, sub-award, or other agreement, and prior to execution of any actions to facilitate the acquisition of such a contract, sub-award, or other agreement, the award recipient shall contact ISPB, or the applicable Federal department or agency, for approval and processing instructions.

DHS Office of Security ISPB contact information:
Telephone: 202-447-5346

Email: DD254AdministrativeSecurity@dhs.gov

Mail: Department of Homeland Security
     Office of the Chief Security Officer
     ATTN: ASD/Industrial Security Program Branch
     Washington, D.C. 20528

Q. GOVERNING PROVISIONS
   The following are incorporated into this Award by this reference:

   31 CFR 205  Rules and Procedures for Funds Transfers
   2 CFR Part 200 Uniform Administrative Requirement, Cost Principles, and
                 Audit Requirements for Federal Awards
   Application  Grant Application and Assurances dated
                 44032, as revised
                 no revision required

R. ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

   2. The terms and conditions of this Award

   3. The Funding Opportunity, DHS-ST-20-106-STC-0001,
      Title:Securing the Cities Program, 2020 STC Sustainment
   4. Application and Assurances dated 44032, as revised No Revisions Required
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<td>1. Prior to receiving a subaward from the City of Los Angeles, did the organization receive a Federal grant (direct or indirectly) within the past 3 years? If Yes, please indicate the total number of Federal awards in the Comments section.</td>
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<td>2. Does the organization have written policies and procedures in place in accordance with 2 CFR Part 200, that include procedures for procurements, travel, contractual services and records retention?</td>
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<td>7. Does the organization have a structure in place whereby the preparer of documents is different than the approver?</td>
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<td>9. Did the organization receive more than $750,000 in Federal awards in the past fiscal year? If No, skip to Question 13.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Was a single audit report completed per OMB Circular A-133? If No, skip to Question 13.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Did the single audit result in ‘No Findings?’ If Yes, skip to Question 13.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. If findings were identified, have the findings been resolved?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Monitoring</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Scoring</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13. Does the organization have documented policies and procedures in place related to fraud investigations and reporting?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Does the organization have equipment monitoring policies in place, including the tracking and safeguarding of equipment?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Does the organization inventory grant-funded equipment at least every two years?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Penny Sun, ASMI

Name/Title of Preparer

Signature

Date

Name/Title of Mayor’s Office Reviewer #1

Signature

Date

Name/Title of Mayor’s Office Reviewer #2

Signature

Date
LOS ANGELES/LONG BEACH UASI REGION
SECURING THE CITIES SUSTAINMENT PROGRAM

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

This Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is made and entered into by and among the various public agencies executing this MOU (each a "Participant" and collectively, "Participants"). The Participants are: The City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office ("LA Mayor’s Office"), the City of Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"), the County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department ("LACSD"), the County of Orange Sheriff’s Department ("OCSD"), the Los Angeles Harbor Department Port Police ("LAHPP"), the City of Long Beach Police Department ("LBPD"), the State of California Highway Patrol ("CHP"), Los Angeles World Airport Police Department ("LAWAPD"), City of Los Angeles Fire Department ("LAFD"), the Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County ("CFPDLA"), County of Los Angeles Public Health Department ("LACPHD"), Riverside Police Department ("RPD"), Riverside Fire Department ("RFD"), and the Ontario Fire Department ("OFD"). Additional public agencies shall become Participants by executing this MOU thereafter. This MOU memorializes the participation of the Participants in the Securing the Cities ("STC") Sustainment Program for the Los Angeles/Long Beach Urban Area ("LA/LB UA") region.

I. Background and Purpose

The STC Program is a program of the United States Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") and is overseen by its Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Domestic Nuclear Detection Office ("CWMD" and along with DHS, collectively the "Grantor"). Through the STC Program, the Grantor assists high-risk urban areas in developing and enhancing capabilities to detect, report and prevent the unauthorized presence and use of radiological and nuclear materials.

The City was first awarded grant funding in 2012 to launch the LA/LB UA STC Program. The goal of the LA/LB UA STC Program (the "STC Program") is to develop a regional structure of law enforcement and first responder organizations to identify, prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats. Under the STC Program, the LA Mayor’s Office works with the Grantor in overseeing the cooperative efforts of Program Participants in developing and enhancing each Participant’s and the broader LA/LB UA region’s nuclear and radiological detection and interdiction capabilities.

In 2020, the Grantor established the STC Sustainment Grant Program ("Sustainment Program") to continue supporting STC programs throughout the country, including the LA/LB UA STC Program, for a period of ten (10) years, from September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2030.
As a precondition to the receipt of Grant funds and other Grantor assistance, the Grantor requires Participants in the Sustainment Program to execute an MOU to memorialize each Participant's commitment to participating in the Program.

II. Sustainment Program Operation

A. Participation

1. The Participants of the Sustainment Program shall be: The City of Los Angeles Mayor's Office ("Mayor's Office"), the City of Los Angeles Police Department ("LAPD"), the County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Department ("LACSD"), the County of Orange Sheriff's Department ("OCSD"), the Los Angeles Harbor Department Port Police ("LAHPP"), the City of Long Beach Police Department ("LBPD"), the State of California Highway Patrol ("CHP"), Los Angeles World Airport Police Department ("LAWAPD"), City of Los Angeles Fire Department ("LAFD"), the Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County ("CFPDLA"), the County of Los Angeles Public Health Department ("LACPHD"), Riverside Police Department ("RPD"), Riverside Fire Department ("RFD"), and the Ontario Fire Department ("OFD").

2. The inclusion of any other additional participants into the Sustainment Program shall be duly considered by the Participants at a Program meeting. Any such approved new Participant shall execute this MOU prior to participating in the Sustainment Program.

3. Each Participant shall designate an authorized representative who is an employee (sworn or non-sworn) of such Participant to attend all Sustainment Program meetings and events. Sustainment Program meetings shall occur approximately once a month either virtually or in person, subject to all current Los Angeles County Department of Public Health Officer Orders and all City of Los Angeles COVID-19-related Orders and Ordinances applicable to this MOU. Decisions to dedicate, appoint and/or control a Participant's personnel involved in the Sustainment Program shall rest exclusively with that respective Participant.

B. Participant Responsibilities
As a Participant in the Sustainment Program, each Participant shall:

1. Use good faith efforts to (a) minimize any absence of its designated representative at all Sustainment Program meetings and activities; and (b) participate in such meetings and activities in accordance with each Participant's policies, procedures and protocols.

2. Assist in identifying current needs for establishing a radiological and nuclear detection program in the LA/LB UA and the Orange County and Inland Empire regions.

3. Collaborate in developing and drafting protocols, procedures, plans, and concept of operations to enhance (a) data collection and sharing capabilities among the Participants and (b) coordinated enforcement, operations and responses to a radiological and nuclear incident in the LA/LB UA and the Orange County and Inland Empire regions, all of which, shall be subject to adoption by each Participant in its respective discretion.

4. Collect, share and analyze intelligence, information and resources to predict, prevent, respond to, adjudicate, report and archive the illicit use, storage or movement of radiological materials in the LA/LB UA and the Orange County and Inland Empire regions, subject to compliance with each Participant's policies, procedures and protocols.

5. Require its designated personnel to attend any training and exercises, either virtually or in-person, as may be deemed necessary for participation in the Sustainment Program by the Grantor and the Participants.

6. Comply with any mutual aid agreements as may be agreed to by Participants and work with established Federal, State and local agency partnerships to support coordinated Sustainment Program operations and mutual aid.

7. Provide assistance, as approved by each Participant, in the coordination and deployment of Participants for the prevention of radiological nuclear detection (PRND) activities by the STC Southern California Regional Intake Center (SCRIC) managed by LAPD.
8. Deploy equipment purchased by Grant funds in a manner as agreed to by each Participant and the LA Mayor's Office.

C. Fiscal Agent

As the primary applicant and recipient of the Grant, the LA Mayor's Office shall be the fiscal agent and the lead agency with regard to the use of Grant funds in the Sustainment Program. All fiscal matters regarding the Grant funds and the daily administration of the Grant and use of Grant funds in the Sustainment Program shall be managed and overseen by the LA Mayor's Office. Further, the procurement of any equipment and services, including trainings and exercises, acquired with Grant funds shall be managed and overseen by the LA Mayor's Office.

III. Term and Withdrawal

The term of this MOU shall be from September 1, 2020 to August 31, 2030. This MOU shall be made effective as to a Participant upon the execution by such Participant of this MOU. This MOU may be modified at any time by written consent of all Participants. Modifications to this MOU shall have no effect unless they are in writing and signed by an authorized representative of each of the Participants.

Any Participant may withdraw from the Sustainment Program and this MOU at any time by written notification to the Mayor's Office. Any such withdrawal shall be effective thirty (30) days after delivery of said written notification. Written Notifications shall be sent to:

Gabriela Jasso
Director of Grants & Finance
Mayor's Office of Public Safety
200 N. Spring St, Room 303
Los Angeles, CA 90012

IV. Confidentiality

Each Participant agrees to keep all information exchanged or provided through the Sustainment Program strictly confidential, including any confidential, proprietary or non-public information, or sensitive security information (as defined by 49 CFR Part 1520). The Participants agree to discuss in good faith whether it is necessary or desirable to disclose any particular information, and if so, to whom. In the event any Participant receives a request from a third party for information provided to them as part of the Sustainment Program, said Participant shall afford the other Participants an opportunity to seek an appropriate protective order.
However, in the absence of a protective order and where the Participant is, in the opinion of its counsel, compelled to disclose the information under threat of liability, violation of federal or State law, or contempt or other censure or penalty, disclosure of such information may be made by the Participant.

V. Non-Responsibility

Notwithstanding any provisions set forth in this MOU, nothing in this MOU shall be construed as encroaching upon the sovereign rights, privileges, and immunities of any of the Participants hereto in the conduct of inherently Municipal, State or Federal government operations. Further, nothing in this MOU is intended to conflict with current law, regulation, or the policies and directives of any of the Participants. If any terms and conditions of this MOU are inconsistent with such authorities, the Participants agree to address and resolve the inconsistency in a timely and legally appropriate manner. If the matter is incapable of timely resolution, the inconsistent term shall be deemed invalid, and the remaining terms and conditions of this MOU shall remain in full force and effect. This MOU, in and of itself, does not result in the commitment, obligation, or transfer of funds or other financial obligations among the Participants hereto. Prior to the reimbursement by Grant funds of any expenses incurred by any Participant or the license to any Participant of any equipment purchased through Grant funds, such Participant shall enter into a contract with the LA Mayor's Office setting forth the terms and conditions of such reimbursement or license.

Each Participant to this MOU will be responsible for its own actions in providing services under this MOU and shall not be liable for any civil liability that may arise from the furnishing of the services by any other Participant to this MOU, and participation in this MOU shall not impose any liability for claims upon any Participant to which it would not otherwise be subject under applicable law.

By entering into this MOU, the Participants do not intend to create any obligations express or implied other than those set out herein. Further, this MOU shall not create any rights in any party other than the Participants.

VI. Miscellaneous

This MOU shall be enforced and interpreted under the laws of the State of California and the City of Los Angeles without regard to conflict of law principles. In any action arising out of this MOU, each Participant consents to personal jurisdiction, and agrees to bring all such actions,
exclusively in state or federal courts located in Los Angeles County, California.

In all cases where written notice may be given under this MOU, service shall be deemed sufficient if said notice is deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, or by email. When so given, such notice shall be effective from the date of mailing of the same. For the purposes hereof, unless otherwise provided by notice in writing from the respective Participants, the lead personnel to whom all communications and information provided pursuant to this MOU shall be directed are as set forth under the respective Participant's execution of this MOU.

This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which will be deemed an original, but all of which together will constitute one and the same instrument.

[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, each of the Participants have caused this MOU to be executed by their duly authorized representatives.

THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Sheriff's Department
By: [Signature]

Name/Title: [Name/Title]
Date: [Date]

Representative for Notice:
Name: [Name]
Title: [Title]
Address: [Address]
Telephone: [Telephone]
Email: [Email]

[SIGNATURE PAGE FOR STC PROGRAM MOU]
SUBRECIPIENT AGREEMENT

Jurisdiction: County of Los Angeles, Acting by and through its Sheriff’s Department

Title: Securing the Cities (STC) Program Sustainment Cooperative Agreement

City Contract Number ______________
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Exhibit C  Certification Regarding Lobbying
Exhibit D  Certification Regarding Drug Free Requirements
Exhibit E  Grant Assurances
Exhibit F  Grants Management Assessment Form
AGREEMENT NUMBER ______ OF CITY CONTRACTS
BETWEEN
THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES
AND THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

THIS SUBRECIPIENT AGREEMENT ("Agreement" or "Contract") is made and entered into by and between the City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation (the "City"), and the County of Los Angeles, a political subdivision of the State of California, acting by and through its Sheriff’s Department (the "Subgrantee" or "Subrecipient").

WITNESSETH

WHEREAS, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), through its Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office\(^1\) ("CWMD" and along with DHS, collectively "Grantor"), has provided financial assistance to the City through the Grantor’s Securing the Cities Program Grant for the Los Angeles/Long Beach Urban Area ("LA/LB UA") region (the "Grant") to assist the City in developing a regional structure of law enforcement and first responder organizations to identify, prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats in the LA/LB UA (the "STC Program"); and

WHEREAS, the City was first awarded grant funding in October 2012 to launch the LA-LB UA STC Program (C.F. #13-1301, 13-1301-S1, & 13-1301-S2, dated 11/05/2013, 01/07/2015, 01/19/16, & 04/05/2017); and

WHEREAS, the Grantor established the STC Program Sustainment Cooperative Agreement ("Sustainment Grant") to sustain STC programs, including the LA-LB UA STC Program, from September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2030; and

WHEREAS, the Grantor intends to provide such financial assistance to the City in annual budget allocations of grant funds for a period of ten (10) years (the "Grant Funds"), subject to the availability of funding; and

WHEREAS, the Grantor has already provided the first allocation of Grant Funds to the City as follows: $2,171,899, for the period of September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2021 (Budget Period 1 Allocation), such Budget Period 1 Allocation having been authorized by the Los Angeles City Council (C.F. #13-1301-S3, dated 05/12/2021); and

WHEREAS, the City shall annually reapply for funding for each subsequent grant year during the term of this Agreement, and request approval from the Los Angeles City Council to accept the corresponding grant award allocation; and

\(^1\) Formerly, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office ("DNDO")
WHEREAS, the City has designated the Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Public Safety ("Mayor’s Office") to provide for the proper monitoring of the funding and administration of the Grant; and

WHEREAS, the Subrecipient has previously entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the City memorializing Subrecipient’s participation in the STC Sustainment Program and the Mayor’s Office’s administration of the STC Sustainment Program; and

WHEREAS, the City and Subrecipient are desirous of executing this Agreement as authorized by the Los Angeles City Council and the Mayor (C.F. # 13-1301-S3, dated 05/12/2021) to allow for the reimbursement by Grant Funds of certain personnel costs of Subrecipient and the use by Subrecipient of certain City equipment purchased by Grant Funds, all in accordance with the conditions set forth in this Agreement.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein and the mutual benefits to be derived therefrom, the City and the Subrecipient (each a “Party” and collectively, the “Parties”) agree as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

§101. Federal Award Information
The “Federal award” (as such term is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”), 2 CFR §200.38, and used in this Agreement) is the Los Angeles - Long Beach Securing the Cities Program Sustainment, FAIN # 20CWDSTC0001, Assistance listing Number #97.106, Federal Award Date 09/11/2020. This is not a “Research & Development” award as defined in 2 CFR §200.1 and 200.332. There is no “indirect cost rate” for this federal award, as defined in 2 CFR §200.1 and 200.332.

The “Federal awarding agency” (as such term is defined in 2 CFR §200.1 and used in this Agreement) is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), through its Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (“CWMD”)

The City, acting through its Mayor’s Office of Public Safety ("Mayor’s Office"), acts as the “pass-through entity” (as such term is defined in 2 CFR §200.1 and used in this Agreement) for the subaward of the Federal award to the Subrecipient for the benefit of the Los Angeles/Long Beach Urban Area ("LA/LB UA") region.

§102. Subrecipient Award Information
Subrecipient hereby accepts the following subaward ("Subaward") of the Federal award upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement:
Subaward Amount:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget Period</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2020- Aug. 31, 2021</td>
<td>$140,625.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2021- Aug. 31, 2022</td>
<td>Subject to DHS funding/Council Approval</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2022- Aug. 31, 2023</td>
<td>Subject to DHS funding/Council Approval</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2023- Aug. 31, 2024</td>
<td>Subject to DHS funding/Council Approval</td>
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<td>Sept. 1, 2024- Aug. 31, 2025</td>
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<td>Sept. 1, 2025- Aug. 31, 2026</td>
<td>Subject to DHS funding/Council Approval</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2026- Aug. 31, 2027</td>
<td>Subject to DHS funding/Council Approval</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2027- Aug. 31, 2028</td>
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<td>Sept. 1, 2028- Aug. 31, 2029</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sept. 1, 2029- Aug. 31, 2030</td>
<td>Subject to DHS funding/Council Approval</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subaward Period of Performance: September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2030

Match Requirement: None

Subrecipient Identifier: 0289506780000

Indirect Cost Rate for Subaward: None

The term of this Agreement shall be the “Term” as set forth in this Section 201.

§103 Parties to the Agreement

The Parties to this Agreement are:

A. The City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, having its principal office at 200 N. Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; and

B. The County of Los Angeles, a political subdivision of the State of California, acting by and through its Sheriff’s Department, having its principal office at 211 West Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012.

§104 Representatives of the Parties and Service of Notices

A. The representatives of the respective parties who are authorized to administer this Agreement and to whom formal notices, demands and communications shall be given are as follows:

1. The representative of the City of Los Angeles shall be, unless otherwise stated in this Agreement:
Jeff Gorell, Deputy Mayor
Mayor’s Office of Public Safety
200 N. Spring Street, Room 303
Los Angeles, California 90012
(213) 978-0687
jeff.gorell@lacity.org

2. The representative of the County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department shall be:

Jack W. Ewell, Chief
County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
211 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
jwewell@lasd.org

With a copy to:

Eric Fox: etfox@lasd.org; and
Penny Sun: psun@lasd.org

B. Formal notices, demands and communications to be given hereunder by either party shall be made in writing and may be effected by personal delivery or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested and shall be deemed communicated as of the date of mailing.

C. If the name of the person designated to receive the notices, demands or communications or the address of such person is changed, written notice shall be given, in accordance with this section, within five business days of said change.

§105. Independent Party

Subrecipient is acting hereunder as an independent party, and not as an agent or employee of the City. No employee of Subrecipient is, or shall be, an employee of the City by virtue of this Agreement, and Subrecipient shall so inform each employee organization and each employee who is hired or retained under this Agreement. Subrecipient shall not represent or otherwise hold out itself or any of its directors, officers, partners, employees, or agents to be an agent or employee of the City by virtue of this Agreement. The provisions of this Section 103 shall not apply to Subrecipient if it is a proprietary department of the City.

§106. Conditions Precedent to Execution of This Agreement
A. [Intentionally Omitted]

B. Certifications Regarding Ineligibility, Suspension and Debarment, attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part hereof. Subrecipient hereby certifies that said Certification so executed is true and correct as of the date of execution of this Agreement.

C. Certifications and Disclosures Regarding Lobbying, attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof. Subrecipient hereby certifies that said Certification so executed is true and correct as of the date of execution of this Agreement.

D. Certification Regarding Drug Free Workplace Requirements, attached hereto as Exhibit D and made a part hereof. Subrecipient hereby certifies that said Certification so executed is true and correct as of the date of execution of this Agreement.

E. Subrecipient shall complete and submit an annual Grants Management Assessment Form to the City (Exhibit F) to evaluate risk and determine grant funding eligibility.

[THIS SECTION IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
II.
TERM AND SERVICES TO BE PROVIDED

§201. Time of Performance

The term of this Agreement shall be from September 1, 2020 through August 31, 2030 (the "Term"). Subrecipient shall cooperate with the City and Grantor in completing any necessary close out activities in connection with the Grant.

§202. STC Sustainment Program and Use of Grant Funds

A. STC Sustainment Program Participation

Subrecipient and the City previously entered into that certain Memorandum of Understanding setting forth certain terms and conditions of Subrecipient's participation in the STC Sustainment Program (the "MOU"). As a participating agency in the STC Sustainment Program, Subrecipient shall be reimbursed through Grant Funds for certain training and exercise-related personnel expenses and Subrecipient shall have use of certain equipment purchased with Grant Funds, all in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Grant, this Agreement and the policies and procedures of the STC Sustainment Program. In consideration therefore, Subrecipient agrees as follows:

1. Subrecipient shall comply with the terms and conditions of the MOU and this Agreement, and the policies and procedures of the STC Sustainment Program as may be approved and adopted by the LA/LB UA Security Initiative ("UASI") Approval Authority (as may be required) and/or the majority of the participating agencies in the STC Sustainment Program.

2. Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable Requirements (as such term is defined in Section 415) of the Grant and any Requirements promulgated by the Mayor’s Office in connection with the administration of the Grant, including, without limitation, Requirements related to the reimbursement and auditing of expenses related to the use of Grant Funds and the procurement and use of all equipment, services and items purchased with Grant Funds.

3. Subrecipient shall designate an authorized representative to attend all general working group meetings of the STC Sustainment Program and shall designate appropriate subject matter expert representatives to attend subcommittee meetings of the STC Sustainment Program. Subrecipient shall make good faith efforts to minimize any absence of its representatives at such meetings.
4. Through its representatives to the STC Sustainment Program, Subrecipient shall work with other participating agencies in the STC Sustainment Program in developing and updating the following plans for the STC Sustainment Program: (a) Operations Plan, (b) Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan, (c) Equipment Plan, and (d) Information Exchange Plan (collectively, the “Plans”). Subrecipient shall assist the Mayor’s Office in developing and executing the scope of projects associated with the Plans. Subrecipient shall also collaborate with other participating agencies in the STC Sustainment Program to develop appropriate implementation and sustainment plans as needed.

5. Subrecipient shall collaborate in good faith with other participating agencies in the STC Sustainment Program in developing various protocols that will be adopted by the participating agencies of the STC Sustainment Program. Such protocols shall include protocols for the detection, collection, dissemination, screening and reporting of information regarding possible radiological and nuclear threats or incidents in the LA/LB UA. Such protocols shall involve the notification of such threats or incidents to the Southern California Radiological Intake Center (“SCRIC”), CWMD, and the United States Department of Energy.

6. Subrecipient shall complete any required training and exercise as set forth in the Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan that is adopted by the STC Sustainment Program and as may be required by the Grantor. Subrecipient shall timely complete and submit to CWMD any forms and reports required by CWMD under the Grant in connection with Subrecipient’s activities as a participant in the STC Sustainment Program, including activities involving incident reporting, training, exercise, and operations.

7. Subrecipient shall not be reimbursed by Grant Funds or the City for any expenses incurred by it which is not approved by the Mayor’s Office and the Grantor and which is not strictly set forth in the budget for use of Grant Funds in the STC Sustainment Program as such budget is approved by the Mayor’s Office and the Grantor. Subrecipient shall assist the Mayor’s Office in the development of such budget by, without limitation, submitting relevant cost information associated with proposed budget items.

B. Mayor’s Office Responsibilities

Subrecipient hereby acknowledges and agrees that the Mayor’s Office, as the primary applicant and recipient of the Grant, is the sole fiscal agent
and lead agency with regards to the use of Grant Funds in the STC Sustainment Program and that all fiscal and administrative matters (including the procurement of any services, goods or equipment) regarding the use of Grant Funds shall be managed and overseen by the Mayor's Office. Subrecipient agrees to cooperate in good faith with the Mayor’s Office duties as fiscal agent and lead agency of the Grant, such duties to include, without limitation, the following:

1. Administration of the STC Sustainment Program and the Grant, including the managing all fiscal operations and procurement activities involving Grant Funds.

2. Development and submission of applications to the Grantor for annual allocations of Grant Funds and serving as the primary point of contact for the STC Sustainment Program with the Grantor.

3. Development of annual budgets for use of Grant Funds in the STC Sustainment Program to be used in the STC Sustainment Program.

4. Coordination of the distribution and licensing to Subrecipient of STC Sustainment Program equipment, source materials, and training and exercise schedules.

5. Periodic inspections and audits of all STC Sustainment Program related materials, equipment, records, documents, and other assets acquired by or related to the use of Grant Funds which may be in the possession or control of the Subrecipient.

C. Reimbursement of Training & Exercise-Related Personnel Expenses

As a participant in the STC Sustainment Program, Subrecipient shall ensure that its designated representatives shall attend all training and exercises as required by the Grantor and as set forth in the STC Sustainment Program’s Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan (“MYTEP”) as adopted by a majority of the STC Sustainment Program participants. Subrecipient shall have the right to participate in the development of the MYTEP through the participation of its designated representatives in the STC Sustainment Program subcommittee tasked with the development of the MYTEP.

All Grant Funds allocated to the Subrecipient under this Agreement shall be disbursed ONLY for reimbursement of Subrecipient’s personnel expenses associated with the attendance and participation of Subrecipient’s designated representatives in any MYTEP training and/or exercise. All such reimbursements shall be in strict accordance with the STC Sustainment Program budget for training and exercise.
reimbursement as approved by the Grantor and the Mayor's Office. Further, any such reimbursement shall be strictly limited to backfill and overtime costs directly resulting from Subrecipient's designated representative's attendance and participation at such MYTEP training and/or exercise and shall be reimbursed at a rate and amount as approved by the Mayor's Office and the Grantor ("Training Reimbursement"). Subrecipient shall prepare, track, maintain and submit to the Mayor's Office originally executed timesheets, timekeeping documents, and any other supporting documentation, all in a form and manner as approved by the Mayor's Office and all as necessary to fully and accurately evidence time expended by Subrecipient's designated representatives in attending approved MYTEP trainings and/or exercises and the allowable expenses incurred by Subrecipient in connection with such attendance ("Expense Documentation"). All such Expense Documentation shall satisfy applicable Federal, State and City audit and review standards and requirements, shall be prepared at the sole expense and responsibility of Subrecipient, and shall be subject to examination pursuant to the provisions set forth in Section 415.R. herein. The Mayor's Office may request, in writing, changes to the content and format of such documentation at any time and it reserves the right to request additional supporting documentation to substantiate costs that are to be reimbursed with Grant Funds. All Expense Documentation must be submitted to the Mayor's Office within sixty (60) days after attendance/participation at the applicable MYTEP training and/or exercise in order to be eligible for reimbursement with Grant Funds.

D. Equipment and Materials Purchased with Grant Funds

The procurement of all equipment and materials acquired with Grant Funds ("Equipment") shall be the sole responsibility of the Mayor's Office, and title to such Equipment shall vest in the Mayor's Office as the primary recipient of Grant Funds. Equipment selected for purchase by the City with Grant Funds shall be in accordance with the STC Sustainment Program Equipment Plan. Subrecipient shall have the right to participate in the development of such Equipment Plan through the participation of its designated representatives in the STC Sustainment Program subcommittee tasked with the development of the Equipment Plan. As a participant in the STC Sustainment Program, Subrecipient shall have the opportunity to use certain selected Equipment for Subrecipient's activities in the STC Program on a license-to-use basis with title remaining with the Mayor's Office ("License"), the selection of such Equipment to be made by a majority of the STC Sustainment program participants and the LA/LB UASI Approval Authority. Subrecipient hereby agrees that, in the event Subrecipient is granted a License to use any Equipment, such License is made on the following terms and that Subrecipient shall comply with such terms:
1. Subrecipient shall be solely responsible for taking possession and transporting the Equipment from the City designated location to Subrecipient’s premises and properly installing the Equipment for use at the Subrecipient’s location approved by the Mayor’s Office. Subrecipient shall be solely responsible for removing the Equipment from Subrecipient’s premises and returning it to the City designated location.

2. Subrecipient shall be liable to the City for any and all liabilities, damages, claims and/or losses arising out of, or related to, Subrecipient’s use and possession of the Equipment. For purposes of this Agreement, Subrecipient’s possession of the Equipment shall commence at the time Subrecipient is given possession of the Equipment at a designated City location where the Equipment is stored and shall continue until such Equipment is returned back into the possession of the City at the designated City location where the Equipment is to be returned for City storage.

3. Subrecipient shall properly maintain, safeguard and inventory the Equipment in accordance with procedures prescribed and approved by the Mayor’s Office, the STC Sustainment Program Equipment Plan, and the regulations of the Grant, including the provisions set forth in 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 13.32(d). Proper maintenance shall include all calibration and repair of the Equipment necessary to maintain the Equipment in good working order. All maintenance, calibration and repair (“Maintenance”) of the Equipment shall be coordinated through the Mayor’s Office, shall require its prior written approval, and shall be undertaken only by appropriately licensed personal authorized and deemed qualified by the Mayor’s Office.

4. Subrecipient shall timely and properly install the Equipment at Subrecipient’s location as agreed to by the Mayor's Office. Subrecipient shall operate and use the Equipment strictly in connection with its activities in the STC Sustainment Program and in a manner as approved by the Mayor’s Office. Subrecipient shall limit access to the Equipment (including access for maintenance and inspections) to personnel, time, place and manner as authorized in writing in advance by the Mayor’s Office. Subrecipient shall not remove or cease operation of the Equipment from its pre-approved location without prior written authorization from the Mayor’s Office. Any replacement of the Equipment shall be coordinated through the Mayor’s Office and shall require its prior written approval, and Subrecipient’s use of such replacement
Equipment shall be subject to the same License terms as set forth herein.

5. Subrecipient shall utilize a database inventory for the purpose of tracking Subrecipient’s Equipment. Subrecipient shall enter and update information and data related to the use and maintenance of the Equipment as required by the Mayor’s Office, including information and data regarding the Equipment’s location, operations, audits, inspections, maintenance, calibration, repair and replacement activities.

6. Subrecipient acknowledges and agrees that the Mayor’s Office and the Grantor shall have the right to access and inspect the Equipment at Subrecipient’s location at any time as may be deemed necessary by the Mayor’s Office and/or the Grantor. Such access and inspection rights shall also include regularly scheduled monitoring visits by the Mayor’s Office. Subrecipient shall cooperate with the Mayor’s Office in coordinating all such monitoring visits.

7. In the event that any activities in connection with the Equipment requires the services of a third-party vendor, the procurement of such services shall be executed solely by the Mayor’s Office. In no event shall any expenses incurred in connection with any activities of the Equipment (maintenance, installation, removal, replacement or otherwise) be reimbursed with Grant Funds if such activities are undertaken on any equipment other than Equipment as so defined in this Agreement or if such activities are undertaken without the prior written consent of the Mayor’s Office and in a manner inconsistent with the provisions set forth in this Agreement.

8. This Equipment License may be terminated (a) upon Subrecipient’s breach of any of the License terms set forth herein, (b) upon Subrecipient’s breach of any terms of this Agreement or the terms of the MOU, (c) upon Subrecipient’s withdrawal or termination of participation from the STC Sustainment Program, (d) or at any time at the sole discretion of the Mayor’s Office upon thirty (30) days written notice. Within thirty (30) days from the date the License is terminated, Subrecipient shall return the licensed Equipment to the City at the City’s designated location.

E. Source Materials

As part of the STC Sustainment Program, the Mayor’s Office has obtained from CWMD certain low-grade radiological materials for use in training and exercise activities ("Source Materials") related to the STC
Sustainment Program. These Source Materials may be stored at various sites controlled by participating agencies in the STC Sustainment Program. If a site controlled by the Subrecipient is selected to store Source Materials, Subrecipient agrees to comply with STC Sustainment Program requirements regarding certification and training of Radiation Safety Officers and State of California or other applicable regulations regarding the handling, storage and security of Source Materials. The Mayor's Office shall work cooperatively with Subrecipient to execute any agreements or instruments necessary to allow for the proper handling, storage, security and use of Source Materials at Subrecipient's site(s) in connection with the STC Sustainment Program.

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III.
PAYMENT

§301. Reimbursement of Grant Funds and Method of Payment

A. The City of Los Angeles shall disburse to Subrecipient its total allocated Grant amount of **One Hundred Forty Thousand Six Hundred Twenty-Five Dollars ($140,625.00)** to reimburse Subrecipient for personnel expenses incurred in connection with STC Sustainment Program training and exercise activities as described in Section 202 above. Such Grant amount represents the total reimbursement amount allocated to Subrecipient and approved by the Mayor’s Office and the Grantor for **Budget Period 1**. The disbursement of such funds shall be made on a reimbursement basis only.

B. During the term of this Agreement, unspent Grant Funds from one Budget Period shall carry over to the subsequent Budget Period, subject to annual review and approval by the City and as acceptable to the Grantor.

C. Subrecipient shall prepare, maintain and provide to the City invoices requesting payment as well as purchase orders, proof of delivery, proof of payment and payroll records, timesheets, receipts and any other supporting documentation necessary to fully and accurately describe the expenditure of funds for which reimbursement from Grant Funds is sought under this Agreement. All such supporting documentation shall satisfy applicable Federal, State and City audit and review standards and requirements. Such documentation shall be prepared at the sole expense and responsibility of the Subrecipient, and the City will not reimburse the Subrecipient for any costs incurred for such preparation. The City may request, in writing, changes to the content and format of such documentation at any time, and the City reserves the right to request additional supporting documentation to substantiate costs incurred at any time.

D. Payment of final invoices shall be withheld by the City until the Mayor’s Office has determined that Subrecipient has turned in all supporting documentation and satisfied the requirements of this Agreement.

E. If applicable, Subrecipient must account separately for all interest income earned from the Grant Funds. In accordance with Grantor regulations and 44 CFR Part 13, interest earned on Grant Funds must be reported and returned to the City. Subrecipient will maintain records of and account for any interest earned, if applicable, on Grant Funds. If applicable, Subrecipient shall promptly return to the City all Grant Funds received which exceed the approved, actual expenditures as accepted by Grantor. In the event the amount of the Grant Funds allocated to Subrecipient is
reduced, the reimbursement payable to the Subrecipient will be reduced accordingly.

F. It is understood that the City makes no commitment to fund this Agreement beyond the terms set forth herein. Funding for all Budget Periods of this Agreement is subject to the continuing availability to the City of federal funds for this program from the Grantor. The Agreement may be terminated immediately by the City upon written notice to Subrecipient of such loss or reduction of Federal grant funds.

F. Final Reimbursement Requests for this Subaward must be received by the City no later than sixty (60) days prior to the end of the Term to allow the City sufficient time to complete close-out activities for this Subaward (the “Reimbursement Deadline”). Any Reimbursement Request submitted after the Reimbursement Deadline shall be rejected unless approved by the Mayor’s Office in advance of the Reimbursement Deadline. After the Reimbursement Deadline, any unexpended Subaward funds may be re-directed to other needs in the STC Sustainment Program. The City will notify Subrecipient, in writing, when unexpended Subaward funds may be re-directed.

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IV. STANDARD PROVISIONS

§401. Independent Party
Subrecipient is acting hereunder as an independent party, and not as an agent or employee of the City. No employee of Subrecipient is, or shall be, an employee of the City by virtue of this Agreement, and Subrecipient shall so inform each employee organization and each employee who is hired or retained under this Agreement. Subrecipient shall not represent or otherwise hold out itself or any of its directors, officers, partners, employees, or agents to be an agent or employee of the City by virtue of this Agreement.

§402 Construct the Provisions and Titles Herein
All titles, subtitles, or headings in this Agreement have been inserted for convenience and shall not be deemed to affect the meaning or construction of any of the terms or provisions hereof. The language of this Agreement shall be construed according to its fair meaning and not strictly for or against either party. The word "Subrecipient" herein and in any amendments hereto includes the party or parties identified in this Agreement. The singular shall include the plural. If there is more than one Subrecipient as identified herein, unless expressly stated otherwise, their obligations and liabilities hereunder shall be joint and several.
Use of the feminine, masculine, or neuter genders shall be deemed to include the genders not used.

§403. Applicable Law, Interpretation and Enforcement
Each party's performance hereunder shall comply with all applicable laws of the United States of America, the State of California, the County and City of Los Angeles, including but not limited to, laws regarding health and safety, labor and employment, wage and hours and licensing laws which affect employees. This Agreement shall be enforced and interpreted under the laws of the State of California without regard to conflict of law principles. Subrecipient shall comply with new, amended, or revised laws, regulations, and/or procedures that apply to the performance of this Agreement.

In any action arising out of this Agreement, Subrecipient consents to personal jurisdiction, and agrees to bring all such actions, exclusively in state and federal courts located in Los Angeles County, California.

If any part, term or provision of this Agreement shall be held void, illegal, unenforceable, or in conflict with any law of a federal, state or local government having jurisdiction over this Agreement, the validity of the remaining parts, terms or provisions of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby.
§404. Integrated Agreement

This Agreement sets forth all of the rights and duties of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and replaces any and all previous agreements or understandings, whether written or oral, relating thereto. This Agreement may be amended only as provided for herein.

§405. Excusable Delays

In the event that performance on the part of any party hereto shall be delayed or suspended as a result of circumstances beyond the reasonable control and without the fault and negligence of said party, none of the parties shall incur any liability to the other parties as a result of such delay or suspension. Circumstances deemed to be beyond the control of the parties hereunder shall include, but not be limited to, acts of God or of the public enemy; insurrection; acts of the Federal Government or any unit of State or Local Government in either sovereign or contractual capacity; fires; floods; epidemics; quarantine restrictions; strikes, freight embargoes or delays in transportation; to the extent that they are not caused by the party’s willful or negligent acts or omissions and to the extent that they are beyond the party’s reasonable control.

§406. Breach

Except for excusable delays as described in §404 herein, if any party fails to perform, in whole or in part, any promise, covenant, or agreement set forth herein, or should any representation made by it be untrue, any aggrieved party may avail itself of all rights and remedies, at law or equity, in the courts of law. Said rights and remedies are cumulative of those provided for herein except that in no event shall any party recover more than once, suffer a penalty or forfeiture, or be unjustly compensated.

§407. Prohibition Against Assignment or Delegation

Subrecipient may not, unless it has first obtained the written permission of the City:

A. Assign or otherwise alienate any of its rights hereunder, including the right to payment; or

B. Delegate, subcontract, or otherwise transfer any of its duties hereunder.

§408 Subcontractor Assurances

Subrecipient shall contractually obligate all of its contractors, subcontractors and vendors funded by Subaward funds as may be required to ensure that
Subrecipient can comply with all of the Requirements and other provisions of this Agreement.

§409 Remedies for Noncompliance

Subrecipient acknowledges and agrees that, in the event Subrecipient fails to comply with the terms and conditions of this Agreement or with any Requirements referenced in Section 2.1 above, the Federal awarding agency, or the City shall have the right to take one or more of the actions set forth in 2 CFR §200.339. Such actions may include, without limitation, the withholding of cash payments, suspension and/or termination of the Subaward, and the disallowing of certain costs incurred under the Subaward. Any costs incurred by Subrecipient during a suspension or after termination of the Subaward shall not be considered allowable under the Subaward unless allowed under 2 CFR §200.343. Subrecipient shall be liable to the Federal awarding agency, and the City for any Subaward funds the Federal awarding agency determines that Subrecipient used in violation of any Requirements referenced in Section 202 above, and Subrecipient shall indemnify and hold harmless the City for any sums the Federal awarding agency determines Subrecipient used in violation of such Requirements.

Subrecipient shall be granted the opportunity to object to and challenge the taking of any remedial action by the Federal awarding agency or the City in accordance with the provisions set forth in 2 CFR §200.341.

§410 Termination

Subrecipient acknowledges and agrees that the Subaward, and any obligation to disburse to or reimburse Subrecipient in connection thereto, may be terminated in whole or in part by the Federal awarding agency or the City as set forth in 2 CFR §200.340. Subrecipient shall have the right to terminate the Subaward only as set forth in 2 CFR §200.340. In the event the Subaward is terminated, all obligations and requirements of this Agreement and the Grant shall survive and continue in full force and effect in connection with any portion of the Subaward remaining prior to such termination, including, without limitation, the closeout and post closeout requirements set forth in this Agreement.

A. Termination for Convenience

City may terminate this Contract for City’s convenience at any time by providing Subrecipient thirty days written notice. Upon receipt of the notice of termination, Subrecipient shall immediately take action not to incur any additional obligations, costs or expenses, except as may be necessary to terminate its activities. City shall pay Subrecipient its reasonable and allowable costs through the effective date of termination and those reasonable and necessary costs incurred by
Subrecipient to effect the termination. Thereafter, Subrecipient shall have no further claims against City under this Contract.

B. Termination for Cause

1. Except for Excusable Delays as provided in Section 405, if Subrecipient fails to perform any of the provisions of this Agreement or so fails to make progress as to endanger timely performance of this Agreement, City may give Subrecipient written notice of the default. City’s default notice will indicate whether the default may be cured and the time period to cure the default to the sole satisfaction of City. Additionally, City’s default notice may offer Subrecipient an opportunity to provide City with a plan to cure the default, which shall be submitted to City within the time period allowed by City. At City’s sole discretion, City may accept or reject Subrecipient’s plan. If the default cannot be cured or if Subrecipient fails to cure within the period allowed by City, then City may terminate this Agreement due to Subrecipient’s breach of this Agreement.

2. If a federal or state proceeding for relief of debtors is undertaken by or against Subrecipient, or if Subrecipient makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, then City may immediately terminate this Contract.

3. If Subrecipient engages in any dishonest conduct related to the performance or administration of this Contract or violates City’s laws, regulations or policies relating to lobbying, then City may immediately terminate this Contract.

4. Acts of Moral Turpitude

   a. Subrecipient shall immediately notify City if Subrecipient or any Key Person, as defined below, is charged with, indicted for, convicted of, pleads nolo contendere to, or forfeits bail or fails to appear in court for a hearing related to, any act which constitutes an offense involving moral turpitude under federal, state, or local laws (“Act of Moral Turpitude”).

   b. If Subrecipient or a Key Person is convicted of, pleads nolo contendere to, or forfeits bail or fails to appear in court for a hearing related to, an Act of Moral Turpitude, City may immediately terminate this Contract.

   c. If Subrecipient or a Key Person is charged with or indicted for an Act of Moral Turpitude, City may terminate this Contract after providing Subrecipient an opportunity to
present evidence of Subrecipient’s ability to perform under the terms of this Contract.

d. Acts of Moral Turpitude include, but are not limited to: violent felonies as defined by Penal Code Section 667.5, crimes involving weapons, crimes resulting in serious bodily injury or death, serious felonies as defined by Penal Code Section 1192.7, and those crimes referenced in the Penal Code and articulated in California Public Resources Code Section 5164(a)(2); in addition to and including acts of murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery, kidnapping, human trafficking, pimping, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, assault on a peace officer, mayhem, fraud, domestic abuse, elderly abuse, and child abuse, regardless of whether such acts are punishable by felony or misdemeanor conviction.

e. For the purposes of this provision, a Key Person is a principal, officer, or employee assigned to this Contract.

5. In the event City terminates this Contract as provided in this section, City may procure, upon such terms and in the manner as City may deem appropriate, services similar in scope and level of effort to those so terminated, and Subrecipient shall be liable to City for all of its costs and damages, including, but not limited to, any excess costs for such services.

6. If, after notice of termination of this Contract under the provisions of this section, it is determined for any reason that Subrecipient was not in default under the provisions of this section, or that the default was excusable under the terms of this Contract, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as if the notice of termination had been issued pursuant to Section 410.A. above, Termination for Convenience.

7. The rights and remedies of City provided in this section shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights and remedies provided by law or under this Contract.

C. In the event that this Contract is terminated, Subrecipient shall immediately notify all employees and Subcontractors, and shall notify in writing all other parties contracted with under the terms of this Contract within five working days of the termination.
§411. Permits

Subrecipient and its directors, officers, agents, employees and contractors/subcontractors, to the extent allowed hereunder, shall obtain and maintain all licenses, permits, certifications and other documents necessary for Subrecipient’s performance hereunder and shall pay any fees required therefor. Subrecipient shall immediately notify the City of any suspension, termination, lapses, non-renewals or restrictions of licenses, permits, certificates, or other documents.

§412. Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action

Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable nondiscrimination and affirmative action provisions of the laws of the United States of America, the State of California, the County and the City of Los Angeles. In performing this Agreement, the Subrecipient shall not discriminate in its employment practices against any employee or applicant for employment because of such person’s race, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, age, physical disability, mental disability, marital status, domestic partner status, or medical condition. The Subrecipient shall comply with Executive Order 11246, entitled “Equal Employment Opportunity”, as amended by Executive Order 11375, and as supplemented in Department of Labor regulations (41 CFR Part 60). Any subcontract entered into by the Subrecipient relating to this Agreement, to the extent allowed hereunder, shall be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.

§413. Bonds

Duplicate copies of all bonds, which may be required hereunder, shall conform to City requirements established by charter, ordinance or policy and all federal requirements regarding the use of Grant Funds and shall be filed with the Office of the City Administrative Officer, Risk Management for its review in accordance with Los Angeles Administrative Code Sections 11.47 through 11.56.

§414. Indemnification

Each of the parties to this Agreement is a public entity. In contemplation of the provisions of Section 895.2 of the Government Code of the State of California imposing certain tort liability jointly upon public entities, solely by reason of such entities being parties to an Agreement as defined by Section 895 of said Code, the parties hereto, as between themselves, pursuant to the authorization contained in Sections 895.4 and 895.6 of said Code, will each assume the full liability imposed upon it or upon any of its officers, agents, or employees by law, for injury caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurring in the performance of this Agreement, to the same extent that such liability would be imposed in the absence of Section 895.2 of said Code. To achieve the above-stated purpose, each party indemnifies and holds harmless the other party solely
by virtue of said Section 895.2. The provision of Section 2778 of the California Civil Code is made a part hereto as if fully set forth herein. Subrecipient certifies that it has adequate self-insured retention of funds to meet any obligation arising from this Agreement.

A. Pursuant to Government Code Sections 895.4 and 895.6, the parties shall each assume the full liability imposed upon it, or any of its officers, agents or employees, by law for injury caused by any negligent or wrongful act or omission occurring in the performance of this Agreement.

B. Each party indemnifies and holds harmless the other party for any loss, costs, or expenses that may be imposed upon such other party by virtue of Government Code section 895.2, which imposes joint civil liability upon public entities solely by reason of such entities being parties to an agreement, as defined by Government Code section 895.

C. In the event of third-party loss caused by negligence, wrongful act or omission by both Parties, each party shall bear financial responsibility in proportion to its percentage of fault as may be mutually agreed or judicially determined. The provisions of Civil Code Section 2778 regarding interpretation of indemnity agreements are hereby incorporated.

§415. Conflict of Interest

A. Subrecipient shall establish safeguards to prohibit employees from using their positions for a purpose that constitutes, or presents the appearance of, personal or organizational conflict of interest, or personal gain for themselves or others, particularly those with whom they have family, business, or other ties. Subrecipient covenants that none of its directors, officers, employees, or agents shall participate in selecting, or administering any subcontract supported (in whole or in part) by Federal funds where such person is a director, officer, employee or agent of the subcontractor; or where the selection of subcontractors is or has the appearance of being motivated by a desire for personal gain for themselves or others such as family business, etc.; or where such person knows or should have known that:

1. A member of such person's immediate family, or domestic partner or organization has a financial interest in the subcontract;

2. The subcontractor is someone with whom such person has or is negotiating any prospective employment; or

3. The participation of such person would be prohibited by 44 CFR §13.36, the California Political Reform Act, California Government Code §87100 et seq, if such person were a public officer, because
such person would have a "financial or other interest" in the subcontract.

B. Definitions:

1. The term "immediate family" includes but is not limited to domestic partners and/or those persons related by blood or marriage, such as husband, wife, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law.

2. The term "financial or other interest" includes but is not limited to:
   a. Any direct or indirect financial interest in the specific contract, including a commission or fee, a share of the proceeds, prospect of a promotion or of future employment, a profit, or any other form of financial reward.
   b. Any of the following interests in the subcontractor ownership: partnership interest or other beneficial interest of five percent or more; ownership of five percent or more of the stock; employment in a managerial capacity; or membership on the board of directors or governing body.

C. The Subrecipient further covenants that no officer, director, employee, or agent shall solicit or accept gratuities, favors, anything of monetary value from any actual or potential subcontractor, supplier, a party to a sub agreement, (or persons who are otherwise in a position to benefit from the actions of any officer, employee, or agent).

D. The Subrecipient shall not subcontract with a former director, officer, or employee within a one year period following the termination of the relationship between said person and the Subrecipient.

E. Prior to obtaining the City's approval of any subcontract, the Subrecipient shall disclose to the City any relationship, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, of the Subrecipient or any of its officers, directors or employees or their immediate family with the proposed subcontractor and its officers, directors or employees.

F. For further clarification of the meaning of any of the terms used herein, the parties agree that references shall be made to the guidelines, rules, and laws of the City of Los Angeles, State of California, and Federal regulations regarding conflict of interest.

G. The Subrecipient warrants that it has not paid or given and will not pay or give to any third person any money or other consideration for obtaining this Agreement.
H. The Subrecipient covenants that no member, officer or employee of Subrecipient shall have interest, direct or indirect, in any contract or subcontract or the proceeds thereof for work to be performed in connection with this project during his/her tenure as such employee, member or officer or for one year thereafter.

I. The Subrecipient shall incorporate the foregoing subsections of this Section into every agreement that it enters into in connection with this project and shall substitute the term "subcontractor" for the term "Contractor" and "sub sub subcontractor" for "Subcontractor".

§416. Restriction on Disclosures and Confidentiality

Subrecipient agrees to keep all information exchanged or provided through the STC Program strictly confidential, including any confidential, proprietary or non-public information, including sensitive security information (as defined by 49 CFR Part 1520). Subrecipient agrees to discuss with City in good faith whether it is necessary or desirable to disclose any particular information, and if so, to whom. In the event Subrecipient receives a request from a third party for information provided to them as part of the STC Program, Subrecipient shall afford the City and the other participants of the STC Program an opportunity to seek an appropriate protective order. However, in the absence of a protective order and the Subrecipient is, in the opinion of its counsel, compelled to disclose the information under threat of liability or violation of federal or state law, or contempt or other censure or penalty, disclosure of such information may be made by the Subrecipient.

§417. Minority, Women, and Other Business Enterprise Outreach Program

It is the policy of the City to provide minority business enterprises (MBEs), women business enterprises (WBEs) and all other business enterprises an equal opportunity to participate in the performance of all contracts and subcontracts, including procurement, construction and personal services. In accordance with Grantor directives, Subrecipient agrees that, to the extent contractors or subcontractors are utilized, Subrecipient shall use small, minority, women-owned, or disadvantaged business concerns and contractors or subcontractors to the extent practicable and shall take the affirmative steps as set forth in 44 CFR §13.36(e).

§418. Publications and Use of Grantor Markings

All publications created or published with funding under this Grant shall prominently contain the following statement: "This document was prepared under a grant from FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of FEMA’s Grant Programs Directorate or the U.S. Department of
Subrecipient shall comply with requirements to acknowledge Federal funding when issuing statements, press releases, requests for proposals, bid invitations, and other documents describing projects or programs funded in whole or in part by Grant Funds.

Subrecipient shall obtain Grantor approval prior to using Grantor seal(s), logos, crests or reproductions of flags or likenesses of Grantor agency officials, including the use of the United States Coast Guard seal, logo, crests or reproductions of flags or likenesses of Coast Guard officials.

§419. Compliance with Applicable Regulations and Statutes

Subrecipient shall comply with all terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement, which includes all guidance, regulations and requirements of the Federal awarding agency that are applicable to a recipient and/or subrecipient of a Federal award or grant. Such requirements are set forth in the following documents and incorporated herein by this reference: (1) Department of Homeland Security FY 2020 Homeland Security Grant Program Notice of Funding Opportunity ("DHS NOFO"), (2) FY 2020 DHS Standard Terms and Conditions ("DHS Standard Conditions"), the Cooperative Agreement Terms and Conditions (FY 2020) and any Continuation Terms and Conditions issued by the DHS Grants and Financial Assistance Division in connection with the Grant (collectively attached hereto as Exhibit E), and (3) the cost principles, uniform administrative requirements and audit requirements for federal grant programs as housed in Title 2, Part 200 of the CFR and in updates issued by the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") on http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/.

These Requirements also include, without limitation, the following:

A. Administrative Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with the requirements set forth in the following, as applicable: Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") Circular A-102 (Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State and Local Governments) as codified in Title 44, Code of Regulations ("CFR") Part 13; OMB Circular A-110 (Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals and Other Non-Profit Organizations) as codified in 2 CFR Part 215; and OMB Standard Form 424B Assurances – Non-construction Programs.

B. Audit Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with the requirements set forth in the following, as applicable: The Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended; 2 CFR Part 200
Subpart F (Audit Requirements); and Los Angeles City Council action dated February 4, 1987 (Council File #84-2259-S1).

C. Cost Principles

In expending federal Grant funds, or seeking reimbursement for costs from federal Grant funds, Subrecipient shall comply with the requirements for allowable costs/cost principles as set forth in the following, as applicable: OMB Circular A-21 (Cost Principles for Educational Institutions) as codified in 2 CFR Part 220; OMB Circular A-87 (Cost Principles for State, Local, and Indian Tribal Governments) as codified in 2 CFR Part 225; OMB Circular A-122 (Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations) as codified in 2 CFR Part 230; and 2 CFR Part 200 Subpart E (Cost Principles); 48 CFR Part 31.2, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Contracts with Commercial Organizations; Improper Payments Information Act ("IPIA") of 2002, as amended, (Public Law 107-300); and Cash Management Improvement Act ("CMIA") of 1990, as amended and codified in 31 CFR Part 205.

D. Americans with Disabilities Act and Related Requirements

Subrecipient hereby certifies that it shall comply with the applicable requirements of the following: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and its implementing regulations; the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-325) and all subsequent amendments thereto ("ADAAA"); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as amended ("the Rehab Act"); 24 CFR Parts 8 and 9 relating to non-discrimination based on handicap; the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards set forth in 24 CFR Part 40 ("UFAS"); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and all its implementing regulations, including those set forth in 24 CFR Parts 100, 103 and 104 ("FHA"). Subrecipient will provide, as applicable, reasonable accommodations to allow qualified individuals with disabilities to have access to and to participate in its programs, services and activities in accordance with the provisions of the ADA, the ADAAA, the Rehab Act, the UFAS and the FHA and all subsequent amendments thereto.

Subrecipient will not discriminate against persons with disabilities nor against persons due to their relationship to or association with a person with a disability. Subrecipient shall ensure that any contract entered into by the Subrecipient (or any subcontract thereof) related to the use of Grant funds, to the extent allowed hereunder, be subject to the provisions of this paragraph.

E. Political and Sectarian Activity Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with all applicable lobbying restriction requirements set forth in 31 U.S.C. §1352, et seq., and political activity
restriction requirements set forth in the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1501-1508, as amended. Subrecipient agrees that none of the funds, materials, property or services funded or reimbursed under this Agreement shall be used for any partisan political activity, or to further the election or defeat of any candidate for public office, or to influence, or attempt to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with any federal action concerning the award or renewal of any federal contract, grant, loan or cooperative agreement. Subrecipient shall not use any funds provided under this Agreement, directly or indirectly, to support the enactment, defeat, repeal, modification or adoption of any law, regulation, pending legislation, pending regulation, or policy (pending or otherwise), at any level of government. None of the funds provided pursuant to this Agreement shall be used for any sectarian purpose or to support or benefit any sectarian activity.

Concurrent with the execution of this Agreement, Subrecipient shall submit to the City a Certification Regarding Lobbying and a Disclosure Form in accordance with 31 U.S.C. §1352. A copy of the Certificate is attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein. No funds will be released to Subrecipient until the Certification is filed.

Subrecipient shall file a Disclosure Form at the end of each calendar quarter in which there occurs any event requiring disclosure or which materially affects the accuracy of any of the information contained in any Disclosure Form previously filed by Subrecipient. Subrecipient shall require that the language of this Certification be included in the award documents for all sub-awards at all tiers and that all subcontractors shall certify and disclose accordingly.

F. Labor Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with all applicable requirements regarding labor, wages, work hours, and conditions of employment, including, without limitation, the following: Executive Order ("EO") 11246 of September 24, 1965, entitled "Equal Employment Opportunity," as amended by EO 11375 of October 13, 1967, and as supplemented by Department of Labor ("DOL") regulations in 41 CFR Part 60; the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. §§276a to 276a-7) as supplemented by DOL regulations in 29 CFR Part 5; the Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act (18 U.S.C. 874) as supplemented by DOL regulations in 29 CFR Part 3; and Sections 103 and 107 of the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 U.S.C. 327-330) as supplemented by DOL regulations in 29 CFR Part 5.

G. Civil Rights and Related Requirements
Subrecipient shall comply with all applicable Requirements regarding civil rights and nondiscrimination, including, without limitation, the following: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.), as amended, which provides that no person in the United States will, on the grounds of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity received Federal financial assistance; Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.), as implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations in 24 CFR Part 100, which prohibits recipients of Federal funds from discriminating in the sale, rental, financing, and advertising of dwellings, or in the provision of services in connection therewith, on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, disability, familial status, and sex; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Equal Opportunity in Education Act), as amended (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., codified in 44 CFR Part 19), which provides that no person in the United States will, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance; the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq.), as amended, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of age in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance; and EO 13166 entitled "Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency," which prohibits discrimination on the basis of limited English proficiency ("LEP") and requires recipients of Federal funds to take reasonable steps to ensure that LEP persons have meaningful access to the recipients' programs, which may include providing language assistance services, including oral and written translation, where necessary. For additional assistance and information regarding language access obligations, please refer to the DHS Recipient Guidance: https://www.dhs.gov/guidance-published-help-department-supported-organizations-provide-meaningful-access-people-limited and additional resources on http://www.lep.gov.

H. Environmental, Energy Efficiency and Preservation Requirements

1977, entitled “Floodplain Management”; EO 11990 of May 24, 1977, entitled “Protection of Wetlands”; EO 12898 of February 11, 1994, entitled “Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations”; Section 1306(c) of the National Flood Insurance Act, as codified in 44 CFR Part 63; the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, as amended (42 U.S.C. §4001 et seq.), which provides that no Federal financial assistance to acquire, modernize, or construct property may be provided in identified flood-prone communities unless certain insurance program requirements are met; the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act of 1990 (44 CFR Part 9); Environmental Protection Agency regulations set forth in 40 CFR Chapter 1; and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq.), which contain policies relating to energy efficiency.

I. Human and Animal Research Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with all applicable Requirements related to the research, handling, care and protection of human and animal research subjects, including, without limitation, the following: the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. §2131 et seq.) and associated regulations set forth in 9 CFR Chapter 1, Subchapter A; the Public Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals (which adopts the U.S. Government Principles for the Utilization and Care of Vertebrate Animals used in Testing, Research and Training, 50 FR 20864, May 20, 1985); the National Research Council Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals; the Federation of Animal Science Societies Guide for the Care and Use of Agricultural Animals in Agricultural Research and Teaching; any additional Requirements set forth in DHS Directive 026-01 regarding the Care and Use of Animals in Research; Requirements set forth in 45 CFR Part 46, Subparts A-D; DHS Directive 026-04 entitled “Protection of Human Subjects” and any related DHS policies and instructions.

Subrecipient shall not initiate any activities contemplated under this Section or execute modifications to any such approved activities until all documentation and forms required by the Grantor pursuant to Requirements set forth in this Section is duly submitted to and approved by the Grantor.

J. USA Patriot Act of 2001

Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable Requirements of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), which amends 18 U.S.C. §§175-175c, which, among other things, prescribes criminal penalties for possession of any biological agent, toxin or delivery system
not justified under the regulations and which establishes restrictions on access to specified materials.

K. **Fly America Act of 1974**

Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable Requirements of the Preference for U.S. Flag Air Carriers: Travel supported by U.S. Government funds requirement, which states preference for the use of U.S. flag air carriers (air carriers holding certificates under 49 U.S.C. §41102) for international air transportation of people and property to the extent that such service is available, in accordance with the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. §40118) and the interpretive guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the United States in the March 31, 1981, amendment to Comptroller General Decision B138942.

L. **Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000**

Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable Requirements of Section 106(g) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, as amended (22 U.S.C. §7104 et seq., 2 CFR Part 175). Subrecipient understands and agrees that it, and any of its subrecipients, employees or subgrantees that are private entities, may not:

(a) Engage in severe forms of trafficking in persons during the period of time that this Grant award is in effect;

(b) Procure a commercial sex act during the period of time that the Grant award is in effect; or

(c) Use forced labor in the performance of the award or subaward under this Grant award.

Subrecipient understands and agrees that the City and the Grant may terminate any award of Grant funds, or reimbursement of expenses through Grant funds, if Subrecipient is found to have violated the TVPA.

M. **Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990**


N. **Activities Conducted Abroad**
Subrecipient shall comply with the Requirements that project activities supported with Grant Funds and carried on outside the United States are coordinated as necessary with appropriate government authorities and that appropriate licenses, permits or approvals are obtained.

O. Drug-Free Workplace Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with applicable Requirements related to maintaining a drug-free workplace, including, without limitation, the following: the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (41 U.S.C. §701 et seq.), codified in 2 CFR 3001; the California Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1990 (Government Code §§ 8350-8357). Subrecipient shall execute and submit to the City concurrent with the execution of this Agreement the Certification Regarding Drug Free Workplace Requirements attached hereto as Exhibit D and made a part hereof. Subrecipient shall also notify the City if an employee of the Subrecipient is convicted of violating a criminal drug statute. Failure to comply with these requirements may be cause for debarment.

P. Suspension and Debarment Requirements

Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable Requirements set forth in Executive Orders 12549 and 12689, which provides protection against waste, fraud and abuse by debarring or suspending those persons deemed irresponsible in their dealings with the Federal government. Subrecipient shall execute and submit to the City concurrent with the execution of this Agreement the Certification Regarding Debarment required by Executive Orders 12549 and 12689 and any amendment thereto (attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part hereof).

Q. Requirements of Collection and Use of Personally Identifiable Information

Subrecipient shall comply with applicable Grantor guidelines regarding the handling of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), as required by OMB M-07-16 and as set forth in DHS Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive PII, which can be found at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook%20for%20Safeguarding%20Sensitive%20PII_0.pdf. In collecting PII, Subrecipient shall have a publicly available privacy policy that describes what PII it collects, how it plans to use the PII, whether it shares PII with third parties, and how individuals may have their PII corrected where appropriate. Subrecipient may find DHS Privacy Impact Assessments, guidance and templates online at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_guidance_june2010.pdf and at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_template.pdf, respectively.
R. Records, Reports and Access Requirements

All books, documents, papers or other records, electronic or otherwise, related to this Agreement and the Grant, including all financial records, invoices, materials, statistical records, payrolls, personnel records, and supporting documents (collectively, “Records”), in their original form, shall be maintained in accordance with Requirements prescribed by the City and Grantor and retained for a period of four (4) years after termination of this Agreement; provided, however, that if any litigation, dispute or audit is started before the expiration of such 4-year period, Records shall be retained until all litigation, dispute or audit findings involving the Records have been resolved and final action taken. In the case of Records related to real property or equipment acquired with Grant funds, such Records shall be retained for three (3) years after final disposition of such real property or equipment. Subrecipient agrees to comply with Grantor directions to transfer certain Records to Grantor custody or continue to retain such Records beyond the time set forth herein when Grantor determines that the Records possess long term retention value or the Records are continuously needed for joint use.

Subrecipient agrees that the Grantor, the City, the Office of the Inspector General of the United States, the Comptroller General of the United States, or any of their duly authorized representatives, shall have the right of timely and unrestricted access to all Records in order to make audits, examinations, excerpts, transcripts and copies of such Records. This right shall also include timely and reasonable access to Subrecipient's facilities and personnel for the purpose of interview and discussion related to such Records. The rights set forth herein shall last for as long as the Records are retained.

Subrecipient agrees that the Grantor and the City, through their respective authorized representatives, each has the right, at all reasonable times, to make site visits to review Grant-related project accomplishments and management control systems and to provide such technical assistance as may be required. If any site visit is made by the Grantor and/or the City on the premises of the Subrecipient, the Subrecipient shall provide all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safety and convenience of the Grantor and/or City representatives in the performance of their duties. All site visits and evaluations shall be performed in such a manner that will not unduly delay the work.

Subrecipient agrees to submit timely, complete and accurate financial and performance reports to appropriate Grantor and City representatives as may be requested and as may be required under the Grant and to maintain appropriate backup documentation to support such reports. Subrecipient shall cooperate with any compliance review or complaint
investigation conducted by the Grantor and/or the City in connection with Subrecipient’s use of Grant Funds.

The provisions of this Section shall survive the termination of this Agreement.

S. Biological/Chemical Defense, Biological Laboratory, and Life Sciences Dual Use Research Requirements

Subrecipient shall conduct all biological and chemical defense research, development and acquisition projects in compliance with all arms control agreements and regulations of the United States, such Requirements to include, without limitation, the following: the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Biological Weapons Convention; DHS Directive 041-01 entitled “Compliance With, and Implementation of Arms Control Agreement.” Subrecipient shall conduct all biological laboratory work in compliance with applicable Requirements, including, without limitation, the following: the latest edition of the Center for Disease Control/National Institute of Health Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories; DHS Directive 066-02 regarding Biosafety; and any local institutional policies that may apply to Subrecipient facilities performing work under this Grant.

Subrecipient shall identify, report and conduct any research involving life sciences dual use research of concern (as defined by the United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern) in compliance with all applicable Requirements, including, without limitation, DHS Directive 026-08 entitled “Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern” and any additional Requirements set forth in related DHS policies and instructions.

Subrecipient shall not initiate any activities contemplated under this Section or execute modifications to any such approved activities until all documentation and forms required by the Grantor pursuant to Requirements set forth in this Section is duly submitted to and approved by the Grantor.

T. U.S. Export Controls Requirements

In performing all Grant supported activities, Subrecipient shall comply with all applicable Requirements related to United States export control regulations, including, without limitation, the following: the Export Administration Regulations; the International Traffic in Arms Regulations; the Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations. Subrecipient shall ensure that all legal requirements for compliance with U.S. export controls are met prior to transferring commodities, technologies, technical data or other controlled information to a non-U.S. person or entity.
U. **Terrorist Financing Prohibition**

Subrecipient shall comply with all Executive Orders and other Requirements which prohibit transactions with, and the provision of resources and support to, individuals and organizations associated with terrorism. These Requirements include, without limitation, EO 13224.

V. **Sub-Awards and Executive Compensation Disclosure**

Subrecipient shall comply with the applicable Requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) (P.L. 109-282), as amended by Section 6202(a) of the Government Funding Transparency Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-252), regarding disclosure of subawards and executive compensation.

W. **Inventions, Patents, Copyrights and Data Rights Requirements**

1. If any project of Subrecipient funded under this Agreement produces any invention or discovery ("Invention") patentable or otherwise under Title 35 of the U.S. Code, including, without limitation, processes and business methods made in the course of work under this Agreement, Subrecipient shall report the fact and disclose the Invention promptly and fully to the City. The City shall report the fact and disclose the Invention to the Grantor. Unless there is a prior agreement between the City and Grantor, Grantor shall determine whether to seek protection on the Invention. Grantor shall determine how the rights in the Invention, including rights under any patent issued thereon, will be allocated and administered in order to protect the public interest consistent with the policy ("Policy") embodied in the following Requirements, without limitation: Federal Acquisition Regulations System, which is based on Ch. 18 of Title 35 U.S.C. Sections 200 et seq. (Pub. L. 95-517, Pub. L. 98-620, 37 CFR part 401); Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy to the Heads of the Executive Departments and Agencies, dated 2/18/1983); government-wide regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce codified in 37 CFR Part 401; EO 12591 dated April 10, 1987; EO 12618 dated December 22, 1987. Subrecipient hereby agrees to be bound by the Policy, will contractually require its personnel to be bound by the Policy, and will consult with Grantor regarding allocation of any patent rights that arise from, or are purchased with, Grant Funds. City and Grantor shall have an unencumbered right, and a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license, to use, manufacture, improve upon, and allow others to do so for all government purposes, any Invention developed under this Agreement.
2. As applicable, the parties shall comply with the requirements of 37 CFR Part 401, “Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations and Small Business Firms Under Government Grants, Contracts and Cooperative Agreements,” and any implementing regulations issued by the awarding agency.

3. When copyrightable material (“Material”) is first produced or developed as part of a project funded by Grant Funds, the Grantor, at its discretion, may copyright the Material. If the Grantor declines to copyright the Material, the Grantor and the City shall have an unencumbered right, and a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license, to reproduce, display, publish, disseminate, perform, prepare derivative works or otherwise use, and authorize others to use, for all government purposes: (a) any Material so produced or developed and (b) any rights of copyright to which Subrecipient purchases ownership with Grant Funds. Subrecipient shall affix the applicable copyright notices of 17 U.S.C. §401 or §402 and an acknowledgement of government sponsorship (including Grant award number) to any Material first produced or developed under this Grant. All publications produced with funding from Grant Funds which are submitted for publication in any magazine, journal, or trade papers shall carry statements of acknowledgment and disclaimers as required by the Grantor under the Grant Requirements.

4. The Grantor shall have unlimited rights or copyright license to any data first produced or delivered under this Agreement or to any scientific, technical, or other copyright work based on or containing data first produced under this Agreement, including those works published in academic, technical or professional journals, symposia proceedings, or similar works. “Unlimited rights” means the right to use, disclose, reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform and display publicly, or permit others to do so. Where the data are not first produced under this Agreement or are published copyrighted data with the notice of 17 U.S.C. Section 401 or 402, the Grantor acquires the data under a copyright license as set forth in 48 CFR 27.404(f)(2) instead of unlimited rights. (48 CFR 27.404(a)).

5. Subrecipient shall require all its contractors and subcontractors funded by Grant Funds to comply with the obligations of this section by incorporating the terms of this section into all contracts and subcontracts. The provisions of this Section X shall survive termination of this Agreement.
X. Procurement and Contracting Regulations

1. Procurement of Recovered Materials- Solid Waste Disposal Act

   In accordance with 2 CFR §200.323, the parties shall make maximum use of products containing recovered materials that are EPA-designated items unless the product cannot be acquired a) competitively within a timeframe providing for compliance with the contract performance schedule; b) meeting contract performance requirements; or c) at a reasonable price. Information about this requirement, along with the list of EPA designated items, is available at EPA's Comprehensive Procurement Guidelines web site, https://www.epa.gov/ctqm/comprehensive-procurement-guideline-cpg-program. The parties also agree to comply with all other applicable requirements of Section 6002 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.

2. Domestic Preferences for Procurements

   In accordance with 2 CFR §200.322, the parties should, to the greatest extent practicable, provide a preference for the purchase, acquisition, or use of goods, products, or materials produced in the United States (including but not limited to iron, aluminum, steel, cement, and other manufactured products). The requirements of this section must be included in all subawards, including all contracts and purchase orders for work or products under this award.

3. Telecommunications

   As applicable, the parties shall comply with 2 CFR §200.216, which prohibits recipients or Subrecipients from obligating or expending loan or grant funds to: 1) procure or obtain; 2) extend or renew a contract to procure or obtain; or 3) enter into a contract (or extend or renew a contract) to procure or obtain equipment, services, or systems that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system. As described in Public Law 115-232, Section 889, covered telecommunications equipment is telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).

Y. Noncompliance

   Subrecipient understands that failure to comply with any of the above assurances or the Grant Assurances attached hereto as Exhibit E may
result in suspension, termination or reduction of Grant Funds, and repayment by Subrecipient to City of any unlawful expenditures. Subrecipient shall be liable to the Grantor for any funds the Grantor determines that Subrecipient used in violation of these Grant Assurances and Subrecipient shall indemnify and hold harmless the City for any sums the Grantor determines Subrecipient used in violation of the Grant Assurances. The provisions of this paragraph shall survive termination of this Agreement.

[THIS SECTION INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
V. DEFAULTS, AMENDMENTS, AND AGREEMENT

§501. Defaults

Should Subrecipient fail for any reason to comply with the contractual obligations of this Agreement within the time specified by this Agreement, the City reserves the right to terminate the Agreement, reserving all rights under state and federal law.

§502. Amendments

Any change in the terms of this Agreement, including changes in the services to be performed by Subrecipient, and any increase or decrease in the amount of compensation/allocation which are agreed to by the City and Subrecipient shall be incorporated into this Agreement by a written amendment properly executed and signed by the person authorized to bind the parties thereto. Subrecipient agrees to comply with all future City Directives, or any rules, amendments or requirements promulgated by the City affecting this Agreement.

§503. Complete Agreement

This Agreement sets forth all of the rights and duties of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and replaces any and all previous agreements or understandings, whether written or oral, relating thereto. This Agreement may be amended only as provided for herein and neither verbal agreement nor conversation with any officer or employee of either party shall affect or modify any of the terms and conditions of this Agreement. This Agreement is executed in two duplicate originals, each of which is deemed to be an original. This Agreement includes thirty-eight (38) pages and five Exhibits which constitute the entire understanding and agreement of the parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the City and Subrecipient have caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized representatives.

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<tr>
<th>APPROVED AS TO FORM AND LEGALITY:</th>
<th>THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES</th>
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<tr>
<td>MIchael N. Feuer, City Attorney</td>
<td>ERIC GARCETTI, Mayor</td>
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By: ____________________________
Deputy City Attorney

Date: __________________________

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<td>JUNE LAGMAY, City Clerk</td>
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By: ____________________________
Deputy City Clerk

Date: __________________________

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<th>APPROVED AS TO FORM:</th>
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<tr>
<td>For: COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a political subdivision of the State of California, acting by and through its Sheriff's Department</td>
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By: ____________________________

Date: __________________________

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<td>By: ____________________________</td>
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<td>City Clerk</td>
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Date: __________________________

[SEAL]

City Business License Number: _________________________________
Internal Revenue Service ID Number: ___________________________
Council File/OARS File Number: 13-1301-S3; Date of Approval: 5/12/2021
City Contract Number: ____________________________
October 12, 2021

The Honorable Board of Supervisors
County of Los Angeles
383 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Dear Supervisors:

APPROVAL OF EXPENDITURE INCREASE TO CONTRACT NO. 78641 WITH HELICOPTER SUPPORT, INC., DBA SIKORSKY COMMERCIAL, INC. (ALL DISTRICTS) (3 VOTES)

SUBJECT

The Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County (District) is requesting Board of Supervisors (Board) approval to increase the annual maximum contract sum for the District’s sole source contract number 78641 with Helicopter Support Inc., DBA Sikorsky Commercial Inc. (HSI), for contract year 2021 (January 1, 2021 – December 31, 2021). The increase is needed to fund projected expenditures during the remainder of the current fire season.

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE BOARD, ACTING AS THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE CONSOLIDATED FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY:

1. Approve an increase to the annual maximum contract spending authority for contract number 78641 with HSI by $1,500,000 for contract year 2021, thereby increasing the 2021 annual maximum contract sum from $5,871,938 to $7,371,938.

PURPOSE/JUSTIFICATION OF RECOMMENDED ACTION

Through this contract, HSI provides a Total Assurance Program (TAP) which consigns a large inventory of parts to the District for its S70 Sikorsky Firehawk helicopters (Firehawks). The District currently operates five Sikorsky Firehawks that are supported by this contract,
and the TAP establishes a fixed yearly operating cost based on a firm fixed price per flight hour.

HSI provides Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) replacement parts, components, tools, technical publications and engineering support for the District’s Firehawks. Consigned parts and components are stored at the District’s Barton Heliport located in Pacoima, California.

As of August 1, 2021, due to extreme weather conditions, the District has flown over 200 hours above the five-year average for this time of year, resulting in TAP contract expenditures forecasted to go beyond the current annual maximum sum. Therefore, an increase to the annual maximum contract sum is necessary to allow for anticipated increased expenditures needed to fund aircraft flight time through the remainder of the current fire season. In order to align contract expenditures with the fiscal year and to add contract language for future exclusion of legacy aircraft, the District will be terminating current contract number 78641 for convenience effective June 30, 2022. An increase to next year’s spending authority for contract number 78641 is not necessary as there is no risk in exceeding 2022’s annual maximum spending authority before June 30, 2022. A new contract with HSI will include negotiated expenditure increases for TAP effective July 1, 2022.

Implementation of Strategic Plan Goals

Approval of the recommended action is consistent with the County’s Strategic Plan Goal No. III, Strategy III.3: Pursue Operational Effectiveness, Fiscal Responsibility, and Accountability by continually assessing our efficiency and effectiveness, maximizing, and leveraging resources, and holding ourselves accountable.

FISCAL IMPACT/FINANCING

Sufficient funding is available in the District’s Fiscal Year 2021-22 Budget. The District will continue to allocate the necessary funds throughout the remainder of this contract (June 30, 2022). This contract does not include an allowance for Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) and there is no impact to net County cost.

FACTS AND PROVISIONS/LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

Since the District does not possess a significant Sikorsky helicopter parts inventory of its own, the utilization of consigned inventory through the TAP is crucial for mitigating aircraft downtime.

CONTRACTING PROCESS

The District’s contract number 78641 with HSI was approved by your Board on December 18, 2018 and is due to expire on December 31, 2023. In order to align contract expenditures with the fiscal year and to add new contract language, the District will be terminating contract number 78641 for convenience effective June 30, 2022. The process to negotiate a new contract with HSI effective July 1, 2022 will begin soon.
The District will provide separate notification of its intent to enter into negotiations for a new sole source contract with HSI pursuant to Board policy 5.100, Sole Source Contracts.

**IMPACT ON CURRENT SERVICES (OR PROJECTS)**

Approval of the recommended action will allow the District to continue to pay for TAP related operating costs without any aircraft downtime for the District’s Firehawks. There will be no significant impact on current services as there will be no displacement of any District or County employees.

**CONCLUSION**

Upon approval by your Honorable Board, please instruct the Executive Officer of the Board to return the adopted stamped Board Letter to the following:

Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County
Executive Office - Business Operations
Attention: Zuleyda Santana, Administrative Services Manager II
1320 North Eastern Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90063

The District’s contact may be reached at (323) 881-6173.

Respectfully submitted,

DARYL L. OSBY, FIRE CHIEF

DLO:cs

c:  Chief Executive Officer
    Executive Office, Board of Supervisors
    County Counsel
October 5, 2021

The Honorable Board of Supervisors
County of Los Angeles
383 Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, California 90012

Dear Supervisors:

APPROVE SOLE SOURCE AMENDMENT NUMBER TEN TO AGREEMENT NUMBER 77655 WITH PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. FOR INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM AND SERVICES (ALL DISTRICTS) (3 VOTES)

SUBJECT

This is a joint recommendation by the Sheriff and the Chief Probation Officer. The Los Angeles County (County) Sheriff’s Department (Department) and Probation Department (Probation) are seeking the Board’s approval of Sole Source Amendment Number Ten (Amendment) to Agreement Number 77655 (Agreement) with Public Communications Services, Inc. (PCS) to extend the Agreement for six months, plus a six-month option period, in any increment. The Amendment will ensure uninterrupted telephone services for incarcerated adults and juveniles within the Department’s and Probation’s facilities while the Department continues developing the solicitation for a successor contract. Additionally, the Amendment will modify the inmate telephone billing rates and Inmate Welfare Fund revenue share, eliminate the Minimum Annual Guarantee, and eliminate or modify certain ancillary service charges, effective October 7, 2021, in accordance with the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Ruling (CPUC 20-10-002) and Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Ruling (FCC 21-60).
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE BOARD:

1. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, or his designee, to execute an Amendment, substantially similar to the attached amendment, to (1) extend the Agreement for six months through April 30, 2022, plus a six-month option period, exercisable in any increment, through October 31, 2022, (2) modify the inmate telephone billing rates consistent with CPUC 20-10-002 and FCC 21-60 rulings, (3) modify the Inmate Welfare Fund revenue share, (4) eliminate the Minimum Annual Guarantee, (5) eliminate or modify the ancillary service charges set forth in the Agreement, and (6) add or modify certain County-mandated standard provisions.

2. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, or his designee, to execute an amendment to the Agreement to exercise the additional six-month option period in any increment, provided it is the best interest of the County.

3. Delegate authority to the Sheriff, or his designee, to negotiate and enter into an alternative amendment with PCS prior to October 27, 2021, in the event CPUC 20-10-002 is stayed by the court, with advance notice provided to the Board.

PURPOSE/JUSTIFICATION OF RECOMMENDED ACTION

The Agreement will expire on October 31, 2021. On May 12, 2021, in accordance with Board Policy 5.100, the Department provided the Board with an advance notification of its intent to enter into a Sole-Source Amendment to extend the Agreement for a period of one year, plus a six-month option period, to ensure uninterrupted telephone services for incarcerated adults and juveniles within the Department’s and Probation’s facilities while the Department continues developing the solicitation for a successor contract. On May 13, 2021, we were requested by the Justice Deputies to change the term to a period of six months, plus a six-month option period, which changed the date of the advance notification to May 13, 2021. Approval of the recommended actions will ensure uninterrupted telephone service for adults and juveniles incarcerated within the Department’s and Probation’s facilities. The Amendment will also ensure uninterrupted services while a collaborative response to the May 18, 2021, Board Motion 13 is prepared, and will allow time to incorporate any further instruction from the Board regarding the competitive solicitation for a successor contract. Additionally, the recommended actions will allow the Department and Probation to align the County’s Agreement for Inmate Telephone System (ITS) and Services with CPUC 20-10-002 and FCC 21-60 rulings, which among other things, lowers the per-minute interim rate caps for all domestic and international calls.

Background
On September 20, 2011, the Board approved the Agreement for the provision of an ITS and Services to the Department and Probation, with an initial term of November 1, 2011, through October 31, 2016. Under the Agreement, the County had the option to extend the term of the Agreement for up to three one-year periods, plus one six-month period, through April 30, 2020, if all options were exercised.

On September 26, 2013, the FCC released a “Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” (FCC 13-113), which among other things, established interim rate caps on the interstate calling rates charged by inmate calling service providers.

On December 2, 2013, the County and PCS entered into Amendment Number One to the Agreement which, among other things, deleted and replaced Exhibit B (Statement of Work), of the Agreement to change the delivery method for Pre-Paid Call Services from a tangible Pre-Paid Phone Card to a Cardless Debit Phone Account administered by PCS.

On February 4, 2014, the County and PCS entered into Amendment Number Two to the Agreement, which (1) reduced the maximum dollar amount to $60 from $125 for collect calls placed to any single destination phone number during any continuous 30-day period, and (2) directed PCS to implement, not later than thirty (30) calendar days from the effective date of the Amendment, the recording of all telephone calls made from any and all phones within the Sheriff’s Department Custody and Detention Facilities, other than those made to an attorney or public defender telephone number, including calls initiated by pro-per inmates.

On February 10, 2014, the County and PCS entered into Amendment Number Three to the Agreement, which reduced the Inmate Telephone Billing Rate for Domestic Calls – Interstate Calls (Debit Phone (Cardless) and Pre-Paid Account), effective February 11, 2014.

On November 5, 2015, the FCC released a “Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” (FCC 15-136), which among other things, established rate caps on interstate and intrastate calling rates and eliminated, restricted, and/or further defined the fees which may be charged by inmate telephone providers.

On March 7, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Court) issued an order staying the implementation of rate caps on the calling rates set forth in 47 CFR section 64.6010, and caps on fees for single-call services set forth in 47 CFR section 64.6020(b) (2), pending judicial review of the legality of those caps established pursuant to FCC 15-136.
On March 23, 2016, the D.C. Court issued another order staying the implementation of the interim rate caps set forth in 47 CFR section 64.6030 only as they apply to the provision of intrastate calling services; whereas, all other provisions, rules, and regulations set forth in FCC 15-136 remained effective and were to be implemented by jail facilities by June 20, 2016.

On June 14, 2016, the Board delegated authority to the Sheriff to execute Amendment Number Four to the Agreement that (1) modified the Inmate Telephone Billing Rates and implemented new FCC-authorized Ancillary Services Charges consistent with FCC 15-136, (2) deleted the Convenience and Single-Bill fees authorized under Paragraph 9.5 (Miscellaneous Fees) of the Agreement, (3) added the Advance Pay One Call (APOC) services, and (4) formally memorialized the addition of Customer kiosks at the Department’s Custody and Detention Facilities. The Board however did not delegate authority to the Sheriff to exercise the first one-year option term. The Board also requested that the Sheriff, in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer, Interim Chief Probation Officer, and the Office of Diversion and Reentry, report back to the Board in writing by September 30, 2016, with a written detailed analysis of the impact of the contract amendments on the cost and use of inmate phones, as well as recommendations regarding terms that should be included in a Request for Proposal (RFP) that would increase contact between inmates and their families, minimize recidivism, which will have an impact on distressed communities.

On October 4, 2016, the Board delegated authority to the Sheriff to execute Amendment Number Five to the Agreement that allowed the Department to exercise the first one-year Option Term and extend the term of the Agreement from November 1, 2016, through October 31, 2017. The Board letter provided the Department’s analysis & findings and proposed recommendations in response to the Board's June 14, 2016, action.

On November 23, 2016, the County and PCS entered into Amendment Number Six to the Agreement that amended Exhibit N (Kiosk Locations) to relocate kiosk machines from Pitchess Detention Center and Lancaster Station to Walnut Station and Norwalk Station.

On December 19, 2016, the Department released a Request for Information (RFI) to seek information from vendors who could provide an ITS. The RFI requested vendors to include any new technology features that allowed the use of emerging electronic technologies including but not limited to: electronic tablets, increased video visitation, video grams, inmate voicemail, and e-mail. The Department received six responses by the January 20, 2017, deadline. All six vendors were invited to participate in a
non-competitive presentation of their products related directly to the subject intent of the RFI. Five vendors participated in the vendor presentations.

After reviewing the RFI responses and observing the vendor product presentations, the Department determined that inmate communication technologies such as electronic tablets need further research, a potential pilot program (pilot), and technical consulting before introducing these devices to the County’s entire inmate population. It was also determined that inmate tablet devices were still considered an emerging technology and, in some cases, still in the prototype pilot phase.

On June 13, 2017, the D.C. Court ruled on the legality of FCC 15-136. The order was upheld in part and vacated in part, and certain issues were remanded to the FCC for further proceeding. The ruling had no immediate impact on the Agreement. There were no permanent calling rate caps or ancillary fee caps in effect that would have required modifications to the Agreement at that time.

On October 10, 2017, the Board delegated authority to the Sheriff to execute Amendment Number Seven to the Agreement to (1) exercise the second one-year option term from November 1, 2017, through October 31, 2018, (2) update the County-mandated provisions regarding Consideration of GAIN/GROW Program Participants, County’s Quality Assurance Plan, and Safely Surrendered Baby Law, and (3) add the new County-mandated provisions regarding Time Off for Voting and Compliance with the County’s Zero Tolerance Policy on Human Trafficking. The parties entered into Amendment Number Seven on October 27, 2017.

During 2018, Department representatives toured jails in various states and counties to observe the use of electronic tablets issued to inmates, and interviewed the jail administrators about the advantages and any problems experienced from issuing the tablets. Based upon the balance of positive reviews, the Department decided to combine inmate telephone and electronic tablet services into one solicitation, and engaged in gathering information to pursue this process. Tablet technology was relatively new and evolving so the Department was exploring the services of a consulting firm to analyze its impact on infrastructure and operations and advise how to go forward with implementing this program.

On October 2, 2018, the Board delegated authority to the Sheriff to execute Amendment Number Eight to the Agreement to (1) exercise the third one-year option term from November 1, 2018 through October 31, 2019, (2) update the County-mandated provision regarding Assignment by Contractor, and (3) add the County-mandated provision regarding Compliance with Fair Chance Employment Practices and
compliance with the County Policy of Equity. The parties entered into Amendment Number Eight on October 22, 2018.

On January 24, 2019, the Department decided to remove the electronic tablets from the inmate phone services solicitation and to forego consulting services due to the uncertainty about future plans for the jail infrastructure. On August 13, 2019, the contract for the Men's Central Jail replacement project was canceled. After further consideration of this news, the Department concluded it should resume exploring enhanced inmate communication platforms. Including electronic tablets within the ITS is expected to assist with Department of Justice compliance by providing an additional platform for inmates to submit service requests and grievances, and for the Department to track and account for such submissions. Tablet technology is being used at an increasing rate throughout correctional facilities in the United States, and has shown the potential to improve how educational services are delivered to inmates, including access to an electronic library, instructional videos, and distance learning opportunities with college partners. Tablet technology also shows the potential to improve accessibility for inmates to complete court mandated training, and for improving the likelihood of successful community reentry.

On October 1, 2019, the Board delegated authority to the Sheriff to execute Amendment Number Nine to the Agreement that extended the Term of the Agreement through October 31, 2021, a total period of two years that included the final six-month option period, and added new County-mandated provisions.

During 2020, despite the unpredictable and inherent challenges and delays associated with COVID-19 (staffing, illnesses, etc.) and the reintroduction of Senate Bill 555 (re: Jails and juvenile facilities communications, information, and commissary services contracts) that was vetoed on September 30, 2020, the Department and Probation continued to actively work on the RFP solicitation for a successor contract that includes an enhanced inmate communications platform.

On May 18, 2021, the Board adopted Motion 13 (Removing Financial Burdens for Families: Providing Free Phone Calls and Eliminating Profits and Mark-Ups on Commissary Items in the LA County Jails and Juvenile Camps and Halls). As a result, the Motion requires the Department, the Office of Inspector General, Internal Services Department, CEO, and others identified in the Motion to submit a report back to the Board prior to issuing a new Request for Proposals for a replacement contract.

On July 28, 2021, the FCC released a “Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking” (FCC 21-60) Final Rule which, among other things, lowers the interim
interstate rate cap to $0.12 for prisons and $0.14 for jails with an average daily population of 1,000 incarcerated persons, effective October 26, 2021.

On August 19, 2021, the CPUC released Decision 21-08-037, Adopting Interim Rate Relief for Incarcerated Person’s Calling Services, Rulemaking (20-10-002) which, among other things, imposes an interim per-minute cap of $0.07 for intrastate debit, prepaid calls, and collect calls on all incarcerated persons calling services operating within California, effective October 7, 2021.

Proposed Amendment/Contract Negotiations:

On September 22, 2021, the Department and PCS reached a negotiated agreement pending approval by the Board, which:

1. Extends the Agreement for six months through April 30, 2022, plus a six-month option period, exercisable in any increment, through October 31, 2022.

2. Modifies inmate telephone billing rates as follows:
   - Establishes a $0.07 per minute rate for all intrastate calls
   - Establishes a $0.07 per minute rate for all interstate calls
   - Establishes a $0.05 per minute rate for Speed Dial Calls to Designated County Entities.
   - Establishes a $0.14 per minute rate cap plus authorized pass-through charges for international calls.

3. Eliminates the Minimum Annual Guarantee and adopts a tiered approach to the Inmate Welfare Fund revenue share based upon total calling minutes.

4. Eliminates or revises ancillary service charges and converts the fee structure to incorporate CPUC authorized transaction fees consistent with CPUC (20-10-002) and FCC (FCC 21-60), as follows:
   - Eliminates the $2.00 Paper Bill/Statement Fee
   - Eliminates the $3.00 Advance Pay Fee – per deposit
   - Eliminates the $3.00 Advance Pay One Call Fee – per call
- Eliminates the $5.95 Live Agent Fee – per call

- Revises Third-Party Financial Transaction Fees, which are passed through to the customers directly with no markup, up to a limit of $6.95, per transaction. This fee is associated with the transfer of money or processing of financial transactions, so as to facilitate a customer’s ability to make account payments via a third party.

Implementation of Strategic Plan Goals

The ITS and services provided under the proposed Amendment support the County’s Strategic Plan, Strategy III.3, Pursue Operational Effectiveness, Fiscal Responsibility and Accountability. Specifically, the Amendment will allow the Department and Probation to continue providing telephone services to inmates and juveniles being held throughout the Department’s and Probation’s facilities.

FISCAL IMPACT/FINANCING

The Amendment will implement new FCC and CPUC rules that eliminate the charging of ancillary service fees and reduce the per-minute rate for intrastate calls by 72%, to $0.07 from $0.25. The rate for interstate calls goes to $0.07 from $0.21 (a 69% reduction) for Pre-Paid/Debit Card calls, and to $0.07 from $.25 (a 72% reduction) for Collect calls. All calls will be provided to Probation free of charge during the Amendment term, and accordingly the $59,000 MAG provided to Probation will be eliminated.

The significant reduction in per-minute rates and the elimination of ancillary service fees are anticipated to result in increased demand for telephone services among the justice-involved population. While the increased consumption might partially offset the loss of revenue due to the reduced billing rates, the overall impact on revenue is not foreseeable. PCS initially offered no revenue sharing for the IWF under the new fee and rate regulations. To preserve revenue for the IWF during the Amendment term, the Department successfully negotiated a tiered revenue sharing structure whereby the IWF would continue to receive a minimum 40% of PCS’s revenue, and the percentage of revenue deposited to the IWF would increase to 45% and then to 60% when specific thresholds of increased call volume are met as further described in the Amendment.

FACTS AND PROVISIONS/LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to California Penal Code Section 4025(d), any commission received from the inmate telephone provider shall be deposited into the IWF.

This extension period allows the Department to continue providing telephone services for inmates needed to meet Department policies and maintain compliance with various California Penal Code and Code of Regulations Title 15 mandates.

PCS is in compliance with all Board and Chief Executive Office requirements, including Jury Service Program Safely Surrendered Baby Law, and Defaulted Property Tax Reduction Program.

The attached Amendment is approved as to form by County Counsel.

**IMPACT ON CURRENT SERVICES (OR PROJECTS)**

Approval of these actions will ensure uninterrupted telephone services for adults and juveniles incarcerated in the Department’s and Probation’s facilities. The Department will continue to work toward finalizing requirements for the RFP solicitation for inmate communications system and services pending the completion of the collaborative response to the Board adopted Motion 13 from the May 18, 2021 meeting and any further instruction from the Board.

**CONCLUSION**

Upon Board approval, please return a copy of the adopted Board letter to the Department’s Contracts Unit.

Sincerely, 

ALEX VILLANUEVA
SHERIFF

Reviewed by,

TIMOTHY K. MURAKAMI
UNDERSHERIFF

ADOLFO GONZALES
CHIEF PROBATION OFFICER
c: Board of Supervisors, Justice Deputies
Celia Zavala, Executive Officer, Board of Supervisors
Fesia Davenport, Chief Executive Officer
Sheila Williams, Senior Manager, Chief Executive Office (CEO)
Rene Phillips, Manager, CEO
Jocelyn Ventilacion, Principal Analyst, CEO
Anna Petrosyan, Analyst, CEO
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel
Elizabeth D. Miller, Chief Legal Advisor, Legal Advisory Unit
Michele Jackson, Principal Deputy County Counsel
Adolfo Gonzales, Chief Probation Officer
Daniel Sahagun, Supervising Program Analyst, Probation
Timothy K. Murakami, Undersheriff
Brendan J. Corbett, Assistant Sheriff
Jorge A. Valdez, Chief of Staff
Conrad Meredith, Division Director, Administrative Services Division (ASD)
Margarita Velasquez, Chief, Custody Services Division Specialized Programs
Glen C. Joe, Assistant Division Director, ASD
Hugo Macias, Commander, Custody Services Division Specialized Programs
Rick M. Cavataio, Director, Fiscal Administration, ASD
Kimberly L. Unland, Captain, Inmate Services Bureau
Dave E. Culver, Assistant Director, Fiscal Administration, Contracts Unit
Dave M. Pittack, Lieutenant, Inmate Services Bureau
Andres G. Bilbao, Sergeant, Inmate Services Bureau
Vanessa C. Chow, Sergeant, ASD
Irma Santana, Contracts Manager, Contracts Unit
Kristine D. Corrales, Deputy ASD
Abby Valdez, Senior Contract Analyst, Contracts Unit
(Contracts/Abby Valdez/77655 PCS/Amendment10/BL)
EXHIBIT C

TELEPHONE RATES AND PAYMENT SCHEDULE

(Restated under Amendment Number Ten)

INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM (ITS) AND SERVICES
TELEPHONE RATES AND PAYMENT SCHEDULE

CONTRACTOR: PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.

A. INMATE TELEPHONE BILLING RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Calls</th>
<th>CALL RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRASTATE CALLS – ALL</td>
<td>Rate per minute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSTATE CALLS – ALL</td>
<td>Rate per minute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Speed Dial Rate to Designated County Entities

The Speed Dial Calls referenced in Paragraph 9.4.4 of the Agreement and Section 2.3.3. (Speed Dial; No Cost Calls to Inmates and Sheriff’s Department) of Exhibit B (Statement of Work) shall be handled through a direct billing process between the Contractor and the Los Angeles County Internal Services Department.

| Rate per minute | $0.05 |

International Calls

Rate per minute

$0.14 plus the amount that Contractor must pay its underlying international service provider for that call on a per-minute bases, without a markup.

Contractor’s inmate telephone billing rates shall at all times comply with all Federal Communications Commission (FCC), California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), or other governmental agency mandates regardless of the rates set forth herein.

B. INMATE WELFARE FUND REVENUE SHARE (IWF REVENUE SHARE)

County IWF Revenue Share Rate, expressed as a percentage of the Total Billable Amount, shall be as follows:

The IWF Revenue Share Rate shall be paid on a monthly basis by the 10th day of each month following the month on which the IWF Revenue Share Earned is generated as follows: 40% of the Contractor’s Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes for each month that the billed minutes in the month are below 9,562,500; 45% of the Contractor’s Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, for the month that the billed minutes are between 9,562,501 minutes and
22,950,000 minutes; and 60% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, for each month that the billed minutes are greater than 22,950,001.

Beginning November 1, 2021 and at the conclusion of each 6-month term thereafter, the actual IWF Revenue Share Earned at the above stated IWF Revenue Share Rate will be compared to a semi-annualized calculation of the billed minutes during the prior six month time period. Should the payment based on the semi-annualized calculation exceed the aggregate total monthly payments received by the County in the preceding six months, Contractor shall provide a “Trued-Up” payment to the County. The semi-annualized calculation shall be based on a payment of 40% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, if the total billed minutes are 57,375,000 or less; 45% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, if the total billed minutes are 57,375,001 to 137,700,000; and 60% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, if the total for billed minutes above 137,700,000. Contractor shall make payment to the County for such Trued-Up amount within thirty (30) calendar days of the conclusion of each semi-annual term.

C. THIRD-PARTY FINANCIAL TRANSACTION FEE

Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee

Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee means the exact fees, with no markup, up to a limit of $6.95 per transaction, that Contractor is charged by third parties to transfer money or process financial transactions to facilitate a Customer’s ability to make account payments via a third party. Contractor may pass these fees through to Customers directly with no markup.]

Contractor’s Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee authorized herein shall at all times comply with all CPUC and/or FCC mandates regardless of the Third-Party Financial Transaction Fees set forth herein.

D. TAXES AND REGULATORY FEES

Contractor shall charge only those mandatory applicable pass-through Taxes and regulatory fees as expressly authorized by the CPUC and/or FCC. Such mandatory applicable pass-through Taxes and regulatory fees shall be applied separately and passed through to Inmates and Customers directly with no mark-up. The inmate telephone billing rates charged in Section A (Inmate Telephone Billing Rates) are exclusive of mandatory applicable pass-through Taxes and regulatory fees collected by Contractor on behalf of federal, state, or local governments. No Taxes or regulatory fees shall be charged unless authorized by the CPUC and/or FCC and compliant with all CPUC and/or FCC mandates.

E. ADDITIONAL FREE CALLS FOR INMATES

In addition to other free calls for Inmates as specified in Subparagraphs 2.3.3 (Speed Dial, No Cost Calls to Inmates and Sheriff’s) and 2.3.4 (Booking Calls) of
the Agreement, Contractor shall allow one no-cost call per week to each Inmate, at no cost to the Inmate or the County, with the condition that the call will be limited to five (5) minutes in length and all other provisions of the Agreement shall be enforced.

The Contractor shall also provide all phone calls placed by detainees in the Probation Facilities free of charge to Juvenile detainees, at no cost to the County.

Contractor represents and warrants that the person signing this Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) for Contractor is an authorized agent, who has actual authority to bind Contractor to each and every item listed in this Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) to provide such actual authority.

____________________________  ___________________________
Printed Name     Title

____________________________  ___________________________
Signature      Date
This Amendment Number Ten ("Amendment") to Agreement Number 77655 ("Agreement") is entered into by and between County of Los Angeles ("County") and Public Communications Services, Inc. ("Contractor"), effective upon execution by both parties.

A. WHEREAS, on September 20, 2011, the County Board of Supervisors approved the Agreement, with an Initial Term from November 1, 2011, through October 31, 2016, with three one-year Option Terms and six months, for Contractor's provision of Inmate Telephone System (ITS) and Services for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("Department") and the Los Angeles County Probation Department ("Probation"); and

B. WHEREAS, in August 2012, County and Contractor agreed to implement County's option to install kiosks at various Department facilities, to enable, among other things, the setting up of Pre-Paid Accounts to be used solely by Inmates for ITS and Services, as defined in the Agreement, and County and Contractor wish to formally memorialize herein the installation thereof; and

C. WHEREAS, on December 2, 2013, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number One to the Agreement which, among other things, deleted and replaced Exhibit B (Statement of Work) of the Agreement to change the delivery method on Pre-Paid Call services from a tangible Pre-Paid Phone Card to a Debit Phone Account (Cardless) administered by Contractor; and

D. WHEREAS, on February 4, 2014, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Two to the Agreement which (1) reduced the collect call maximum dollar amount from $125 to $60 to any single destination phone number in any continuous 30-day period, and (2) directed Contractor to implement, not later than thirty (30) calendar days from the effective date of Amendment Number Two, the recording of all telephone calls made from any and all phones within the Department Custody and Detention Facilities, which are not made to an attorney or public defender telephone number, including calls initiated by Pro-Per Inmates; and

E. WHEREAS, on September 26, 2013, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released a Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC-13-113) which, among other things, established interim rate caps on the interstate calling rates charged by inmate calling service providers; and
F. WHEREAS, on February 10, 2014, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Three to the Agreement which reduced the Inmate Telephone Billing Rate for Domestic Calls – Interstate Calls (Debit Phone Account (Cardless) and Pre-Paid Account), effective February 11, 2014, in compliance with FCC 13-113; and

G. WHEREAS, on November 5, 2015, the FCC released a Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 15-136) which, among other things, established rate caps on interstate and intrastate calling rates and eliminated, restricted, and/or further defined the fees which may be charged by inmate calling service providers; and

H. WHEREAS, on March 7, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Court") issued an order staying the implementation of rate caps on the calling rates set forth in 47 CFR section 64.6010, and caps on fees for single-call services set forth in 47 CFR section 64.6020(b) (2) pending judicial review of the legality of those caps, as established by FCC 15-136; and

I. WHEREAS, on March 23, 2016, the D.C. Court issued another order staying the implementation of the interim rate caps set forth in 47 CFR section 64.6030 only as they apply to the provision of intrastate calling services; and

J. WHEREAS, all other provisions, rules, and regulations set forth in FCC 15-136 remain effective and shall be implemented by jail facilities by June 20, 2016; and

K. WHEREAS, on June 16, 2016, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Four, effective June 20, 2016, which (1) modified the Inmate Telephone Billing Rates and implemented new FCC-authorized Ancillary Service Charges consistent with FCC 15-136, (2) deleted the Convenience and Single-Bill fees authorized under Paragraph 9.5 (Miscellaneous Fees) of the Agreement, (3) added the Advance Pay One Call (APOC) service, and (4) formally memorialized the addition of Customer kiosks at the Department Custody and Detention Facilities; and

L. WHEREAS, on October 19, 2016, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Five to the Agreement to extend the Term of the Agreement for the first one-year Option Term from November 1, 2016 through October 31, 2017; and
AMENDMENT NUMBER TEN TO AGREEMENT NO. 77655
BY AND BETWEEN
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
AND
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.
FOR INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM (ITS) AND SERVICES

M. WHEREAS, on November 23, 2016, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Six to amend Exhibit H (Kiosk Locations) to relocate kiosk machines from Pitchess Detention Center and Lancaster Station to Walnut Station and Norwalk Station respectively; and

N. WHEREAS, on June 13, 2017, the D.C. Court ruled on legality of the Second Report and Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (80 Fed. Reg. 79136-01 (Dec. 18, 2015)) (“Second Order”) issued by the FCC, which, among other things, set permanent rate caps and ancillary fee caps on both interstate and intrastate calls. (Global Tel*Link v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, No. 15-1461 (D.C. Cir. June 13, 2017)). The Second Order was upheld in part and vacated in part, and certain issues were remanded to the FCC for further proceedings; and

O. WHEREAS, on October 26, 2017, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Seven to the Agreement to (1) extend the Term of the Agreement for the second one-year Option Term from November 1, 2017 through October 31, 2018, (2) update the County-mandated provisions regarding Consideration of GAIN/GROW Participants, County’s Quality Assurance Plan, and Safely Surrendered Baby Law, and (3) add the County-mandated provisions regarding Time Off for Voting and Compliance with County’s Zero Tolerance Policy on Human Trafficking; and

P. WHEREAS, on October 22, 2018, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Eight to the Agreement to (1) extend the Term of the Agreement for the third one-year Option Term from November 1, 2018 through October 31, 2019, (2) update the County-mandated provision regarding Assignment and Delegation/Mergers or Acquisitions, and (3) add the County-mandated provisions regarding Compliance with Fair Chance Employment Practices and Compliance with the County Policy of Equity; and

Q. WHEREAS, on October 23, 2019, County and Contractor entered into Amendment Number Nine to the Agreement to (1) extend the Term of the Agreement through October 31, 2021, a total period of two years, which included the final six-month option period of the Agreement, and (2) add the County-mandated provision regarding Compliance with Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) of 2003, Zero Tolerance for Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment; and

R. WHEREAS, on July 28, 2021, the FCC released a Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC 21-60) Final Rule which, among other things,
lowers the interim rate caps on interstate calling rates to $0.12 for prisons and $0.14 for jails with an average daily population of 1,000 or more incarcerated people, effective October 26, 2021; and

S. WHEREAS, on August 23, 2021, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) released Decision 21-08-037, Adopting Interim Rate Relief for Incarcerated Person’s Calling Services Rulemaking (CPUC 20-10-002) which, among other things, imposes a per-minute interim rate cap of seven cents ($0.07) for intrastate debit, prepaid calls, and collect calls for all incarcerated persons calling services (IPCS) operating within California, effective October 7, 2021; and

T. WHEREAS, the Agreement currently expires on October 31, 2021; and

U. WHEREAS, County and Contractor agree to (1) extend the Term of the Agreement for six months, from November 1, 2021, through April 30, 2022, plus an additional six-month option period, exercisable in any increment, (2) modify the Inmate Telephone Billing Rates, (3) eliminate the Minimum Annual Guarantee and modify the Inmate Welfare Fund Revenue Share, (4) delete or modify Ancillary Services Charges currently authorized in the Agreement (5) update the County-mandated provision regarding Facsimile, and (6) add the County-mandated provision regarding Prohibition from Participation in Future Solicitation(s).

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, and for good and valuable consideration, County and Contractor agree to amend the Agreement as follows:

1. Subparagraph 2.15 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to rename the subparagraph:

   2.15 “IWF Revenue Share Rate” means the County’s percentage of revenue payable by Contractor to County from the Total Billable Amount received by Contractor for providing ITS and Services.

2. Subparagraph 2.17 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to rename the subparagraph:

   2.17 “IWF Revenue Share Earned” has the meaning set forth in Subparagraph 9.3.2 of the Agreement.
3. Subparagraph 2.52 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to update the definition of Total Billable Amount:

2.52 “Total Billable Amount” means the aggregate of total claims made by Contractor against Inmates and Customers for all calls, both Domestic (Intrastate and Interstate) and International, excluding the Speed Dial Call Rate for Designated County Entities, CPUC and FCC-permissible Third-Party Financial Transaction Fees, and Taxes and Regulatory fees listed in Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) of this Agreement for which revenue share to County is not realized.

4. Subparagraph 6.2.4 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to delegate authority to the Sheriff or designee regarding exercising the extension option:

6.2.4 For the six-month option period in any increment, an Amendment to this Agreement shall be mutually agreed upon and executed by Sheriff or designee and Contractor.

5. Subparagraph 6.2.5(a) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to update the reference and location for Speed Dial Call Rate to Designated County Entities in the Agreement:

6.2.5(a) any change that decreases the Speed Dial Call Rate to Designated County Entities set forth on Section A (Inmate Telephone Billing Rates) of Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) consistent with Paragraph 9.4.4 of the Agreement.

6. Paragraph 7 (Term) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to extend the Term of the Agreement for six-months, from November 1, 2021, through April 30, 2022, plus an additional six-month option period, in any increment:

7. **TERM**

7.1 The Term of this Agreement shall be from November 1, 2021, through and including April 30, 2022, unless terminated earlier in whole or in part, as provided herein.
AMENDMENT NUMBER TEN TO AGREEMENT NO. 77655
BY AND BETWEEN
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
AND
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.
FOR INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM (ITS) AND SERVICES

7.2 The County has the option, at County’s discretion and upon notice to Contractor prior to the end of the Term, to extend the Term of this Agreement for an option period of six months, in any increment, for a maximum total Agreement Term not to exceed eleven (11) years. Such extension shall be in the form of an Amendment executed by both parties in accordance with Subparagraph 6.2.4 above.

7.3 County maintains databases that track/monitor Contractor performance history. Information entered into such databases may be used for a variety of purposes, including determining whether County will exercise an Option Term extension of the Agreement.

7.4 If applicable, Contractor shall notify Sheriff Project Director, Sheriff Project Manager, Probation Project Director and Probation Project Manager when the current Term is within six (6) months from the expiration of this event, Contractor shall send written notification to the addresses herein provided in Exhibit K (County and Contractor Administration) of the Agreement.

7. Subparagraph 9.1 (Minimum Annual Guarantee (MAG)) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety to eliminate the Minimum Annual Guarantee required under the Agreement, effective October 7, 2021.

8. Subparagraph 9.3 (Commission) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to rename the subparagraph and to modify the Inmate Welfare Fund Revenue Share, effective October 7, 2021:

9.3 Inmate Welfare Fund Revenue Share (IWF Revenue Share)

9.3.1 County IWF Revenue Share Rate, expressed as a percentage of the Total Billable Amount, shall be as follows:

In accordance with Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule), the IWF Revenue Share Rate shall be paid on a monthly basis by the 10th day of each month following the month on which the IWF Revenue Share Earned is generated as follows: 40% of the Contractor’s Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes for each month that the billed minutes in the month are below 9,562,500; 45% of the Contractor’s Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, for the month that the billed minutes are
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FOR INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM (ITS) AND SERVICES

between 9,562,501 minutes and 22,950,000 minutes; and 60% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, for each month that the billed minutes are greater than 22,950,001.

9.3.2 Beginning November 1, 2021 and at the conclusion of each 6-month term thereafter, the actual IWF Revenue Share Earned at the above stated IWF Revenue Share Rate will be compared to a semi-annualized calculation of the billed minutes during the prior six month time period. Should the payment based on the semi-annualized calculation exceed the aggregate total monthly payments received by the County in the preceding six months, Contractor shall provide a “Trued-Up” payment to the County. The semi-annualized calculation shall be based on a payment of 40% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, if the total billed minutes are 57,375,000 or less; 45% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, if the total billed minutes are 57,375,001 to 137,700,000; and 60% of the Total Billable Amount, excluding applicable taxes, if the total for billed minutes above 137,700,000. Contractor shall make payment to the County for such Trued-Up amount within thirty (30) calendar days of the conclusion of each semi-annual term.

9. Subparagraph 9.4.4 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to update the reference and location for Speed Dial Call Rate to Designated County Entities in the Agreement:

9.4.4 Contractor shall charge the County for Speed Dial Calls made by Inmates to designated County entities at the rate set forth in Section A (Inmate Telephone Billing Rates) of Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule). This call rate shall remain firm and fixed for the Term of the Agreement, but may be adjusted downward only upon the mutual agreement of the parties. Such change shall be in the form of an Amendment in accordance with Paragraph 6 (Changes Orders and Amendments) and shall be mutually agreed upon and executed by Sheriff or designee and Contractor.

10. Subparagraph 9.5 (Ancillary Service Charges) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to eliminate ancillary service fees, rename Paragraph 9.5 “Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee,” and continue to authorize
third party financial transaction fees consistent with FCC 21-60 and/or CPUC 20-10-002.

9.5 Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee

Contractor shall only charge a Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee as set forth on Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) of the Agreement and expressly authorized by CPUC 20-10-002 and/or FCC 21-60. Contractor’s Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee charges shall at all times comply with all CPUC and/or FCC mandates.

11. Paragraph 59.0 (Facsimile) of Exhibit A (Additional Terms and Conditions) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced as follows to update the County-mandated provision regarding Counterparts and Electronic Signatures and Representations:

59.0 COUNTERPARTS AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND REPRESENTATIONS

59.1 This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original but all of which together shall constitute one and the same Agreement. The facsimile, email or electronic signature of the Parties shall be deemed to constitute original signatures, and facsimile or electronic copies hereof shall be deemed to constitute duplicate originals.

59.2 The County and the Contractor hereby agree to regard electronic representations of original signatures of authorized officers of each party, when appearing in appropriate places on the Amendments prepared pursuant to Paragraph 6 (Change Orders and Amendments) and received via communications facilities (facsimile, email or electronic signature), as legally sufficient evidence that such legally binding signatures have been affixed to Amendments to this Agreement.

12. Paragraph 71.0 (Prohibition from Participation in Future Solicitation(s)) is added to Exhibit A (Additional Terms and Conditions) of the Agreement as follows to add the County-mandated provision regarding Prohibition from Participation in Future Solicitation(s):
AMENDMENT NUMBER TEN TO AGREEMENT NO. 77655
BY AND BETWEEN
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
AND
PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.
FOR INMATE TELEPHONE SYSTEM (ITS) AND SERVICES

71.0 PROHIBITION FROM PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE SOLICITATION(S)

71.1 A Proposer, or a Contractor or its subsidiary or Subcontractor ("Proposer/Contractor"), is prohibited from submitting a bid or proposal in a County solicitation if the Proposer/Contractor has provided advice or consultation for the solicitation. A Proposer/Contractor is also prohibited from submitting a bid or proposal in a County solicitation if the Proposer/Contractor has developed or prepared any of the solicitation materials on behalf of the County. A violation of this provision shall result in the disqualification of the Contractor/Proposer from participation in the County solicitation or the termination or cancellation of any resultant County contract. This provision shall survive the expiration, or other termination of this Agreement.

13. Attachment 1 (Glossary of Terms) of Exhibit B (Statement of Work) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the revised Attachment 1 (Glossary of Terms) [Not attached - will be amended to update the glossary of terms consistent with this Amendment].

14. Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the revised Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule), attached hereto, to modify inmate billing rates, revise the County IWF Revenue Share Rate, add International Call Rates and the Speed Dial Rate for Calls to Designated County Entities, add free calls, and implement the revised Third-Party Financial Transaction Fee, effective October 7, 2021.

15. Attachment 1 (International Rate Table) of Exhibit C (Telephone Rates and Payment Schedule) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety.

16. Attachment 2 (Speed Dial Call Rate to Designated County Entities) of Exhibit C (Telephones Rates and Payment Schedule) of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety.

17. Except as expressly provided in this Amendment, all terms and conditions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

18. Contractor represents and warrants that the person executing this Amendment for Contractor is an authorized agent who has actual authority to bind Contractor to each and every item, condition, and obligation of the Amendment and that all
requirements of Contractor have been fulfilled to provide such actual authority.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the County of Los Angeles, by order of its Board of Supervisors, has caused this Amendment to be executed on its behalf by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, and Contractor has caused this Amendment to be duly executed on its behalf by its authorized officer.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

By: _____________________________
     ALEX VILLANUEVA, SHERIFF

Date: ____________________________

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC.

By: ______________________________

Name: ____________________________

Title: _____________________________

Date: _____________________________

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RODRIGO A. CASTRO-SILVA
County Counsel

By: ______________________________
   Michele Jackson
   Principal Deputy County Counsel
Understanding Subgroups Within the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department

Community and Department Perceptions with Recommendations for Change
Preface

For decades, groups of Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) deputies have organized themselves into secret subgroups, some of which have allegedly committed illegal acts or violated departmental policy. Although LASD has acknowledged that these groups exist, their purpose and actions within the department have remained unclear. To better understand this issue, Los Angeles County Counsel commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct an independent research study on deputy subgroups within LASD. The study was commissioned to help the county and LASD learn more about how subgroups have affected community perceptions and trust in LASD, how these subgroups are formed, why they exist, and what actions might be taken if it is determined that these subgroups have a significant impact on LASD’s mission. With cooperation from various county stakeholders, including community representatives across the county, the Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel, LASD, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission, the authors of this report sought to understand the community perspective, the perceptions and experiences of deputies, and the organizational perspective of LASD to provide a comprehensive picture. The authors also aim to assist county decisionmakers and LASD in their efforts to address problems created by the subgroups going forward. This report should be of interest to Los Angeles County officials and residents.

Justice Policy Program

RAND Social and Economic Well-Being is a division of the RAND Corporation that seeks to actively improve the health and social and economic well-being of populations and communities throughout the world. This research was conducted in the Justice Policy Program within RAND Social and Economic Well-Being. The program focuses on such topics as access to justice, policing, corrections, drug policy, and court system reform, as well as other policy concerns pertaining to public safety and criminal and civil justice. For more information, email justicepolicy@rand.org.
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For at least 40 years, secret cliques or gangs of deputies (subgroups) have formed within the ranks of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). Los Angeles County has been subject to numerous lawsuits about subgroup members who have allegedly mistreated both community members and their coworkers. Various investigations, lawsuits, and news reports have looked into different allegations, which have resulted in several large settlements with community members and LASD personnel as victims in these cases, and which led LASD to establish a policy in 2020 prohibiting group member behavior that violates the rights of others.\(^1\) Prior accounts allege that these subgroups are associated with varying forms of misconduct in the community and within the department, including the violation of constitutional rights, use of excessive force, a glorification of shootings committed by deputies, and fostering a code of silence, as well as bullying, harassment, intimidation of and retaliation toward other department members, resistance to supervision, and establishment of subgroup symbols and tattoos. Thus, the existing concerns about these groups are highly consequential to Los Angeles County residents, Los Angeles County governance, and LASD. These subgroups could also exacerbate the current legitimacy crisis facing American law enforcement.

Past studies and commissions have reported in some detail on the existence of deputy subgroups. A 2021 report from the Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy lists 18 deputy subgroups, some dating back to the 1970s: 2000 Boys, 3000 Boys, Banditos, Buffalo Soldiers, Cavemen, Cowboys, Executioners, Grim Reapers, Jump Out Boys, Little Red Devils, Pirates, Posse, Rattlesnakes, Regulators, Spartans, Tasmanian Devils, Vikings, and Wayside Whities (Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, 2021). Our research suggests that several of these groups were still actively adding members at the time of our interviews. These entities have been called cliques, gangs, secret societies, fraternal societies, clubs, and subgroups. (In this report, we use the terms subgroups and cliques.)

The existence of subgroups is also reflected in the roughly $55 million in subgroup-related judgments against Los Angeles County since 1990—$21 million of this between 2010 and 2020—and in the steps the county has taken to address the subgroups. In response to a variety of prior lawsuits and investigations (not just those associated with subgroups), the

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\(^1\) In February 2020, LASD implemented a new policy, “3-01/050.83: Employee Groups Which Violate Rights of Other Employees or Members of the Public” (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Manual of Policy and Procedures, 2021b). As indicated by its name, the policy focuses on problematic behaviors by group members and refers to them as “illicit groups.” Sheriff Alex Villanueva stated in January 2021 that “from here on out, if anyone feels the need to join, participate in, or solicit others to join any non-approved department-sanctioned group, that is unacceptable” (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 2021). The policy recognizes the potential harm to the department’s image, the potential harm to community trust, and the risk of civil liability caused by such groups and specifies other policies under which violations apply (e.g., Hazing, General Behavior, Performance to Standards).
Board of Supervisors previously established the Kolts Commission (1992); a Special Counsel (1993–2014); the county Office of Independent Review (2001–2014); the Citizens’ Commission on Jail Violence (CCJV; 2012); and the county Office of Inspector General (OIG), which was established in 2014 as part of the recommendations by the CCJV. LASD has also implemented reforms and policies to prevent and mitigate issues associated with subgroups, including creating a Risk Management unit, implementing recommendations from the CCJV in the jails, and creating a policy specific to subgroups.

Decades after the 1992 Kolts Commission report first examined the subject of deputy subgroups in LASD, questions remain. What impact do subgroups have on LASD and the communities it serves? What do deputies and community members think of them? What is the function of subgroups? How do they form? What do members of subgroups do? In an effort to understand the subgroups, the communities’ experience with them, their role in LASD, and why they form in the first place, Los Angeles County commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct this study.

The RAND team examined court documents, prior reports, and other public records regarding the subgroups and analyzed the text of news articles to determine how frequently LASD subgroups were mentioned over time and in what context. This information was used to formulate questions for an anonymous survey, confidential interviews, and focus groups with a range of community stakeholders and LASD personnel. RAND researchers interviewed county officials and personnel at all levels of LASD, as well as community leaders and residents who lived in LASD’s four patrol divisions. The RAND team collected interview and focus group data from 141 community leaders and community members across the county and in nine selected station areas; interview data from 57 individuals, including members of LASD and other county stakeholders; and 1,608 survey participants. To preserve confidentiality and promote honest responding, surveys were conducted anonymously, and no information was retained that could link interviewees to their data.

Community Perceptions of Subgroups

Given that many subgroup behaviors conflict with LASD’s responsibility to protect the communities it serves, it was critical for the RAND team to engage with residents and community leaders to understand their experiences with and perceptions of subgroups and LASD overall. In interviews and focus groups, community members conveyed a range of deputy behaviors, from disrespect to actual crimes committed against residents. It also became clear from our engagement with the community that their perceptions of the department are influenced negatively not only by the historical nature of this issue and ongoing revelations alleging misconduct by subgroups but also by a history of strained relations between the community and specific LASD stations.

We found that the community leaders and members and the LASD personnel whom we interviewed and surveyed had many of the same concerns, to varying degrees. Deputies cited

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2 We took strict precautions to protect the confidentiality of our research participants. See Chapter Four for a discussion of our approach to protect confidentiality.

3 The stations were Century, Compton, East Los Angeles, Industry, Lakewood, Lancaster, Norwalk, Palmdale, and Temple.
the negative impact that subgroups have on public perceptions of LASD as the most common effect of subgroup behavior and pointed to other subgroup behaviors (e.g., offensive, intimidating, or endangering acts) that they saw as less common but that are still highly concerning to both LASD and the community. However, our interviews and focus groups demonstrate that community views of LASD are not the same across the board. The views of community leaders as a group often were different from the views of residents as a whole. We suspect that this is because leaders interact more regularly with deputies, station personnel, and LASD leadership through their involvement in citizens groups and advisory panels than typical residents do.

What Is the Overall Community Perception of LASD?
Community leaders and members (referred to as community stakeholders when we combine their perspectives) were most critical of current department leadership, expressing concerns about a lack of transparency, a lack of trust, and a culture of aggressive policing. Some stakeholders said that LASD could learn from other law enforcement agencies how to better engage the community.

What Is the Community’s View of LASD Policing?
Stakeholders described various forms of mistreatment, including harassment, retaliation, and excessive force, as well as differential treatment by race, socioeconomic status, physical appearance, and other factors. Community members from the Central and North Patrol Division areas overall reported less-positive views of LASD. Stakeholders also pointed to the ways deputies behaved during community events (e.g., coffee with a cop, toy giveaways) as coloring their perceptions. Some saw some station personnel as vested in the community, approachable, and motivated to meet the community’s needs. Others viewed some deputies as antagonistic, lacking the skills necessary to engage the community, not vested in the community, and not caring about community well-being or engagement. Participants expressed varying levels of satisfaction with (1) the level of services provided, which vary from a prompt, supportive response to failure to provide necessary services; (2) the level of station personnel interactions with the community, including hosting formal and informal events and being congenial, as opposed to attending events but not interacting with the community; and (3) community partnership, which varies from collaborating on public safety issues to creating a climate that is exclusively focused on enforcement and does not solicit community input.

What Is the Community’s Understanding of Subgroups?
Community stakeholders varied in their awareness of subgroups, from no awareness to extensive knowledge of groups, their identity, and their behavior. The primary sources of information about subgroups were the media, other community members, personal experiences, and LASD personnel. Participants who were aware of subgroups discussed why these groups form, including providing justification for their existence while also denouncing them. Participants also shared the names of some groups (e.g., Jump Out Boys, Banditos) and described how they identify themselves with tattoos or other symbols. When asked to describe subgroup behavior, community stakeholders listed hazing, excluding, harassing, and covering up for fellow deputies; targeting former jail inmates, particularly people of color; and harassing community residents (e.g., aggressive behavior, excessive force, intimidation, illicit behavior). The potential for subgroups to encourage excessive force or shootings by deputies was particularly concerning to community members in the Central and North Patrol Division areas, which is where
subgroups have been identified previously. When asked what specific strategies the department has implemented to address the issue of subgroups, some participants were unaware of any or did not think anything was being done, while others thought LASD was taking steps to minimize the occurrence of subgroups and their misconduct.

**LASD Perspectives on Subgroups**

The most concerning descriptions of deputy subgroups in media reports, legal claims, statements by public officials, and some of our interviews with LASD personnel and community members are that they are gangs that glorify violence and recruit only hard-charging crime fighters, especially deputies who have committed shootings. Lawsuits from community members accuse subgroup members of rights violations, excessive force, and wrongful death and cite the county’s inability to supervise and discipline subgroups. Lawsuits from fellow LASD members allege intimidation, harassment, bullying, retaliation, workplace violence, and the creation of a hostile work environment by subgroup members. Members of some groups have allegedly subverted management at their stations. Descriptions of deputy subgroups also accuse members of showing disrespect for or physically attacking deputies who are not part of the group and forcing members of the same subgroup to perform favors for other members with more status. In the past, at least some parts of LASD leadership had been perceived as complicit with some of the subgroups’ activities.4

The next several sections attempt to answer key questions about subgroups at LASD based on the research team’s surveys and interviews with LASD personnel.

**Do Subgroups Exist?**

Subgroups clearly exist, though they do not appear to exist everywhere and are more likely to occur in areas where they have existed historically, but the extent of membership in these groups remains unknown. Although many survey respondents claimed to have little knowledge of the groups, 16 percent acknowledged that they had been asked to join a subgroup,5 with one-quarter of those being invited in the past five years. There was little agreement among LASD survey respondents about whether subgroups were a detriment or a benefit to the department. Personnel had a wide array of views on the structure, function, risks, and value of the subgroups. The responses ranged from “those who belong to a subgroup hold themselves and each other to a higher standard and are the best LASD has” to “they [subgroups] have destroyed many honest and hard-working deputies’ lives and careers.” Our interview and survey findings suggest that the subject is divisive within LASD.

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4 This was reported publicly in the media; see Leonard and Faturechi, 2013.

5 We chose not to ask directly whether a survey respondent had ever belonged to a subgroup because of the sensitive nature of this question and our concern that many individuals would be reluctant to provide such information. Therefore, we instead used a proxy indicator of whether they had ever been invited to join a subgroup or had been asked within the past five years to join a subgroup. We felt that the analyses that compared those who had ever been invited to join a subgroup with those who had never been invited were informative as to these respondents’ knowledge of and assessments of subgroups’ characteristics and conduct.
What Purpose Do Subgroups Serve?
Subgroups vary significantly. Some are drinking groups. Others are closer to cliques or, as one respondent called them, “popular kids.” And some encourage a culture of aggressive policing.

Few LASD interviewees said that subgroups engaged in coordinated misconduct. According to 30 percent of LASD survey respondents and 42 percent of those who were invited to join a subgroup, the groups have their own informal codes of conduct and expect members to abide by them (e.g., arresting gang members or those with weapons offenses). Among this group of deputies, subgroups are perceived to be a motivational tool to encourage hard work.

Some LASD interviewees also believed that the subgroups facilitate social connection, ease transitions to other units where former subgroup members might have transferred, and provide advice about challenging situations. Some interviewees noted that groups can start out as positive forces, but as those who started the group age and younger members change the focus, the groups can become complacent or misdirected, or can splinter into new subgroups or cliques within the clique.

Overall, 55 percent of LASD survey respondents either somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that deputy subgroups provide a sense of camaraderie or fraternity (including 91 percent of subgroup invitees), and 42 percent agreed that deputies join these subgroups to “fit in” at their work assignment. Nearly one-third of LASD survey respondents also agreed that members of these deputy subgroups get special privileges at work (e.g., choice of assignments, choice of shifts, time off).

Relatedly, 21–25 percent of LASD survey respondents indicated that not belonging to a deputy subgroup could negatively affect a deputy’s work assignment or could limit a deputy’s opportunities for career advancement or promotion. However, about a third of LASD survey respondents somewhat or strongly disagreed with that proposition.

Why Do Subgroups Form?
Subgroup formation stems at least partially from the organizational and workplace culture.

Some aspects of the organizational context are conducive to subgroups forming. LASD is a large, complex, and geographically dispersed organization. Its 23 stations serve communities ranging from busy urban areas to quiet suburbs, including a mixture of unincorporated county areas and cities that contract with LASD to provide policing. Individual stations have their own histories and traditions. Despite the department’s size and diversity, deputies say that it feels small; your reputation follows you wherever you go.

Reputation and loyalties are often tied to work experience, starting with the station where a deputy trains for patrol. To some members of the department, completing patrol training at “fast” stations—ones with more violent crime—is a point of pride and means that one is competent enough to work anywhere in the department. Deputies at fast stations might be perceived as hard chargers, although deputies might choose slow stations for practical reasons, such as proximity to their homes or longtime ties to the community. In fact, those who train at slow stations but seek to join a fast station later are sometimes perceived as “not doing it right.”

Subgroups are also more likely to form at these fast stations. About 40 percent of LASD survey respondents agreed with the statement that deputy subgroups are more common at patrol stations in high-crime areas. Subgroups also exist in custody facilities.

Our survey found that most deputies typically feel more loyal to the unit or station where they trained than to LASD overall. Agreement on this point was higher among individu-
als who had been invited to join a subgroup (71 percent) and among midlevel management (66 percent).

These loyalties and reputational concerns can begin to form during deputies’ first assignments. Deputies begin their careers in the jails, where social circles develop. They can request where they want to do patrol training, so friends can request the same station. This contributes to peer selection processes and station loyalties, which are likely precursors for subgroup formation. As one line-level deputy explained, selecting a station reflects one’s background and expectations for the job:

Men’s Central Jail. I saw the mentality there. Certain people who are well-liked get pulled to work the old side: 2000/3000 [floors]—it’s the most respected place to work. I started on 4000 [floor]—the new side. It’s weird how they start the brainwashing. Like you want to work 2000/3000 to build your reputation as a hard charger and can handle ghetto.6 Those floors are associated with the station you want to go to. . . . It’s a passage. I wanted to go to ELA [East Los Angeles] station because I’m Latino and felt like I could be on the level with the people I’m helping out. I speak the language, I can put myself in their shoes. I grew up in the ‘hood. I could see myself making a difference.

Working hard and being humble are LASD values, but these values are also espoused by some subgroups. Throughout the interviews, we heard many individuals express norms and values related to reputation and loyalty. When interviewees would talk about LASD, the expectations for deputies, and generally “how things work,” a core set of values emerged. The most pronounced theme is that deputies “work hard” and value hard work. A second value is to “be humble.” As one deputy put it, “If you’re a hard worker, you should be humble. You’re not looking to outshine or be better. Showboating is not cool, especially in this crowd.” Being a hard worker was often discussed as a potential reason for why people form subgroups or get invited to join subgroups, but some interviewees challenged this characterization. It is not clear why hard work and humility could not be recognized and rewarded through ordinary LASD processes, but it was a recurring theme in the interviews.

Supervision and leadership matter. Personnel views about supervisors and leadership also play into participants’ descriptions of “how things work.” These perceptions could factor into deputies’ decisions to form or join subgroups, as well as types of subgroup behavior. Our survey results indicated that respondents had generally favorable views of various processes within LASD, but participants did note problems with hiring, training, promotions, and discipline. Discipline and promotions, especially to the ranks of captain and above, had been seen in the past as based in some part on favoritism. Some command staff noted that opportunities continue to exist for promotions or marginalization to be based on favoritism, but several perceived the new process for promotion to captain (implemented in 2019) to be an improvement. Nearly half (47.4 percent) of LASD survey respondents believed that promotions were handled fairly. Fifty-three percent of LASD survey respondents agreed that “executive leadership within LASD represents high ethical standards,” but the share was lower among individuals who said that they had been invited to join a subgroup (41 percent of this group disagreed; 40 percent agreed) and slightly lower among midlevel managers (47 percent agreed; 32 percent disagreed).

6 This interviewee used the word ghetto in our discussion. We have left this wording intact in quoted material.
In short, reputation matters in LASD, and a variety of factors play into this, but much of it is tied to where people have worked in the department. Certain units have higher status because of the nature of the external environment (e.g., high crime), and certain types of people are drawn to these units. This is perceived as a positive in the sense that it allows people’s skills and preferences to align with their work. Some interviewees identified the danger associated with working in some high-crime areas as contributing to colleagues developing a strong bond, which could increase the likelihood of subgroup formation. This emphasis on work history presents challenges, however, because it can create misperceptions about others who might choose a different path, particularly by those in supervisory positions. Some LASD interviewees noted that, at least in the past, department leadership encouraged forms of favoritism and formalized them through promotions, which signaled to people in the department that certain work histories and personal relationships were important for promotion. This undermined discipline and created the perception of lax supervision. Proper supervision was identified by LASD interviewees as critical for managing subgroups.

Another key role in the formation of subgroups identified by LASD personnel and in research literature is that of the frontline supervisor. This role is important for guiding organizational change by modeling and monitoring behavior. However, participants identified several challenges to effective supervision, such as sufficient training for sergeants and work experience (e.g., promoting too soon). These supervision challenges could be particularly important for supervising deputies in subgroups. Training officers and peer leaders are equally as important in LASD and could play important roles in subgroup formation and subgroup conduct.

What Do LASD Personnel Know About Subgroups, and What Is Their Impact?

Most deputies viewed subgroups as forming not for nefarious purposes but as a way to recognize a common bond and express pride in one’s work. Once groups had formed, many deputies said that invitations to join a subgroup were likely to be based on friendship and perceived competence. This could mean that informal peer evaluations and peer motivation plug gaps that supervision and formalized performance evaluations have not filled. These justifications for group formation are sometimes contradicted by the secrecy of these groups and negative behaviors associated with them (e.g., supporting one another leads to ostracism, harassment of others). Ensuring that subgroups maintain values and incentives that are consistent with those of LASD more broadly is difficult because of the secrecy of the groups, the lack of proactive efforts to supervise them, and a lack of clear direction for appropriate responses where necessary.

Who Gets Invited to Join a Subgroup?

Hard workers, socializers, and aggressive deputies get invited to join, according to deputies. About 40 percent of LASD survey respondents identified the following criteria for being invited to join a subgroup: being known as a hard worker (91 percent of invitees and 67 percent of midlevel managers agreed), willingness to work in challenging environments (86 percent of invitees and 60 percent of midlevel managers agreed), and willingness to engage in social activities with other subgroup members (51 percent of invitees and 50 percent of midlevel managers agreed). In addition, 35 percent agreed that a willingness to engage in specific behav-
iors at work, such as being aggressive about making arrests, was a criterion for being invited to join a deputy subgroup (47 percent of invitees and 46 percent of midlevel managers agreed). In interviews, some participants were critical of those who were perceived as “trying too hard” to secure an invitation to a subgroup and raised the potential of this leading to adverse behavior. For example, deputies might use unnecessary force to show how aggressive they are in an effort to be invited to join a subgroup. Thus, how a subgroup defines competence has implications for what behavior is valued by the group.

**New deputies are less likely to be invited to join.** Survey results indicate that sworn personnel who are new to LASD are less likely to be invited to join a deputy subgroup. Specifically, 25 percent of LASD survey respondents who had been in the department for 21 or more years and 15 percent of those who had been with LASD for eight to 20 years reported ever having been invited to join a deputy subgroup, compared with 4 percent of those who had been with the department seven years or less.

**Committing shootings or misconduct might contribute to being invited to join, but this is perceived to be less common.** Interviewees noted that committing a shooting would likely lead to being invited to join a subgroup but disagreed that being invited to join a subgroup could be a motivating factor to commit a shooting. Some said that a “justifiable shooting” can also lead to an invitation but stressed that subgroups are not exclusively for deputies who have committed a shooting. Others posited that because much violent high-stakes crime occurs at night, it is likely that subgroups form among deputies who work the evening shift, reflecting the bonds that form when facing danger together. Around 15 percent of subgroup invitees and 15 percent of midlevel managers agreed that being invited to join a subgroup was associated with behavior that violates LASD policy, while 22 percent of each agreed that willingness to look the other way when others engage in improper or unethical behavior was a criterion for being invited.

**Those who have been invited to join a subgroup might be asked to do things for the group.** Over 25 percent of LASD survey respondents who had been invited to join a subgroup agreed that deputies in subgroups exhibit a willingness to engage in specific behaviors outside of work (e.g., paying for things of value to the subgroup), while 63 percent disagreed. In interviews with LASD personnel, these favors were things like writing reports for other members, taking on extra duties, hosting parties, or obliging egregious demands, such as “paying rent to work at a station.”

**Subgroups have few women members and few members of color.** Just 10 percent of LASD survey respondents overall agreed that subgroups restricted membership based on race/ethnicity, but one-quarter of Black respondents agreed. Also, just 16 percent of all deputies agreed that subgroups restrict membership based on gender, but one-quarter of female respondents agreed.

**Not all deputies want to join a subgroup.** Being a hard worker does not equate with being a member of a subgroup. Several LASD interview participants stated that they were asked to join a subgroup on the basis of their performance and declined without professional repercussions. In interviews, those who opted out mentioned some form of work-life balance, and command staff speculated that deputies working toward promotion might opt out to ensure that “there is no dirt on them, ever,” as one put it.
Are Tattoos Problematic?
Much of the media coverage on deputy subgroups has focused on the tattoos that members often share. Examples of these tattoos include a grim reaper, a skeleton holding a revolver and two playing cards known as the “dead man’s hand,” and a skeleton surrounded by flames carrying what appears to be an AK-47 assault rifle and wearing a helmet similar to those worn by German troops in World War I and World War II, as well as tattoo enhancements for committing a shooting, such as a tombstone or smoke coming from a gun barrel. LASD interviewees largely saw subgroup tattoos themselves as a nonissue and pointed out that tattoos have become more socially acceptable. However, respondents still recognized the potential negative effects of subgroup tattoos on litigation (e.g., they likely increase settlement amounts), criminal cases, promotion, or damage to LASD’s reputation. Some compared subgroup tattoos with the tattoos that service members get in the military, and others pointed out that subgroup logos can also be found on stickers, phone cases, and mouse pads. Additionally, some people get station tattoos that correspond to the LASD-recognized logo for the station.

Deputies’ views were mixed as to whether adding to a tattoo (e.g., adding a tombstone) to denote that a deputy had committed a shooting was a bad idea, but none saw it as a positive, and this aspect of subgroup behavior was particularly shocking to community members we interviewed. For some LASD personnel, the tattoo addition was a matter of personal expression, while others saw it as crossing a line. Those deputies who saw tattoos generally in a positive light saw them as a useful way to recognize hard workers and to show pride in a subgroup.

A quarter of survey respondents somewhat or strongly agreed that a deputy must get a subgroup’s tattoo in order to be a member, while 16 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed. In addition, nearly 40 percent somewhat or strongly agreed that having a tattoo is an acceptable way to show pride in a subgroup (66 percent of subgroup invitees and 48 percent of midlevel managers agreed).

Do Subgroups Carry a Risk to LASD and Individuals?
Deputies recognized the potential negative outcomes from subgroups, such as civil liability and damage to LASD’s reputation. Others saw the subgroups as divisive because they exclude some people, or as potentially divisive depending on their behavior, such as criticizing other people’s work unfairly or making work more difficult for some. More dramatically, this behavior could include efforts to get people to act in certain ways (e.g., make certain arrests) or to transfer out of the station. Many of the internal problems that can develop with subgroups involve patterns of disrespectful behavior toward co-workers. Those on the receiving end of ostracizing, humiliating, or intimidating behavior could try to deal with these behaviors on their own or might put up with them until they become very serious. Community members also perceived intimidating or harassing behavior to be indicative of subgroups. Many deputies noted that the risks of more serious or criminal behavior are rare but can become real under the right circumstances. Some participants did express concerns about deputies in subgroups having their own code of conduct or engaging in concerning practices (e.g., poor tactics). Finally, some noted that subgroups might be mechanisms of coping with the stress and danger of the job; this type of coping mechanism can be healthy or unhealthy.

How Do Subgroups Impact the Workplace and LASD as a Whole?
According to nearly half of survey respondents, deputy subgroups have no effect on a station or unit’s daily operations. About a quarter said that the presence of deputy subgroups can
help motivate others within the station or unit, while a similar number said that they can hurt morale and alienate nonmembers. In addition, people within LASD tended to recognize that subgroups’ behavior negatively impacts community perceptions of LASD, but many also expressed that deputy subgroups are not as harmful as the media makes them out to be. Nevertheless, the most serious negative outcomes associated with subgroups (e.g., workplace violence and community harassment), while perceived as rare by those within LASD, are unacceptable at any frequency.

**How Do Supervisors Approach Deputy Subgroups?**

It appears that about half of supervisors were aware of subgroups’ conduct, but there did not appear to be a collective effort to discourage deputies from joining subgroups. Additionally, 28 percent of survey respondents said that supervisors do not consider deputy subgroups to be problematic (32 percent of midlevel managers agreed). Although about a quarter agreed that supervisors formally discipline subgroup members for improper or unethical behavior (42 percent of midlevel managers agreed), 15 percent thought that supervisors were too lenient with subgroup members who violated LASD policies or procedures (16 percent of midlevel managers agreed). As direct supervisors of frontline personnel, sergeants play a critical role in supervising deputy behavior. Our findings suggest a lack of clear direction for sergeants to monitor and intervene to prevent problematic behavior by subgroups.

**Recommendations**

Waiting to act until subgroups are accused of misconduct is too great a risk for the county and its residents. Efforts should be made to intervene early to prevent problems from escalating or occurring in the first place. Research on change management suggests that a critical aspect of successful change involves managing the psychological contract between the employer and the employee by (1) involving employees in the change process and (2) developing and implementing an effective communication strategy. Central to preserving the psychological contract and managing change is having clearly articulated expectations. This suggests that deputies will easily spot any effort that is rushed or half-hearted. LASD has taken some initial steps to begin to address subgroups in its ranks, most visibly by creating the policy that prohibits deputies from joining or soliciting others to join subgroups, although the policy language does not specifically prohibit subgroups themselves. This policy recognizes the potential for these groups to erode public trust and create a negative public perception of the department, and it specifically identifies excessive force, harassment, and mistreatment of others as prohibited conduct. To reinforce this new policy, there needs to be clear guidance for command staff at all levels—and particularly for captains—about expectations and appropriate responses. In the past, captains have developed their own approaches to addressing issues with subgroups, which tend to involve direct communication and setting expectations, or transferring people as deemed necessary. This could contribute to a lack of consistency in the captains’ approaches and the differing expectations across the department that we observed.

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7 As noted, Sheriff Villanueva has seemingly clarified that this policy is intended to prohibit subgroups completely, although statements made to the Civilian Oversight Commission have appeared to contradict a firm message of prohibition.
Deputies expressed mixed opinions as to what actions the department should take. More than one-third (37 percent) of respondents agreed that subgroups should be prohibited. This result suggests that this subject is divisive within LASD and that prohibition will be met with some resistance. More than half of respondents agreed that LASD should break up problematic deputy subgroups by moving members to different stations or units. At the same time, one-quarter of survey respondents disagreed with the notion that a mandatory station or unit rotation policy could limit the influence of subgroups. Survey respondents also recognized that training plays a role in enabling supervisors to more effectively deal with deputy subgroups. About half of respondents agreed that LASD needs to provide training and support to supervisors on how to address any improper or unethical behavior by deputy subgroups.

Overall, we found that perceptions of problematic behaviors associated with subgroups are not universal among LASD respondents and tend to change over time given a set of conditions (e.g., poor supervision, subgroup leadership). Although LASD personnel perceive the more serious instances of misconduct to be rare events, given the exclusive nature of many groups, they can become divisive and lead to internal conflict or can evade detection of serious misconduct by avoiding outsiders. The existence, outside of the command hierarchy, of a secret alternative source of professional status within LASD can have a corrosive effect on discipline. Incidents that connect subgroup members to mistreatment of community members are particularly serious.

Recommendations for Subgroups

- **Take steps to bolster the policy on employee groups by clarifying policy language, taking steps to address secrecy, improving investigations, and identifying desired cultural change.** One of the first steps is to set a clear vision and communicate the need for change. Next, the official policy language should be clarified to add language that formally prohibits subgroups, which would seemingly align with a recent video statement by the Sheriff. The new language could define exactly what is prohibited by this policy and explain how the policy reinforces LASD’s mission and core values. The policy could also address the secrecy of subgroups by requiring deputies to disclose membership in all work-related groups or organizations. Decisions will need to be made about whether to investigate subgroups internally or externally. Internal investigations into employee groups are complex and will require internal investigators to examine collateral misconduct and operate with oversight. Investigation of and discipline for all forms of misconduct related to a subgroup investigation are critical for addressing potential group involvement. Resources should be devoted to ensure that internal investigations are thorough and conclude swiftly and should cooperate with external oversight. Lastly, the Sheriff stated that the new policy is intended to be part of cultural change within LASD. The vision for cultural change needs to be spelled out and planned for.

- **Open lines of communication and encourage reporting behavior.** Clear communication surrounding issues associated with subgroups is critical and requires the entire command staff to be on the same page. This should include communicating that reporting problems is encouraged and ensuring that this is reflected in reporting systems (e.g., revising current reporting systems or creating a new anonymous system for reporting). Communications should also express zero tolerance for retaliation.
• **Encourage collaboration among executive leadership.** Given the unique environments and independence of the various units across LASD, chiefs and commanders should work with unit commanders to develop strategic plans for managing known subgroups.

• **Ensure that those in key roles are aware and accountable.** Unit commanders are directly responsible for managing personnel, involving employees in organizational processes, and setting expectations. Unit commanders should also emphasize the common identity of working in a particular unit, given that communicating a shared identity and shared goals can help reduce intergroup conflict. Unit commanders with known subgroups should ensure that other supervisors have appropriate training and guidance to monitor the work environment. They should continue to discourage participation in subgroups.

• **Develop personnel through training.** LASD could consider implementing a peer intervention program to set expectations and provide LASD personnel with the tools to intervene in misconduct by another deputy. The peer intervention approach focuses directly on cultural change to prevent misconduct, avoid policing mistakes, and promote officer health and wellness. This approach also includes training and mentoring for training officers and midlevel supervisors, including training on the newly created policy on employee groups or training to improve how they monitor the workplace for behaviors addressed in that policy.

• **Promote openness to change, adaptability, and learning.** This recommendation includes developing a lessons-learned program from subgroup-related and other internal investigations and disseminating best practices across the department. Other efforts include improving performance evaluation practices and incorporating community policing metrics into evaluations. This could also include reviewing unit-level training programs and incorporating 360-degree reviews for training officers and supervisors.

• **Devote resources to change efforts.** LASD could consider creating working groups or task forces for specific issues. This might also include enhancing existing mentoring or career planning programs, enhancing long-term health and wellness programs, and enhancing the peer support program. The department could also identify priorities focused on pressing organizational challenges and further study of subgroups and related topics, such as workplace harassment and workplace bullying, reducing civilian complaints, or reducing uses of force.

**Recommendations for Strengthening Ties Between LASD and the Communities It Serves**

Community stakeholders in more than a third of the discussion groups and interviews (most frequently from those in the Central and North divisions) recommended changes to LASD training on a broad range of topics: cultural competency or antibias training, trauma-informed responses to domestic violence situations, helping people with mental illness or developmental disabilities, and building skills for interacting with people and displaying empathy. Some training recommendations were specifically about the practice of deputies starting their careers in the jails instead of in patrol stations, which community stakeholders said predisposes deputies to later treat community members with more hostility and aggression.

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8 As we note later, the research suggests that this training is not associated with changes in behavior (Forscher et al., 2019).
• **Institutionalize procedural justice through training, performance, and accountability.** A critical element for institutionalizing procedural justice is ensuring that deputies slow themselves down in order to properly respond to the situation (Sherman, 2020). Add training modules focused on such topics as procedural justice, crisis intervention, the neuroscience of respect, and social interaction skills. Training in these areas could help deputies shift from a warrior mindset to a guardian mindset. The department could also implement supervisor review meetings with deputies to discuss positive encounters and how procedural justice was used. The recent introduction of body-worn cameras for deputies provides a potential new tool for building in systems of continuous improvement. To contribute to improved community relations, LASD should consider implementing a systematic approach to review videos from body-worn cameras.

• **Improve or increase community interaction.** Create opportunities for community members and LASD personnel to interact outside of traditional law enforcement activities. Develop station-level plans for community-oriented policing that incorporate input from the community.

• **Give the community a greater voice and more points of contact,** such as an online feedback form to allow public comment on policy proposals or publishing public contact information for department leadership. Conduct broad community surveys or contact surveys to measure perceptions of LASD.

• **Increase the accountability of both the department and individual deputies.** This could include external monitoring of department policies, spending, or other activities. LASD could hold individual deputies accountable by hiring independent investigators to review excessive-force cases, mandating that deputies wear body cameras (which has begun), and creating a way for the public to anonymously report complaints to LASD regarding deputy behavior (the OIG already offers this option).

• **Improve hiring practices.** Research on hiring practices to improve cultural sensitivity is sparse, but LASD could consider incorporating conflict management and cultural sensitivity screening into the hiring process, if it is not already doing so. Community members would also support efforts to increase education requirements (e.g., associate or bachelor’s degree) or support continuing education (e.g., tuition reimbursement).

• **Improve relationships with external oversight.** This includes establishing community advisory councils, soliciting feedback on policies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission, and building a productive working relationship with the OIG to support continuous improvement (Walker and Archbold, 2019).

### Conclusion

Producing lasting change on this issue might require changing fundamental assumptions that exist within LASD. Any efforts for change must begin with accounting for organizational and subunit culture and leveraging positive features of that culture. Some recommendations are directed at the individual level, while others target the organizational level. Leadership practices, culture, and other features related to subgroups will not change overnight, but showing that the department is committed to making real changes can go a long way toward strengthening relationships between LASD and the communities it serves.
Acknowledgments

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### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td>American Civil Liberties Union</td>
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<td>ALADS</td>
<td>Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs</td>
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<td>CCJV</td>
<td>Citizens’ Commission on Jail Violence</td>
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<td>COC</td>
<td>Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>community-oriented policing</td>
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<td>COPS</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing Services</td>
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<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>coronavirus disease 2019</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
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<td>ELA</td>
<td>East Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPIC</td>
<td>Ethical Policing Is Courageous</td>
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<td>FAQ</td>
<td>frequently asked question</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>LAPD</td>
<td>Los Angeles Police Department</td>
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<td>law enforcement officer</td>
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<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General, County of Los Angeles</td>
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<td>OIR</td>
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<td>POST</td>
<td>California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRMS</td>
<td>Performance Reporting and Monitoring System</td>
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<td>Project ABLE</td>
<td>Project Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement</td>
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SWAT  special weapons and tactics
TO     training officer
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Over the past 40 years, lawsuits, investigations, and media coverage have linked secretive groups of deputies (which we refer to in this report as subgroups and cliques) to misconduct in various stations in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). The allegations about these groups—which have been described as “gangs,” “gang-like,” and “secret societies”—have forced Los Angeles County to pay tens of millions of dollars in judgments and create new policies, yet the origin of these subgroups and the role they play in the department and the community are largely unclear to county and department leadership.

In September 2018, deputies who were reportedly members of a subgroup called the Banditos allegedly attacked several other deputies who were not part of the group at the conclusion of an off-duty party for deputies completing patrol training at the East Los Angeles station.1 The Banditos had been associated with misconduct previously; they were implicated in a sexual harassment lawsuit in 2014. This was not the first time that a group of deputies in a subgroup had reportedly attacked other deputies. The last incident of this nature that received media coverage involved a deputy subgroup from Men’s Central Jail reportedly called the 3000 Boys, which had also been implicated in reports of excessive force in the jails (Banks, 2011).

Concerns of excessive use of force against inmates in Los Angeles County jails led to the formation of the Citizen’s Commission on Jail Violence (CCJV; 2012), which sought testimony, conducted interviews, and reviewed documents related to the use of force in the jails. The CCJV concluded that subgroups, such as the 3000 Boys, were a contributing factor to excessive force. Other subgroups have been revealed over time through the mistreatment of other employees or through revelations of shared tattoos when deputies have been deposed in civil litigation. Such allegations of mistreatment by subgroup members on the part of both LASD employees and community members speak to the unfavorable public image of these groups and their association with negative outcomes. These groups reportedly date back to at least the 1970s, but they first reached broad public awareness in 1991 amid allegations and lawsuits filed by community members regarding civil rights violations and excessive force associated with a subgroup known as the Vikings. We provide more detail of media coverage, the timeline of court cases, and previous reports that have discussed this issue in Chapter Two.

Events like those described above damage public trust. Moreover, as indicated by allegations of community mistreatment (e.g., excessive force), the risk of harm to the community is a key reason why this issue is a matter of public discussion. This risk makes understanding community perspectives on this subject particularly important. Understanding how community

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1 The party was held at an event venue called Kennedy Hall; it is sometimes referred to as the Kennedy Hall incident.
members feel about this issue and what they want LASD to do about it is critical for repairing harm and building trust.

In October 2018, the Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission (COC) formed an ad hoc committee to “address the issue of secret deputy subgroups” (Los Angeles County Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission, 2020). At the same time, the Office of the Los Angeles County Counsel asked the RAND Corporation to research the phenomenon to answer several key questions about the existence of subgroups within the department, including reasons why they form, what activities they engage in, whether they affect LASD’s mission, and the perceived effect of these groups on the community. It is worth noting that this subject is dynamic. As recently as August 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was reportedly investigating LASD’s subgroups more broadly (Lau and Rubin, 2019). Next, in July 2020, an internal whistleblower came forward, alleging that a subgroup from the Compton station called the Executioners encouraged shootings of civilians and had assaulted at least one other deputy at the station. In August 2020, Los Angeles County Sheriff Alex Villanueva announced a new policy meant to address the negative behavior of these groups and announced discipline for 26 members of LASD from the internal investigation into the 2018 incident involving the Banditos (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, undated-b). The policy was effective as of February 2020.

Primary data for this project were collected from November 2019 through November 2020—a period that included both the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and nationwide social unrest in the wake of George Floyd’s death at the hands of Minneapolis police. That event was another painful example of already strained relations between communities and the police that serve them and only one of the latest in a long line of police-involved killings that have affected public discourse about the role of law enforcement. Over the last several years, the urgency and scale of calls for police reform have become more pronounced.

Los Angeles County was not immune to the unrest, and the sociopolitical context of local law enforcement is highly dynamic. There have been general calls for criminal justice and policing reform and public demonstrations against police brutality, as well as several high-profile shootings committed by deputies that have contributed to tension with some community members. These tensions also manifested in attacks on deputies, the most notable of which was an ambush shooting of two deputies. It is inevitable that this environment would have an influence on both the community and LASD, including proposals to shift funding from LASD to other purposes intended to prevent crime before it begins.

The year 2020 saw other upheaval for LASD. In October, the COC called for the resignation of Sheriff Villanueva as a result of an ongoing uncooperative relationship (Williams, 2020). This lack of cooperation is exemplified by the Sheriff’s refusal to comply with at least two subpoenas—one to appear at a meeting of the COC to discuss COVID-19 in the jails and another to meet with the Inspector General to discuss subgroups in LASD (subpoena power was recently granted to the COC and the Office of Inspector General, County of Los Angeles [OIG]) and the Inspector General’s accusations of unlawful conduct by the Sheriff’s Department (OIG, 2020c). Two members of the Board of Supervisors have also called for Villanueva to resign (ABC7.com staff, 2020), and the Board of Supervisors passed a motion

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2 The existence of this group was revealed in 2018 when a deputy who had committed a shooting testified in a deposition about his tattoo that was associated with this group. This shooting, of Donta Taylor, resulted in a $7 million payout by Los Angeles County (Lau, 2018).
asking County Counsel, in consultation with others, to report back and present on options for
removing or impeaching the Sheriff, including making revisions to the county charter to allow
for the Sheriff’s removal. Several community organizations have also called for the Sheriff to
resign, including the Los Angeles County Democratic Party, the UNITE HERE Local 11
labor union, and the Check the Sheriff coalition.

Although the current climate is certainly important for understanding the interests and
perspectives of stakeholders who might be interested in this report, the phenomenon under
study in this project has existed and endured for decades. Despite punctuated interest over
time, direct study of subgroups in departments nationwide has been largely ignored or avoided.
This is not uncommon with complex social phenomena, especially those that are difficult to
observe or are purposefully hidden.

That said, there could be recognition among LASD leadership that change is warranted,
and officials have welcomed this project as an opportunity to learn more. For instance, LASD
created a new policy on subgroups in February 2020, and Sheriff Villanueva has highlighted
this policy as indicative of his zero-tolerance approach to misconduct by subgroups (LASD,
undated-b). However, conflicting statements about the intent and reach of this policy, ongo-
ing conflict with civilian oversight bodies regarding the department’s approach to subgroups,
and post-policy allegations of ongoing subgroup activity provide reasons to be wary. Addition-
ally, recent deposition testimony contradicts the Sheriff’s explanation of his response to the
Banditos incident, leading some to further question the Sheriff’s commitment to dealing with
this issue (Tchekmedyian, 2021). In the background, the FBI is apparently investigating the
deploy subgroups (Lau and Rubin, 2019), although the details of this investigation are not
public. Where relevant, the research team has tried to track the ongoing events occurring in
the county (e.g., reporting on the alleged Executioners group in Compton). Finally, 2020 also
saw a global pandemic that interrupted some of our planned research activities and introduced
delays in data collection and adjustments of certain data collection methods (e.g., virtual focus
groups).

Purpose and Components of the Current Study

This study has four overarching goals: (1) to understand community members’ experiences
and perceptions of subgroups, (2) to understand deputies’ experiences and views of subgroups,
(3) to understand the organizational context, and (4) to provide suggestions to both LASD and
Los Angeles County as to how to address this issue.

To provide a comprehensive view of how these stakeholders see LASD subgroups, the
research team collected data and information from a variety of sources: confidential inter-
views with community leaders in the areas that LASD serves, focus groups with community
members, confidential interviews with selected LASD personnel, and an anonymous survey of
the entire LASD sworn workforce. The research team worked to engage a diverse set of stake-
holders so that a variety of perspectives are represented, while also maintaining strict confi-
dentiality for research participants and maintaining RAND’s role as an independent research
organization.

Additionally, several questions guided the study: How are subgroups viewed outside of
the department? Why do subgroups exist, and what is their purpose? What is the process
for joining, including initiation activities? How are subgroups viewed inside the department?
What types of conduct toward other LASD employees and county residents do subgroups’ members engage in? What policies or practices currently exist in the department, and what others might be relevant? How, if at all, should these policies and practices be managed?

Our approach to answering these questions used a broad framework that situates subgroups within the community and organizational context, considers features of groups and their members, and considers the impact of subgroups, which includes their activities and perceptions of LASD personnel and community members. This framework recognizes that subgroups and issues surrounding them exist within a broader context, which could have implications for group formation, group features, group member characteristics, and behavior. Perceptions of subgroups by both community members and LASD personnel can also be shaped by perceptions of LASD in general. Table 1.1 depicts this framework and highlights the potential interrelated nature of contextual and group factors on conduct. Below each component, we list the research activities that inform our understanding of that component.

Importantly, the study provides an opportunity to those directly involved—community members and deputies—to have their voices heard. The research team was guided by key questions and incorporated relevant theory and research findings where applicable, but we did not seek to confirm a certain theoretical framework.

### Table 1.1
**Framework for Understanding Deputy Subgroups Within LASD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
<th>Domains of Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Why do subgroups form, and what is their purpose?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Why do subgroups form?</td>
<td>LASD interviews, LASD survey, Research literature, Prior reports about LASD, Legal pleadings and media reports</td>
<td>Organizational environment, Organizational stressors, Organizational culture and subculture, External environment, Subgroup theories, Group and peer influence, Criteria for being invited, Reasons for joining and characteristics of those who join, Conduct of group members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What do they do?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How are they viewed inside LASD?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What impact do they have on LASD?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What impact do subgroups have on community experiences and perceptions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What types of conduct do subgroups engage in toward the community?</td>
<td>Media reports, Legal pleadings, Prior reports about LASD, Community interviews and focus groups</td>
<td>Accounts of attitudes or behaviors, Community experiences and perceptions of LASD overall, Community experiences and perceptions of deputy subgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How are they viewed outside of the department?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What policies or practices currently exist in the department, and what others might be relevant? How, if at all, should these policies and practices be managed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What policies or practices exist?</td>
<td>LASD interviews, LASD survey, Community interviews and focus groups, Research literature, Prior reports</td>
<td>Identified risks and behaviors associated with subgroups, Perceptions of potential responses from LASD personnel, Perceptions of potential responses from community members, Organizational change, Management of groups within organizations, Creating comprehensive, sustainable, feasible, and acceptable responses to addressing subgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• How should they be managed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similarly, the work is not part of any legal investigation. As a research organization, RAND is legally bound to protect research subjects, including, in this case, interviewees, focus group participants, and survey respondents. Surveys were conducted anonymously; RAND does not have any information that could be linked to an individual.

Additionally, we present many of our qualitative findings with as much detail as possible so as to represent the range of our participants’ views. This effort also led to suggestions for change aimed at improving the work environment at LASD and enhancing the community’s trust and experiences with the department.

The remainder of this document is organized so that each component builds on the ones before it. In Chapter Two, we provide a brief history of investigations, lawsuits, and media coverage that help convey the allegations made against LASD subgroup members over time and how LASD responded. We used lexical analysis to summarize the media coverage on this subject, focusing on articles published in the *Los Angeles Times*. We also summarize prior reports that have touched on subgroups and note their recommendations for change. In Chapter Three, we examine research literature that provides insight on this unique subject and some of the historical issues identified in Chapter Two. In Chapter Four, we detail our methods and approach—an admittedly technical section that might be more useful to other researchers than to the lay reader. In Chapter Five, we report on interviews with community stakeholders and focus groups with community members to reveal community perspectives. Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight of this report draw extensively from our interview and survey data to convey how LASD personnel of various ranks view subgroups. In Chapter Nine, we synthesize our key findings. Finally, in Chapter Ten, we discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations based on information gathered through our primary data collection, from other relevant policies, and from other academic research.

Four appendixes are available for download at www.rand.org/t/RRA616-1. Appendix A describes the methods used. Appendix B presents the survey instrument. Appendix C presents the LASD interview protocol. Appendix D presents the community interview protocol and focus group guide.

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3 We are not proving or disproving the merit of any particular allegation. We also did not have the ability to compel people to participate, as this research effort was voluntary and confidential.

4 Accordingly, RAND personnel did not link any identifying information to our interview participants, redacted direct identifiers from our interview notes, and deleted contact information and correspondence with interviewees. RAND General Counsel and Human Subjects Protection Committee reviewers also conducted reviews of these methods and the quotes used in this report for potential risks of disclosure.
CHAPTER TWO
Prior Reports and Media Coverage of LASD Subgroups

This chapter covers relevant inquiries and lawsuits into LASD subgroups over several decades and analyzes media coverage to see how frequently and in what context subgroups have been mentioned (primarily in the *Los Angeles Times*). The Kolts Commission provided the first mention of deputy subgroups in its 1992 report documenting problems with use of force and lax discipline in LASD (Kolts et al., 1992). Since then, subgroups have surfaced repeatedly in allegations made against the department. Notably, each of these events follows a predictable trajectory, and these events often become scandals. Sherman, 1978, provides a theoretical framework for understanding how scandals progress, which includes the following stages: revelation, publication, defense, dramatization, investigation, and labeling. The stages involve actions taken by the media, the department in focus, and other public officials, which ultimately lead to a determination by community members of whether to label the entire organization as deviant. LASD has not effectively avoided this deviant label when it comes to subgroups, as evidenced by ongoing media coverage and other public figures’ use of the term *gangs* in official documents and in public statements. The actions of other public figures, the actions taken by LASD in response, and other critical events involving LASD all factor into public perceptions of LASD.

**Historical Context**

Deputies forming unofficial, invitation-only groups with a common logo, often in the form of a tattoo, is a long-standing issue in LASD. Much of what is known about these groups comes from lawsuits, media coverage, and prior reports that were focused on other topics, such as the use of force, that explored the role of these groups in contributing to uses of force. These groups have been called *subgroups*, *cliques*, *gangs*, *secret societies*, *fraternal societies*, *clubs*, and likely many other descriptors, but there has not been a concentrated effort to understand more about these groups, such as why they exist. In this report, we aim to answer this question. We use the terms *subgroups* and *cliques* to describe these groups.

The history of these groups often surfaces in present-day discussions. In this chapter, we highlight key events and important insights regarding deputy subgroups that are present in the media or in the public domain. We begin by discussing media coverage on this subject, primarily from the *Los Angeles Times*. Next, we explore whether other law enforcement agencies in the United States have received media coverage related to subgroups. We then categorize claims from several lawsuits that detail specific behaviors by subgroup members or the department. Finally, we summarize findings from a variety of reports that have focused on LASD generally, but we also comment on and provide suggestions regarding LASD subgroups.
Media Coverage of LASD Deputy Subgroups

Web searches for “deputy cliques,” “deputy gangs,” and “deputy subgroups” reveal coverage from local, national (e.g., *New York Times*), and international (e.g., *The Guardian*) news sources. Often, this coverage quotes or reuses information published by the *Los Angeles Times*.

As seen in Figure 2.1, the number of articles related to this subject over time reflects spikes during significant events. For example, 22 *Los Angeles Times* articles from 1990 to 1992 reflect coverage of lawsuits involving members of the Vikings subgroup (e.g., *Thomas v. County of Los Angeles* and *Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles*) and the findings from the Kolts report, which included a chapter on deputy gangs (Kolts, 1992).

Articles in the late 1990s and early 2000s reference the Kolts report and a new subgroup, the Regulators, and subsequent articles in the late 2000s covered a lawsuit filed by a Regulators member against LASD. In the early 2010s, another cluster of articles reported allegations of deputy subgroups in the jails, including a physical attack by a subgroup called the 3000 Boys on other deputies at a Christmas party, an investigation into the subgroup known as the Jump Out Boys, and Operation Pandora’s Box, which would ultimately lead to the convictions of Sheriff Lee Baca and Undersheriff Paul Tanaka (and his ties to the Vikings—see Leonard and Faturechi, 2013) on unrelated charges of obstruction of justice and conspiracy. The most recent articles are about a Compton shooting of a community member by a deputy with a tattoo of an unnamed subgroup (now believed to be called the Executioners), another incident by the Banditos subgroup, an attempt to rehire Caren Carl Mandoyan (who is reportedly a

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Figure 2.1
*Los Angeles Times* Articles That Mention LASD Subgroups, 1986–2019

NOTES: The selected headlines depicted in this figure are not a random sample, and many are recent headlines (2018–2019). The top two headlines are from 1992 and 1999, respectively.
Researchers also analyzed the set of articles using RAND-Lex, a cloud-based text analytics computing platform (see Appendix A for more detail on our methods to summarize these articles). The method allowed the team to identify groups of topics, each representing a distinct issue addressed in the Los Angeles Times articles. The overarching themes spanning the topics can be seen as concern about corruption and misconduct connected to deputy subgroups. The scan of the media reporting on this subject tends to describe deputy groups as gangs (or gang-like) or cliques and identifies matching tattoos and use of force or excessive force as features of these groups. This reporting often notes the potential connection between subgroups and shootings committed by deputies, which further underscores the potential severity of this issue and its importance as a community concern. The articles also make note of deputy subgroups in the jails, the role of different sheriffs over time, complaints (including lawsuits) and investigations involving groups, and specific groups (e.g., the Banditos) or locations where groups exist or have existed. Many articles reference that this is an issue with a long history (e.g., quotes from cases involving the Vikings).

Articles on deputy subgroups occasionally provide perspectives from deputies in subgroups or others in LASD that discuss the purpose of the groups, which tends to center around camaraderie, unit pride, and recognition for hard work. These articles also often feature statements made by various sheriffs. “The Secret Society Among Lawmen” from 1999 provides one of the most detailed accounts, with quotes from tattooed deputies, statements from deputies who disapprove of the groups, and Baca’s stated disapproval (O’Connor and Daunt, 1999). The articles also include ongoing recognition that having a tattoo could be revealed in court and could contribute to higher liability for the county. Many of the themes reported in these articles appear to have changed little over time. Indeed, in June 2020, reports emerged of a deputy subgroup in Compton allegedly named the Executioners, with accusations that are remarkably similar to those alleged against the Banditos (e.g., intimidating and assaulting fellow deputies). This newer group allegedly glorified the use of force, including shootings committed by deputies (Tchekmedyian and Lau, 2020).

Media Coverage of Identified Cliques or Groups in Other Law Enforcement Agencies

Although the Los Angeles Times and other media outlets have reported on deputy subgroups in LASD over multiple decades, the extent to which similar unofficial groups exist in law enforcement more generally is not well known. Law enforcement is formally organized into many workplace groups of various sizes—across units, shifts, and areas of responsibility, and this structure can create a sense of isolation and localized patterns of behavior (Klinger, 1997; Hassell, 2007), which occasionally result in misconduct involving groups of officers engaged in policy or criminal violations. There is potentially a selection effect in news stories on these groups, in that news coverage is contingent on the group(s) being engaged in newsworthy behavior—e.g., suspicious, deviant, or potentially criminal behavior. As a result, much of the media coverage of these groups tends to be negative. Web searches for evidence of law enforce-

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1 We exclusively searched for reports of unofficial groups existing within law enforcement organizations rather than external groups that could include law enforcement officers as members. There are a wide variety of official fraternal organizations for law enforcement officers. The New York City Police Department (NYPD), for instance, has 37 officially recognized fraternal organizations (NYPD, undated-b).
ment subgroups, cliques, or gangs in other departments reveal several stories that implicate groups of officers engaging in misconduct or criminal activity or performing exclusive or ritualistic behaviors as a form of group identification.

Some of these examples indicate group identification as a reason that subgroups form, but other purposes and actions of other law enforcement groups are often not verified.

A 2000 article on the Family, a police clique in New Jersey that held ritualistic candlelit induction ceremonies (Hedges, 2000), alleged that an estimated 20 percent of the force belonged to the group. Forced to swear allegiance and forbidden from speaking to nonmembers, members allegedly took part in intimidation, racist language, planting evidence, controlling overtime and promotions, and protecting members from being disciplined. The existence of the Family came to light when a separate group of officers filed a complaint. Other whistleblowers emerged, but none of the multiple investigations led to the removal of the alleged leader.

Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s, three race-affiliated subgroups proliferated in the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD): Taylor’s Children, the Antoinettes, and the McNuggets (Scharf and Phillippi, 2015). Members were so tied to these affiliations that they would reportedly introduce themselves by their clique, and competition among cliques seemingly led to different narratives about NOPD’s response to Hurricane Katrina. There is speculation that the subgroups still exist in some form and that this culture might have kept the department in “post-Katrina limbo” longer than necessary. Again, the purpose and activities of these groups is unclear; however, the NOPD at the time was mired in scandals related to various forms of corruption and outright criminal conduct (Frontline, 2009).

Other groups have been identified following whistleblower accusations about pressure to use lethal force or the glorification of lethal force, but again without any direct indication that the groups committed criminal conduct.

A lawsuit from a former police captain in Vallejo, California, claimed that some officers who had committed fatal shootings were inducted into an exclusive clique, symbolized by members bending one corner of their badge, labeled the “Badge of Honor” (King, 2020). This captain believed that he was retaliated against and fired for pushing for an investigation and eventually speaking out against the department’s negative culture. Allegations of excessive force and a high rate of shootings committed by officers have been linked to badge bending, as well as a culture of secrecy surrounding the alleged practice and the alleged clique. The Vallejo Police Department has been described in news articles as having a culture that is conducive to bullying, retaliation, and pressure to use force.

In another recent example, a whistleblower from the Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD’s) special weapons and tactics (SWAT) unit filed a lawsuit claiming that a subgroup of tenured SWAT officers—labeled the “SWAT mafia” (Rector and Winton, 2020)—attempted to control selections and promotions, encouraged the use of deadly force over less-lethal alternatives, and retaliated against the whistleblower. The lawsuit followed a previous complaint to Internal Affairs in 2018 and a change of assignment for the whistleblower.

In other cases, internal whistleblowers have revealed groups of officers involved in patterns of criminal behavior that have resulted criminal charges for those officers. In a California case involving the Oakland Riders, four officers on the same beat were accused of beating, robbing, and planting evidence on people in West Oakland (Fagan and Lee, 2000). None were convicted, and one is still reportedly a fugitive. Sixteen years after the scandal, the Oakland
Police Department is still in the process of federally mandated reform, with resistance to culture change identified as a key impediment (Fernandez, 2019).

In 2017, nine Baltimore officers from the Gun Trace Task Force were charged with forms of racketeering, robbery, and firearms crimes against suspected drug dealers and other civilians since at least 2014 (Richardson, 2019). The group included sergeants, detectives, and at least one officer from Philadelphia.

As a final example, “a gang of criminal cops” in Chicago on an antigang tactical team was accused of taxing drug dealers and targeting the dealers’ rivals for enforcement for more than ten years (Kalven, 2016). Two Internal Affairs undercover investigators originally assigned to investigate were reportedly removed from the case after two and a half years; claiming they were reassigned and ostracized, the investigators filed a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit. An FBI probe eventually led to a sergeant and another officer being convicted of federal charges in 2012 after they attempted to extort an undercover FBI agent posing as a drug courier. Ten other officers involved in the case are on a prosecution “no-call” list. The scandal resulted in 23 related lawsuits and more than 42 charges or convictions being vacated in cases involving the officers.

Although group formation is a common feature in all these cases, there are often unique contextual factors, such as varying opportunity structures or rationales, that contribute to different forms of misconduct and corruption (Pertiwi, 2018). Common themes across all of these examples include violation of civil rights and excessive force or the glorification of force. Notably, although several cities have experienced recurring scandals involving criminal behavior by groups of officers, few of these groups had an official name, and none was reported to have associated tattoos or logos.

### Historical Misconduct and Corruption Involving Groups Within LASD

Historical examples of misconduct, corruption, and scandal can provide valuable lessons learned for members of today’s LASD, but such scandals also continue to factor into public and internal perceptions of the department. This might be seen as unfair to the current members of LASD, but historical context often affects perceptions well into the future (Weitzer, 2002). Additionally, misconduct or corruption in other law enforcement agencies can impact perceptions of the occupation in general (Weitzer and Tuch, 2005), and such incidents and the subsequent criticism of policing locally and elsewhere can impact officer attitudes (Nix and Pickett, 2017; Turchan, 2020). Both of the following cases were mentioned several times in our interviews as evidence of criminal misconduct in LASD.

#### Arco Narco

The Arco Narco case (1988–1990) involved a group of deputies assigned to a specialized narcotics unit called Majors II. At least seven deputies and their sergeant were accused of taking money from drug dealers during arrests, beating drug dealers, and lying on reports (Merina, 1993). Ultimately, the deputies were convicted primarily on charges of theft and tax evasion in relation to the theft of $48,000 during a sting operation conducted by the FBI. Their criminal activities included the sergeant supervising the unit, who would later testify against the deputies. In response, LASD eliminated its four narcotics units.

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2 Law enforcement officers on “no-call lists” are deemed to have questionable credibility, so the prosecution will not call them as a witness.
Operation Pandora’s Box

More recently, the 2011 Operation Pandora’s Box scandal resulted in federal charges and convictions for former Sheriff Baca and Undersheriff Tanaka (Grad and Winton, 2016). In this case of process corruption, LASD was charged with attempting to hide a federal informant from the FBI, which was investigating claims of excessive force and corruption in the jails. Among other allegations, deputies reportedly tried to intimidate an FBI agent in front of her home. Charges included obstruction of justice, lying under oath, and corruption. Twenty-one individuals, including many deputies, were convicted. Other adverse organizational and managerial practices during this period were also detailed by the CCJV, which is discussed later. Much of the scandal focused on the actions of the undersheriff, with allegations of pay to play, favoritism, and undermining supervisors in Men’s Central Jail and elsewhere. The undersheriff’s past membership in a deputy subgroup was frequently mentioned in reporting on this subject. The significance of this event and related leadership failures likely still factor into internal and external perceptions of LASD (and subgroups) today.

Lawsuits Alleging Misconduct by Deputy Subgroups

LASD has been sued repeatedly over alleged misconduct by deputy subgroups. These lawsuits appear to follow the real or perceived failure of internal channels to investigate the existence or behavior of subgroups and to correct inappropriate behavior through discipline or discharge. Lawsuits or complaints involving deputy subgroups can be organized into two categories: (1) community members alleging unjustified or excessive force or violations of civil rights by group members and (2) other deputies alleging harassment, retaliation, violence, and violation of workplace rights by group members.

According to the Los Angeles Times, the Los Angeles County Counsel determined that subgroups or their members have been involved in roughly $55 million worth of judgments against Los Angeles County since 1990, and $21 million worth of these judgments occurred in the past ten years (Tchekmedyan, 2020). The County Counsel’s report remains confidential, so the number of cases and calculation of costs is unclear. For comparison, recent litigation expenses attributed to LASD3 totaled $81.5 million in fiscal year 2018–2019, $62.1 million in 2017–2018, and $68.6 million in 2016–2017.

The community members’ claims in Table 2.1 point to the existence of deputy subgroups in LASD or a specific deputy’s membership in a subgroup as evidence of enhanced county liability, given that LASD knows about the subgroup(s) and that the defendants were acting within their capacity as law enforcement officials. Some of the recent complaints have included allegations of harassment toward family members of individuals who were killed in shootings committed by deputies. Community members’ claims typically cite unreasonable search and seizure; unreasonable or excessive force; failure to train, supervise, and discipline; and municipal liability for unconstitutional customs and practices.4

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3 Los Angeles County Counsel, undated. Total litigation expenses in these data include Contract Counsel and County Counsel fees, in addition to judgment and settlement costs, and many of these judgments or settlements reflect the conclusion of lawsuits from years prior.

4 Estate of Paul Rea v. County of Los Angeles; Serrano Robles, Sr. v. County of Los Angeles; Rathbun & Sexton v. County of Los Angeles; Lindsey & Rodriguez v. Tanaka; Estate of Darrell Logan, Jr. v. County of Los Angeles; Rosas v. Baca; Moffett v. County of Los Angeles.
Complaints and lawsuits brought forth by internal whistleblowers tend to accuse subgroup members of threats, intimidation, harassment, bullying, ostracism, and violence against other deputies, as shown in Table 2.2. Other allegations include the subgroups controlling shift assignments and vacation days, overloading other deputies with work, not providing backup or providing limited backup, and vandalizing property. Often these claims include allegations of retaliation, such as denial of transfer requests; opening internal affairs investigations; and direct behavior, such as vandalism, threats, intimidation, denial of promotion and attempts to harm reputation. One claim implied that subgroup membership had an impact beyond the rank of deputy, alleging that a lieutenant and Tanaka’s membership in the same subgroup contributed to their retaliatory behavior (e.g., Rathbun & Sexton v. County of Los Angeles).

Together, such complaints and lawsuits provide ample examples of subgroup members’ alleged misconduct against both county residents and other deputies. However, the resolution of these cases often does not provide sufficient information to establish which allegations were affirmed or refuted, nor is this information commonly communicated to deputies or the public. Indeed, a criticism of the current process is that settlements that are sealed or that have nondisclosure agreements often preclude an understanding of the facts involved in these cases (Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, 2021). LASD does have a Risk Management Unit that, in conjunction with County Counsel, identifies and addresses common features of claims against the department, but this work is not disseminated publicly. Moreover, the recent cases involving the Banditos and the Executioners were preceded by cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subgroup Name</th>
<th>Related Litigation</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3000 Boys</td>
<td>Evan Tutt v. Baca et al.</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Civil rights violation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000 Boys and 3000 Boys</td>
<td>Rosas v. Baca et al.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Excessive force</td>
<td>Settlement agreement</td>
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<td>Banditos</td>
<td>Vargas v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Wrongful death</td>
<td>Pending</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rea v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Wrongful death</td>
<td>Pending</td>
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<td>Serrano v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Wrongful death</td>
<td>Pending</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executioners&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;/CPT (Compton)</td>
<td>Taylor v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Wrongful death</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lockett et al. v County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<td>Guardado et al. v. County of Los Angeles</td>
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<td>Wrongful death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jump Out Boys</td>
<td>Estate of Arturo Cabrales et al. v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Wrongful death</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vikings</td>
<td>Thomas v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Class action—excessive force, discrimination</td>
<td>$6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Carrillo v. County of Los Angeles</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Civil rights violation, wrongful prosecution</td>
<td>$10,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayside Whities&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Crawford v. Block et al.</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Excessive force</td>
<td>$40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> The official name of this group is disputed.

<sup>b</sup> The existence of this group is disputed by LASD.
related to these groups several years prior, suggesting potential opportunities to intervene to prevent further claims.

In addition to the considerable costs to the taxpayer, this history of lawsuits suggests a long history of problematic behavior by LASD deputies involved in subgroups.

Findings from Prior Reports

Media reporting and lawsuits about excessive force have occasionally resulted in external inquiries into LASD. In this section, we discuss previous reports that mention deputy subgroups. With one exception, the primary purpose of these reports was not to research or investigate deputy subgroups specifically, but rather to review departmental practices, often those related to the use of force and biased policing, and internal processes potentially affecting these outcomes, such as supervision, discipline, and community engagement, among others. Here, we review key findings from these reports as they relate to subgroups or cliques and LASD culture generally and for recommendations related to subgroups or cliques.

Kolts Commission

The Kolts Commission was led by retired federal judge James Kolts and published its report in 1992. Like similar commissions on police misconduct from the early 1990s—such as the Christopher Commission of LAPD and the Mollen Commission of NYPD—the Kolts report took a comprehensive look at complaints of excessive force against LASD’s Patrol Division. Other civilian complaints discussed in the report included a lack of respect in interactions, that complaints were not taken seriously, that complaint results were not publicly disclosed, and that the complaints extended to supervisors as well as patrol deputies. The report concluded...
that there was “deeply disturbing evidence of excessive force and lax discipline. The LASD has not been able to solve its own problems of excessive force in the past and has not reformed itself with adequate thoroughness and speed” (Kolts, 1992, p. 1). The report noted a “code of silence” that could contribute to dishonesty.

Notably, this was also the first report to explore allegations of deputy subgroups, focusing solely on the Vikings at the Lynwood station. The report stated that, “after a series of interviews with persons who hold a wide range of views on the issue, we conclude that, although there is some evidence suggestive of the existence of deputy gangs, such evidence is, at most, inconclusive” (Kolts, 1992, p. 323). However, the report notes that some deputies associated with the Viking symbol appeared to have engaged in behavior that is “brutal and intolerable and is typically associated with street gangs,” concluding that such activities are likely to “erode the community’s trust in the LASD” (Kolts, 1992, p. 323). The report did document some identified features of the Vikings and its members, noting that markers of “gang-like” behavior included tattoos, ethnically derogatory language, hand signs, slang, graffiti, harassment (of supervisors), and vandalism. The report noted that deputies associated with the Vikings were likely to be “hard chargers” or aggressive deputies assigned to late night or early morning shifts5 and that they tended to recruit others with similar attitudes who were nearing the end of their custody rotation. The report also noted that the groups might start with good intentions and, somewhat contradictorily, were not necessarily racist in and of themselves (despite the use of racially derogatory language, which was also documented across the department).

The primary community-related recommendation of the Kolts report was to increase funding for community policing. Regarding the subgroups, the report recommended that LASD eradicate offensive station mascots and conduct an immediate internal affairs investigation to identify and punish gang-like behavior. It recommended breaking up deputy groups that engage in conduct that signifies gang-related activity. Sheriff Sherman Block rejected the conclusion that deputies were operating in gangs and denied the need for an internal investigation. However, the Board of Supervisors implemented other reforms after this report, including hiring a Special Counsel (1993) and eventually establishing the Office of Independent Review, County of Los Angeles (OIR; 2001).

Special Counsel Reports
Merrick Bobb, who served as Special Counsel from 1993 to 2014, was tasked with ensuring that the recommendations of the Kolts report were implemented. During that time, Bobb and his staff at the Police Assessment Resource Center published 36 reports about all aspects of LASD and its policies and procedures (Police Assessment Resource Center, 2018). Recurrent themes included the lack of strategic vision by commanders and supervisors, lax oversight and discipline, training deficiencies, and a strong “us versus them” culture. The reports also documented a collection of themes, such as resistance or slow uptake of changes in policy, strategy, supervision, training, etc. However, the reports also commended the department’s agility in resolving problems in some cases (e.g., through the creation of a task force).

5 Early morning shifts occur outside of regular working hours, so regular management personnel (e.g., captains) are less likely to be present. Additionally, the early morning shift might handle more serious calls for service or crimes (i.e., most people are sleeping), and their irregular hours could contribute to a stronger bond among deputies (e.g., few other people work the same shifts; in Los Angeles, early morning shift workers might spend downtime together as they wait for rush hour to pass after their shift).
The Special Counsel reports mention “deputy cliques” or “deputy gangs” 13 and five times, respectively. The overall impression is that poor leadership, a lack of close supervision, stagnant assignments, and a sense of isolation among deputies contributed to groups forming and becoming problematic. Some of the Special Counsel’s early reports recommended addressing the issue at the first sign of deputy cliques and identified as potential indicators things like deputies “running roughshod over sergeants and lieutenants,” increases in the use of force, and incidents with large numbers of deputies behaving poorly off duty. The reports recommended that chiefs and commanders be accountable for having in-depth knowledge of the areas under their responsibility, understanding strengths and weaknesses of management, knowing what training had been received or is needed, and knowing whether subgroups are forming and what assistance has been given to the captain. This assistance included developing working plans with captains to analyze needs and problems and to develop solutions. Another suggestion included instilling assignment rotations to prevent cliques from forming. Discussions of cliques in later reports tended to be more general and pointed to the need for a strategic vision and feedback that provides deputies with a better sense of what is expected of them. In reviewing LASD’s street gang intervention strategy, the Special Counsel noted in 2013 that simply having good intentions does not always translate to success and can even be counterproductive, noting being busy and trying hard does not always translate into success, and there is a large disconnect between these well-intentioned efforts and the reality on the ground. And while we did not witness any signs of pervasive problems related to civil rights abuses, it is our sense that if management skills and tools are not improved significantly, we will be reading about incidents in the community within the next few years that mirror events in the jails, generated by a small, overly aggressive clique led either by a few rogue deputies or naïve deputies thinking they are carrying out orders. (Bobb, 2013, p. 29)

Other statements in these reports reflect a recognition of the culture in the department and prospects for change. A quote from Special Counsel’s final report captures this:

Many leaders in the Department have not been trained on how to create culture change. Thus, to have conversations about risk management, or to hold people accountable for improving decisionmaking by deputies in the field, is difficult if leaders do not have the tools or skill set to do so. . . . Changing what deputies believe; altering what pressures they feel from peers; transforming what characteristics, information, and actions are valued; and clarifying how to prioritize competing goals—the will to do all of this must come from within, and be sustained by, the organization, with the process informed and supported continually by the community and outside experts. (Bobb, 2014, p. 40)

Although there are some recommendations regarding cliques, details such as group names, locations, and activities are not discussed in these reports. Nevertheless, the Special Counsel reports provide a detailed historical perspective of LASD policies and practices, with a multitude of recommendations for improvement.

American Civil Liberties Union Reports on Jail Violence
For several years in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) monitored the jails and published two reports on jail violence (ACLU National Prison Project and ACLU Foundation of Southern California, 2011; Liebowitz et al., 2012). These reports
identified deficiencies in LASD’s use-of-force policy; its training; and its reporting, investigation, and discipline for excessive force and noted a culture of violence that emphasized the use of force as a first rather than last resort for controlling inmates. The ACLU identified “deputy gangs” as a significant source of this culture in that they glorified violence or used it as a rite of entry for joining a group. Lax discipline and departmental denial contributed to the subgroups gaining a foothold, according to these reports.

Citizens’ Commission on Jail Violence
Prompted by the ACLU’s reporting, the CCJV (2012) focused on the use of force in county jails. The report concluded that the “totality of the evidence, however, provides a credible picture of the excessive force in the Los Angeles County Jail system that has not been addressed adequately by the Department’s leaders, policies, and systems” (CCJV, 2012, p. 11). The 194-page report arrived at several conclusions and recommendations that directly relate to department culture and deputy subgroups. For one, the report noted that aspects of deputy cliques contributed to a culture that normalized the excessive use of force. A mindset of “us versus them” between deputies and inmates promoted not only a lack of respect for inmates but also a culture of aggression that encouraged using force early in interactions as a means to control inmates. The CCJV maintained that a code of silence contributed to deputies not reporting misconduct and that there was a lack of leadership, supervision, and accountability. It also noted that an unprofessional climate was a result of custody not being a valued assignment in the department and that personnel trends at the time led to high supervisor turnover while deputy assignments remained stagnant. Transfers to custody assignments were also occasionally used as punishment.

The report identified deputy cliques as a key element of jail culture, stating that they can contribute to a sense of allegiance to a subpart of the department, can contribute to further “us versus them” mentalities (in this case, deputies in the clique versus jail inmates), and can erode a deputy’s moral compass or affect decisionmaking. Then–Assistant Sheriff Tanaka reportedly empowered the jail cliques at the time, and the cliques were either resistant to or lacked adequate supervision. An aggressive mindset within the cliques was believed to contribute to use of force and, eventually, to a reported assault at an LASD Christmas party that led to the firing of six deputies. The report identified tattoos as a reward for aggressive behavior against inmates, although other reporting by OIR questions the importance of tattoos or even having a name for the clique (Gennaco et al., 2012).

From this report, one can infer that cliques were emblematic of a culture or subculture within the department that supported the use of force as a tool. The CCJV advocated culture change, noting that it would require committed supervisors, strong and clear communication of policies and core values, timely and strict enforcement of zero tolerance policies for misconduct and dishonesty, and engaged and visible leadership at the highest levels of the department. The report also noted several instances of cliques being identified as potentially problematic, yet no action was taken (e.g., the Regulators and cliques in the Men’s Central Jail). The CCJV recommended preventing cliques by having mandatory assignment rotations and discouraging participation in cliques or allegiance to a subpart of the department, among many other recommendations for jail operations more generally.
Understanding Subgroups Within the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department

**U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Report on Antelope Valley**

As part of an investigation into allegations of racially biased policing in the Antelope Valley in 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division made several conclusions and recommendations regarding community engagement, the handling of civilian complaints, and “a pattern or practice of discriminatory and unlawful searches and seizures, including the use of unreasonable force” (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2013, p. 1). This investigation produced a settlement agreement between LASD and DOJ that requires ongoing monitoring to ensure that the changes specified by the settlement agreement are fully implemented. In addition to unconstitutional policing, the DOJ’s findings noted the presence of a deputy subgroup that was associated with “an intimidating skull and snake symbol as a mark of their affiliation with Antelope Valley stations,” which was interpreted as symbolizing the divide between deputies and the community (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2013, p. 44). They noted that this symbol took the form of tattoos and bumper stickers and that station leaders were trying to discourage its use. This letter recommended “stronger measures to dissuade deputies from displaying these symbols, including training to ensure that deputies understand the inconsistent and divisive message sent by deputies’ apparent adoption of such insignia, while respecting their First Amendment rights” (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, 2013, p. 44).

It appears that the discussions on deputy subgroups or cliques were a peripheral aspect of the DOJ’s investigation and that there was no further inquiry on that subject. Ongoing monitor reports document the Palmdale and Lancaster stations’ efforts to comply with the settlement agreement (Antelope Valley Monitoring Team, undated). The agreement includes a variety of recommendations related to stops, seizures, and searches; bias-free policing; community engagement; Section 8 enforcement; data collection; use of force; personnel complaints; and accountability. These recommendations include changes to policy, procedures, and training, as well as ongoing monitoring activities to ensure adequate compliance. Many of the community-facing recommendations focus on ensuring that interactions with the community are professional, respectful, and free of bias and on promoting greater partnership with the community. These reform and monitoring efforts are ongoing, and the progress and lessons learned from the Antelope Valley agreement could serve as useful guidance for future reforms across LASD.

**Office of Inspector General, County of Los Angeles**

The OIG was created in 2014 after the CCJV recommended creating a single oversight body by combining the oversight entities that existed at that time (Special Counsel, OIR, and the Office of the Ombudsman). The OIG has issued 73 reports since its inception pertaining to the policies, procedures, practices, and operations of LASD. This includes reporting on disciplinary actions, investigation quality, body-worn camera policy, use of force, complaints, and overall reform and oversight efforts of the department. The OIG is responsible for reviewing administrative data and case documents, evaluating existing department processes, and directly observing current practices. The OIG has documented compliance with the CCJV’s recommendations over time. In a December 2018 report, the OIG recommended adopting a policy “prohibiting membership in organizations which advocate violation of laws, policy, and civil rights or which conceal their nature and membership” (OIG, 2019, p. 20).

Most recently, the OIG issued a report on the LASD internal criminal investigation into an alleged assault by Banditos members on fellow deputies (OIG, 2020a). The report criticized investigators for not further exploring the importance of clique membership in the assault.
Specifically, the OIG recommended further investigating the suspects’ possible motives and witnesses’ potential bias and following the same investigative practice used in external criminal investigations. The OIG also recommended compelling statements from deputies who do not invoke their Fifth Amendment rights. A statement from Sheriff Villanueva rejected the idea that the investigation was not thorough but did not address the recommendations (LASD, 2020).

**Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy**

In January 2021, the Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy published *Fifty Years of Deputy Gangs in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department: Identifying Root Causes and Effects to Advocate for Meaningful Reforms*, which surveys past investigations on deputy subgroups (Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, 2021). The report distinguishes between deputy subgroups or cliques and deputy gangs based on whether the group has engaged in gang-like behaviors, defined as using tattoos, hand signals, and rituals that are similar to those of a criminal street gang. The report identifies two active and seven inactive “gangs” within LASD, along with four active and five inactive subgroups or cliques. It also noted that stations with known deputy subgroups have had the most shootings committed by deputies during the past five years. Furthermore, it highlights the potential public impact via criminal justice (e.g., “Brady lists,” which are prosecutors’ lists of members of law enforcement who are not strictly credible) and civil justice processes that pertain to deputies’ membership in groups. Lastly, this report identifies community policing, constitutional policing, and procedural justice as important for reforming a culture of aggressive policing associated with subgroups.

**Prior Reports Summary**

Subgroups are not a new problem for LASD and the county. The prior reports on LASD reveal several recurring topics or themes that span policies, procedures, organizational structure, organizational leadership, and culture. Inconsistent or lax discipline and supervision, an opaque and inadequate complaint system, excessive or lethal use of force and insufficient review processes for use-of-force incidents, aggressive behavior, leadership deficits, and an “us versus them” culture that promotes a code of silence and resistance to implementing external recommendations are all recurring and common themes. In most of these reports, analysis and discussion of cliques or subgroups within LASD tend to be secondary to the overall purpose of the report but highlight cultural aspects of LASD that could contribute to subgroup formation or that subgroups exemplify. Many of these efforts have recognized subgroups or cliques as a contributing factor in problematic behavior but did not attempt to collect more-detailed information about the nature or purpose of these groups. Based on their findings, recommendations from these prior reports in Table 2.3 include efforts to prevent, detect, and punish subgroups and subgroup behavior within LASD, as well as some more general recommendations for culture change that were believed to have the potential to limit the formation of cliques and subgroups.

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6 For instance, the Kolts Commission and CCJV reports are largely focused on the use of excessive force and identify cliques as one contributing factor, at least in some instances. The Antelope Valley settlement agreement is focused on discriminatory patrol practices and mentions cliques but draws no further conclusions. The Special Counsel and OIR reports have a few mentions of cliques but did not devote entire reports to them, instead focusing on disciplinary and other departmental processes. The OIG’s recent report on the Banditos criminal investigation (OIG, 2020a) and the Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy report (Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, 2021) are directly focused on cliques.
of subgroups or reduce problematic behavior. Prevention practices include using a rotation policy in the jails and leadership efforts to monitor and discourage participation in subgroups. Recommended detection efforts involve conducting internal affairs investigations and improving those investigations by ensuring that subgroup motives are part of the questioning. Other recommended detection efforts involve having the OIG investigate and using internal and external processes to identify deputies with subgroup tattoos or who belong to subgroups. Punishment-related recommendations included implementing a policy that prohibits membership in subgroups or breaking up problematic groups. Recommendations for culture change include enhanced ethics training, emphasizing community-oriented policing and community engagement, de-escalation and respectful interactions, and not condoning allegiances to subparts of the department.

LASD disagreed with some of the findings and recommendations, typically noting their points of disagreement in response letters. LASD has, however, implemented several of the recommendations from the CCJV (rotations, ethics training, and actions to discourage participation in subgroups). LASD also recently created a policy on subgroups, which we discuss later in the report. Notably, despite these numerous prior recommendations regarding subgroups, revelations of negative behavior have persisted over time. What is unclear is whether the persistence of these issues is due to a lack of implementation (i.e., LASD has ignored or failed to support previously recommended changes), a lack of effectiveness (i.e., such recommendations are unable to effect change on this issue), or both. Moreover, prior reports have provided some recommendations for improving LASD’s relationship with the communities it serves; the most notable of these is the Antelope Valley settlement agreement. To our knowledge, none of the reports has recommended that LASD acknowledge and apologize for the harm caused in the multiple examples discussed above as part of a reconciliation process.
Conclusion

Like the Kolts report, numerous blue-ribbon commissions focused on other agencies have noted how an overemphasis on aggressive crime fighting and recurrent incidents of force or excessive force against residents can deteriorate police-community relations and can contribute to other negative outcomes (e.g., complaints, lawsuits). These reports discuss how elements of the organizational (e.g., Christopher Commission) and occupational culture contribute to this narrow definition of the police role (e.g., Institute for Defense Analyses, 1967; National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968; President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015). Thus, although the attitudes and behaviors of individuals or groups of officers are observable, messages and signals from the broader environment are also worthy of examination. We used the information provided in the various media reports, lawsuits, and prior reports to summarize the publicly available information about subgroups and behaviors believed to be associated with them. This information informed the development of our interview protocol for community members and LASD personnel. These prior reports also informed our search for relevant research literature that we discuss in the next chapter and throughout the rest of the report.
CHAPTER THREE

Relevant Research

The prior reports on subgroups have largely focused on issues related to misconduct and the use of force imposed on the community. They also discuss the potential role of organizational culture and peer selection and influence in the group setting (e.g., “tattoos associated with deputy cliques . . . have also in some instances been used as a reward for aggressive behavior”; CCJV, 2012, p. 115). What has been missing in prior accounts of deputy subgroups is an explanation of why these groups form, including where they fit in the organizational context. In this chapter, we review relevant policing and organizational research to better understand motivations for group formation.

The subject of subgroups and cliques in law enforcement is not often a direct focus of research, although the existing research does mention the development of groups, cultural factors that contribute to a sense of belonging to a group (e.g., loyalty, us versus them), and the importance of peers and potential peer influence on behavior. Moreover, supervisory issues and issues among deputies that have been associated with deputy subgroups in the past suggest potential relevance of the organizational justice literature. Specifically, lawsuits by both subgroup members (e.g., Jaimes v. County of Los Angeles, 2007) and complainants against subgroup members (e.g., Moffett v. County of Los Angeles, 2012) have alleged unfair treatment or an unsatisfactory organizational response. Organizational justice concepts have implications for adherence to policy, treatment of community members, and other outcomes identified in prior reports on subgroups (e.g., dishonesty, excessive force). These concepts are also important for implementing a policy on deputy subgroups and understanding potential undesired effects of such a policy. In this chapter, we provide a brief discussion of a variety of research perspectives that are relevant for understanding why and how subgroups form, including findings from the most notable research literature on culture and the role of peers in law enforcement.

Cultural Norms and Themes

Culture is often conveniently used as a catch-all term for a multitude of values, attitudes, assumptions, and behaviors in various aspects of life. As it relates to law enforcement, police culture is thought to emerge from occupational and organizational features associated with police work. Culture develops as “collective sense-making” (Crank, 2004, p. 15) with ideational, behavioral, social, and emergent elements. The ideational element consists of values, attitudes, and ways of thinking about problems; this incorporates ethical thinking. The behavioral element consists of “accepted practices, rules, and principles of conduct that are situationally applied and generalized rationales and beliefs” (Hunt and Manning, 1991). Culture is also
socially structured, including geographic, organizational, and strategic factors that affect both how the work is done and how culture develops from this structure (Chan, 1996). Finally, culture is emergent—that is, it is part of a creative process that is influenced by social action and group interactions and conflict. This includes the broader social context, and deputies bring their own beliefs, values, and worldviews to the job.

Policing-Specific Cultural Norms and Themes

Considerable research exists on police culture, yet this construct is difficult to define for two reasons. First, police culture is difficult to study because it requires a high degree of access with which many law enforcement agencies and personnel are not comfortable. This difficulty raises questions about whether agencies that are open to cultural research differ from those that are not and calls into question the generalizability of the findings from that research. Second, the extent to which law enforcement officers (LEOs) as a group adhere to the cultural themes identified by researchers is questionable. Prior research exploring the variation in outlooks of LEOs has used typologies (i.e., categories qualitatively identified by the researcher) and statistical approaches (e.g., cluster analysis, latent class analysis) to identify and classify LEOs according to their shared or divergent views. Classic research often discussed and grouped officers into “types” or “styles.” This includes comparing ranks or “street cops” versus “management cops” (Reuss-Ianni, 1983). Characteristic styles of police officers have taken a variety of forms that often relate to degrees of aggressiveness and having a crime fighter orientation, such as the “old-style crime fighter” compared to the “clean-beat crime fighter” or the “service style” versus the “professional style” (Brown, 1988). Other identified styles include traditionalists, law enforcers, lay lows, peacekeepers, old pros, anti-organizational street cops, “Dirty Harry” enforcers, tough cops, avoiders, problem solvers, and professionals (Paoline, 2004; Worden, 1995). More recently, researchers have focused on “guardian” (e.g., “It is important to have non-enforcement contacts with the public”) and “warrior” (e.g., “My primary responsibility as a police officer is to fight crime”) outlooks, showing that many officers embrace elements of both (Morin et al., 2017). It is not clear how these styles might change over time or whether there is conflict across those of different styles, with the exception of street cops versus management cops.

A common framework for studying police culture begins with understanding the occupational environments of LEOs, which can be grouped into internal (organizational) and external (community) environments. Such environments provide opportunities for ambiguity, conflict, and, ultimately, job stress, which must be dealt with or adapted to. Persistent stressful features of these environments could ultimately lead to cultural adaptations that are common across many law enforcement agencies, which reflects an occupational culture within law enforcement. In relation, an organizational perspective posits that unique features within a particular agency lead to unique cultural adaptations that vary across agencies (Paoline and Terrill, 2013).

Many cultural studies identify the components of police culture as themes: shared occupational activities that have behavioral, ideational, and sentimental components that are related to social and organizational structure and the environments in which work occurs (Crank, 2004). Crank, 2004, considers themes to be the “building blocks” of police culture and groups them into four broad categories: street environment, uncertainty, solidarity, and loosely coupling.

Themes organized under the street environment reflect the daily responsibilities and coercive authority of LEOs (e.g., themes related to the use of force, territorial control, mili-
tarism, the centrality of guns). Themes organized under *uncertainty* reflect the unpredictable nature of police work (e.g., suspicion, danger, situational uncertainty, maintaining the edge). Themes organized under *solidarity* reflect the conflicts and challenges to authority that officers receive from other groups while pursuing righteous goals (e.g., morality, common sense, masculinity, solidarity, racism). Finally, *loosely coupling* themes highlight the distance between formal organizational goals and processes (i.e., administrative functions) and the day-to-day activities of lower-ranked actors (e.g., secrecy/invisibility, individualism, deception, deterrence, distrust of bureaucracy). Here, themes of individualism and distrust of bureaucracy are thought to be associated with subgroup formation in order to protect against administrative scrutiny or outside influence.

Other research focuses more directly on how environmental (internal and external) features of police work connect to coping mechanisms and cultural outcomes that develop in response (Paoline and Terrill, 2013). Figure 3.1 summarizes how these concepts are connected. Key features of the organizational environment include unpredictable and punitive supervisor scrutiny and role ambiguity. To cope with supervisor scrutiny, officers might lay low (e.g., avoiding extra effort or focusing on specific offenses, such as felonies). To respond to role ambiguity, officers might adopt or value role orientations that their supervisors most clearly recognize, which tends to lead to a crime-fighting orientation. Loyalty is considered an eventual cultural outcome of the internal environmental features of supervisor scrutiny and role ambiguity and the coping mechanisms of laying low and concentrating on crime-fighting. Loyalty can be manifested in prioritizing the physical protection of other officers, maintaining camaraderie and a bond with other officers, and believing that adherence to the code of silence is important for the mutual trust needed to perform well. In research surveys on this topic, officers tend to overwhelmingly endorse physical protection and emotional protection or the camaraderie/bond features of loyalty, while between 12 and 40 percent endorse the code of silence. Thus, most officers remain loyal as long as it does not require adherence to a code of silence. Other research suggests that the code of silence is somewhat conditional on the seriousness of the behavior and perceptions of fairness of discipline. More-serious misconduct is less likely to be kept secret while overly harsh punishments increase the likelihood of secrecy, and these patterns are similar across supervisors and nonsupervisors (Ivković, Peacock, and Haberfeld, 2016).

**Figure 3.1**
*Cultural Outcomes as They Relate to Environmental Features of Police Work*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of stress</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Coping mechanism</th>
<th>Cultural outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Supervisor scrutiny</td>
<td>Laying low</td>
<td>Loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role ambiguity</td>
<td>Crimefighter role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>Suspicion</td>
<td>Social isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercive authority</td>
<td>Maintain the edge</td>
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</table>

SOURCE: Adapted from Paoline and Terrill, 2013.
To deal with the street environment, officers might be suspicious of most citizens and feel that it is important to “maintain the edge” over citizens in interactions or to establish control at the beginning of encounters. This mindset could contribute to interactions with the community that are antagonistic. These coping mechanisms could be related to the perceived danger of the job and coercive authority (i.e., legal authority to issue commands), respectively, as features of the external environment. Social isolation is considered an eventual cultural outcome of the external environmental features of danger and coercive authority of police work combined with the coping mechanisms of suspiciousness and maintaining the edge. Social isolation contributes to a sense that people outside of law enforcement do not understand the difficulty or danger involved in doing the job. It also contributes to a tendency to associate with other law enforcement officers outside of work. This can contribute to “us versus them” outlooks because of a preference for other officers and a tendency to feel misunderstood by the community (Marier and Moule, 2019). Survey research indicates that officers overwhelmingly agree that most people do not understand how difficult their job is, while slightly less than half of officers would prefer to hang out with officers over nonofficers while off duty (Paoline and Terrill, 2013).

Subcultures
Given differentiation and fragmentation within law enforcement organizations (Herbert, 1998), subcultures could develop when “a subset of an organizations’ members who interact regularly with one another, identify themselves as a distinct group within the organization . . . and routinely take action on the basis of collective understandings unique to the group” (Van Maanen and Barley, 1984, p. 38). The extent to which subcultures reflect other subcultures or the culture of the organization overall likely depends on a variety of organizational and environmental features to which the subcultural group is exposed. The attitudes, values, and behaviors of subcultural members might be taken for granted or could remain hidden or not well understood. As a defining feature of police culture, secrecy works both internally and externally (Manning, 1974). It could also function to fracture individuals and groups into those with “secret knowledge” and those without, which can serve as a rewarding feature of joining such groups (Parker, 2016). Depending on the extent of secrecy within an organization, the amount of shared secret knowledge (and, therefore, the number of those with similar understandings of work) might be low. Part of this secrecy involves understanding that revealing more than you need to could be used against you. Bittner observed that “the overriding rule within departments is no one ever tells anybody else more than he absolutely has to” (Bittner, 1970, p. 64), which is echoed in subsequent research (Chevigny, 1995). More generally, research indicates that secrecy is a feature of many organizations and groups within organizations and could be a core feature of group identity (Behr, 2006) or an individual’s identity as a trusted group member (Costas and Grey, 2014). The act of maintaining secrecy can also enhance social cohesion and social bonding within groups and further solidify ingroup members from outsiders. Organizationally, both public transparency and internal knowledge-sharing (e.g., silos) face obstacles due to both formal and informal control of secret information (Arellano-Gault and Lepore, 2011; Roberts, 2004).

Other observation-based research stresses how subculture varies as a function of local conditions and preferences and therefore can change over time. Herbert, 1998, focused on how police officers might weigh six “normative orders” in their work to define situations and their reactions: the law, bureaucratic control, adventure/machismo, safety, competence, and moral-
Relevant Research 27

ity. These normative orders might be internally inconsistent from situation to situation (e.g., being concerned with safety threats in the form of physical assault compared with not wearing a seat belt). Hassell, 2007, following the work of Klinger, 1997, took more of an organizational approach, noting that subunits within an organization have different cultures and expectations for behavior based on five key factors: (1) the individuals drawn to certain subunits, (2) the population being served, (3) situational features of the work to be done (e.g., the level of danger), (4) preferences and ideologies of command structures, and (5) types of crimes and legal authority commonly used (e.g., stops and searches for weapons). Both formal and informal processes shape subunit culture and officer behavior.

Thus, it is a challenge for common understandings to be shared across law enforcement organizations. Organizational and social divisions inherently keep much of the work, and, therefore, shared knowledge, fragmented. Research on police culture broadly suggests that police culture is not monolithic but is influenced by the internal and external environment. Cultural outcomes such as loyalty and social isolation speak to potential sources of subgroup formation, while the identified coping mechanisms could explain some subgroup behavior. Subculture research in policing provides potential explanations for variation in outlooks within the same organization and how this might contribute to subgroup formation. It also highlights the role of secrecy as a reward and source of control in groups. Although some studies on police culture describe the potential conflict that exists across ranks, much of the research on police culture focuses on describing similarities shared by different types of officers or within particular types of outlooks, but it does not typically discuss conflict across groups.

Social Identity, Social Selection, and Peers in Policing

Although not singly identified as a key element of police culture, the role of peers and peer groups in policing can be identified through such group concepts as loyalty, solidarity, and the code of silence or through group processes such as socialization or camaraderie (i.e., bonding). What has been described as the “many tribes of police” might simply be ingroup identification and distinction that is ubiquitous in all human settings (King, 2018). Moreover, law enforcement might be a profession where groups are particularly likely to form because officers are reliant on one another for safety. With groups come values, norms, and expectations for behavior, and groups can be critical for understanding or driving cultural change. When people decide who is “ingroup” and “outgroup,” they base it on whether people are similar or dissimilar to themselves. The theories that explain common features of social behavior in organizations are social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Hogg and Terry, 2000).

According to self-categorization theory, perceived similarities are based on an ingroup prototype, and individual behavior is either in or out of alignment with the prototype. This contributes to such group phenomena as norms, stereotypes, ingroup cohesion, cooperation, emotional contagion, and mutual influence. Prototypes reflect attributes of group members that distinguish them from other groups, which reduces uncertainty. Two common forms of nonprototypical members are negative outliers (or “free riders”) and “high-flyers.” Rejecting the free riders is important for solidifying the ingroup prototype, while high-flyers can be tolerated as long as the group can take some ownership of their behavior and the high-flyers are not overly arrogant about their performance (Hogg and Terry, 2000). Self-categorization theory also contends that group leaders will be highly prototypical, so they will have higher
prestige and status. Risks of highly cohesive groups include groupthink, exclusion of minority attributes from leadership positions, and an environment conducive to leaders exercising and abusing power.

In large organizations, people can be motivated to strive for distinctiveness through subgroup identification. In organizations with highly cohesive or multiple subgroups, “it may be best to balance loyalty to and identification with the subunit with loyalty to and identification with the superordinate organization, and not emphasize either one to the detriment of the other” (Hogg and Terry, 2000, p. 131). Activities that strengthen only friendships are more likely to fragment the organization and disrupt norm adherence, potentially leading to subgroups that dislike each other. Contextual factors such as uncertainty and conflict also contribute to group dynamics.

It is not clear how well this theoretical framework applies to hierarchical organizations, such as law enforcement, but, although subgroups and cliques are underresearched, they are not uncommon in law enforcement, as evidenced by the sources discussed in Chapter Two. Research on informal hierarchies within organizations suggests that bureaucratic top-down organizations tend to create informal hierarchies within levels of the organization (i.e., among equals) as an extension of the formal hierarchy (Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011). Professional organizations that value autonomy and seniority could lead to the creation of informal hierarchies that cross levels of the organization and exist alongside the formal hierarchy. This theory suggests that formal and informal hierarchies are intrinsically linked (i.e., as one increases, the other decreases; Diefenbach and Sillince, 2011).

In addition to potential organizational factors that contribute to group formation and group behavior, other research has identified various themes related to the importance of peers in policing, although the direct contribution of peers and peer groups to decisionmaking has been overlooked and is less understood (McCluskey, Terrill, and Paoline, 2005). The difficulty in studying this aspect of police decisionmaking and culture might be due in part to other cultural themes that prevent observation (i.e., the sensitive nature of these questions and the tendency for police to avoid external scrutiny). In addition to the impact of peer groups, a key consideration for research in this area involves group processes. The idea of emergence—how elemental content (e.g., individual orientations to aspects of police culture) and interactive processes lead to shared perceptions or attitudes among group members—might help explain variation across groups or group features (Crank, 2004). That workgroups might share their own cultural features that are related but distinguished from the department around them is a more recent issue in police cultural research (Ingram, Paoline, and Terrill, 2013). Recognizing that behaviors and attitudes diffuse through peer networks is an emerging area in policing research and is an important element in understanding police behavior more broadly.

Peer learning is well-recognized as a feature of law enforcement organizations. For instance, an individual’s professional entry into law enforcement requires a significant amount of learning and attention to detail under stressful conditions. Although the primary goal of police training is to prepare recruits for the challenges they will face on the street, training also teaches them about hierarchy, danger, suspicion, bonding, and a reliance on other officers for safety, and it could reinforce “us versus them” attitudes (Blumberg, Papazoglou, and Creighton, 2018). Because academy training only goes so far, field training is considered a critical component of teaching the craft of policing, which involves high levels of discretion and few situations that can be handled “by the book.” The common phrase “forget what you learned in the academy” is partially a byproduct of the uncertain working environment. Field
training continues the process of learning from peers and experienced officers about how to do the job. A mixture of formal influences (e.g., supervision) and informal influences (e.g., peers) affects the entrant's socialization into the organization. These early phases of the job reflect critical stages for the development of attitudes and orientations (e.g., about use of force), although officers' incoming attitudes are also important, and socialization is an ongoing process (Oberfield, 2012).

Social learning theory posits that attitudes and behaviors are shaped by peer associations, definitions provided by peers, reinforcement, and modeling (Akers, 1998). Through interactions and observing others, people learn about attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors that their peers deem to be important. This could include attitudes and beliefs that support both deviant and normative behaviors. Finally, peers might reinforce the attitudes or behaviors that are deemed important through various social or tangible rewards. In policing, peer and peer group effects have been identified for use of force (McCluskey, Terrill, and Paoline, 2005), views about use of force (Oberfield, 2012; Roithmayr, 2016), misconduct (Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Ouellet et al., 2019; Quispe-Torreblanca and Stewart, 2019; Wood, Roithmayr, and Papachristos, 2019), ethical decisionmaking (Blumberg, Papazoglou, and Creighton, 2018), shootings committed by officers (Zhao and Papachristos, 2020), and cultural attitudes (Ingram, Paoline, and Terrill, 2013). Research on the topic measures “peers” both according to an individual’s perceptions of peer attitudes and behaviors (what someone thinks their peers believe) and according to direct measures of peer attitudes and behaviors (what their peers actually believe). Perceptual measures and direct measures of peers might not match, but both are important, nonetheless.

Recent studies have used direct measures of peer effects in policing, focusing on the impacts of peer group attitudes and peer group behavior. This research has used either regression or network analyses to identify the peer effect. In an analysis of 30,000 officers and staff from London's Metropolitan Police Service, Quispe-Torreblanca and Stewart, 2019, found that for a 10-percent increase in prior peer group misconduct (based on citizen and internal complaints), an individual officer's risk of misconduct increases by 8 percent, controlling for individual and organizational features. Other studies using network analysis identify peer effects by examining networks of individuals named in complaints together. This research suggests that officers are frequently named together in civilian and departmental complaints, and a small number of officers have a large number of complaints and con-complainants (Wood, Roithmayr, and Papachristos, 2019). These connections have been shown to increase the risk of complaints of excessive force (by 26 percent; Ouellet et al., 2019) and shootings committed by officers (Zhao and Papachristos, 2020).

In addition to peer group behavior, peer group attitudes can also affect an individual’s behavior. For officers embedded in “high aggression” peer groups (attitudes about aggressive patrol aggregated within shift and assignment), aggressive attitudes were positively related to their use-of-force levels, although less-experienced officers in these groups were at higher risk (McCluskey, Terrill, and Paoline, 2005). Similarly, Ingram, Paoline, and Terrill, 2013, explored the extent to which common cultural attitudes are shared across workgroups (defined as sharing a shift and beat). Workgroups showed significant between-group variation for attitudes about top management, direct supervisors, job satisfaction, order maintenance, and aggressive patrol, which suggests that large differences in cultural orientations can exist across workgroups within the same organization and unit of assignment. What is unclear from these various studies on peer effects is what proportion of these effects occur because of selection (i.e., “birds of a
feather flock together” or influence. Thus, research on social identity, self-categorization, and social learning or peer influence all have implications for group formation, group attitudes, and group behavior. The self-categorization process explains how group identities can develop in organizations, providing potential explanations for why deputy subgroups form and their behavior toward outgroup members. Research on social learning and peer influence shows how peers can affect attitudes and behaviors and has important implications for outcomes in policing and those that are potentially linked to subgroups (e.g., use of force or excessive force).

Organizational Justice

In addition to being the frontline of the criminal justice system, law enforcement agencies have their own internal systems of justice or fairness, structured around policies and procedures related to internal processes such as discipline, promotions, and performance evaluations. This system and perceptions of this system fit the concept of “organizational justice”—or whether employees believe that they are treated fairly. It has been said that “there is no justice in a police department” (Reynolds and Hicks, 2015). That is, many officers find some aspect of the organization to be unfair, or they find that the organization tries to be fair but is unsuccessful. Many perceptions of unfairness are related to preferential treatment of some members of the organization. Experiences and perceptions of fairness have been associated with officer job satisfaction, job commitment, and relationships with other employees, but they have also been linked to how officers perceive and treat community members. Organizational justice also enhances compliance with existing policies (Bradford et al., 2014; Haas et al., 2015; Tyler, Callahan, and Frost, 2007).

Perceptions of injustice are associated with important outcomes, such as types of police misconduct (Eitle, D’Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2014; Kääriäinen et al., 2008; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011; Reynolds, Fitzgerald, and Hicks, 2018). For instance, Kääriäinen et al., 2008, found that people who perceived administrative unfairness were more likely to report themselves or their peers behaving badly (e.g., disrespecting citizens, corruption, dishonesty with supervisors, drug or alcohol use, excessive force, theft). Wolfe and Piquero, 2011, found that citizens’ formal complaints, internal affairs investigations, and charges for violating departmental policies were all associated with levels of perceived organizational justice.

To our knowledge, research has not examined whether the cultural orientations or outlooks of police affect perceptions of fairness in law enforcement agencies or the extent to which workgroups share similar outlooks. However, other research has shown that fairness perceptions are associated with observed treatment of peers, and particularly more similar peers (Huang, Ryan, and Mujtaba, 2015). As mentioned earlier, the existing cultural research on cliques in law enforcement suggests that they function to protect against administrative scrutiny or outside influence. Therefore, fairness perceptions might be particularly important to consider for any efforts to manage groups directly, because perceptions of unfairness could backfire by making groups more difficult to supervise if group members take extra precautions by “laying low.” Conversely, organizational fairness perceptions will also be affected if the organization allows subgroups or cliques to engage in behaviors that affect unit operations (e.g., trying to control schedules) or involve mistreating other deputies.
Conclusion

Research on culture, groups, peers, and fairness has important implications for our findings and our understanding of subgroups within LASD. The police culture literature suggests that the majority of officers do not strongly endorse the orientations of the traditional police culture (Paoline, 2004; Paoline and Terrill, 2013). Thus, the desire to join a subgroup that might foster an overaggressive crime fighting approach and emphasize the use of force might not be an orientation that is supported by a majority of deputies, which could provide an explanation for why some deputies join while others might not. This theory also contributes a partial explanation for the existence of problematic subgroups because deputies with similar attitudes might be likely to become connected.

The research also tells us that features of police work and the policing environment contribute to cultural adaptations or collective sensemaking that often occurs in groups or emphasizes the value of tight-knit groups. Some research in this area emphasizes the importance of understanding local norms, or how culture varies within law enforcement organizations, and the reasons why this may be. This variation might contribute to subcultures across the organization. For instance, areas perceived to be more dangerous might adopt different norms around safety and competence compared with less dangerous areas (Herbert, 1998). These bonds and connections also contribute to modeling and social learning that can influence a variety of attitudes and behaviors. Lastly, local norms and peer connections might also affect people’s perceptions of fair treatment from the organization. These perceptions have also been connected to important behaviors, such as misconduct and treatment of community members.

In short, this research provides explanations for why subgroups form and how they could affect attitudes and behavior. The organizational justice literature recognizes that the way an organization treats employees also can affect attitudes and behaviors and has implications for reforming LASD and implementing new policies. These concepts also have relevance for understanding orientations toward and interactions with the community.
CHAPTER FOUR

Methods

This chapter provides an overview of the methods used in conducting this research study. We used interviews with community leaders, focus groups with community members, and interviews and surveys with LASD personnel. To develop our various data collection instruments, we considered information from media coverage, litigation, and prior reports and insights from relevant stakeholders, as well as the key goals of the project. We outline the general approach and key elements of our data collection methods here, and we provide a detailed discussion of each in Appendix A (available online at www.rand.org/t/RRA616-1).

Two critical elements of conducting this study were stakeholder engagement and confidentiality protections for research participants. Given the sensitive nature of this topic and the overlapping systems of county governance, stakeholder engagement and cooperation were critical to the success of this research project. A multitude of county stakeholders have roles, responsibilities, experience, and perspectives that can provide valuable insight into this topic. Our methods helped secure the input of these critical participants.

At the beginning of the project, RAND researchers met with various stakeholders to explain the goals of the study, our research approach, and relevant components of this approach (e.g., confidentiality for research participants, the fact that this research is not part of any investigation) and to answer questions and listen to concerns. We gave presentations to both the Board of Supervisors at a public meeting and the COC, along with a public presentation at the COC’s September 2019 meeting. Early project meetings with LASD included Sheriff Villanueva and Undersheriff Tim Murakami, along with the Sheriff’s chief of staff, a presentation at the department’s Executive Planning Council, and combined and individual meetings with deputy unions: the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS), the Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association, and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Professional Association. We also presented at an ALADS board meeting and the ALADS unit representative annual training, which allowed us to describe the project and answer questions directly from sworn personnel below the rank of sergeant.

Throughout the project, we engaged various stakeholders to apprise them of our ongoing progress and solicit their assistance, as needed. As the project began, LASD and ALADS issued separate announcements informing LASD personnel of the project. To begin our interview process, LASD provided contact information for command staff in the custody 1 and patrol divisions. We developed our survey approach through feedback from LASD stakeholders, which informed our decision to conduct a paper survey. LASD and ALADS also assisted with survey announcements and reminders. The COC, Board of Supervisors staff, and LASD

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1 The custody division is responsible for the operations of all jail facilities in Los Angeles County.
provided us with community stakeholder contact information. More details about stakeholders’ assistance are provided in Appendix A.

First, we briefly discuss our approach to protecting the confidentiality of our research participants. Then, we discuss our community data collection approach, which incorporated both interviews and focus groups. Next, we discuss our approach to interviewing members of LASD and our analytic approach to those interviews. We also discuss our survey development approach and the fielding of our survey. Finally, we provide a brief discussion of our approach to analyzing the various Los Angeles Times articles on deputy subgroups.

Confidentiality Protections

Open and honest responses from study participants were essential to our research. The team therefore implemented a strict approach to confidentiality intended both to enable participants to communicate their knowledge and experiences freely and without fear of repercussions and to satisfy RAND’s commitment and legal obligation to protect research subjects. The study utilized a variety of methods to protect the research subjects and their identities. For all interviews, once interviews were confirmed and conducted, no names were retained in or associated with notes (i.e., we did not write down any names); emails and other correspondence with participants were permanently deleted. Notes and contact information were never stored in the same location. Interview notes were reviewed for identifiable information within 24 hours, and any direct identifiers were removed. Interviews were categorized by broad position categories only (e.g., command, middle management, line staff). After the completion of the report, any crosswalks linking participants to notes, as well as typewritten interview or focus group notes, were destroyed using permanent file disposal software. Crosswalks did not contain direct identifiers.

Community Stakeholder Interviews and Focus Groups

Community interviews and focus groups were used to better understand the perspectives and experiences of community leaders and community members regarding their overall relationship with LASD, interactions between the community and deputies, and perceptions of and experiences with deputy subgroups. For community interviews, we sampled 103 community stakeholders across all LASD station areas using referrals and independent searches to ensure that a variety of perspectives were represented. Ultimately, 46 community stakeholders agreed to participate, yielding a 45-percent response rate. For the focus groups, we recruited 95 English- or Spanish-speaking community members from nine target communities, which included those with the most calls for service in each of the four patrol divisions. The communities are the following:

• North stations: Lancaster and Palmdale
• Central stations: Century, East Los Angeles, and Compton
• South stations: Lakewood and Norwalk
• East stations: Industry and Temple.
Community Leaders
In November 2019, the RAND team emailed captains of all stations across the four patrol divisions to request referrals for key community leaders who are actively engaged and appear to be knowledgeable about community views and experiences with LASD. At the same time, we solicited recommendations from community groups (e.g., the COC, Board of Supervisors staff). We also supplemented the list by conducting web searches to identify critical community stakeholders from a wide range of stakeholder groups (e.g., faith-based organizations, community-based organizations, grassroots organizations, civic leaders).

Community Members
In February 2020, RAND researchers began recruiting participants from the nine target communities. The recruitment approach for focus groups leveraged existing contacts while also broadening the pool of potential participants. First, the RAND team provided invitation flyers to identified community stakeholder groups in the target communities and asked them to distribute and post the flyers. In addition, pastors/clergy, neighborhood groups, and organizations like the COC were asked to announce the focus groups on their bulletin boards, social media, or other platforms. We also used Facebook pages, Facebook ads, and Eventbrite posts to get community members’ attention and invite them to participate in the focus groups. We engaged in street canvassing and posted flyers as well. Finally, we contacted local print and broadcast media to invite community members to participate in the groups. Interested community members were invited to call the RAND-hosted toll-free phone number listed on the flyer, post, or advertisement to determine their eligibility and register for the focus group. To be eligible, people needed to be at least 18 years old and live or work in the target communities.

More-detailed descriptions of our recruitment efforts, focus group methods, and data analysis approach are discussed in Appendix A.

LASD Interviews
LASD interviews were used to better understand the perspectives and experiences of command-level, midlevel, and line-level sworn personnel within LASD regarding organizational context, motivations to build a career in LASD, challenges facing LASD and the communities in which it operates, awareness of deputy subgroups, impacts of deputy subgroups, and perspectives on how to address deputy subgroups.

Recruitment
In October 2019, LASD sent out an email announcement giving personnel an overview of the various components of the project. LASD initially invited and scheduled interviews for LASD leadership, including assistant sheriffs, chiefs, and commanders, to participate in a one-time, hourlong, in-person interview with two members of the RAND team with an expertise in qualitative interviewing. Our goal was to recruit LASD leadership responsible for Patrol and Custody to participate in an interview. Subsequently, announcements by ALADS provided a description of the project and asked for interested individuals to contact RAND to schedule an interview. We also began scheduling interviews with patrol station captains and attending briefings to describe the project and to encourage interested individuals to contact us for an interview in person or over the phone.
From November 2019 to February 2020, we visited LASD patrol stations during regularly scheduled station briefings to introduce the study and invite staff (e.g., deputies, lieutenants, sergeants, detectives, field training officers) to participate in an interview. Line-level staff were given the option to meet at a location of their choice (e.g., RAND headquarters, local restaurants) or to conduct the interview by phone. During these brief presentations, we described the survey and responded to any questions about the purpose and overall procedures of the study. Because of the sensitive topic, we employed a convenience and referral (or “snowball”) sampling approach to recruit line-level staff. We completed 57 total interviews using these LASD interview protocols, which includes a small subset (less than ten) of interviews with retired members of LASD and other county stakeholders who have direct knowledge of LASD. Ten of these interviews were completed over the phone.

See Appendix A for more details on recruitment and data analysis.

**LASD Survey**

The anonymous survey was designed to gather information from all sworn deputies currently employed by LASD on their perceptions and experiences regarding their workplace atmosphere and the existence of deputy subgroups in the department. The survey was intended to be a census of the estimated 10,000 sworn personnel across all LASD divisions, stations, and units. The survey gathered information on the following topics:

- workplace atmosphere, including feedback on departmental leadership, training, discipline, handling of complaints, and promotion practices
- deputy subgroups in the work environment, including
  - whether a respondent had been invited to join a subgroup
  - criteria and requirements for being invited to join a subgroup
  - where subgroups are typically found within LASD
  - advantages of belonging to a subgroup
  - conduct, attitudes, and behavior of deputies who belong to a deputy subgroup
  - impact of subgroups on the workplace
  - supervisors’ approach to subgroups
  - views regarding what LASD should do, if anything, about subgroups
- demographic background information
- an open-ended question asking the respondent for any comments or feedback they might have about the survey.

To develop the questionnaire, we began with the core set of research questions regarding the LASD workplace atmosphere overall and the role of deputy subgroups in the work environment, organized around several themes. Themes such as subgroup formation, purpose, and

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2 We chose not to ask directly whether a survey respondent had ever belonged to a subgroup because of the sensitive nature of this question and concerns that many individuals would be reluctant to provide such information, which could potentially lead them to stop filling out the survey. Therefore, we instead used instead as a proxy indicator their responses to the questions of whether they had ever been invited to join a subgroup or had been asked within the past five years to join a subgroup. The analyses that compare those who had ever been invited to join a subgroup with those who had never been invited are informative as to these respondents’ knowledge of and assessments of subgroups’ characteristics and conduct.
prevalence were of particular interest, along with more general topics, such as job satisfaction, perceptions of fairness around discipline and promotions, work-life balance, and training. The scope of work for this project also provided the following specific questions of interest regarding subgroups that were used to guide development of the questionnaire:

- Why do they exist, and what is their purpose?
- What is the process for joining, including initiation activities?
- How are they viewed inside the department?
- How, if at all, should they be managed?
- What policies or practices currently exist in the department, and what others might be relevant?
- What types of conduct toward other LASD employees do their members engage in?
- How are they viewed outside the department?
- What types of conduct toward members of the community do their members engage in?

We also used common themes or questions from our interview findings to develop questions specifically related to subgroups or cliques and their activities. This helped the project team identify topics and compare the perspectives of interviewees with those of others in the department. This also helped with refining the survey. The final questionnaire focused primarily on questions pertaining to deputy subgroups, with approximately 90 percent of the questions designed to elicit information regarding their activities, prevalence, and impact at the station, department, and community levels.

To pretest the survey, we recruited 12 LASD personnel of varying ranks to participate in cognitive interviews. Cognitive interviewing, which involves administering a survey while asking a respondent to elaborate on the clarity and appropriateness of the questions and response options, is a method for empirically studying the ways in which individuals mentally process and respond to survey questionnaires. The goal of the cognitive interviews was to pretest the survey questions to determine how well they were understood, reveal any ambiguity in interpretation of the questions or response options, and assess how they should be modified before the survey was fielded to make them more understandable or easier to answer.

We also received feedback and comments on the draft survey from LASD’s Audit and Accountability Bureau and County Counsel. For these stakeholders, we solicited feedback on the survey and conducted follow-up meetings to discuss the survey in detail and respond to their comments. The final survey is included in Appendix B.

**Fielding the LASD Survey**

Initially, we considered fielding a web survey with a paper survey option. However, feedback from LASD, County Counsel, and others indicated that sworn personnel might be concerned about the confidentiality of a web survey and the ability to track their responses. As a result, we decided to field a paper survey only. Because we did not have access to the individual email addresses of LASD’s nearly 10,000 sworn personnel, we used the following approach to field the survey.

To field the survey, the RAND project team reached out to the station captains and arranged a time for the project team and the RAND Survey Research Group to deliver the packets of surveys to each location. As a reminder about the project and LASD’s commitment, the Undersheriff sent an email to captains notifying them that RAND personnel would
be contacting them to plan and schedule for survey distribution at their unit. The survey packets included a cover letter explaining the purpose of the survey; the questionnaire itself; a document that provided responses to frequently asked questions (FAQs); and a stamped, self-addressed, business reply envelope that they could use to send the survey directly back to RAND. An 800 number also was provided in case they had questions and to give them the option of completing the survey by telephone. We estimated that completing the survey would take approximately 20 minutes. The FAQs explained that the survey was anonymous and that participation in the survey was completely voluntary, so deputies could choose not to participate or decline to answer any questions. The consent statement also stated that RAND was not conducting an investigation, was not working with any entities investigating LASD, and would not provide confidential information to any outside entity, including the county. Information gathered as part of the survey would only be used for research purposes and would not be shared with anyone outside of the RAND research team, including LASD, County Counsel, labor unions, etc. The surveys would not be linked to individuals.

Prior to fielding the survey, Sheriff Villanueva sent an initial email on August 31, 2020, to the entire department explaining the purpose of the survey and encouraging sworn personnel to participate. ALADS also sent an initial email encouraging the union’s members to take part in the survey. Several reminders were sent by both LASD and ALADS. The survey fielding period began August 31, 2020, and continued through October 23, 2020.

Survey Response Rates and Limitations
Table 4.1 summarizes the response rates by the major LASD units. Although the overall response rate for the survey was 16.8 percent,\(^3\) it varied by type of unit, with higher response rates (29 and 38 percent, respectively) from investigative and administrative units and a 16.5-percent response rate from patrol station units. In spite of the relatively low overall response rate, we felt that the survey results were still informative as to the views of sworn personnel on the issue of subgroups within LASD. We assessed whether there were systematic differences at the unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Unit Type</th>
<th>Total Number of Survey Packets Delivered</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>3,202</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custody</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other county (courts, Special Enforcement Bureau)</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigative</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>9,596</td>
<td>1,614(^a)</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Six surveys were returned with completely blank or only “don’t know” responses. The usable total is 1,608.

\(^3\) Similar large sample surveys of law enforcement that used mass distribution returned similar response rates (Morin et al., 2017). In spite of the events that occurred during the fielding of the survey (e.g., COVID-19, civil unrest, wildfires), we felt that the response rate was higher than one might expect given these challenges.
level and for survey respondents overall. Our benchmarking analysis indicated that units as a whole responded within reasonable expectations of what we projected. We also found no evidence of coordinated survey responses within units (see Appendix A, available online at www.rand.org/t/RRA616-1).

We chose not to ask directly whether a survey respondent had ever belonged to a subgroup because of the sensitive nature of this question and our concern that many individuals would be reluctant to provide such information. Therefore, we instead used as a proxy indicator their responses to the questions of whether they had ever been invited to join a subgroup or had been asked within the past five years to join a subgroup. We felt that the analyses that compared subgroup invitees with those had never been invited to join a subgroup were informative as to these respondents' knowledge of and assessments of subgroups' characteristics and conduct.

**Survey Challenges**

LASD was unable to provide us with contact information for the sworn deputies and command staff to be surveyed, but the department agreed to send out email notifications and reminders, using text that we provided, to request that sworn personnel complete the survey. LASD encouraged us to deliver the survey packets to each station or unit captain and instructed the selected captains to ensure the timely distribution of the survey packets to all sworn personnel at their station, unit, or department. Because the survey was completely anonymous, this meant that RAND's Survey Research Group was unable to follow up directly with nonrespondents to encourage their participation. Therefore, we were limited only to making multiple distributions of the survey packets to stations and units.

During this fielding period, a number of unforeseen events occurred that potentially impacted the response rate. The novel coronavirus pandemic occurred during this period, which meant that some deputies were out sick and required adjustments to our survey fielding approach. In addition to COVID-19, the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, and the subsequent unrest in various parts of Los Angeles County meant that LASD was focused on responding to and providing security for a series of protests and related unrest throughout the summer and into the fall. Southern California also experienced large wildfires lasting several months that taxed LASD personnel and resources. We decided to delay fielding the survey until August because we felt that the department would be consumed by these events. We also wanted to let some time pass from the period of peak civil unrest so that the protests did not unduly influence responses regarding the workplace atmosphere; that said, there is no way to tell whether we would have gotten different responses if the survey had been fielded prior to any these events. These challenges, the mode of administration, the large sample size, and the sensitive subject of the survey all might have impacted response rates (Nix et al., 2019) and are comparable to those found in other large law enforcement surveys conducted similarly (Morin et al., 2017). More details on survey development, cognitive interviews, survey methodology, and survey analysis are available in Appendix A.

**Benchmarking, Internal Consistency, and Survey Response Bias Checks**

To better understand the quality of our survey responses, we used three separate analyses to examine potential indicators of systematic survey response bias at the unit level and for survey respondents overall. First, we used benchmarking to identify units that had significantly lower or higher levels of reported subgroup activity than we would expect, given the demographics of the individuals who responded. We compared these results with external
estimates of where subgroup activity does or does not exist. These results suggest that units, on the whole, responded within reasonable expectation. See Appendix A for more information on the benchmarking.

We also examined intraclass correlation metrics to determine how much individual respondents agreed or disagreed with each other on their views of subgroups. Overall, we found that the majority of units agreed with each other at fairly high levels. For questions on the impact of subgroups, we found that units with more reported subgroup activity showed somewhat higher levels of agreement. For questions on what should be done about subgroups, we found that units with more reported subgroup activity showed somewhat lower levels of agreement. There were no units where everyone responded with the same responses. Thus, there did not appear to be any evidence of coordinated responding within certain units. See Appendix A for more information on the intraclass correlation estimation.

Finally, we looked at response rates by demographics based on the reported number of LASD sworn status individuals by gender, race/ethnicity, and rank. Although we found some demographics with much higher rates of response, overall, we did not estimate the differences in response rate to have significantly affected the proportion of reported subgroup activity. See Appendix B for more information on the demographic response rates.

**Lexical Analysis of Los Angeles Times Articles**

To understand the *Los Angeles Times* articles on this subject over time, we conducted a Pro-Quest database search and performed descriptive text analytics to identify common phrases from these articles. The compiled articles were identified from and published between 1986 and May 2020. Included articles were found through a database search using the terms “sheriff” or “deputy” and “clique,” “subgroup,” or “society.” The database search identified 138 articles, which were compiled and prepared for processing. Twenty-six duplicate articles were removed, and special characters were removed from the text files. The resulting article set included a total of 112 articles for analysis. Please see Appendix A for more details.
The various public reports, media coverage, and lawsuits regarding exclusive deputy subgroups within LASD paint a grim picture of these groups and convey an antagonistic relationship with the community. The media coverage on this subject appears very similar over time, indicating a potential lack of willingness or ability for the department to change in response to public outrage or pressure from other county stakeholders. Therefore, we sought to understand community perceptions on this issue, as well as how those perceptions are related to views of LASD overall.

The communities served by LASD are varied, with different sociodemographic and geographic characteristics, as well as different types of services provided. Variation in these characteristics is likely connected to perceptions of and experiences with LASD, making it difficult to generalize to the entire community served by LASD. LASD serves 42 contract cities; 141 unincorporated areas; various hospitals, clinics, and other facilities; the Metropolitan Transit Authority; 37 Superior Court locations; and inmates in seven custody facilities. It also provides academy training for smaller law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County. Thus, LASD’s community reach extends across the county. Contract cities and unincorporated areas receive patrol services from LASD, with some stations serving multiple contract cities and unincorporated areas, while others serve only one. For instance, the West Hollywood station serves only West Hollywood as a contract city and three other county areas, one of which is Universal Studios. In contrast, the East Los Angeles station serves Cudahy, Commerce, and Maywood as contract cities and an unincorporated area to the north. Lakewood and Temple each serve five contract cities along with unincorporated areas. Local governance for contract cities is an important relationship to manage for LASD patrol station leadership, while unincorporated areas are represented by their county supervisor.

This chapter presents the results of our interviews with community leaders and focus groups with residents in areas across all four LASD patrol divisions. As we discussed in Chapter Two, the historical nature of this issue and the severity of public allegations related to subgroups are of significant importance to the community. Analyzing community perspectives about subgroups is critical for understanding the impact this issue has on community trust and for understanding community expectations for the department to repair any harms. Although we asked community leaders and residents (whom we call community stakeholders when combining their perspectives) for their views on deputy subgroups, it can be difficult for a civilian to differentiate between a deputy involved in a subgroup and one who is not, so we also asked broader questions about the community’s interactions with LASD.

A community’s leaders and its residents often had different points of view on LASD, with leaders providing a more favorable assessment of LASD personnel. We suspect that this
is because leaders interact more regularly with deputies, station personnel, and leadership through their involvement in citizens groups and advisory panels. In addition, stakeholders in the North and Central divisions more frequently offered negative perceptions of LASD than community representatives in the other divisions did. These disparities could be due to historic discord between these communities and law enforcement and due to the high crime rate, which could increase the potential for contentious encounters in these areas.

Because the methods used were interviews and focus groups, our findings are presented in a way that does not include the quantity or proportion of community members who held a particular perspective, as we do for the LASD survey findings. Nevertheless, the perspectives discussed below provide valuable insight into how community members view LASD as an organization, their experiences with LASD, and their views about subgroups. This includes ideas about what a desirable relationship between the community and LASD might look like and what community members want LASD to do about subgroups.

Here is a preview of the key findings from community stakeholder interviews and focus groups:

- **How does the community overall perceive LASD?** Community leaders and members were mostly critical of current department leadership, expressing concerns about lack of transparency and trust and about a culture of aggressive policing. Community stakeholders thought that additional funding might be needed to improve services, and some stakeholders stated that LASD could learn from other law enforcement agencies how to better engage the community. In addition, participants noted that their assessment of the department is framed by a legacy of strained relations between the community and specific LASD stations.

- **What is the community’s view of LASD policing?** Community stakeholders said that they engage with LASD in a variety of activities directly or indirectly related to law enforcement (e.g., calls for service, coffee with a cop, toy giveaways). Based on these interactions, stakeholders said that some station personnel were accessible, approachable, and motivated to meet the needs of the community. However, some community residents stated that they were fearful and distrusting of LASD personnel and viewed them as antagonistic and lacking the skills necessary to engage the community. Stakeholders also perceived some LASD personnel as being vested in the community, while others did not seem to care about community well-being or engagement. Participants also expressed varying levels of satisfaction with (1) services provided, which vary from prompt, supportive response to failure to provide necessary services; (2) the level of station personnel interactions with the community, including hosting formal and informal events and being congenial, as opposed to attending events but not interacting with the community; and (3) community partnership, which varies from collaborating to address public
safety issues to creating a climate that is exclusively enforcement focused and does not solicit community input. In addition, stakeholders described various forms of mistreatment, including harassment; retaliation; excessive force; and differential treatment by race, socioeconomic status, physical appearance, and more.

• **What is the community’s understanding of subgroups?** Community stakeholders varied in their awareness of subgroups from no awareness to extensive knowledge of groups, their identity, and their behavior. The primary sources of information about subgroups were the media, other community members, personal experiences, and LASD personnel. Participants who were aware of subgroups discussed why these groups form—sometimes providing justification for their existence while also denouncing them. Participants knew some subgroups by name (e.g., Jump Out Boys, Banditos) and described how the subgroups identify themselves with tattoos or other symbols. They perceived subgroups as engaging in such behaviors as hazing, excluding, harassing, and covering up for fellow deputies; targeting jail inmates, particularly people of color; and harassing community residents (e.g., aggressive behavior, excessive force, intimidation, illicit behavior). When asked about specific strategies that the department has implemented to address the issue of subgroups, some participants either were unaware or did not think anything was being done, while others praised the department for taking steps to minimize the occurrence of subgroups.

The qualitative findings presented in this chapter are based on the 46 interviews with community leaders across the four LASD patrol divisions (20 in the Central division, nine in the East division, nine in the South division, and eight in the North division). Community leaders represented public safety groups, social service or youth-serving agencies, faith-based organizations, grassroots and advocacy organizations, and businesses. In addition, findings are based on individual or group interviews and focus groups with 95 community members across the nine target communities (i.e., station areas with the first- and second-highest numbers of calls for service; Figure 5.1).1

Community leaders and members offered several different perspectives on and experiences with department personnel and subgroups. The aim of this chapter is to present this information as it was described by a diverse array of community stakeholders. We note that our approach is focused on understanding the variation in community leader and community member perspectives. Our sample and findings might not be representative of these communities as a whole.

**Overall Perception of LASD**

In assessing LASD overall, community stakeholders commented on the quality of leadership, availability of funding, how the department compared with other law enforcement agencies, and LASD’s history.

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1 This count includes some leaders who participated in community focus groups (six) or individual interviews originally intended for community members (three).
Participants’ overall perceptions of LASD were largely based on their opinions of current department leadership. Approximately two-thirds of comments on this topic were critical of the current administration. Some community stakeholders said that current leadership ignores what is best for the community and lacks transparency. They also responded that current leadership fosters a culture of aggressive policing and institutionalized racism. Others noted that Sheriff Villanueva had violated community trust by failing to uphold campaign promises regarding department-wide reform and by rehiring deputies involved in wrongdoing. As one community leader stated:

[Villanueva has] clearly shown the community and everybody else that he has a lack of respect for the community. He’s [re]hiring people that have been shown to hurt the community—that’s saying you don’t care about the community.

Other participants were concerned about the relationship between LASD leadership and other government leaders. One community leader said:

I feel like the county leaders and [Villanueva] are more preoccupied disliking each other than dealing with the community issues.

Another participant described the relationship between LASD leadership and county leaders as “unprofessional.” Some participants stated that LASD leadership had been unable to make desired changes because of ongoing conflict with government leaders (e.g., the Board of Supervisors). A community stakeholder cited the LASD budget freeze as an example of inappropriate or excessive external oversight:
We elected [Villanueva]. . . . I think the Board of Supervisors was being retaliatory. [Villanueva] answers to the people, not to the Board, but they control his budget, so they went after him [through the] budget. . . . The Board should drop their lawsuit and let [the Sheriff] do what he was elected to do.

**Funding**

Some participants expressed concern about the level of funding available to the stations to provide necessary services. One community member indicated that contractual relationships between the department and contract cities influenced funding decisions, saying:

I think it’s budgetary. I think since we’re a contract city they’re more worried about revenue. Because it’s not its own police force, there is no investment in the community. The Sheriff’s Department view contract cities as how much revenue can I generate from one car and how much does the city have to pay for it.

In addition, community leaders and members indicated that more funding should be directed toward community engagement efforts and improving response times to calls for service.

**Comparison with Other Law Enforcement Agencies**

Some participants compared the interactions with LASD to other agencies, particularly LAPD. In these comments, participants viewed LAPD as more community-oriented, friendlier, and better at serving customers than LASD. Participants also stated that the LAPD better prioritizes community engagement and partnering with community organizations (examples of this are detailed in later sections). A community leader who interacts with both LASD and LAPD explained,

In December, there was a toy giveaway where [LASD deputies] came out and passed out some toys and they brought some toys to give away, but after a couple pictures they’re gone. LAPD on the other hand, when they do something like that, they have a big old tent, they come out in their blues, they’re walking the line and saying hi to kids, they go all out. . . . I have yet to be in a rally where a group of people will walk up to a deputy and ask to take a picture with them. But with the LAPD, it’s all selfies all the time.

Some community stakeholders indicated that LAPD and other police departments have specific programs that have been beneficial to the community, but this type of collaboration with the community is less prevalent in LASD. Examples included gang units, community policing initiatives, and community advisory groups.

**Historical Perception**

Participants who were longtime residents of Los Angeles County or who had intergenerational ties to the community described how the historical relationship between LASD and the community shapes present-day relationships, which has been found in other research on police perceptions (Weitzer, 2002). Perceptions of the department as a whole were often shaped by historical contexts specific to a given station or division area. For instance, in Compton, many participants explained the transition from the Compton Police Department to the LASD
Compton Station to describe the present relationship between Compton and LASD. Community leaders in the North Division frequently mentioned the 2015 Antelope Valley settlement agreement when discussing current deputy interactions. A community leader put the agreement into historical context:

Broadly, there is a very negative history going back 50 years with the Sheriff’s Department, and some of that history continues to repeat itself from what we hear on the ground, particularly from young people. . . . I just think there’s disregard for the community we’re trying to build. And it does go back 50 years to when the sheriffs were the apparatus that was trying to shut down the Chicano movement that was born in East LA.

Participants also explained that specific incidents can fracture the community’s trust in the department, and it can take decades to rebuild the relationship. Participants noted that station personnel who are not from the community might be unaware of the past events that are salient to community perceptions of the department or potential solutions to improve the relationship. For example, a community leader said:

About 25 years ago, one of the sheriffs killed . . . a young Black man, and we still haven’t gotten over that. They need to go out of their way to get to know everyone; otherwise we’re living in a police state. They just come here to patrol, but if they take the time to get to know the community, that’ll go a long way.

**Views on Policing in General**

One of the primary aims of the interviews and focus groups with community stakeholders was to capture their perspectives of LASD personnel based on engagement in LASD, community-sponsored activities or events, and day-to-day interactions with local deputies. We asked them to describe the typical ways in which they interact and the quality of these interactions measured by the attitude and behavior of station personnel. In addition, community stakeholders described how deputies’ behavior contributes to the relationship with LASD. Finally, we learned how the relations have changed over time.

**Types of Interaction**

Interactions between the community and LASD personnel included a variety of activities directly or indirectly related to law enforcement. Community stakeholders interacted with personnel when making a call for service, visiting the station, being pulled over or witnessing someone else pulled over, and seeing deputies on patrol. Beyond activities related to crime, community stakeholders interacted with deputies at events such as National Night Out, coffee with a cop, food or toy giveaways, Trunk or Treat (a Halloween event with a car show where participants decorate their cars and pass out candy), and various other station events with the community. Some stakeholders participated in LASD programs, such as the Youth Activi-

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2 In 2011, the DOJ, Civil Rights Division, initiated an investigation of LASD to evaluate allegations of violations of the Fair Housing Act. DOJ found that LASD’s Palmdale and Lancaster stations “had engaged in a pattern and practice of conducting stops, searches, and seizures that were unreasonable and in violation of the Constitution and federal law.” A settlement agreement was established to ensure that LASD implemented reforms to address and eliminate this behavior (Antelope Valley Monitoring Team, undated).
ties League, the Community Citizens Academy, ride-alongs, or school-based programming. Finally, participants described interactions with LASD personnel at community meetings, such as town halls and neighborhood watch meetings.

**Perceptions Based on Station Personnel’s Attitudes**

When community stakeholders were asked to describe interactions with station personnel, two main themes emerged. They described both negative and positive aspects of the culture as they interpret it through interactions with station captains and deputies, and they discussed personnel as having an attitude of investment or noninvestment in the community. Community stakeholders related these attitudes to the quality of their relationship with LASD station staff.

**Culture**

Although cultural barriers to institutionalizing community-oriented policing have been recognized for some time (e.g., the challenge of getting personnel who might think of themselves as warriors to instead embrace a guardian role and mindset), it is not clear how much progress has been made. Importantly, although officers can embrace both warrior (e.g., “My primary responsibility as a police officer is to fight crime”) and guardian (e.g., “As a police officer, it is important that I have non-enforcement contacts with the public”) attitudes (Morin et al., 2017), those with a prevailing guardian mindset are more likely to prioritize communication rather than control in interactions with the public and are less likely to endorse attitudes that rationalize force misconduct or attitudes supportive of punishment for civilian disrespect (McLean et al., 2020).

Cultural barriers might also exist, such that officers might not see the value in community policing as compared with traditional policing (Silver et al., 2017), or they might perceive that the community does not want community policing or that the relationship with the community is adversarial (Chappell, 2009). Officers who see value in community policing, however, suggest that it can make their jobs easier, because developed relationships can improve efforts to identify and solve problems. It is worth noting that attitudes of officers vary both within and across agencies, with some officers being more supportive of community policing or having positive views of community members (Paoline, 2004). Some research suggests that supervisor expectations can affect whether officers engage in community policing or problem-solving (Engel and Worden, 2003), but much more research is needed to understand the optimal conditions for high-fidelity implementation of community and problem-oriented policing models. In addition to supervisors, senior officers (and training officers) must also embrace community policing for it to be culturally adopted (Crank, 1997), and there is some positive evidence that “traditional” police are more open to community-oriented policing than might be expected (Adams, Rohe, and Arcury, 2002; Paoline and Terill, 2013).

When describing positive and negative interactions with LASD, participants noted certain deputy characteristics that reflect a good or bad culture, potentially reflecting community member perceptions of LASD’s commitment to community policing. Community stakeholders perceive the culture as good when deputies are accessible and approachable, station leadership has an open-door policy, and members of the community feel comfortable reaching out with questions or concerns. These deputies are also friendly: They smile and wave when out and about, and they converse with community members at events. Finally, good deputies prioritize addressing the needs of the community. The East and South divisions had the most reports of a positive station culture. In contrast, participants from the North Division
described positive culture in about half of the discussions, and participants from the Central Division noted it much less frequently.

Participants stated that they perceived the culture to be bad when deputies were aloof, rude, and lacking in “customer service skills.” Community stakeholders said that these deputies create a climate in which the community fears and distrusts LASD. Community members and leaders said that they were afraid of physical violence, retaliation, and wrongful arrest at the hands of personnel. Fear and distrust stemmed from experiences with deputies mistreating the community. One participant said:

The police have us frustrated and terrorized because they are supposed to help us, but we are afraid of them. When we are in need of them, we are scared to call them. We are frustrated, and we don’t trust them. I feel like if something happens, I don’t feel comfortable reaching out to them.

Community stakeholders described these deputies as having an antagonistic, bullying attitude toward the community. They said that these deputies are aggressive, act superior to the community, and want residents to be afraid of them. Participants used phrases like “wanting to put their foot on you” or “thinking they can do anything because they have a badge and a gun.” Community members discussed negative culture in nearly every focus group or interview in every division. However, community leaders’ perceptions were more varied, with negative culture mentioned in a fourth of interviews in the South Division, approximately two thirds of interviews in the Central and East divisions, and every interview in the North Division.

Vested in the Community
Both community leaders and members valued LASD personnel who demonstrate personal investment in the community. Participants said that deputies are perceived as vested when it appears that they care about and feel like part of the community. They used terms such as “family” or “a next-door neighbor” to describe station personnel who have taken the time to introduce themselves to the community or to get to know community members on a first-name basis. Deputies’ efforts to get to know community members made participants feel like the deputies cared. A community member described one such interaction:

He seemed like he really cared because he wanted to talk to me. I know he’s busy and maybe he missed a call or two that was more relevant while he was talking to me. . . . He looked me in the eyes, and he made me feel safe. I left really happy. You can see that he thinks you matter and is interested in you when he talks to you.

Additionally, participants reported that deputies are uniquely vested when they have local ties to the community that other deputies do not. One participant explained:

There’s a difference when the deputies know the community because they trained there or grew up there and they really care about the city. . . . I asked one of the deputies why they came back here, and they said, “This is my city, my people are here.”

Participants from the South Division described LASD personnel as being vested in the community more often than participants from other divisions did. Conversely, participants had negative experiences with and perceptions of deputies who they saw as uncaring and not vested in the community. Participants described these deputies as
apathetic to the well-being of community members and disinterested in forming relationships in the community. Community stakeholders described these deputies as dismissive of their concerns, unempathetic, and unwilling to listen to them. Community members were much more likely than community leaders to perceive deputies as not caring about the community. This issue often arose when community stakeholders reported a crime. One community leader said:

A little empathy would be nice. You’re not calling them because you’re having a great day, and they get there downplaying what you’re going through. And it’s like, wait, to me this is a big deal. You should feel like they think you’re important too. They should make you feel like you’re important too.

Community leaders and members also stated that they perceived deputies who were not from the area as being less vested in the community. Others described problems emerging when the majority of deputies do not represent the community culturally or demographically. A community leader noted that having stations represent the racial and ethnic composition of the community is important for building trust and feeling that deputies are part of the community. This leader said:

They need to have African Americans and Latinos be able to see there’s a deputy I can go to who I can relate to. When you don’t see yourself in your community, it doesn’t feel like you’re a part of it.

Participants from the North and Central divisions described LASD personnel as not vested in the community in most of the discussions. Those in the East Division and the South Division mentioned this issue in less than half of the discussions. As a whole, this issue surfaced more frequently when speaking with community members than with community leaders. This suggests that being vested in the community could be particularly salient in residents’ interactions with deputies.

Perceptions Based on Station Personnel’s Behavior
The primary behaviors that contributed to a positive or negative relationship between the community and station personnel fit into three overarching themes: quality of service, level of engagement with the community, and treatment of community members.

Quality of Service
Across all station areas, community participants reported varying levels of satisfaction with the service that station personnel have provided. Particularly in the South Division, participants expressed satisfaction with LASD services, indicating that deputies respond promptly and adequately fulfill the law enforcement needs of the community. Conversely, participants dissatisfied with service stated that deputies are slow to respond to calls, are slow to investigate crimes, or do not sufficiently patrol the area.

In communities where stakeholders were satisfied with the services, they described deputies as going above and beyond the standard for satisfactory service. These deputies proactively took steps to reduce crime or otherwise support the community, either through community-wide programs or individual interactions. Many instances of proactive behavior involved station personnel providing social services to people in need. For example, participants told of
deputies providing homeless individuals with food and housing or taking the time to counsel community members after a shooting. One community leader said:

When we have a homicide, they’re out there in full force, and instead of a business thing to take needed information, the captain has them spend quality time and ask if everyone is okay and counseling support. It’s a whole different kind of scenario.

Conversely, others reported that LASD was failing to provide necessary services for the community. This theme was especially prominent in the North and East divisions, with approximately half of discussions of those divisions describing inadequate service. This topic was raised far less frequently in the Central and South divisions.

Part of the criticism about the quality of service involved being unable to anonymously report a crime because individuals are required to give their name when they call in. In addition, participants indicated a need for better Spanish-language services when calling a station. Community stakeholders also stated that deputies do not provide adequate services for people experiencing mental illness or with developmental disabilities and that deputies often escalate the situation. Finally, participants said that LASD lacks appropriate services for people experiencing domestic violence. Survivors described deputies as rude, angry, or lacking compassion. After one such experience, a community member stated:

In my opinion, they are called to so many situations that they think it’s just another person and they’ll go back to the domestic violence situation anyways. But not everybody’s situation is the same. . . . And you shouldn’t judge them because they’re going to go back or assume everyone is the same. . . . They should get more training on that and giving the person what they need in that moment. When I was giving my report that day, I’d barely finished when the sheriff was getting called away. And I said please don’t leave—I felt like my situation was important enough, but I had to wait until midday.

**Level of Engagement**

Another theme that emerged in discussions of relations related to community engagement. Participants described two distinct types of engagement: (1) interaction with the community through events or informal channels not directly related to law enforcement and (2) partnerships with the community to achieve shared public safety goals.

**Community Interaction**

Stations facilitated interaction by holding such events as National Night Out or community block parties and by attending events hosted by other organizations in the community. Participants were more likely to describe LASD interactions at community events as positive. Community interaction also occurred in more informal ways, such as deputies waving or saying hello to people in the street. Community leaders and members discussed the impact that interaction can have community perception of LASD personnel. For example, an interviewee said:

If you only see deputies when there is an emergency, you associated them with evil and crime. But if they are helping with an event, you start to build a relationship.

Other participants stated that opportunities to interact helped the community and the deputies better understand one another and made it feel like station personnel were part of the
community. More community stakeholders from the North and South divisions mentioned having opportunities to interact with deputies than did those in the other divisions.

Despite the importance of community interaction, some participants noted that deputies might attend community events but did not always interact with the community stakeholders or appear to welcome interaction during these events. One community member described how deputy attitudes can hinder community interaction:

Sometimes I see deputies at events and want to introduce my [family]. But I just see them so quiet [sitting or standing] on the side, and I think maybe I [should] go up to them. . . . They should do something to show that we can go to them and tell them issues. . . . If I knew one of them, even if I had a name, maybe I could ask for one of them next time I have an issue.

The absence of opportunities to interact with deputies or the perception that deputies did not want to interact contributed to a negative view of the relationship with the station. Community members were more likely than leaders to report insufficient deputy interaction, likely because many of the community leaders hold positions that involve collaboration with LASD stations. Participants from the Central Division described inadequate opportunities for community and deputy interaction in the greatest portion of discussions (almost half), compared with participants from the South, East, and North divisions.

Community Partnership
Beyond general community interaction, participants expressed the importance of having opportunities to partner with the department and provide input on public safety issues. Some existing partnerships involve formal collaboration between stations and community organizations, while others are more informal. Examples of efforts to solicit community input include stations requesting feedback through town hall meetings, community advisory committees, surveys, neighborhood watch meetings, and generally having an open-door policy.

Community stakeholders perceived stations as not wanting to partner with the community because station leadership either did not create opportunities for input or did not act on the input when it was provided. Participants also viewed clear communication and sharing of information—about both station events or activities and general public safety issues—as essential to good partnerships.

Community leaders and members also stated that partnership involves deputies and community members working together toward shared goals and that community needs should dictate station priorities. For instance, one leader said:

When a school district raises a safety concern, the captain will ensure there are additional patrols provided around the schools to ensure that the issue raised by one of the partners is addressed as soon as possible. With issues of homelessness, some people felt unsafe so LASD ensured they had more presence with deputies. There is also a roving COPS [Community Oriented Policing Services] team that comes to the community. It is proactive policing. They are very actively involved if there is a meeting at one of the schools and representation is needed, they are always at the table representing the department to field questions. They are a major partner when it comes to coordinating the community events. They are more than a law enforcement presence but also a volunteer force.
Participants from the East, South, and North divisions described successful partnerships in approximately half of the discussions, whereas participants in the Central Division described partnerships in just over a third of the discussions.

The antithesis of a good partnership is a climate in which deputies have an “us versus them” mentality and treat community members as people who need enforcing rather than as partners in public safety, participants said. They compared stations with this mentality to “an occupying force.” These stations might focus on enforcement or a warrior style of policing instead of collaboration or a guardian approach to policing (McLean et al., 2020). One community member described the dynamic this way:

They say they are law enforcement foremost and everything else comes second. They are not there to build community—they are just there to have law enforcement responsibilities. I think when the community requests involvement, they see it as an option.

Participants noted that when stations have an “us versus them” culture, they set their priorities without regard for community needs—and often in direct opposition to those needs. Poor partnership was described in twice as many interviews and discussion groups with community members as with community leaders. More than half of the discussions in the Central Division and close to half in the North Division referenced inadequate partnerships. Stakeholders in the South Division seldom raised this issue.

There is a growing recognition that law enforcement should not focus exclusively on the singular goal of crime reduction. Equally as important is the goal of community trust (Gill et al., 2014). Indeed, one of LASD’s mottos, “Earning the public’s trust every day,” acknowledges that trust should be at the forefront of its day-to-day activities, although our community findings show room for improvement in this regard. Interaction and partnership between LASD and the community are intertwined and critically important to creating a positive, trusting relationship. Participants described interactions as ways of building trust and a sense of community with the station, whereas partnerships allow the community to have a voice in public safety decisions. Attempts to partner with the community might not be successful if station personnel have not engaged in relationship-building through community interaction.

A community leader mentioned that the local station’s attempts to solicit feedback from the community have been unsuccessful because community members do not trust the deputies:

The community has been abused for so long by them, but they expect us to come to them instead of coming to us. . . . Their terms are “we’re having community meetings and we expect you to show up” instead of engaging with the community, coming out to the community. . . . They need to have activities the community wants to come to.

**Treatment of Community Members**

The concept of earning trust implies both that there is a way to measure trust and that there are certain activities that could increase or reduce trust. In policing, a variety of concepts are related to trust, most importantly fairness and neutrality. Each of these concepts are key features of procedural justice, or the perception that police officers treat people appropriately in their interactions and that their actions are legally justified and free of bias. When people interact with legal authorities, their perception of whether the encounter was fair or procedurally just involves four components:
1. whether they were treated with dignity and respect
2. whether they were given voice (i.e., a chance to voice their concerns and participate in decisionmaking)
3. whether the decisionmaker was neutral and transparent (i.e., decisions are unbiased and based on transparent reasoning)
4. whether the decisionmaker conveyed trustworthy motives (i.e., concern about well-being and acting within rightful authority) (Quattlebaum, Meares, and Tyler, 2018).

Importantly, trust in the police and perceptions of procedural justice also feed into police legitimacy (i.e., the belief that the police follow the law and legal standards, whether the decisions made by police reflect the values of those being governed, and whether people voluntarily defer to police authority; Jackson and Bradford, 2010), which is associated with satisfaction, confidence, cooperation, and compliance with police (Mazerolle et al., 2013; Tyler and Fagan, 2008). Legitimacy is also connected to credibility—does the public believe that the department will act in the public’s best interests when things go wrong (e.g., provide information, respond appropriately)? Ensuring positive interactions with legal authorities also has a basis in social psychology and intergroup dynamics, which stress the importance of positive intergroup contact. Positive intergroup contact can reduce prejudice and anxiety and could increase empathy (Pettigrew et al., 2011).

Community mistreatment is a prevalent theme that emerged during interviews and focus groups with stakeholders. Community members and leaders reported experiencing mistreatment by deputies—including harassment, retaliation, and excessive force—as well as differential treatment. Community members described mistreatment in every interview and focus group, which was more often than in our discussions with community leaders. Mistreatment was discussed most often in the Central and North divisions but was a salient theme across the other divisions.

**Harassment, Retaliation and Excessive Force**

Participants described instances of harassment, such as being stopped without cause or being treated with undue suspicion, both in person and when calling the station for service. Stakeholders said that deputies retaliate or threaten to retaliate against people who report crimes or question deputy actions. Among the examples of retaliation were deputies destroying memorials for people killed by LASD, patrol cars circling the block of someone who reported deputy misconduct, and deputies pressing charges only after someone questioned their actions. Community leaders and members from the Central Division mentioned both harassment and retaliation most often in our conversations, and community members in the East Division mentioned harassment most often. Deputies were also perceived as using excessive force, such as physical beatings, K-9 attacks, or shootings. Some participants said that deputies use excessive force with impunity. One community member stated:

> They attack innocent people instead of real criminals. . . . They show up [to people’s homes] like terrorists. They intimidate us, and we suffer emotionally from that. . . . They vandalize things and break things and make fun of you. That is not legal. They leave you with fear and bad experiences. . . . We have suffered a lot at their hands.

Excessive force was discussed in almost half of the interviews and focus groups with participants in the Central and North divisions and was seldom mentioned in the South Division.
Differential Treatment

Approximately half of the comments about mistreatment reflected a perception that certain populations are treated differently from others. Some participants explicitly stated that deputies mistreated them because of their race, socioeconomic status, physical appearance, gender, criminal involvement, language, or some other characteristic. Examples of differential treatment included wrongful arrest, sexual harassment, threats to call immigration, use of slurs, traffic stops without cause, and excessive force. Differential treatment was mentioned in almost all interviews and focus groups with community members and was discussed twice as frequently with community members than with community leaders. Differential treatment appeared to be a more prevalent issue among stakeholders in the North and Central divisions.

The majority of the comments suggested that differential treatment was based on race (i.e., primarily Black and Hispanic individuals). A community member described the relationship between the Hispanic community and deputies this way:

There have been many cases where the sheriffs have beaten or killed people. Now we are scared to call them. They come into your homes without warrants and do what they want. They don’t think about what they leave behind in terms of the trauma. They insult us verbally and physically. We don’t trust them anymore.

Although this comment was specifically in relation to treatment of Hispanic individuals, it was similar to how participants described LASD treatment of Black individuals and the long-lasting psychological impact of mistreatment. One community leader noted:

I went to the gym and talked to African American kids, and they say they get patrolled and get searched and they don’t seem to trust them, so there is a lot of relationship-building that needs to happen. They still do things like stop people for no reason or holding onto their gun while talking to Black people.

Community members described receiving worse treatment because of their neighborhood. A community member explained:

They think if you live here, you’re a drug dealer or gang member. They automatically assume the worst of people. They automatically think low income and a negative image not just because of race but because of the city we live in.

Similarly, people reported receiving worse service or treatment because of living in an unincorporated area.

Besides differential treatment due to social identity or economic status, some participants noted instances of people being treated differently because of their personal relationships with LASD personnel or due to their position in the community. One participant described deputies being unwilling to pursue a noise complaint directed at individuals who were friends with LASD personnel. Another community member said:

I would call as a regular citizen, not using my position, and nothing would happen. But if I called back and said I was [TITLE], they would be here in less than 5 minutes. I’m so upset about that. I don’t like to use my title for anything. I consider that a disgrace. We pay our taxes, why should one person get preference because of where they work? When you do call as a regular citizen, they don’t listen to you.
Effects of Community Behavior on Policing

Some community members, and particularly community leaders, indicated that the community itself is also responsible for the quality of the relationship with LASD. Some of these participants said that residents do not attend events or participate when the station makes efforts to partner with the community. As a result, the station is unable to effectively address the community’s needs. For instance, a community leader attributed lower crime rates to successful partnerships between the deputies and the community and added that:

it takes the community working with the sheriffs. Now, if the community doesn’t care or isn’t working with the sheriffs [you won’t have that].

Others mentioned that community stakeholders might have a negative perception of deputies because they do not understand what deputies go through. Finally, some participants noted that the community’s behavior can cause deputies to respond more aggressively or escalate tensions. One community member said:

If you treat [the deputies] like people, they’ll treat you like a human being. But if you’re acting like an animal, they’ll treat you like an animal.

This issue was raised in almost twice as many focus groups and interviews in the South and East divisions as in the other divisions.

Changes in Interaction Over Time

Some participants were mixed on whether the relationship between their community and station has improved or worsened over time. Participants primarily described improvements in community engagement (e.g., the station partnering with local organizations, opportunities to interact with deputies at community events), service (e.g., response times to calls), and treatment (e.g., harassment, excessive force, differential treatment). However, some participants noted deterioration in these areas, especially in regard to harassment or use of excessive force.

Community stakeholders attributed changes in the station-community relationship to different station leadership, funding changes, the efforts of community members or organizations, and external oversight. In the North Division, many participants said that the community experiences less harassment and excessive force because of the Antelope Valley settlement agreement. Some participants associated changes in community engagement with changes in treatment of the community (i.e., the more station personnel engage the community, the better they treat the residents). A community leader explained that local organizations established ongoing events with the station because youth were reporting harassment from deputies:

We did not have a good relationship with the sheriffs . . . so we started having more events between the sheriffs and our young people. . . . Our local sheriffs got to speak about “hey, we’re human too” and we were able to have honest conversations about the stereotypes they might have about one another. . . . We started to break that cycle and we were also trying to teach our young people to be respectful but know their rights and I think that really changed things.
Participants also described the converse, where they stated that reduced community engagement from the station led to worse treatment of the community. For example, a community leader said:

There were more programs in the community which made it more comfortable for them to understand who the community is. Now, it’s “I’m going to shoot you, I’m going to beat you.” . . . I asked [deputies] to come by for [an event] to say hi to people and improve the relationship instead of just coming to a meeting every week. But they didn’t come. It’s part of the growth of the community because if the community knows who they are, they’ll say, “Okay, they’re cool.”

In all divisions, conversations more frequently included mentions of relationships becoming better rather than worse. The majority of discussions with community stakeholders in the North, East, and South divisions described improvements, compared with less than half of discussions with the Central Division. Central Division participants also more frequently described relationships with LASD becoming worse over time. Across all divisions except the East, community leaders were more likely to mention community-sheriff relationships improving and community members were more likely to mention them worsening.

Community Perspectives on Subgroups

When introducing the topic of deputy subgroups in our conversations with community stakeholders, we heard a mix of viewpoints on the existence of subgroups. Some participants had no awareness of subgroups; others had minimal awareness but no specific ideas about where they were located or how long they had been around; and others shared more-detailed knowledge, including where subgroups were located, how they identified themselves, and how long they had been in existence. Some community leaders and members also explained that subgroup behavior is more a manifestation of a culture within the department than a collection of a subset of personnel. Finally, participants shared their views on the impact that deputy subgroups have on the community and described ways in which the department has addressed or is seeking to address this issue. Comments about subgroups varied by division, and there were differences in levels of awareness between community leaders and community members. We give a more detailed description of these nuances in the sections below.

Community Awareness of Existence and Location of Subgroups

In each division, awareness of subgroups ranged from minimal to extensive. A number of comments suggested that some participants were not aware that subgroups existed within the department. Conversely, some participants provided considerable information based on their knowledge and experience. Comments indicating limited awareness of subgroups were most prevalent among community leaders in the Central and South divisions. These comments generally suggested speculations about subgroups but not in-depth awareness or understanding of them. For example, a community leader said:

I hadn’t gotten that story good where I could really hear everything about that. It was just in a walk-by way, if that makes sense—it wasn’t the main point in the conversation, so I
hadn’t really thought about it. But I could believe it. I could believe it just based on the way they act in the streets.

Of the participants who had more-detailed knowledge of subgroups, some were aware of subgroups within their own neighborhood (i.e., most were aware of groups in the Central and North divisions), while others were aware only of groups outside their neighborhood (i.e., they were aware of groups in jails, East LA, Palmdale, Century, Lynwood, South Central, and Compton). These perceptions of areas where subgroups exist or have existed align with prior reporting and media coverage, as well as with perceptions from some of our LASD interviewees.

How the Community Learned of Subgroups
Community members indicated that they learned about subgroups in a variety of ways, including through other community members (e.g., at organized community meetings, by talking to other members of the community), personal experiences (e.g., through people they know who have been in the jail describing being assaulted by deputies perceived to be subgroup members, from having been in jail themselves, from having known people who have been threatened by deputies perceived to be part of subgroups, from hearing deputies in the community greet each other by their subgroup name), the media (e.g., television news, social media, newspaper articles), or members of LASD or affiliated personnel. Most comments on this topic signaled that participants had heard of groups through the media (mostly community members in the Central Division and community leaders in the South Division), and almost half of the comments suggested that participants had also learned about subgroups through other community members or their own personal experiences (mostly community leaders in the Central Division). Only a small number of comments described participants having learned about subgroups from members of LASD or other affiliated personnel (mostly community leaders in the Central and North divisions).

Community Views on How Subgroups Form and Whether They Should Exist
Participants had different ideas about why subgroups might form within the department. A few said that the formation of these groups was in some ways understandable, and others had ideas about why they formed, although they said that the groups should not exist. Most of the few comments that were more understanding of subgroups came from community leaders in the Central and South divisions. These participants suggested that subgroups are normal cliques that form in workplaces and are not harmful, and some said that they believed that the subgroups were making the community safer because they were less likely to tolerate criminal activity in the community. One community leader explained,

I have seen those cliques make the community safer because they don’t tolerate the things that are going on, so the crime rate has significantly reduced. These cliques are not out to hurt people. When I was in the service, especially the marines used to tattoo themselves as a camaraderie thing because these streets are not safe.

Several community leaders and a few community members commented that they did not agree with the existence of subgroups but had ideas about why they formed. Some said that the formation of subgroups was related to how deputies were trained. As one community leader noted:
You got a Sheriff and an Undersheriff in prison because they let too much stuff go by. And I hate seeing officers that should be good, but they come up underneath that kind of training.

Others said that they thought groups were formed partially as a response to and tactic for dealing with a lot of gang-related issues (i.e., “you got your gang, we’ve got ours”) or because the current sheriff was in denial about the issues within the department. One community member said,

When you have a department with 10,000 employees and a Sheriff in denial, the deputies can perpetuate their behavior with the gangs and it creates a culture out there.

Community leaders in the East, North, and South divisions made most of these comments, and a few were from community members in the Central and East divisions.

**Community Knowledge of Subgroups**

Community leaders and stakeholders who had some awareness of deputy subgroups shared their knowledge about the names of these groups, physical characteristics typically associated with subgroups, and their understanding of the type of behavior subgroups engage in.

**Subgroup Names**

Several participants were aware of the names of different subgroups that either currently or previously existed within the department. Community leaders and members in the Central Division provided the overwhelming majority of comments about subgroup names. Specific names mentioned included the Jump Out Boys in Compton and Century; the Vikings in Lynwood; the Regulators; the Cavemen; the Stoney Boys in Firestone (thought to have become the Pirates); the Banditos and 3rd Street in East LA; and the 2000 Boys and the 3000 Boys within Twin Towers (likely referring to the groups that existed in Men’s Central Jail).

**Tattoos or Symbols**

Community members described a range of symbols as representing subgroups, with tattoos being the most common. Other symbols mentioned were tiles or banners on station floors, stickers on cars or windows, patches on uniforms, mugs, jackets, specific styles of facial hair, and hand gestures to signal group affiliation. Most comments about tattoos or other symbols came from community members in the Central Division (with only one additional comment from a community member in the East Division) and from community leaders in the South and North divisions.

**Subgroup Behavior**

**Patrol Deputies’ Behavior**

Community leaders and members gave examples of how patrol deputies who are perceived as subgroup members behave. The types of behavior they shared include

- **hazing** as part of initiation practices:

  There has been a lot of talk [that] may not be backed up with facts about a lot of hazing with new sheriffs that want to report it to the higher ups and are roadblocked because the people that are there for a number of years have been the people running the cliques.
• **exclusionary practices of deputies** who are members of the group:

What we observed was if you were in their organization, you could use certain resources. They had a barbeque place you could eat at only if you were part of their organization and if you weren’t, you couldn’t even go there.

They put Latinos down even within each other amongst deputies. They exclude them and don’t give them the same opportunities. I have heard that they don’t promote them in the same ways. I think that also influences the way they work on the street and with the community. That affects them when they are working with the community. I imagine that it is like a war within themselves, like others competing with themselves.

• **harassment of other deputies** who are not part of the group:

Even the ones that want to do the right thing feel like they can’t do that because they don’t want to go against their fellow officers or get retaliated against. I’ve heard that from Black deputies. Because they have ways of getting back at them, like giving them dangerous assignments. They’re told not to rock the boat.

• **covering up their negative actions:**

I’ve heard that they cover each other when they’re going to do the reports. They lie on the reports to make someone else seem like they’re at fault or they placed weapons or illegal drugs on people. That’s what I’ve heard.

Additionally, some community members noted that deputies perceived to be part of subgroups often used special language among themselves (seemingly not police language) and made up disrespectful names for rival subgroups. A community member provided a concrete example of how deputies disrespect neighborhood gangs in a way that appears to be similar to gang behavior:

They do conduct themselves as a gang. For example, with gangs, the rival will usually come up with a diss name, a disrespect name. There is a gang called Maravilla [a very prominent gang in East LA]; if you are my enemy, instead of saying a Maravilla guy they will say *mantequilla* [butter]. It is a disrespectful term used by rival gangs. When a Bandito rolls up, they say, “What’s up, mantequilla? What’s up, butter?” How come you are using this language if you are not a gang? Are you my rival? That is the language of rival gangs.

In addition, some participants were reticent to file complaints about subgroup behavior because they said that the complaints would just go through fellow LASD personnel and would likely never be heard. Comments about the behavior of patrol deputies who were believed to be part of subgroups primarily arose from community members in North and Central divisions, with only a couple of comments from community members in the East Division. Most comments from community leaders about this type of behavior were in the Central Division, with only a few community leader comments from the North and South divisions.

**Custody Deputies’ Behavior**

Participants in the Central and North divisions also gave examples of how they perceived subgroups in the jails. Community members shared accounts of how deputies target inmates and
set up inmates to be beaten up by other inmates, particularly Black and Brown prisoners. A community leader described this behavior as follows:

It is common knowledge that if you go to the jail you are expected to be treated a certain way by the 5000 Boys or the 3000 Boys. The department knows about it and thinks it’s normal, and this is the case since the ‘70s.

A community member shared personal experience with discriminatory treatment and associated that treatment with deputy subgroups in custody facilities:

I experienced cruel and unusual punishment that particularly targeted me and others who were Black and Brown.

Other participants recounted being awakened for strip searches at random hours of the night and not being given proper bedding or hygiene products. Community leaders discussed issues such as giving some inmates preferential treatment while disadvantaging other inmates by putting them in different racial quarters to fight each other or putting them in solitary confinement; implementing “flashlight therapy,” described as beating people with flashlights; and sexual assault and harassment in the women’s jail. A community leader said:

Sheriffs with Black and Brown groups that have issues sometimes put one Black [person] with [the] Brown quarter. They do flashlight therapy where they were beating people unconscious and some even died. Some have had flashlight imprint on forehead in the autopsy.

Department Culture or Subculture, Not Subgroups
In a small proportion of conversations with both community leaders and community members across divisions, we heard comments suggesting that the behaviors described were not necessarily related to subgroups but were instead a larger cultural issue within LASD. Some community leaders describe personnel assimilating into a widespread culture that promotes these types of behaviors. One community leader said:

It is a culture of the organization. The reason I can say that is because I was part of the military and I know how these rank-and-file companies are and how they are run. If you have a bad person running that company . . . when I think of the sheriff rank-and-file group, they teach the same kind of training as in the military, very intense and are willing to kill others for their own gratifying need. You should see the type of disregard of families of deceased. This also reminds me of my battle buddies who went to war and also had that kind of indifference in their face. They are desensitized to what this really means for people’s lives and communities.

Others said that it is difficult to tell whether deputies’ behaviors were related to subgroups or to ethnicity or age group (e.g., Latino deputies harassing Latino community members, young deputies engaging in negative behavior). Some participants indicated that people might perceive subgroups to be representative of the entire department because those people might only interact with a few deputies who behave badly, so their schema is limited to these experi-
I think unfortunately to the public who received services, we just see guys in tan and green—we can’t really tell the difference if it’s a subculture or not. One deputy represents the whole department, as it should be, so I think it’s hard for community members to understand that. But I think the sentiment from a lot of community members was that the entire Sheriff’s Department was against us as a community. But that was back then—I’d like to emphasize that it’s not like that now.

Comments from community members suggested that issues with subgroups were more a matter of camaraderie and of deputies having each other’s backs and that such issues were prevalent in law enforcement in general. A community member explained:

They’re close-knit like a good old boys’ club. . . . my concern is that if you bring up something that one deputy did, they’ll go, “Oh no, he’s a good guy.” They’re friends. They protect each other.

Impact of Subgroups on Communities

Overall Impact

When we asked participants how subgroups affect the community, most said that the impact would be negative, and the majority said that it led to lack of trust in or fear of law enforcement. These comments primarily came from the Central and North divisions. Several participants also said that the behavior of deputies who were perceived to be members of subgroups caused fear and trauma in the community. A few community leaders also said that the existence of subgroups within the department created an “us versus them” mentality, which was also discussed in prior reports on this subject. Only one community leader said that groups actually had a positive impact on the community because subgroup members were less tolerant of lawlessness and kept the community safe, and a few said that there really was no impact on the community. In general, however, the predominant sentiment was that subgroups have a negative impact on the community. As we note later, this sentiment aligns with that of LASD survey respondents: Most of the deputies who expressed an opinion agreed that subgroups’ behavior has negatively impacted community perceptions of LASD.

Direct Impact of Subgroups

Community stakeholders—primarily in the Central and North divisions—gave examples of what they considered subgroups harassing the community. Their examples fell broadly into two categories: (1) perceptions of aggressive behavior, including excessive force, threatening or intimidation, destruction of people’s property, and use of disrespectful language; and (2) perceptions of illicit behavior, such as dropping off gang members in enemy territory, shooting and sometimes killing civilians, detaining people without good reasons, and treating people of different races and socioeconomic statuses differently.

Aggressive Behavior

Discussion of aggressive behavior that community stakeholders associated with deputy subgroups was common throughout our conversations. As mentioned above, one type of aggres-
sive behavior described was the use of excessive force. For instance, one community member said that they “have seen them rough people up, kind of like the gang culture.” Another type of aggressive behavior was intimidating or threatening community members, with recent allegations that deputies have harassed or intimidated family members of individuals killed by LASD in fatal use-of-force incidents (OIG, 2020b). One example of this came from a community leader who said:

[I] watched [deputies] torment a girl whose son got killed by a ricochet bullet. . . . I literally watched them torment this girl. We were talking to investigators and they were outside in front doing donuts in their sheriff’s cars trying to intimidate us and make us leave. . . . I had to escort her home because they were following her.

More generally, a community member described how the behavior of deputies had changed over time and become more threatening:

When I was a kid, they treated people nice, like Sheriff John. Sheriff John would be kinda like an uncle and asked nicely, and now it’s more vulgar and more aggressive and it goes on and on in their questioning, bolder language, threatening people, being intimidating, threatening your family.

Community members also shared instances where deputies destroyed property in ways that seemed unnecessary when inspecting homes. Furthermore, it was noted that deputies sometimes used inappropriate language with community members. Both community members and leaders said that these types of aggressive behaviors indicated the existence of and participation in subgroups.

Illicit Behavior
Community members and leaders described illicit behavior that they associated with subgroups. One common and unlawful practice that participants discussed was dropping off people believed to be gang members into the territory of rival gangs. A community leader said that this was done when deputies were looking for “swift justice”:

In conversations with law enforcement, you become aware of [subgroups] because they refer to their group and they refer to it as it is a score for us. That happened to me, and I would get picked up and get dropped off in another neighborhood in order for there to be some sort of discipline, and that is how they would deliver their swift justice when they couldn’t make arrests.

There were also several comments about shootings or killings committed by deputies and a stated belief that some of these are tied to subgroups. As one community leader detailed:

You have to be willing to do certain things—beat people up, use excessive force, shoot people. A lot of illegal things. It’s not like joining the Boy Scouts. . . . Everybody knows when there’s a shooting, and if you’re celebrating people getting killed with tattoos, it’s out of hand. . . . So, the Jump Out Boys got terminated by [a former sheriff] because they had shot and killed people, but the only reason he terminated those guys was because we were putting pressure on him.
There were also many comments about people getting pulled over for no reason, and participants often stated that these practices were racially motivated. One community member shared concerns over this:

As an African American, I know the rules, but I do know that if I ask why they stop me, I know they are going to say, OK, get out of the car. Every African American is afraid they are going to get shot and killed. . . . I'm a goody two shoes, but as an African American, I can tell you that if I see the police behind me, I really start sweating and I'm nervous [even though] everything is straight on my car.

**Current or Past Efforts to Address Subgroups**

We asked participants whether they were aware of any specific ways in which the department had attempted to address the issue of subgroups, and we received very few responses from either community members or community leaders. All comments relating to this question came from the Central Division, except one. A few participants said that they were not aware of any ongoing or past efforts or said that there were no efforts. Of those who were aware of efforts to address this issue, one community leader stated that past administrations had done a good job of acknowledging and dealing with the issues:

My perspective is that the Sheriff's Department has done a good job of acknowledging it and addressing it with the past administration of the Sheriff’s Department. I think even when the *LA Times* article came out last year, they did a good job communicating that the cliques aren’t there now, so from my perspective and my neighbors’ perspective, we don’t really have a sense of that being there anymore. It might be more of a sense of something in the past that was recently discovered and is now being highlighted.

Another community stakeholder said that they thought they had heard that the department was going to try to break up the groups; and another person said that they felt the department was taking steps to minimize the occurrence of subgroups by discouraging tattooing and making it known that these kinds of groups were not acceptable.

**Recommendations by Community Members**

One of the main objectives of our interviews and focus groups with community stakeholders was to understand the improvements they wanted to see and to search for possible strategies to improve the relationship between the community and LASD. These recommendations, which were offered by community leaders and members, generally relate to training, community engagement, and accountability. These recommendations might not necessarily be supported by empirical evidence and might not be practical or legally feasible. We incorporated some of the suggestions that are practical and feasible into our recommendations in Chapter Ten.

**Training**

Community stakeholders in more than a third of the discussion groups and interviews recommended changes to LASD training. Most training recommendations came from community members in the Central and North divisions. One of the most common training recommen-
dations was for LASD personnel to receive cultural competency or antibias training. In the majority of these comments, participants stated that deputies need to improve how they treat and interact with people of color. A community leader explained that not only should the department offer this type of training, but a person of color from the community should also deliver it:

There’s still a distrust between African Americans and the Sheriff’s Department. . . . One of our suggestions was that every sheriff should go through a cultural sensitivity training so they can understand how to approach a person of color. We had asked them to . . . have people in the community who are certified to give the training, but they did not allow us to have community members go in to do it. They might have that training, but it’s given by someone who is White. And that is totally different when it’s delivered by someone who is White.

Additionally, participants recommended that deputies receive training on using a trauma-informed approach in response to domestic violence situations and training on helping people with mental illness or developmental disabilities. Other participants advocated for training to focus more on building skills for interacting with people (e.g., procedural justice) and displaying empathy. One community member said:

[They need people skills, because you’re dealing with people. You’re dealing with the community, not just criminals and suspects. When dealing with the people minding their business and everything, don’t be ready to draw a gun out or judge this person just because they look a certain way. You have to talk to them, and if you’re going to talk to someone, you can do it in a friendly way, you know, just say hey. At least have some kind of people skills.

Finally, some training recommendations were specifically in relation to the practice of assigning deputies to work in the county jails prior to working in the patrol stations. Community members and leaders stated that deputies treat community members with more hostility and aggression because of their experience in the jails. As a community leader said:

In the Sheriff’s Department, some of them stay in the jails for four or five years, so they’re used to criminals, and they come out of the jails and look at the community as criminals. That’s one of the things they need to change. They need regular correction officers like prison guards to man the jails and let the police go out in the field to be community police. While they’re there, they look at criminals, and then they bring that same mentality into the community. If you have trained jailers, that’s all they do. But the Sheriff’s Department goes through that, then comes into community—they’re programmed to harass people. They’re so used to criminals in jail, they think that’s all the citizens.

Community Engagement
The most prevalent recommendation from the community was for LASD to improve or increase community interaction. Community members were more likely to recommend com-

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3 We note that research on implicit bias training suggests that such training is not associated with changes in behavior (Forscher et al., 2019). Another review of antibias training suggests that there is mixed evidence on its efficacy, but there are potential areas for improvement (Carter, Onyeador, and Lewis, 2020).
Community interaction than community leaders. As described previously, participants expressed a desire for opportunities to interact with LASD personnel outside of traditional law enforcement activities and a desire for LASD personnel to be friendly and have genuine interest in getting to know the community. Some participants spoke favorably about the “Town Sheriff” program, which they describe as the assignment of a lead deputy or lieutenant to serve as the liaison between the local patrol station and the community. These community stakeholders indicated that this program has helped improve community interaction and relations, but this support is very limited because the town sheriff is just one person responsible for the entire community.

In a similar vein, participants recommended that LASD overall engage in more community-oriented policing (COP). Participants described COP as working with the community to advance public safety, engaging with community members and organizations to ensure that the station’s actions match the community’s priorities, and discouraging deputy subgroups. Community members and leaders mentioned specific examples of what COP should look like, such as deputies knocking on doors asking people whether anything could be improved or whether there were any ongoing issues in the neighborhood (i.e., having contacts with the department that were not related to enforcement). Some participants also recommended that station personnel partner with local social services organizations to create alternatives to incarceration. Several participants mentioned that former COP initiatives had been cut because of funding issues and that the reduction of these services had been detrimental to the community/station relationship. One leader said:

One of the things that we had and no longer have is a COPS team that was community oriented. Maybe ten years ago, due to budgetary restraints, those COPS programs were disbanded at each station and just formed a county-wide program. It was a great outreach for the department. They did not respond to regular radio calls; they were in the community making relationships and addressing quality-of-life issues. So, when that disbanded, they had the county one, and they are transitory in nature and are just here to put out fires.

Recommendations Related to Subgroups

When participants were asked what would help to address issues of subgroups within the department, community leaders and members provided a variety of suggestions. Some recommendations focused on steps that the department could take internally to deal with these issues. These types of recommendations included improving hiring and training practices to reduce the sense of “us versus them” and increasing investigations and disciplinary action where necessary. Other types of recommendations focused on what could be done externally to address these issues. These types of suggestions included establishing external oversight of the department and decreasing funding or shifting it away from the department.

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4 The DOJ’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office recently defined community-oriented policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2012, p. 1).
Recommendations for Internal Activities

Improve Hiring and Training Practices

Both community leaders and community members had suggestions about improving hiring and training practices as a way of addressing issues of subgroups within the department. For community leaders, suggestions included providing trainings that focus on being professional, respectful, and communicating properly; hiring deputies who are older and have more than a high school education because they might have more lived experience and exposure to diverse communities; and ensuring that TOs and other leadership emphasize proper behavior and do not impart or condone negative attitudes or habits. A community leader emphasized the potential impact of TOs:

If I’ve got a training officer and I’m new, and he says you need to get these assholes and show who’s boss, I’m going to do what he’s saying . . . . the training officers need to let them know you don’t beat people up, that’s not how we do that.

Community members had similar suggestions to improve training and hiring practices, and these suggestions were distributed relatively evenly across the North, Central, and East divisions, with no such recommendations coming from the South Division. The type of recommendations we heard from community members on this topic included generally increasing the amount of training that is required for deputies and leadership, providing dual training that includes teaching community members about their rights and the role of law enforcement and teaching deputies how to handle situations with dignity and respect, having deputies learn about the community by living there for a period of time, and hiring people who are passionate about being in law enforcement. A community member elaborating on this point said:

I think hiring people who are more passionate about their true jobs and a newer generation that’s not only [looking] for a job but really want to be here, not just because you live here but because you want to do work for your city. We have a newer generation that just wants to have a job, and I feel like we need to start all over and get those passionate cops.

Increase Accountability Through Investigations and Disciplinary Action

Another internal recommendation for addressing deputy subgroups is increasing accountability by ensuring that there are investigations and that disciplinary action is taken when necessary. Recommendations about ensuring proper investigations primarily came from community members in the East and Central divisions. Both community leaders and members across all divisions provided recommendations supporting disciplinary action. Several community members said that there should generally be more investigations or evaluations of deputies. Other community members said that investigations should be external because having department members investigate themselves was likely to be ineffective. A community member’s comment underscored this point:

There needs to be investigations by independent bodies within the department of any suspicions. I have doubts about any internal committees to be unbiased—I don’t think that is possible. There is such a strong culture of brotherhood and unity in the [sheriff’s] department and a tendency to stick together even in cases where it doesn’t make sense to back others.
Recommendations related to disciplinary action varied, but the majority of them suggested suspending or terminating members of subgroups. A community member and a community leader in another area emphasized the need to get rid of subgroups:

Terminate [them] if they are part of the subgroups. Gangs can’t police a community, gangs cannot police gangs. There should be no tolerance or existence of subgroups within the station. They should not be allowed to provide law service. They will always be more loyal to [the] gang than to the community.

It’s like if you got rot in something, you have to cut it out. I don’t know if there’s time to cut it out. And if we bring new officers in, the old officers will still have that mentality and tell them how they have to be. So those officers have got to go. That gang mentality needs to be rooted out. I don’t know if they can be retrained or reformed. You just have to get them out.

Other suggestions included breaking up the groups, penalizing those who have group tattoos, making deputies wear body cameras, having group membership be a disqualifier for promotion as a way to dissuade group participation, and eliminating transfers as a solution for dealing with problems with deputies. A community member explained why transfers are not a good strategy to deal with subgroups:

If they do something wrong in the gangs in East LA, they take care of it by transferring that person to West Hollywood. All they did is transfer the person. That’s not taking care of it. Transfers need to be eliminated. These are trained people to protect and take care of everybody, so I don’t think transferring should even be an option.

**Recommendations for External Solutions**

*Establish Mechanisms for External Oversight of the Department*

Several community members and leaders suggested greater oversight as a way to address issues with subgroups within the department. Some community members generally suggested having more community meetings or events with the Sheriff’s Department and the Board of Supervisors to give the community a voice and a better understanding of issues within the department and to increase accountability to the community. Suggestions for mechanisms that could be used for external oversight of the department included community advisory councils or other groups made up of community members to allow for transparency and discussion about how the department is dealing with deputy subgroups; federal agencies, through consent decrees or federal injunctions, to keep the pressure on the department to do something about subgroups; the Board of Supervisors and the COC exercising their power over the department to dismantle these groups; and having publicly available lists of deputies who have a record of subgroup-related issues.

*Reduce Funding or Shift Funding Away from the Department*

A few community members and leaders from the Central Division suggested a strategy that is currently being explored across the United States: shifting funds away from the Sheriff’s Department and into other needed resources, as well as limiting the department’s role. A community leader explained the latter point this way:
The county needs to rethink accountability over the Sheriff’s Department. They need to rethink how to take that power away from them in the jail system, in the community, and possibly limiting the sheriffs all together.

**Conclusion**

It is important to recognize that LASD patrol stations and the communities they serve vary in terms of geography, demographic makeup, and crime. As reflected in our interviews and focus groups, some community stakeholders perceived their relationship to be positive and noted the professional courtesy they often received. Others recounted experiences of harassment, aggressive behavior, or feeling disrespected. Perceptions of LASD leadership, both current and historical, impacted views of the department overall. Additionally, community stakeholders had varying perspectives on the level of services provided by LASD, interactions with deputies, and community engagement and community partnership. Community leaders and members most commonly became aware of subgroups through media coverage, although some also learned about them through other community members and, to a lesser extent, members of LASD, or they might have discerned the existence of subgroups through negative experiences with deputies. Stakeholders with awareness of subgroups often characterized their members as engaged in behaviors that are detrimental to the community. Thus, whether community members have direct experience with subgroups or not, media coverage and external scrutiny of subgroups could affect community member interpretations of their experiences with LASD, particularly if there is an overemphasis on heavy-handed crime-fighting within a patrol station.

In addition, although there was some similarity in community perspectives of LASD (i.e., mistreatment of community residents is a concern), there was some variation by respondent type and region of the county. Community leaders most often described the LASD culture as positive and viewed personnel as partners with the community and their services as satisfactory. Community leaders were also more likely to highlight the need for residents to be more involved in efforts to improve LASD community relations. Conversely, community members typically offered a less favorable assessment of LASD culture, station personnel behavior, level of engagement, and quality of services. Negative comments about LASD were also consistently more prevalent in the North (specifically Palmdale and Lancaster) and Central (specifically East LA, Century, Compton, and South LA) divisions, including descriptions of subgroup behaviors and their effect on the community. In particular, community members in these areas noted issues with harassment, intimidation, and excessive force. These participants were more likely to be in favor of harsh consequences for subgroups.

It is clear that, at least in some stations, LASD could work to improve community members’ perceptions and trust through its commitment to community-oriented policing and procedural justice. Operationalizing this philosophy involves strategic, tactical, and organizational dimensions that must be aligned (Cordner, 1999). This also includes overcoming potential cultural barriers to effective implementation of community policing (Mastrofski, Willis, and Kochel, 2007; Silver et al., 2017). However, other issues that community members identified (e.g., harassment, excessive force) could point to a need for improvements in supervision, internal investigations, and discipline.
In this chapter, we provide findings from our interviews that describe what it is like to work at LASD, including the structural features of the department, the key internal processes that shape the workplace, and the key roles within the organization. We also highlight important norms that were described in these interviews.

As institutionalized organizations, law enforcement agencies are judged according to the values that their constituents expect them to uphold (Crank, 2003). Institutions are guided by central authority, culture, and individuals and contain three elements: complexity, loose coupling, and good faith. To meet the demands of their environment (e.g., community demands, court orders), institutionalized organizations grow in complexity (e.g., policies, procedures). Often, however, this complexity does not adequately reflect the work of the organization, and behavior can become loosely coupled with official policy. Good faith reflects trust in others and the purpose of the organization but can prevent critical evaluation of existing practices or systems and downplays external criticism. Thus, although such organizations are certainly guided by policies, procedures, and processes, they also contain institutional elements of assumptions, values, symbols, rituals, and common-sense ways of understanding behavior and outcomes (Crank, 2003).

Some of our interview and survey questions were aimed at helping us understand whether complexity (or lack of it) at LASD is a factor in deputy subgroups forming. RAND researchers with expertise in qualitative data collection interviewed a total of 57 individuals, including representatives of LASD (most of whom were at the command level; the remainder were an even distribution of midlevel, line-level, and recently retired LASD staff members) and other Los Angeles County stakeholders. Interviews were conducted from October 2019 to October 2020. The interview length ranged from 45 minutes to more than four hours. Participants met with RAND researchers in LASD stations and offices, local restaurants, and RAND Corporation headquarters. The findings presented in this chapter pertain to LASD’s organizational dynamics so that we can understand the workplace atmosphere in which subgroups have formed. The interview findings presented here reflect a range of views about LASD. We note that our interviewees were aware of the subject of our project, and it is likely that the views expressed here pertain to organizational factors that contribute to subgroup development and
behavior. The subsequent chapter looks more closely at the topic of deputy subgroups within LASD. It is worth noting that most of our interviews were completed before the social unrest that spread through the country and Los Angeles County in June 2020. Had our interviews been conducted during or after that period, this section would have likely included more current events.

The interviewees discussed a variety of features relevant to the workplace dynamics of LASD. We present the following preview of key findings:

• **Key elements of working in LASD.** Although LASD is formally a single entity, it might be better considered a collection of separate departments. That is, much of the day-to-day work functions largely independently across units. Interviewees also noted that an individual’s reputation is incredibly important and precedes you wherever you go (i.e., LASD is large but “everybody knows somebody”). In terms of unit hierarchy, higher status is awarded to those who go “where the action is,” or what people call “fast stations.” These tend to be urban areas and high-crime areas and are associated with more arrests and more violent crime. Some interviewees provided historical examples of how executive leadership reinforced the idea that working certain places matters. Additionally, patrol tends to be a more valued assignment than other assignments like custody and courts, and special assignments (Special Enforcement Bureau, Homicide Bureau) tend to be the most highly valued assignments.

• **Core organizational processes.** The department tends to be understaffed, and some noted that hiring sprees have contributed to problems in the past, either because of lowered standards for hiring or because of people spending long periods of time in custody assignments. Training was noted as an especially challenging issue because the department is fragmented and there does not appear to be emphasis on improving the consistency of training. In terms of promotions, people generally noted historical issues with promotions but stated that test-based promotions had at least improved consistency in the process. There was some concern that there was an overreliance on testing. Regarding discipline, people broadly discussed the pendulum swing in terms of the severity of discipline over time and across sheriffs.

• **Key roles within LASD.** Interviewees noted that leadership could exist at a variety of levels but stated that at the highest levels, open communication and setting expectations was key. At lower levels, leaders serve as role models and can either model appropriate or inappropriate behavior. Receiving mixed messages from executive leadership can contribute to hesitation by lower levels of leadership. Additionally, frontline supervisors are the critical link for monitoring deputies’ behavior and holding people accountable. Their role has changed to be more active over time, but there could be reluctance or pushback to overeager supervisors. They have to balance being firm and fair but can face challenges based on their level of experience or social status. Field training officers (TOs) and peer leaders are also critical for influencing unit culture and other deputies’ attitudes and behavior. Being a trainee is a high-stress and low-status position that serves as a formative period for young deputies. In their descriptions of LASD, interviewees often noted the importance of “working hard” and “being humble.” These shared understandings factor into people’s expectations and reputation in the department. Finally, some interviewees discussed the changing external environment, perceiving the job to have gotten much
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department

LASD is the largest sheriff’s department in the nation. The department’s mission is “to proactively prevent crime, enforce the law fairly, and enhance the public’s trust through transparency and accountability,” and their core values are to “lead with compassion, serve with humility and courageously seek justice for ALL.” Their creed—attributed to Deputy David March, who was ambushed and killed in the line of duty—states: “My goals are simple, I will always be painfully honest, work as hard as I can, learn as much as I can and hopefully make a difference in people’s lives.” We highlight these values and mottos here because they communicate ideals that all members of LASD are expected to pursue.

LASD is structurally and geographically diverse, with nearly 10,000 sworn personnel and roughly 8,000 civilian staff providing a wide range of services. As of August 2020, there were 43 individuals at the rank of assistant sheriff, chief, or commander; 72 captains; 373 lieutenants; 1,213 sergeants; and 8,179 deputies in LASD. The Patrol Division covers 3,171 of the county’s 4,084 total square miles: 23 patrol stations police urban areas in South Los Angeles, coastal areas, the mountainous and desert areas in north Los Angeles County, and Santa Catalina Island. Patrol stations vary in the square miles they cover (from 775 to 6 square miles) and the size of the population (286,000 to 4,051). LASD serves 42 contract cities and 141 unincorporated areas in the county and is responsible for seven custody facilities; 37 court locations; seven transit stations; nine community colleges; 216 facilities, hospitals, and clinics; and more than 177 parks in the county.

Workplace Atmosphere

Given how large, complex, and geographically dispersed LASD is, many of our interviewees’ career pathways seemingly contributed to differing experiences and perceptions of the working climate and culture of LASD. Despite this diversity in backgrounds, many interviewees conveyed some common assumptions and ways of understanding the organization.

First, many interviewees noted the contradiction that although LASD is a large department, it feels small in the sense that one can always find someone with personal or secondhand knowledge of a particular employee. This could lead to perceptions of favoritism. Relatedly, we heard that “reputation is everything,” and reputation is often tied to work experience, particularly the station where someone completed patrol training. To some members of the department, completing patrol training at certain stations—ones with challenging training and more violent crime—means that one is competent enough to work anywhere in the department (we provide more detail on these “fast” stations below).

The idea that patrol stations have their own identities was also commonly referenced in our interviews. This appears to be due partly to the geographic dispersion of stations and partly to the stations’ unique histories and traditions. LASD’s four patrol divisions (North, Central, South, and East) are in geographically diverse areas; within each division, patrol stations exist more difficult and thankless and perceiving the national environment as antagonistic toward law enforcement.
Understanding Subgroups Within the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department

in unique communities that range from urban areas to suburbs and from high-crime areas to low-crime areas. These differences contribute to deputies’ perception of the experience to be gained by working at some stations (e.g., deputies in high-crime areas will be more likely to work on a homicide, or some stations are “fast” because they have more challenging work and training). Geographic separation also means that deputies from different divisions tend to be unfamiliar with stations in other divisions or might have limited knowledge of the department overall.

All patrol stations serve a mixture of unincorporated county areas and contract cities. Contract cities have a variety of specific local requirements that leads to some organizational functions, such as dispatch and training, being decentralized, which further contributes to variation in how stations operate. Table 6.1 provides a snapshot of these features of LASD patrol stations from LASD’s annual report. Stations also vary widely in their Part 1 crime rate (which includes attempted or completed homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson) and felony-to-misdemeanor arrest ratio. Century Station was the leader in total arrests in 2019, with more than 10,000.

Additionally, the history and traditions of stations are important for identity. Stations are numbered, with lower numbers reflecting stations that have existed for longer. These numbers are always incorporated into station logos. East Los Angeles (ELA) was the second patrol station ever opened in LASD and is currently the oldest (#2), while Compton (#28) and Walnut/Diamond Bar (#29) are the newest. The ELA logo is probably the most well known; it is also controversial. Banned by Sheriff Jim McDonnell in 2015 and restored by Sheriff Villanueva in 2019, the logo features a helmet on top of a boot with the number 2 on the heel. It includes the words “Fort Apache” and “Low Profile,” and the Spanish slogan “Siempre una patada en los pantalones,” which means “Always a kick in the pants.” The logo reflects the historical view of the station as a lone outpost (Fort Apache) and the station’s historical role in violent clashes during the 1970s Chicano Moratorium, when a deputy fired a tear gas canister that killed Los Angeles Times reporter Ruben Salazar. The helmet and boot are supposed to represent a deputy keeping a “low profile” during the protest—an order from Sheriff Peter J. Pitchess at the time. Another phrase associated with ELA, “Second II None,” has a more status-driven connotation.

Over time, executive leadership might have helped cement the seeming importance of station identity and where one trained. For instance, former executive leadership purportedly showed favoritism toward former workplaces, such as Lynwood (now Century) and Lennox (now South Los Angeles), leading to Region II (now Central Division) earning the reputation of having favored assignments within LASD. According to one retired department member,

Working in [other areas], you were nothing. You weren’t worthy of promotion. [One region] had the stigma of being the cowboy country. I was talked to by [an executive] about [one region] being my only experience, he said I needed to work a fast station. If you worked a certain region, you were God’s gift to the planet, and if you didn’t you were the stepchild, and you were nothing. “You can work Century, and then we’ll talk.” Every station, even Custody, has their group, their logo. For the most part, that’s okay, but [when it’s] ELA or Century, “Oh, we handle business here. We get in gun fights,” and then the others aren’t worthy unless you’re involved in a shooting . . . . It was perpetuated by the executive management. Those that worked the fast stations and were worthy of promotion. If you didn’t work those fast stations, you weren’t worthy and couldn’t promote.
Table 6.1
LASD Patrol Station Characteristics, 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division and Station</th>
<th>Incorporated Population</th>
<th>Unincorporated Population</th>
<th>Square Miles</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
<th>Part 1 Crime Rate</th>
<th>Felony-to-Misdemeanor Arrest Ratio&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Division</td>
<td>638,146</td>
<td>169,165</td>
<td>2,202.02</td>
<td>366.62</td>
<td>216.42</td>
<td>0.38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>157,617</td>
<td>32,058</td>
<td>600.69</td>
<td>315.76</td>
<td>271.04</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malibu/Lost Hills</td>
<td>68,011</td>
<td>23,070</td>
<td>173.37</td>
<td>525.36</td>
<td>176.55</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmdale Station</td>
<td>158,666</td>
<td>44,426</td>
<td>775.44</td>
<td>261.91</td>
<td>200.55</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clarita Valley</td>
<td>217,917</td>
<td>68,640</td>
<td>649.07</td>
<td>441.49</td>
<td>153.93</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hollywood</td>
<td>35,934</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>10,684.63</td>
<td>606.67</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Division</td>
<td>274,661</td>
<td>383,849</td>
<td>188.97</td>
<td>3,484.70</td>
<td>301.94</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avalon</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>132.11</td>
<td>30.66</td>
<td>214.76</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Century</td>
<td>72,100</td>
<td>120,807</td>
<td>12.99</td>
<td>14,845.06</td>
<td>324.82</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<td>Compton</td>
<td>99,988</td>
<td>22,866</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>9,677.83</td>
<td>375.65</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Los Angeles</td>
<td>65,486</td>
<td>124,532</td>
<td>16.32</td>
<td>11,640.30</td>
<td>258.5</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marina del Rey</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>28,357</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>4,486.31</td>
<td>355.12</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Los Angeles</td>
<td>33,374</td>
<td>86,949</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>14,113.93</td>
<td>249.00</td>
<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Division</td>
<td>680,103</td>
<td>131,400</td>
<td>116.71</td>
<td>6,953.45</td>
<td>275.03</td>
<td>0.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carson</td>
<td>93,799</td>
<td>24,550</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>4,890.00</td>
<td>316.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cerritos</td>
<td>50,352</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8.85</td>
<td>5,687.58</td>
<td>477.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lakewood</td>
<td>243,553</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>23.39</td>
<td>10,506.41</td>
<td>328.64</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lomita</td>
<td>73,321</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>22.87</td>
<td>3,377.96</td>
<td>155.22</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwalk</td>
<td>155,017</td>
<td>69,304</td>
<td>24.03</td>
<td>9,333.85</td>
<td>204.53</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pico Rivera</td>
<td>64,060</td>
<td>31,459</td>
<td>13.36</td>
<td>7,148.69</td>
<td>241.63</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Division</td>
<td>323,558</td>
<td>369,788</td>
<td>645.63</td>
<td>1,073.90</td>
<td>192.99</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altadena</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>44,894</td>
<td>25.65</td>
<td>1,750.10</td>
<td>149.91</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crescenta Valley</td>
<td>20,512</td>
<td>21,362</td>
<td>263.22</td>
<td>159.08</td>
<td>123.95</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>46,017</td>
<td>139,756</td>
<td>46.09</td>
<td>4,030.37</td>
<td>199.28</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Dimas</td>
<td>34,335</td>
<td>49,239</td>
<td>218.39</td>
<td>382.67</td>
<td>171.11</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temple</td>
<td>135,302</td>
<td>59,602</td>
<td>46.97</td>
<td>4,149.49</td>
<td>222.83</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walnut/Diamond Bar</td>
<td>87,392</td>
<td>54,935</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>3,141.84</td>
<td>190.69</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Felony-to-misdemeanor arrest ratio. This potentially highlights adaptations to local crime problems (Klinger, 1997).
Whether reality or perception, this idea that certain assignments are more favorable feeds into department members’ understanding of what leadership values. It is not clear how pervasive these perceptions are today, as some interviewees reported that there is currently no clear “fast track” to success. As one interviewee noted,

Some stations are now living on the reputation of two or three generations ago. They like to keep the legend alive of being badasses. Some places may be working twice as hard, but just don’t have the reputation. They have more activity of people out and about. But more well-rounded work with a wider variety of people.

Thus, instead of geography, perceptions of “hard-working” stations might be more closely linked to activity (e.g., calls for service, contacts, arrests, violent crime), which divides the department into “fast” stations and “slow” stations.

**Fast Versus Slow Stations**
Fast stations are perceived to have more challenging training, better opportunities for gaining experience, and more opportunities for doing “police work.” As one tenured line-level deputy put it:

You see more in 2 years than you would elsewhere in 8 years. There are rough neighborhoods and gang violence. It exposes you to a lot. You test yourself. A lot of people can’t make it. There’s a lot of violence and you gotta know to expect it. I wanted to learn from the best and go where there’s stuff going on and some excitement. I didn’t want to go to a slow station where all you have to do is deal with some drunk guy. At [station] you have to hustle every day.

There is also a perception that fast stations are more dangerous:

The high-crime stations are perceived as having a higher reputation than the low-crime stations. There is a bond that occurs with people who face death together. If we’re all in this together, I know the A-players will be there, but maybe the C-players won’t. C-players are not doing proactive policing. They have the blinders on. A-players look for the crime that is occurring. It takes a certain person to pursue the criminal down the alley.

As discussed in Chapter Three, danger is a commonly identified external stressor of law enforcement work. It is associated with coping mechanisms of “maintaining the edge” over civilians and suspicion and the cultural outcome of social isolation (Paoline and Terrill, 2013). Additionally, role ambiguity and supervisor scrutiny could contribute to adopting a crime-fighter role (e.g., focusing on felony arrests) and “laying low,” which contributes to a cultural outcome of loyalty. Thus, the external environment and people’s perceptions of it (e.g., danger) could contribute to adaptations and cultural features, such as social isolation and “us versus them” outlooks, that could increase the likelihood of subgroups developing in some areas.

Some might perceive that working at fast stations has a shortcoming, however. Because there is a higher volume of serious crime, this could result in a trade-off in quality when it comes to writing reports, can hinder the development of skills to deal with less serious crimes or provide service, and can result in less diverse experiences for personnel. As one interviewee recounted their experience at a fast station:
It’s a fast station regarding violent crime. They are great at that. But they are terrible at little stuff. So over time you have constant turnover. At one time as training sergeant, I had 43 people on training. One TO went to prison for falsifying evidence. I had to pick him to be [TO] because we ran out of guys. So, everyone was way too young. They don’t train in the right way. I think the department is very young right now, too, which may be a problem. But back then, a lack of maturity.

It’s likely that those who currently work this station would disagree with this characterization, but these perceptions could play into assumptions about what it is like to work at a station or the qualities of those who work there. Thus, there is a perception that fast stations are associated with gaining experience faster and dealing with more serious crimes, but also with higher turnover, which can create staffing challenges and place potentially less-qualified people in key positions.

In contrast with the challenges of fast stations, an interviewee said that at slow stations, “I think you have to work harder than the faster ones because at the faster ones you open your back door and people come in. At the slower ones, we’re out there hunting for people that are up to no good.” Several interviewees highlighted these distinctions between fast and slow stations, but it is important to note that there is no objective definition of “fast” or “slow.”

Although there is a tendency among deputies to group stations and therefore personnel into fast and slow, we also heard sentiments emphasizing the importance of hard work (e.g., “I don’t frown upon those from other stations, though. If you have a strong work ethic, I don’t care where you’re from”) and the ubiquitous risk of danger (e.g., “Some stations think they are the most fire-tested. So, had to train there to get a pin, even if you transferred in from another fast station. You can argue that every station is risky, but that’s not how people think”). There is also a question of whether having different skill sets across stations is actually beneficial and allows people to self-select into places that are a good fit for them. As one command staff noted,

That’s the beauty of the Sheriff’s Department. It takes different deputies to handle different places. Not all can do Compton, Lennox. Some can do Marina. Different people for different places. A deputy will learn at Century in a year what will take 3 or 4 years in other places. It doesn’t make you better, though. LASD stations operate as independent police departments.

This statement also recognizes that, rather than operating as districts or precincts within the same department, LASD stations are more like completely separate departments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1977), which can lead to differing ways of understanding the organization or doing the work (e.g., dictionary, directory, or recipe knowledge; Sackmann, 1992), potentially creating differing unit subcultures within the organization (Herbert, 1998).

**Devaluing Certain Assignments**

The importance placed on patrol can affect how members of the department perceive other assignments (e.g., custody or courts services). The CCJV report noted the devaluing of custody in particular (e.g., custody deputies are sometimes nicknamed “steputies”). As one interviewee explains:
Custody is a good place to work, the problem is the stigma associated with it. It’s always been around. I think custody is still looked down upon as that’s where the slugs, the problem [and lazy] people go. It’s unfortunate because custody is a very important part of our department. That’s when they started to change to be allowed to promote in custody, but I don’t know if that’s still in place.

Being able to promote in custody was the result of what is known as the Dual Track option,1 which the current administration ended and replaced with new requirements for personnel to spend four years in their first patrol assignment before being eligible to promote or transfer. This solidifies the importance of patrol as a career pathway and is viewed as critical for developing certain skills. That is, a deputy might not be considered a “real deputy” until they finish patrol training. This could be considered unfair to people who might have wished to promote through the Dual Track option and can no longer do so. Importantly, a critical feature of LASD and all sheriff’s departments is that new deputies almost always start their career working the jails. This is where deputies begin to learn about patrol stations and where they would be interested in working patrol after their jail stint. This is also where work relationships and networks begin to form; as one interviewee said, “People in the jails were divided by where they wanted to go in terms of stations in patrol. Different floors of the jail typically went to certain stations.”

As one line-level deputy explained, selecting a station is reflective of one’s expectations for the job and individual background:

> Men’s Central Jail. I saw the mentality there. Certain people who are well-liked get pulled to work the old side: 2000/3000 [floors]—it’s the most respected place to work. I started on 4000 [floor]—the new side. It’s weird how they start the brainwashing. Like you want to work 2000/3000 to build your reputation as a hard charger and can handle ghetto. Those floors are associated with the station you want to go to. 3000 go to Compton. In patrol, they ask where did this guy work? Which floor? 2000 go to Century. NCCF [North County Correctional Facility]—heard stories that certain buildings go to SLA [South Los Angeles Station], Lennox [Century Station]. It’s a passage. I wanted to go to ELA [East Los Angeles] station because I’m Latino and felt like I could be on the level with the people I’m helping out. I speak the language, I can put myself in their shoes. I grew up in the ’hood. I could see myself making a difference.

Despite custody being perceived as an undesired assignment, several interviewees recognized the importance of custody for personal development but also suggested shorter stints there. Some people noted that working custody is important for interacting with and understanding people who have violated the law, which helps deputies understand crime and criminal behavior when they reach patrol. As one command staff explained, “Custody allows you to grow, gain confidence, and get street wise, and learn the tricks of the trade of the guys on the street.” Spending a few years in custody also allows younger deputies to mature in what might be considered a more controlled environment. However, several interviewees noted that spend-

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1 Historically, deputies were not allowed to promote to sergeant or beyond without having gone to patrol first. Starting in 2014, LASD began the Dual Track option, which allowed deputies to promote and have a career path exclusively in custody assignments.
ing too much time working in custody can have a negative impact on deputies’ worldview. According to one command staff:

Another problem with our culture is that you go straight to the jail. You mature in the jail. You learn about the seedy side of life. The bad part is that everyone is a crook. Then, you go out into the field and you treat people like crooks, victims, informants. Maybe people should spend less time in the jail, a maximum of maybe 1 year. Your time in jail depends on the stations you put in for.

The potential for the custody experience to make deputies cynical was an observation that several participants noted and was referenced as a potential issue by community stakeholders, but it is an open question. There is a limited amount of research in this area, but some evidence suggests that there is some overlap across the occupational cultures of correctional officers and police officers, based on similar task environments (Farkas and Manning, 1997). Thus, assignment and patrol station hierarchies define how many view the department and, therefore, department personnel. It is not clear how strongly these factors affect career decisions of LASD personnel, as they might make decisions based on other priorities (e.g., being close to home, a regular schedule).

**Key Organizational Processes**

Although a full examination of organizational processes is beyond the scope of this project, several of these processes were frequently mentioned in relation to both subgroups and general challenges for LASD. Hiring, training, promotions, and discipline are important organizational features that subtly affect a variety of organizational processes and outcomes. The individual differences in the skills, abilities, and outlooks that people possess when they enter the department can potentially endure throughout their career. Training is critical for developing skills and institutionalizing job-specific knowledge, and academy training is a key step for early socialization of recruits. Finally, promotions and promotion processes reflect the qualities and characteristics that the department values in personnel (Brodin, 2018). Hiring, training, and promotions are important elements of any organization, and each is worthy of its own systematic study, but we highlight findings that interviewees noted as particularly important because they affect personnel and their perceptions and experiences, whether from a historical perspective, an operational perspective, or an organizational climate and culture perspective.

**Hiring**

Hiring is a critical but underresearched aspect of law enforcement effectiveness. In January 2021, LASD began to require an associate’s degree for new hires. When the idea of higher educational requirements came up, some interviewees certainly saw it as a positive step. This is also consistent with policing research literature that highlights the importance of education for policing outcomes, such as the use of force and complaints (McElvain and Kposowa, 2008; Paoline and Terrill, 2007; Rydberg and Terrill, 2010; Terrill and Mastrofski, 2002), as well as with feedback from the community, who recommended higher education requirements to improve deputies’ performance. Other interviewees noted that cyclical hiring sprees are a historical concern for many in the department. Cyclical hiring sprees are partly a function of county budgets and hiring freezes. Some command staff noted that “in the push to hire deputies, they are going to get issues like they did in 2008 because they got a lot of bad apples and lowered the standard in terms of the background check. I know people who have left the
background unit because they did not agree with the decisions being made. He’s filling up the
vacancies, but they’ll have to see how that turns out.” Another command staff member esti-
mated that hiring roughly 400 people per year would be a more balanced approach to hiring
as opposed to 1,000 in a single year followed by 200 or less in subsequent years. Hiring sprees
could also contribute to making the department “too young” because they could lead to people
leaving custody too soon and being unprepared for patrol training. Conversely, contingent on
county funding, if a hiring spree is followed by a hiring freeze, people might stay in custody
too long, which has reportedly contributed to problems in the jails in the past.

Training Challenges
Several interviewees noted structural challenges that affect LASD’s ability to provide timely,
effective, and consistent training across the department. Some command staff perceived that
new deputies enter LASD with deficient communication skills. This perception was linked to
generational differences (e.g., millennials and Generation Z) but also to the changing nature of
interactions in the jails. The perception is that various administrative and procedural require-
ments of custody work (e.g., cell checks, paperwork) leave less time for interacting with inmates
that improves communication skills and street knowledge. Others noted that a lack of inmate
interaction can leave deputies unprepared for their crime-fighting duties when they leave cus-
tody for patrol. As one command staff noted, “Today, the last batch of trainees had been on
the job for 4 months in custody. They’re not prepared (for patrol) and they’re scared. So, the
TOs have to teach deputies more about how to do the job.”

Additionally, except for the academy, much of the training that deputies receive is not
centralized and is handled at the unit level. Given the autonomy of units, this could contribute
to variation in training across the department. As one command staff remarked:

We get cynical and maybe because it’s the nature of our jobs and who we see, but I think
we need to have a better training structure. We used to have centralized training when I
first came onto the department. Now, each unit is responsible for the training. It’s expen-
sive to centralize training. You have to give time to people for the training, but if you want
to reduce liabilities, it’s going to cost money . . . spending money on the front end so you
don’t have to pay for it on the back end. . . . I think if we were better, if these things come
together, it would minimize deputy groups happening, giving people a reason to do some-
thing that is incongruent with the missions and goals.

Others noted that training affects supervisory ranks as well. One command staff said:

Sergeants have administrative and supervisory tasks that we don’t really train them for. It’s
all on the job. We don’t have the resources to do the training; we’d have ridiculous amounts
of overtime. There’s an 80-hour mandate by POST [the California Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training], and we’ve asked for 120 hours to do 40 [hours] of LASD
extra [training], but the answer is always “no.” Most of the POST stuff is not the hands-on
practical stuff that we need them to know. We have the field operations school for sergeants
that’s supposed to be had within a year [of promoting to sergeant], but 90 percent of the
typical class has at least 3 years [on the job]. We have no training for sergeants or lieutenants
to make them better at their job.

Limited training at any level can create a ripple effect leading to “practical drift” (i.e.,
a slow steady uncoupling of practice from written procedure; Klinger, 2020) or, as one com-
mand staff put it, “blurred copies” of training programs that might not quite match what LASD intended:

The bottom line is, you have to have the right training in place, everywhere, all the way down the line. If you have people indoctrinating new recruits into this way of policing, it’s people who’ve worked at different stations who policed under different circumstances. . . . if you have flaws in training, the way things are done, you have a series of blurred copies. You have to have a fresh new perspective on training consistently.

Finally, training challenges are also evident for in-service training. As one midlevel supervisor explained:

We lack the technology to train. . . . Depending on the subject matter, some of it is annual, some biannual, etc. I spent the last 10 years of patrol and didn’t have a single first aid or CPR class. I only went to training 1 or 2 times because I took initiative . . . it comes down to money and the higher-ups. I brought things up to supervisors who have a lack of interest.

Multiple survey respondents also mentioned training deficiencies, as one explained:

In my opinion, the biggest problem LASD has is the lack of ongoing training. For most deputies, training consists of being given a handout to read and signing an APIS [Automated Personnel In-Service] roster, with no practical application exercise to support the information provided. The recent incidents that have incited the unrest in this country boil down to the quality of officer training or the lack thereof.

Promotions

Several interviewees also noted that promotions are judged in terms of whether the people being promoted are the right fit for their new position. Perspectives on promotions took two forms: (1) those who commented on promotions to executive leadership and command staff positions and (2) those who commented on promotions to midlevel supervision and the process for how these positions are assigned.

Historically, favoritism was perceived as the basis for many promotions (e.g., accusations of rigged exams), especially to the ranks of captain and above. Some command staff noted that people might still be promoted or marginalized based on this history, but several perceived the new process for promotion to captain\(^2\) to be a positive direction.

Previously if this job had opened, the Sheriff and command staff would pick a few people and interview them all, and usually there was a ringer in there. There would be a county rep or a city manager or someone that you’d interview with, and they would tell the Sheriff who they wanted. And the Sheriff would ignore that and pick the person they actually wanted.

There is now apparently a broader applicant pool and more local control in selecting captains. It is worth noting that consistency matters, and there is some concern that the process is not being followed, or, as one individual put it:

\(^2\) Beginning in 2019, LASD executive staff could select up to ten candidates (previously three) to interview for a captain position. These candidates must have worked at least four cumulative years in patrol assignments. Community leaders interview the candidates and make a recommendation.
As long as it’s enforced uniformly. If you make exceptions, then it’s a huge drawback. It affects supervisors and deputies. People lose respect for leadership.

Some noted that the promotions process still appears to be bifurcated. As one command staff member noted,

Some people are promoted from good work. Some are promoted from connections. Yesterday, one person who promoted [did not meet supposed qualifications]. That person had clear connections to people at the top. It’s frustrating for people who are passed over. How do you know [the reason]? Is it politics of the department or something else?

Several interviewees noted that promotions at lower ranks are now much more formalized than they used to be, which led to suspicions of favoritism in the past. However, the new process can pose challenges because it does not give the captains any say. Promotions to coveted positions and midlevel supervisory posts are test-based, and assignments tend to occur based on seniority. Captains typically are not allowed to pick the sergeants and lieutenants who work for them. As one commented,

You have what you have. You can try to mentor. Only some specialty positions can be picked by captains now, so problems can come in with a supervisory issue. The department does a better job now training sergeants than 20 years ago. We do mentoring and classes, but ideally it would be a standard other than the test. . . . I understand the reason for it—prior people abused that power. People couldn’t get out of custody because they didn’t know people in patrol.

Finding a balance between an impartial or test-driven promotion process while also promoting individuals with the appropriate experience and skills was seen as a challenge in need of solutions.

**Investigations and Discipline**

We also heard a variety of perspectives on discipline. The themes related to how the severity of discipline can send a message to deputies about whether LASD takes a matter seriously, the importance of individualized discipline and how discipline varies across the department, and historical perspectives on discipline under different sheriffs.

Historically, several command staff noted a pattern of lax discipline during Sheriff Baca’s tenure, primarily attributed to favoritism on the part of Undersheriff Tanaka.3 As one person said, “Tanaka . . . let the deputies do whatever the hell they wanted to do. Baca was way up in the clouds and let Tanaka do whatever he wanted to.” Several interviewees thought that the pendulum swung the other way under Sheriff McDonnell but has now swung back to more of a middle ground. As one person said:

With Baca and Tanaka, who you knew could get you out of discipline. For McDonnell, it swung the other way. Now, we are back to less punitive and better union protections. One mistake is not the end of the world now. Now, you have discretion to take each case as it is. . . . We still have guidelines for fairness, and discipline is equitable across the department if circumstances are similar.

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3 This has been documented publicly in the media (Faturechi and Leonard, 2012) and in the CCJV report.
This idea of fairness can be challenging because the process that leads to disciplinary decisions can be opaque, especially when trying to compare decisions across the department. As one interviewee explained:

Under McDonnell, people felt like there was too much discipline and it was unfair. But they didn’t understand the process and the efforts to make it fair. People don’t want to hear the truth. And it’s secretive, so people don’t understand decisions and how it may be fair. That’s state law to keep investigations closed. They think, “So-and-so did the same thing and didn’t get into trouble, why am I getting in trouble?” They don’t know how the situations are different.

Perception of unequal treatment is a common issue in law enforcement agencies, but perceptions matter nonetheless because they can affect morale and treatment of others (Jacobs, Belschak, and Den Hartog, 2014; Wolfe and Piquero, 2011; Wolfe et al., 2018). Similarly, perspectives varied on individualized discipline and variation across the department. In support of increasing consistency, one command staff noted:

One significant thing they don’t do and should is find the best practices and what works and what doesn’t and implement that. I can run whatever I want, but they don’t go out looking for those best practices. We are all under one department and they should run the same way. We should not have so much latitude from division to division. There’s different discipline based on division.

The other perspective, however, is that having more independence is valuable for adapting to local circumstances or leadership priorities, within limits. As one person said:

I’m allowed to manage my unit and hold people accountable in my own way. We deal with people until they cross a certain line. That’s what we’re trying to get our younger personnel to understand. Consistency is a good thing, but every situation should be looked at differently. There should be minimum standards, but everything needs to be evaluated. If you’re not going to own the mistakes, then we’ve got a problem.

But where there is too much freedom to vary, there is potential for people to deviate from acceptable practice. According to a midlevel supervisor: “Supervisors [are] trying to self-preserve and can’t hold their own guys accountable anymore. Discipline is inconsistent and any rules can be bent and manipulated.”

Lastly, several interviewees commented on the messages the department sends about acceptable behavior based on discipline. As one command staff noted,

If they really want to make change, they make change. If they’re just being political and putting something out in the atmosphere, we can see the difference. For example, not wearing a seat belt is just a write up. But if the punishment is days off with no pay, then they know it’s serious.

Other signals about what is important come from the way discipline is implemented—for instance, if there are “a lot more written reprimands and not discipline happening. Or things are not written up as excessive force. So people are not being held accountable.”
Two significant challenges with discipline in law enforcement agencies are that there is no “correct” answer as to the level of discipline for the various types of infractions, and employee protections make it difficult to fire poorly performing personnel, which is why leadership and supervision practices are so important. Sometimes this boils down to determining why a violation was committed: “Some has to do with intent. Honest mistake? Trying to cut corners? Training issue? All those factors play into it,” one person said.

Leadership and Supervisory Roles

Ensuring that the department runs in a fair, effective manner is directly tied to the actions of leadership. Additionally, leadership sets the tone for the climate and culture (Dragoni, 2005; Schaefer and Boyd, 2010; Trice and Beyer, 1991; Zohar and Tenne-Gazit, 2008), both within the department and externally with the community. In an organization as large and complex as LASD, understanding and leading the entire organization is challenging. Throughout our interviews, we heard a variety of perspectives on leadership and supervision that touched on department history, communication styles, supervisor skills and experience, and interactions with subordinates.

Perspectives on Leadership

First, interviewees were consistent about the importance of direct communication with subordinates. Particularly at the captain level, direct communication at all levels of the unit was cited as important for giving voices to all, building trust, and ensuring that everyone is on the same page. The simplest aspect of this is walking around the station or facility and talking to people where they work rather than in an office. Captains deemed this to be critical for understanding what is actually going on within a unit:

You’re always trying to get ahead of it. The hardest job is dealing with human beings. It’s a constant feeling of “Am I missing something?” I’m trying to prevent burnout and provide training. . . . We build ourselves up so much that we forget to be human. We have to humanize law enforcement.

Another way direct communication is important is to give deputies a voice in decision-making and to generate buy-in for common goals. Some captains reported allowing people to take ownership of redesigning assignments or asking deputies for feedback about what is working and what is not. Direct communication is important for making sure that everyone is on the same page—both all the way down and back up the chain of command. Being able to communicate and understand the unit better from a ground level also helps captains anticipate and be proactive about problems: “If someone is disciplined, and someone says, ‘we could see that coming,’ that’s a failure of leadership,” one person said. This anticipation is connected to acting decisively and not letting problems fester. Others recognized the fact that different types of leadership occur within different levels of the organization. Deputy leaders, sometimes referred to as “peer leaders,” serve as role models for other deputies, and “every station has its person, the culture of the station revolves around a person or a couple of people. Their mannerisms, the way they speak, the way they act resembles the way the legend acts.” These individuals are seen as important for getting people on board
with change. The quote above and the one below both reflect the importance of deputy leaders and TOs for implementing the goals of the department.

You have that one guy everyone wants to be like. Deputies hate change, but if you make a change, they’re going to do it, we’re still paramilitary. Making change isn’t hard, it’s more how to motivate them to want to do it.

Equally or more important are TOs, who might have the most influence on a unit.

If you’re a good training officer, you have to figure out how people learn and find the best way to communicate. If you are a really great TO, you have the ability to almost clone yourself. If you’re really good, you have the ability to change or create or maintain the personality of a station. I tell my TO here, “If you don’t believe that this is the best station, you should. And you as a TO, you have the ability to make that true through the trainees you send out here. If you believe you’re the best, you should be able to make your trainees the best here.”

Both of these quotes reflect the importance of deputy leaders and TOs for implementing the goals of the department. Sergeants are also in important leadership positions, but as a supervisor, their role is slightly different in that they need to guide and monitor behavior without needing to be liked. “It comes back to strong supervisors knowing the temperature of a unit. The sergeant role is critical. The sergeant should be strong and assertive,” one interviewee said.

**Mixed Messages**

Other discussions about leadership focused on leaders sometimes sending mixed messages, which can impede accountability or lead to loss of respect. The most notable historical example is former Undersheriff Tanaka’s infamous “work in the gray” speech, in which he implied that it is acceptable to push boundaries or break policy if it leads to a desirable outcome. As one interviewee noted:

There were really bad leadership flaws where he empowered people too much and gave free range. This is a fact as well, when the Undersheriff (Tanaka) came out to my station and he gave the infamous “working in the gray” speech. Whenever you believe you’re exempt from rules, that’s when you’re no use anymore. You have to abide by the rules. You have to have loyalty and respect for the rules. If supervisors say the rules don’t apply to you, that’s where you have problems.

This and other previously reported actions appeared to undermine supervisors’ ability to hold people accountable, particularly in the jails. This extreme example can take other forms, as another interviewee explained:

It’s accountability. If they’re coming in late, and the captain says it’s no big deal, it’s going to perpetuate with that and other policy. Now this person shows up in a different location and they have to walk the walk. It’s all contingent upon who is watching you.

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4 This has been discussed publicly in the media (Faturechi and Leonard, 2012) and in the CCJV report.
Such inconsistency affects subordinate leadership as well. For instance, one interviewee gave an example of a captain questioning why the interviewee wrote up a sergeant for a use of force that had gone unreported. The interviewee explained to the captain that it was done to correct the adverse behavior. How a lax approach can impede accountability is best summed up in this statement:

These deputies keep pushing the line and dipping their toes to see how far they can go. The “ah, boys will be boys, it’s harmless,” won’t work. You create a shitstorm, and that’s what we have.

Finally, some interviewees noted that personnel pay attention to who is promoted to executive leadership positions and whether those individuals fit the stated criteria. For example, a new push for executives in LASD to have a certain amount of time in patrol and custody is viewed as an important requirement because their deeper experience and knowledge of assignments in these areas will likely make them better leaders. However, “if they make exceptions, then it’s a huge drawback . . . people lose respect for leadership.”

**Front-Line Supervision**

Front-line supervisors play a critical role in public safety organizations. Because they are in direct contact with line-level personnel, supervisors have direct influence on behavior, attitudes, and organizational culture (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018). This role often involves making sure that front-line staff understand departmental policies, discussing tactics, responding to critical incidents, debriefing, holding people accountable, and other critical functions related to front-line work. Front-line supervisors are responsible for communicating messages from executive leadership, implementing organizational changes, and serving as role models for subordinates (Weiss, 1977). Research on the influence of sergeants suggests that they can affect perceptions of organizational fairness, support for the organization’s use-of-force policy (Ingram et al., 2014), job satisfaction (Ingram and Weidner, 2011), compliance with internal policies (Haas et al., 2015), use of force (Lim and Lee, 2015), and arrests (Engel, 2000; Engel and Worden, 2003).

LASD has high expectations for all supervisors. As outlined in the Manual of Policies and Procedures (section 3-01/020.25), supervisors have “ultimate responsibility for the supervision of all members subordinate to [them] in the chain of command” (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Manual of Policy and Procedures, 2021a), including ensuring their general welfare, evaluating performance and investigating complaints, developing acceptable attitudes, and counseling on career paths. Supervisors perform regular inspections, give instructions, delegate authority, and assign tasks. They are ultimately responsible for the conduct of their subordinates and subordinate supervisors.

Several interviewees noted that the role of sergeants has changed over time. For instance, since the 1990s and early 2000s, sergeants have taken on a larger role. As one member of command staff explained:

In the 1990s, they neutered the power of the bonus deputy. Deputies were mandated to report to a sergeant when you used force. There was more responsibility on the sergeant because of this. They didn’t use to have to do this in the department; this was viewed as an LAPD thing because police officers in LAPD have to get sergeant approval for everything.
LASD hasn’t gotten to that yet, but they have put more accountability on the sergeants. Sergeants are more hands-on now.

This contrast with LAPD was mentioned several times as being indicative of deputies being expected and judged on their ability to “handle things” and of supervisors supporting but not dictating or controlling activity, which could set LASD apart from other law enforcement agencies. This approach can present a tension with supervision, however, as people could feel that if a supervisor does “roll” on a call (accompany the deputy when responding to a call), he or she might not trust the deputy or might be trying to “burn” (punish) the deputy.

**Balance Between Firmness and Fairness**

The position of sergeant was described as the ultimate balancing act: being firm and fair, getting close to deputies but not too close, giving enough instructions but not micromanaging, and so on. Trust appears to be essential, as one command staff member noted:

> Sergeant position is the key position. I tell them “treat them like your own children.” Set the environment so that deputies come to you. They have to be comfortable coming to you, seeking advice, leadership, and guidance. Educate them. Be there for them. The sergeant has to be a conduit to the captain. The captain won’t know anything from where they are. I communicate this to every sergeant and lieutenant.

Caring was also noted as an important characteristic that distinguished good sergeants from bad sergeants. One command staff member said:

> With anything in law enforcement, if you have strong supervisors and make employees believe you care about them, a lot of the problems will be diminished or not arise. But a lot [of supervisors] don’t care and just come here to get paid. You have to be passionate with the things you do. I try to surround myself with those who care, and if not, I send them somewhere else.

Another way supervisors were perceived as effective was if they set expectations and upheld them. Effective supervisors accept accountability for the behavior of their subordinates. As one command staff noted: “Good sergeants will make or break deputies. They are the ones that have to ensure that the deputies are working hard, treating people with respect, and any time you see them wavering, grab ‘em and ask them, ‘Have you considered this or this or this?’” Accountability applies to both overseeing deputies’ general behavior and communicating new policy directives (e.g., ensuring that deputies wear seat belts).

**Supervision Challenges**

Although there are clear characteristics that promote effective supervision, there are also structural and individual factors that can present challenges for effective supervision. These factors include supervisors’ experience and knowledge, their work history, their courage, and department policies and procedures.

One key challenge that several interviewees noted is that, because the department is young and there are a lot of sergeant vacancies to fill, some sergeants might have much less experience than deputies who they are assigned to supervise. Although deputies respect rank, when it comes to doing the work, experience tends to matter more. As one command staff
member noted, “Years of service is more important than rank. On the surface, we’re very compliant with the hierarchy. You have to set the tone early as a sergeant.”

Related to experience is how the current promotions process works. The process is largely test-driven (e.g., paper-and-pencil tests of knowledge and situational judgment), and unit commanders are unable to select their sergeants or lieutenants. Although the lack of choice was generally understood in light of the substantial favoritism allowed under previous practices, a reliance on testing alone was seen as potentially fraught:

We are promoting 300 sergeants soon. More than some departments as a whole. Sometimes you get good test-takers who don’t have common sense or street knowledge, so it’s a mixed bag. But we have to start mentoring all of them. It’s only informal mentoring. Training is more about paperwork, their role.

As mitigation, some interviewees deemed it important to pair new sergeants with more-experienced sergeants or lieutenants and to avoid a mismatch between new sergeants and the deputies they supervise (e.g., a new sergeant supervising “Type A” deputies). Although inexperience has to be managed, there is still no substitute for experience, as command staff noted: “Those that are tenured sergeants are invaluable. They can navigate through any problem that comes their way and they have the commitment level to roll up their sleeves.”

Another supervisory challenge for some stations stems from the perception of fast and slow stations. Some interviewees noted that people who trained in slow stations could try to go to fast stations as supervisors—referred to as “back-dooring”—to gain the fast station reputation without having trained there. As one supervisor explained:

You have a lot of inexperienced people get promoted. You get these people who, there’s this drive in people to work at a fast station. . . . You have to be stronger than a lot of heavy-duty assholes there. You have to have the wherewithal to get through every day. What they do is say “I went to this slower station and it was closer to home,” etc., then they get to sergeant and try to get to a fast station. It’s nowhere near as difficult as a sergeant. You chose not to take the hard route. . . . I’ll say “you should have transferred here as a deputy.” . . . they’re driven by this insecurity that they need to be liked so they won’t make the hard decisions. . . . they don’t recognize who’s being scandalous or conning them. You get astute deputies who could just as well be criminals fooling supervisors into thinking they’re hard workers, down for the cause, good people, etc., and they’re allowed to run the program that they want.

Because subgroups are likely to exist in fast stations, a sergeant’s background could potentially inhibit his or her effectiveness when dealing with subgroup members.

**Promote and Remain**

On the flip side of “back-dooring” is the idea of “promote and remain,” or promoting from within the same station where one spent a lot of time as a patrol deputy. This is perceived as a challenge because a new supervisor would be supervising their friends, which could make it challenging to firmly hold subordinates accountable. There is a trade-off, however, because their familiarity can be beneficial in that, as one person put it, “they know the area. They know the City Council. The pitfall is that now they’re supervising deputies they worked with.” This presents a potential challenge for new supervisors who “have to have the courage to step up and
confront people.” This can be a challenge for supervisors who promote and remain in stations with subgroups, because they might have developed bonds with members.

**Supervisor Cowardice or “Deputy Five”**

Supervisor courage or, alternatively, supervisor cowardice was seen as a related potential challenge. In the extreme, supervisors who are too interested in being friends with deputies or behave as they did before their promotion are known as a “Deputy Five” (there are four levels within the deputy rank). As one command staff member explained, “Some supervisors want to be friendly and be accepted, but that’s the distinction between weak and strong leadership. Custody had supervisors who wanted to be accepted, which is why they had a problem, but it’s not the job to be friends with deputies.”

This also speaks to the ability to address problems decisively as soon as they surface, as one command-level interviewee discussed:

> Where there is strong supervision, where supervisors have the pulse of the workplace and can nip things in the bud right away, that’s where groups are not allowed to flourish. If groups cause a problem, then it can be addressed. . . . Good supervisors are not afraid to take action. Supervisors need to explain to young, impressionable deputies the pitfalls and consequences of their actions if they go astray.

**Policies Can Tie Supervisors’ Hands**

Another unique aspect of the sergeant’s role is that they are the link in the chain of command between deputies and the more administrative or managerial positions. This requires them to both go into the field and perform administrative tasks. Some interviewees noted that supervisors have little discretion in many important matters other than to follow the standard procedures. As one supervisor said:

> Sergeants have the toughest job. You get it from below, above, and the public. It’s thankless but they still have the responsibility because they’re immediate. They don’t have the ability anymore to back a deputy who didn’t handle a call a certain way that gets them in trouble. The sergeant is bound by policy to start an investigation. Once that investigation starts, the deputy could be blacklisted or worse. Policy dictates the way the supervisor will supervise. . . . Even guiding someone, it affects the sergeant-deputy relationship. I can see these things being good and bad.

Thus, these administrative requirements are important because they ensure that policies are being upheld, but they can affect the deputy-sergeant relationship because deputies know that a sergeant has little discretion on some matters. Given that cliques generally serve a function to “lay low” from administrative scrutiny (Crank, 2004), this could increase distance between supervisors and subgroup members. Additionally, deputies who are dealing with issues caused by subgroups might be hesitant to discuss them with a supervisor due to the supervisor’s potential duty to report, invoking a process that is out of the complainant’s control.

**Administrative Burden Could Limit Effectiveness**

Others noted that the supervisor position has changed over time and now includes much more paperwork and office work than it used to. This pulls sergeants from direct supervision and might limit their effectiveness. This could also prevent them from engaging in other, poten-
tially more important, aspects of their supervisory responsibilities because the paperwork that could result from taking action might not be “worth it.” This is sometimes the case for situations that allow an employee to “grieve” the supervisors’ decision (initiate a formal challenge to the decision). One supervisor put it this way: “As a supervisor, issuing a report on a deputy makes you ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t.’” Looking up from below, a few deputies noted that this administrative burden might lead to supervisors who let things slide and are not interested in making waves.

**Discipline Can Be Perceived as Too Harsh**

Knowing that there is little discretion once formal procedures begin, some interviewees indicated that if discipline is perceived as being too harsh, supervisors might hesitate to impose it. As one command staff member noted,

> It’s important to enforce. If it’s too severe, it affects the supervisor’s decision. It’s gotten too much attention and overblown. Supervisors aren’t addressing bad behavior that has to be dealt with. Reporting on others is a challenge in any profession. You’re in life and death situations and you’re having to trust people. Trust and camaraderie are important.

By emphasizing trust and camaraderie, this quote suggests that taking supervisory action can limit effectiveness, which was echoed elsewhere, although there is a limit. As one individual said,

> We look at every complaint. If it’s not written down it didn’t occur. We document everything to protect the deputies. The change to everything is education. If it is correctible, then education can be more effective than discipline. Discipline can make some deputies ineffective. But if the offense is bad enough, there’s no problem firing the deputy. For instance, if a deputy needs to improve their driving patterns, that’s correctible. If it’s drunk driving or domestic violence, which is widespread across the county and department, it’s one and done.

As the discussion above suggests, front-line supervision is critical for the functioning of LASD (or any department), but a variety of organizational and individual dynamics can factor into effective supervision. This includes supervisor experience, work history, and courage, as well as organizational factors, such as limited discretion, administrative workload, and options for discipline. These factors can provide challenges to effective supervision of subgroups, given that subgroup members might have more experience or might have worked at the station for a long period of time. Effective supervisors use a firm yet fair approach and show subordinates that they care through communication and action. Collectively, supervisors need to be on the same page and uphold the same standards.

These challenges for supervision also need to be considered in the context of the supervisory environment. Supervisors do not directly observe much of the patrol work (i.e., deputies have a high level of autonomy and discretion), which makes it critical that supervisors effectively communicate and guide deputies toward desired behaviors. Some of the above challenges are not novel, as other research has identified several overlapping acts of commission (e.g., arrogance, closed-mindedness, micromanaging, capriciousness) and omission (poor work ethic, failure to act, poor communication, lack of interpersonal skills, lack of integrity) of ineffective police leaders (Schafer, 2010).
Training Officers

TOs fulfill a unique role in between being a deputy and a sergeant. The limited research on how TOs influence their trainees suggests that TOs have a significant impact on trainee behavior in terms of transferring academy training into the field (Dulin, Dulin, and Patino, 2019), incorporating community policing into field training (Chappell, 2007), preventing future allegations of trainee misconduct (Getty, Worrall, and Morris, 2016), and affecting trainees’ decisions to leave police work (Haarr, 2005).

In LASD, TOs have elevated status and pay as a “Bonus Deputy” and are responsible for training and evaluating trainees both in the jails and on patrol. Because patrol training is a key step, the relationship between patrol TO and trainee is prominent in LASD and is occasionally described in familial terms (e.g., second generation). “Leadership is important at every level,” as one interviewee said. “[TO] is most important and dynamic personnel at every station. They control how [the] deputy will go.” Another outlined the characteristics of a good TO this way:

Good TOs recognize what works with the trainees. There is no “one size fits all.” You have to be dedicated and willing to put in the hours. Have maturity. Be able to own up to mistakes. Willingness to learn as well. You want your best people who can write good paper. Got to have patience.

Currently, a deputy must go through “coveted testing” and qualify before they are promoted to a coveted position, such as the TO position. Historically, the process was much less formal, as one interviewee described:

Back in the day, the captains picked the training officers. Really need TOs to be knowledgeable about their area and the station. That way you can teach your trainees about the community. They looked for hard workers, someone who was teachable. Now, they do a universal test, and you come out of a list, so you can be a training officer anywhere. So, you can go without knowing anything about that neighborhood or station. They changed this about ten years ago because there were some captains who were just picking people they knew. But the pendulum swung too far the other way for the purpose of fairness. However, they do still try to make sure they can pick their people who are familiar with the area.

Other interviewees noted that, under the old system, captains would consult with deputies about who would make a good TO, possibly contributing to undue influence of deputy subgroups. Currently, command staff note that they understand the need for a fair process but that the coveted testing process gives them no say in the selections, and they occasionally have to resort to workarounds, such as “letting the list die” (closing the position and reopening it later), to get the right person. Said one:

If it’s the right person, they can play a huge role, but the big problem we have right now is coveted testing—it’s a huge problem. There are a lot of people with a sense of entitlement. They take the test before they’re ready. Every job should have an oral interview with it. You

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5 We use the generic term TO to avoid confusion because many of the functions of training officers in custody and field training officers in patrol are similar. We note where we are specifically discussing patrol training officers.

6 This is a test people must take to promote to a Bonus Deputy position, which is still within the deputy rank but includes a pay raise. These positions include TOs, as well as several other positions, such as detective, team leader, and others. Once passing the test, coveted positions are filled on a seniority basis.
need the A player, the B player to assess someone. I’ll just lock up the list if I don’t see someone who can be trusted to take the position. If you as a supervisor are going to be responsible for managing the person, you should at least be able to weigh in on who gets the job.

**Peer Leaders**

Informal peer leaders were mentioned as having an important role in helping communicate messages from captains to the deputy level. Like TOs, peer leaders have considerable influence on a station; one person described them as “usually a hard worker with some tenure. Extremely respected and are chosen by reputation. The main thing is work ethic.” They could also mentor younger deputies in situations when going to a supervisor is not ideal. As one deputy explained:

> If I found myself in a bind, which you do, you’ve got a lot going on. You know you did it the right way, but you ask whether it really was the right way, it’s always nice to go to those seasoned deputies who you know are good at guiding people for advice. . . . No one wants a supervisor looking over your shoulder.

This peer leader role and the person(s) in this position can help a captain get buy-in or address issues while they are still nascent. As one command staff member said,

> I meet with the peer leaders. Sometimes I tell them, “I hear this is happening.” They say, “We don’t know, but we’ll find out.” Later, they come back and say, “We dealt with it.” I hold them accountable and they buy into it. They are empowered.

This illustrates both the importance of the peer leader(s) and the potential risk in having deputies handle supervisory issues. Although this is a balancing act, the same interviewee emphasized the importance of communication and buy-in across the entire chain of command and having set expectations and zero tolerance when lines are crossed. As we note in the next chapter, TOs and peer leaders are occasionally involved in subgroups or in inviting others to subgroups.

**What Is Expected of Trainees**

The training period, especially patrol training, is stressful for trainees. Learning the job is one source of stress, but the trainer-trainee relationship can be another. As one deputy explained:

> Our training program is very hard and difficult. Hear stories of people who don’t make it on training and go back to the jails. Once you’re a roll up, you’re considered a black sheep. Not good enough. I used to think that they didn’t work hard enough or were lazy. You’re steered towards thinking that. They weren’t cut out to be here. Not until I got out to patrol that I understood that it’s more than just job related. It’s stressful. You have to please your TO. It’s up to him. He decides your career. You’re put in this spot where I have to do whatever I have to do to get off training. Puts a lot of pressure and stress. Not only do you train to do the job, you have to worry that they like me. I hope they give me a chance. They could fail you on training no matter what. People know that. You hear the stories.

Trainees are also expected to listen and learn, or, as one command staff put it:

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7 To “roll up” means to leave patrol training before completing it and returning back to custody or another nonpatrol assignment.
Trainees don’t talk unless they have to talk. This is part of a learning environment to get them to observe. Even as a captain you observe and learn things. Anyone who's new will be humble and will wait to gain everyone's respect.

This was observed to differ from how LAPD treats trainees. Stated another way, given that older trainees may feel more deserving of respect:

There's a certain mentality you need to get off training. I was talking with a trainee that was a little older and I was saying here’s what you need to do to get out—you need to eat some humble pie and you need to understand your explanations sound like excuses. That’s just how it is.

In general, people who are new to an assignment are expected to be humble. This expectation could be interpreted as a direction to not ask questions, or it might be a barrier to people speaking up about perceived issues or questioning a TO. One interviewee said:

It’s high risk for a trainee to complain. You want to be included and liked. No one wants to be the one who complains. Trainee needs to understand that you're not going to break the law, though. The goal in patrol training is to become a successful patrol deputy sheriff. There will be stress, but it should not be preventing people from succeeding. There’s a line that should not be crossed. Immoral, unethical, illegal are not okay. If deputy comes forward, then it was likely bad. The average deputy does not want to tell supervisor that things are not going well. The first level of supervision should see a lot of what’s going on, though.

Other interviewees mentioned that some TOs in custody and patrol, as well as other deputies, will occasionally “play games” with trainees. This could take the form of simply telling a deputy to “figure it out,” interfering with their equipment, or pressuring them to complete paperwork for others. More extreme forms might include hazing, harassment, or “taxing”—that is, pressuring trainees to pay for things.

**LASD Norms**

Throughout our interviews, when interviewees would talk about LASD, the expectations for deputies, and generally “how things work,” a core set of themes emerged that might be considered reflective of an ethos or organizing set of values that factor into many aspects of LASD.

The first and probably most obvious theme is that deputies work hard and value hard work, which is reflected in LASD’s creed. In an organization where reputation matters so much, becoming known as a “slug” or someone who is not a hard worker can be almost impossible to overcome. Being a hard worker was mentioned as a characteristic of deputies, TOs, and sergeants and was evident in command staff descriptions of their own approach to the job. Being labeled a hard worker could help a deputy advance or maybe even get one out of trouble. Some interviewees noted that deputies can occasionally be hard working to a fault, as in being too defined by work and having a work-life imbalance (e.g., always at the station) or becoming so “hard charging” that the person bends rules or cuts corners. Definitions of hard workers vary, but those who get the hot calls, show up to calls quickly, offer help to other deputies, are proactive, and handle themselves well might be more likely to receive this label.

A second and related organizing value is “be humble,” which is reflected in LASD’s core values. As one deputy put it, “If you’re a hard worker, you should be humble. You're not look-
ing to outshine or be better.” This seems to apply to everyone in the organization, especially when they are a trainee or assigned to a new unit. Even a new captain is expected to be a little humble, listen to others and observe their surroundings, and slowly earn respect. This idea of remaining humble, however, could lead to not asking questions, not speaking up about issues, or not trying to change problematic features of the work environment. A lack of humility is sometimes perceived as contributing to problems in the department, particularly problems associated with subgroups.

Additionally, several interviewees noted that the mission and core values of the department are worthy pursuits but observed challenges in aligning them with organizational practice and having deputies internalize them throughout their work. Connecting the mission and values to everyday practice could be a worthwhile pursuit (Crotts, Dickson, and Ford, 2005).

**External Pressures and Stressors**

We also frequently heard about how the level of external scrutiny has increased over time and how this affects deputies working in patrol and custody assignments. As one midlevel supervisor noted, “The idea that law enforcement are not people and are like robots is not right. And the level of expectation that are placed on deputies are almost unattainable. Law enforcement is not infallible.” Also, deputies assume that video will exist of any incident, which further increases the pressure. The expectations of the job could conflict with individual expectations of deputies as well:

God bless the people taking calls nowadays because it’s rough. My partners and I are like, wow, I’m so glad the hardest thing I have to deal with now is [investigative work]. And I think that’s one thing with society as a whole because we have placed so much importance on law enforcement. Parents expect us to help their children and then deal with mental health and homelessness—I was on the homelessness task force, too. But when I applied to be a sheriff, I thought, okay, I’m going to do law enforcement—I wasn’t thinking, okay, I’m going to help this person find a home, okay, I’m going to help this person get into foster care. And they don’t give people enough training to deal with that. It’s a lot. They give you ten hours of mental health training and think you’ll be ready to deal with a homeless guy in the streets [in a crisis] and you have ten seconds to decide what to do.

A midlevel supervisor noted that the administrative burden has increased dramatically due to law enforcement being expected to deal with increasing challenges (e.g., more people experiencing mental illness or homelessness), as well as mandated reforms resulting from litigation in the form of settlement agreements.

Others mentioned the national trends of the public’s deteriorating view of law enforcement and public institutions in general. As one interviewee said:

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8 In our survey of LASD sworn personnel, we asked, “Would you recommend working in law enforcement to your friends and relatives?” and “Would you recommend working at LASD to your friends and relatives?” 56 percent of respondents said that they would definitely not or probably not recommend law enforcement and 46 percent said that they would definitely not or probably not recommend LASD. Two-thirds of midlevel managers said that they would definitely not or probably not recommend law enforcement to their friends and relatives. Many write-in comments noted that the lack of support for law enforcement was related to their answer to these questions.
Law enforcement is in a precarious tipping point in the nation. We are losing the ability to keep the community safe from themselves. When people lose faith in the structures of government, the default is anarchy. We are starting to see those shifts.

Others noted that these challenges are not going to go away on their own: “In the next three years, the biggest challenge will be earning some public trust back. I don’t think that is going to get better. . . . All the things the LA Times and Board of Supervisors talk about are going to continue to be issues.” Some interviewees weren’t quite as bleak in their assessment, discounting “loud voices” and believing that a “quiet majority” in the community supports the department.

Several interviewees also pointed to a general resistance to external influence on the department. This is both historical and linked to the nature of the sheriff being an elected position. As one command staff said of LASD leadership:

They are always hesitant when outside entities try to manage the department. It has to be the right kind of people who understand the dynamics of the work and have been in a police car. There needs to be accountability. Discussions are healthy, and, of course, we all make mistakes. But how you address them instead of just putting your hands in it and filing lawsuits is the question.

Conclusion

LASD is a large and fragmented law enforcement agency, with each patrol station operating largely as an independent police department. Despite the size and fragmentation, individual reputation matters. A variety of factors play into reputation, but much of it is tied to where people have worked in the department. Certain units have higher status because of the nature of the external environment (e.g., high crime), and certain types of people might be drawn to these units. This is perceived by some as a positive in the sense that it allows skills and preferences to match the work. Because of the unique settings and independence of different stations across LASD, different local practices and normative orders could lead to station styles or subcultures (Hassell, 2007; Herbert, 1998). The emphasis on work history might also present challenges, however, because it can create misperceptions and misattributions about others. Prior department leadership, possibly based on their own work history, encouraged perspectives that favored certain stations and engaged in other forms of favoritism that were formalized through promotions. This, along with mixed signals and lax supervision, potentially created a setting conducive to practice being loosely coupled with official policy. Front-line supervision is perceived to be the most important position for guiding organizational change and for modeling and monitoring behavior, and participants identified several challenges to effective supervision, including training and experience, which could contribute to further loose coupling of practice with policy. Other key roles of TOs and peer leaders are arguably equally as important for making sense of the department. Core values of humility and hard work were central to the outlooks of many of our interviewees, but an overemphasis on these factors can contribute to good faith and a lack of critical examination of current practices. This chapter has important implications for understanding how structural features of LASD, along with key organizational processes and key roles within the department, can contribute to the development of subgroups or affect their
perceived behaviors. These organizational processes also potentially have implications for how deputies treat the community. Although value conflicts are common challenges for law enforcement organizations to balance (Willis and Toronjo, 2019), our community findings provide some insights into values (e.g., empathy, vested interest) that LASD might consider embedding in organizational processes. For instance, compassion is identified as a core value of LASD, but compassion was not mentioned in our interviews. This would be worth exploring further. Additionally, the extent to which expectations for serving the community are embedded into key organizational processes is worthy of further exploration.
CHAPTER SEVEN

LASD Views on Subgroups

Among LASD staff, there is little agreement about the degree to which subgroups are a detriment or a benefit to the department. Personnel had a wide array of strong but nuanced views on the structure, function, risks—and value—of the subgroups. The responses ranged from “those who belong to a subgroup hold themselves and each other to a higher standard and are the best LASD has” to “they [subgroups] have destroyed many honest and hard-working deputies’ lives and careers.”

This chapter conveys how a diverse range of LASD representatives described subgroups in the organization. The qualitative findings are based on our 57 interviews, the vast majority of which were representatives from LASD (most of whom were at the command level, followed by an even distribution of midlevel, line-level, and recently retired LASD staff members), as well as other Los Angeles County stakeholders. We also include free responses that survey respondents shared on any other topics that they deemed relevant. A description of our methods can be found in Chapter Four.

The interviews addressed the following questions. We provide an overview of key findings:

• Why do unofficial, exclusive subgroups form in LASD? Interviewees explained that people form subgroups to recognize their common bond and pride in their work. After forming the group, invitations to new members are likely to be based on a standard of competence that the group defines, as well as friendship. Competence, recognition, and acceptance from peers are considered especially important for line-level deputies, and formal evaluations of performance might not identify competence in the same way as deputies. Finally, groups are dynamic in terms of leadership and standards, and those that exist over long periods of time have fractured or “sub-cliqued” on a few occasions.

• What are the qualities of deputies who join subgroups? Interviewees provided conflicting examples of the characteristics of deputies in subgroups. Some contended that deputies in subgroups are the hardest workers in their unit, while others noted that it was a mix of all types of deputies. Others noted that being invited could be unrelated to work and would consist of those who are looking for acceptance and willing to perform favors for subgroup membership. Additionally, subgroup members were characterized as both humble and overly boastful. Others noted that women were typically not likely to be invited to join subgroups, although some had been. Some interviewees characterized subgroup members as masculine or “Type-A” personalities. Lastly, some interviewees noted reasons why they did not join a group when asked, citing individualism or remaining independent, maturity, and focusing on their personal lives or having family obligations that prevented socializing with colleagues above and beyond regular work interactions.
• **What are the actions and functions of subgroups?** Few interviewees said that groups engaged in coordinated misconduct, but they did note other forms of work-related expectations of group members. This includes expectations to perform at a high level (e.g., make arrests of gang members or make arrests for weapons offenses), which was directly connected to reputation. This is contrasted with those who are “lazy.” Another action is to facilitate social connection and transitions to other units where former group members might have transferred. Additionally, the group can be relied upon for advice about challenging situations. Some interviewees noted that groups can start out as positive forces but could become complacent or misdirected, and their influence can negatively affect the unit.

• **What are LASD members’ perspectives on tattoos?** In general, interviewees did not indicate that tattoos were the core issue to be addressed. Tattoos do tend to be part of joining a group, but interviewees noted other means of expression, such as stickers and phone cases with the emblem of a subgroup. Interviewees noted that committing a shooting would likely lead to being invited to get a tattoo but disagreed that being invited to get a tattoo could be a motivating factor to commit a shooting. Interviewees were mixed on whether adding insignia to a tattoo following a use-of-force incident was a bad idea. For some, this addition was simply a matter of personal expression, whereas others saw it as crossing a line and glorifying violence. Negative outcomes from having subgroup tattoos were recognized, such as being involved in litigation, affecting criminal cases, and affecting promotion. Those who saw tattoos in a positive light saw them as a useful way to recognize hard workers and to show pride in the station.

• **What are the risks associated with subgroups?** The risk of civil liability and damage to LASD’s reputation were recognized by most interviewees. Others saw subgroups as divisive in and of themselves because they exclude some people, or they saw them as potentially divisive, depending on their behavior. Divisive behaviors included chastising other people’s work unfairly, making work more difficult for some, or shifting the purposes of those involved in the group. More markedly, this could include efforts to get people to act in certain ways (e.g., make certain arrests) or to leave the station (e.g., being overly critical of trainees they do not like). Many of the internal problems that can develop with subgroups seem to involve escalating patterns of disrespectful behavior. Those on the receiving end of ostracizing, humiliating, or intimidating behavior might try to deal with these behaviors on their own or put up with them until they become very serious. Many noted that the risks of more serious or criminal behavior are rare but can occur. Finally, some noted that subgroups might be mechanisms of coping with the stress and danger of the job; these mechanisms can be healthy or unhealthy.

**What Are Subgroups, and Why Do They Form?**

The names of many historical and some current deputy subgroups have already been identified. A report from the Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy lists 18 deputy subgroups: the 2000 Boys, the 3000 Boys, the Banditos, the Buffalo Soldiers, the Cavemen, the Cowboys, the Executioners, the Grim Reapers, the Jump Out Boys, the Little Red Devils, the Pirates, the Posse, the Rattlesnakes, the Regulators, the Spartans, the Tasmanian Devils, the Vikings, and the Wayside Whities (Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy,
However, a few LASD interviewees disputed some of these groups and group names. For instance, some said that Wayside Whities was a nickname that inmates bestowed on White deputies, who did not actually form a subgroup. The existence of other subgroups is not in question, but their exact names are not always known; for example, some interviewees said that a lawyer assigned the Executioners that name. Our research focused more on the existence of groups rather than their exact names, although subgroup names were freely offered by people who had direct or indirect experiences with many of the above groups and others, past and present. We also recognize that the list of group names provided here is likely incomplete. Indeed, several interviewees acknowledged their awareness of past subgroups but did not disclose the name of a particular group.

At the time of our interviews, the following groups were discussed as being currently active by our interviewees: the Banditos (East Los Angeles station), the Reapers (South Los Angeles station), the Spartans (Century station), and the Executioners/CPT (Compton station). Depending on the timeline of the group, some members of the 2000 Boys, the 3000 Boys, the Cavemen, the Cowboys, the Jump Out Boys, the Rattlesnakes, the Regulators, and the Tasmanian Devils are likely still employed by the department, but these groups do not seem to be actively adding members.

To avoid interviewees and survey respondents misinterpreting the groups we were interested in learning more about, we used a functional definition of subgroups or cliques that recognized their unofficial status, exclusivity, and use of symbols. This was to distinguish them from official work units and common social groups (e.g., station sports teams) that are not exclusive. Our definition is as follows: “Deputy subgroups, also sometimes referred to as ‘cliques,’ typically have a name or symbol that is known to group members, but they are not officially recognized by LASD. Deputies typically join the subgroup by invitation only and may have to meet certain requirements for subgroup membership.”

Organizational research on other professions recognizes subgroups in work teams as common features of the work environment. According to a typology developed by Carton and Cummings, subgroups are characterized by identity, resources, and knowledge (Carton and Cummings, 2012). They define subgroups as “subsets of team members that are each characterized by a unique form or degree of interdependence” (Carton and Cummings, 2012, p. 441). Members share cultural values, scarcity of resources, or knowledge frames that distinguish one subgroup from others. Identity-based subgroups form on the basis of shared identity; fulfill the needs of social support, friendship, and identification; and prefer interacting only with those in the same group. These are also called cliques. Resource-based subgroups are established on the basis of social dominance and control of resources, such as authority, power, materials, and status. These groups reflect preexisting or created hierarchies and are associated with an imbalance of fairness, creating “haves” and “have-nots.” Identity-based subgroups could have the impact of fracturing the identity of the larger team or unit, while resource- or dominance-based subgroups affect perceptions of fairness and could cause a power imbalance within the larger team or unit. In this model, subgroup formation and the type of subgroup partially depend on the activation of existing fault lines or dividing lines regarding values, power, or knowledge within work groups. These dimensions are important to consider for understanding the development and activities of subgroups within LASD.
Perspectives on Why Subgroups Form

We heard indirect explanations for why certain groups formed and the nature of those that joined the group. The explanations we were given suggest that not a lot of thought is put into the reasons for forming a group, other than recognizing colleagues to whom one feels aligned. As one retiree explained:

I was invited [early on] but declined. I declined because I draw a distinction between friends and those to respect as police officers. I didn’t think they were the guys out there hustling. The first ten weren’t the best cops. I had no interest in tattoos, too. Also, I was loyal to the unit while I was there, but I didn’t plan to stay there for 35–40 years. I had more LASD pride. I never saw anything bad or rule breaking. They weren’t out there shooting people. . . . Initially, they were selective, but then it became anyone who wanted to join.

This individual’s characterization of the group focused on members’ work ethic, the individuals joining the group, the nature of the group, and the individual’s own feelings about tattoos, and unit-based versus LASD pride. The groups often form based on shared work experience; as another interviewee explained, the name Cavemen was selected because people in this group were working a lot of overtime and would take naps in a dark room in the basement of the station. Given that interviewees often cited staffing shortages as a department-wide challenge, the prevalence of people working extreme hours could also provide a setting that makes group formation more likely.

We also heard from people who had discussed creating a group tattoo but did not:

When I was at [station], there wasn’t one because it was a brand-new station. We talked about having a tattoo for the station, but it didn’t manifest itself. We were all from other stations, so the consensus was if the guys wanted a tattoo, they could pick one up later on. But for us, when the guys were thinking about getting a tattoo it wasn’t about being an exclusive group or anything. It was just like the military, like thinking about finding something really cool to do. But I also remember there was discussion because a lot of guys don’t like getting ankle tattoos.

Although these individuals were interested in representing their unit in the form of a tattoo, the station was too new and none of them had trained there, so they did not move forward. The final statement also suggests that the group involved in this discussion might not have been similar enough to agree on a tattoo.

Finally, some subgroups form in direct reaction to subgroups that they are not invited to join. For instance, a command-level staff member explained that the “Regulators are old school. The Spartans were guys who started their own group because they didn’t feel like they fit in.” Thus, exclusive groups could create conflict that can lead to the creation of more groups. Subgroup theory highlights the potential for subgroups of one type (e.g., dominance-based) to create fault lines or dividing lines that lead to the formation of other subgroups (e.g., identity-based) (Carton and Cummings, 2012). This has allegedly transpired in at least one other station, as the Tasmanian Devils spawned a new group with a tattoo that included the roman numeral of the station number, “V.” There is also a temporal element as the older group’s members transition to other assignments or advance in rank (e.g., from Cavemen to Banditos).
Peer Acceptance
Peer acceptance is very important in LASD. Some interviewees claimed that recognition from peers was more important than recognition from supervisors or unit commanders. This is the general, but not the only, basis for why groups form. As one command staff member stated, “It’s about acceptance from peers.” Another command staff member said:

Football teams have captains. They are elected by peers. They communicate information from the coaches. That’s how I view subgroups. Subgroups are people of like minds. A true friend will communicate to you if you’ve screwed up. The department needs more mentoring to help with things, but leaders can sometimes watch out for themselves and not the group. That’s where it goes bad.

At least historically, the importance of peers begins in the academy, as one command staff member explained:

While in the academy, peer approval was king. You needed to have the peer vote to progress. For example, you wouldn’t be the honor graduate without peer approval. It was all about peer approval and teamwork. This was about 30 years ago.

Recognizing Competency
Groups can form to recognize people who work hard and to maintain higher levels of performance. As one deputy put it:

Being in a clique is about being good. It’s about being the best you can be. You can’t cut corners. If you get a 10-15 [subject in custody], are you dedicated to your craft? Do you know what you’re doing? Can we depend on you? Can you act in the moment? People call us when the world is coming to an end. Can you step up to the plate? Most people would just crumble. It’s about competency and willingness to help your partner.

The idea of informal peer evaluations being focused on performance is sometimes used as a means of preventing people from using the reputation of having worked at fast stations without the performance to back it up (e.g., “fake hard chargers” or “posers”). As one line-level deputy said:

There are some deputies who might not be embraced by the group, but you could still be cool, as opposed to others who are seen as frauds or phonies, or just want to use a station like Century for its tough reputation but don’t really want to fight crimes. Competency is heralded out there. You are shunned if you are incompetent. Groups are just a way of recognizing who the aggressive cops are. They have to follow the law and follow the policies. Even without a freaking tattoo, these groups are still going to exist. Nobody has any time to do stupid shit anymore.

Additionally, peer evaluations of competence might not be accurate or might not reflect performance that the department values, nor were they described as formal or systematic. When interviewees discussed informal peer evaluations, they seemed to focus on proactive policing (e.g., making arrests) and what might be described as organizational citizenship behaviors (e.g., these are behaviors that go above and beyond what is required and could include actions...
such as showing up to calls and helping out; Eatough et al., 2011; Morrison, 1994; Rioux and Penner, 2001).

The high value placed on the opinions of peers could mean that informal peer evaluations and peer motivation fill in the gaps where supervision and formalized performance evaluations cannot. For instance, we repeatedly heard that the “county only requires people to be competent and not good.” There are five levels to the performance rating: unsatisfactory, needs improvement, competent, very good, and outstanding. A “competent” rating is the minimum standard. A “needs improvement” invokes paperwork and a process to improve the individual to “competent.” There was also a sense that performance ratings tend only to increase, as a decreased rating could result in a deputy challenging that rating, requiring much more effort and paperwork. As one command staff member said,

[Performance ratings are] not used for anything. You just have to be competent or better to stay on the job. The county code says annual performance evaluation. From a leadership standpoint, it’s a tool to have conversations with the deputy. It has no bearing on promotions and transfers.

Additionally, informal peer evaluations can happen because formal peer concerns about performance are typically serious but rare. As one command staff noted,

[It’s] not common, but when they do, it’s usually accurate. I had a deputy voice concerns about another deputy and identified it in writing. He was right and the person ended up being fired within two years... tried to correct performance, but the person was incompetent. The person lied and got caught. Lying got them fired, not the incompetence.

Intra-Group Dynamics

Several interviewees noted that the character of some subgroups could change over time. At some point, those who started the group might have moved on, and many current members might not have worked at the station when the group first formed. Thus, the group’s purpose can shift in ways that might or might not be problematic. Subgroups that formed to recognize hard work could grow more focused on popularity or control of station activities, as one deputy noted: “But I mean, any [subgroup] symbol can be corrupted. I think they all started with good intentions, but if people don’t know the reason behind it, it can be corrupted.”

Subgroups that drift from their original purpose can lead to a splintering of that group or the formation of a new group. As one midlevel supervisor explained:

There are plenty of stories about sub-cliques within the cliques. When I was there, toward the end the Regulator ink started sub-cliquing. Adding ink to distinguish themselves... There was this tension for guys across shifts. Groups mean security. We always find ways to get into groups and define ourselves into groups. When they get too big, they start to form sub-subgroups. There have been other evolutions within the groups where some hokey crap goes on. I’m not advocating, I could care less. Most people are saying, “it was a waste and I shouldn’t have got this ink.”

This provides a clear example of how groups that get too big lose their ability to provide distinctiveness to their members, which motivates people to find other ways to be distinctive
(Hogg and Terry, 2000). Tension can also arise across groups or between members within the same group. A different midlevel supervisor stated:

There’s also two factions of the Banditos. The older group who started the Banditos, they look down on this new group that’s always in the papers. They’re telling these kids, “you don’t beat up or shoulder check other deputies.” . . . The kids think that being an obnoxious idiot is what it means. I know an older guy [who] is a [supervisor], and he had his Bandito [tattoo] covered. He says, “I don’t associate with punks. I’m at [station] now and they’re punks.”

These internal conflicts are divisive and can present challenges for unit commanders and supervisors, because small instances of disrespect run the risk of escalation.

Qualities of Subgroup Members

We asked representatives from LASD about specific qualities of deputies who are invited to join a subgroup. Several themes emerged from this question, with some consensus that deputies in subgroups are hard-working, take responsibility and pride in their work, and are willing to take the initiative to complete tasks and duties on the job. Although these qualities in and of themselves are admirable, several respondents noted that a person’s desire to be seen as having these qualities so that they might be asked to join a subgroup can lead to undesirable outcomes, such as taking undue actions to appear to be a hard-charging deputy. It is also important to note that although most interviewees acknowledged knowing about fellow colleagues in subgroups, a survey respondent with over a decade of experience in patrol reported to “have never had personal knowledge of any deputy subgroups/cliques.” Another respondent adamantly disagreed that “cliques are predominant throughout the department” and maintained that “they are the exception, not the rule.” To add to this point, a retired LASD representative acknowledged not having any awareness of subgroups until he rose to a command-level position.

Membership Based on Job Performance

Respondents maintained that members of LASD could not simply join a subgroup of their own volition. Command staff described deputies who actively try to join groups as “trying to make a name for themselves” and said that being a hard worker and “willing to show up when you [a deputy] don’t have to be there” is often enough to receive an invitation. A command-level representative noted that the subgroups were not secretive and were composed of the “self-proclaimed cool guys and girls at a station,”1 adding that it was mostly men who have demonstrated their commitment to a particular station and do “good police work.” A line-level staff representative noted:

If you get involved in a shooting or a fight, that’s it. You’re in. [In custody], if a deputy was involved in a physical fight with an inmate, that was huge [for getting asked to join a subgroup]—even though you could have de-escalated the situation! I’ve pulled my partners off of things where they should have defused, but they escalated it.

1 Some interviewees used the word *girls* when discussing adult women. We have left this wording intact in quoted material.
As another member of command-level staff speculated:

I bet the guys in cliques’ rate of being in shootings is higher. . . . if you feel like you have to join, you’re likely to feel that you have to shoot someone to be a cop. . . . But it’s not clear whether guys in cliques are involved in more shootings because they put themselves in the tactical position or because they have a mindset that everyone is out to get you.

Other representatives offered a slightly different perspective on whether committing a shooting or other serious incidents were criteria for joining a subgroup. Some respondents said that committing a “justifiable shooting” can also lead to an invitation but stressed that subgroups are not exclusively for deputies who have committed a shooting. A line-level representative echoed this sentiment, noting that deputies in subgroups are the cream of the crop in terms of performance, willingness to fight crime, and exhibiting a can-do attitude and that these qualities are the only criteria for being asked to join a subgroup. Others posited that because most high-stakes crime occurs at night, it is likely that subgroups form among deputies who work the evening shift. This could be connected to the risk present in the environment and the bonds that form when facing danger together. Groups reduce uncertainty by recognizing those who they perceive can be counted on in dangerous situations, as one command staff member explained:

To be a member of those groups, you couldn’t be a “glad-hander” or a slug. The people who are getting the tattoos are seizing drugs, finding shot-caller gang members, putting people in prison and getting those who are trying to kill us.

It is, however, important to note that several LASD representatives stated that they were asked to join a subgroup on the basis of their performance and declined without facing any additional bias, ill will from colleagues, or impediments to promoting. Thus, to be a hard-working deputy does not necessarily equate with subgroup membership.

Not Discussing Subgroups
Another aspect of subgroup membership mentioned was the importance of keeping a low profile, or, as one line-level representative said, “You don’t brag about it [being in a subgroup]. If you’re a hard worker, you should be humble. You’re not looking to outshine or be better. Showboating is not cool, especially in this crowd.” Some groups are noted for this. Being reserved about one’s status in a subgroup could contribute to the secrecy and the allure of the subgroups. Notably, one LASD interviewee explained that there is a general tendency and preference for privacy among department members.

Membership Contingent on Non–Work-Related Actions
Various respondents noted that some subgroups originally formed to recognize deputies for their hard work but that this criterion over time had been corrupted, devolving into either an exchange for personal favors or an invitation to join based on subjective personal likeability. As a midlevel representative put it, “As time went on, it wasn’t about rewarding the hard workers; it became an ‘if we like you or not’ group, and if I like you or if you will do something for the group or for me, we may or may not give you a tattoo.”

As one seasoned midlevel LASD representative explained,
I’ve known people with ink [a tattoo] and without ink. Some are assholes and some aren’t. . . . I knew some guys who were pushing to create a group, but I’ve always been a very independent guy. I want to be able to tell someone to “f” off and be independent. A lot of guys had it [a tattoo] and most regret it today. Hard core believers say it’s about stats [arrests, et cetera], but it’s really about friends. Some are assholes, some are lazy, some are great guys . . . but there was nothing that could be interpreted as organized crime.

Others cited youth or lack of education as factors in subgroup membership. As a member of command-level staff said, “We talk to deputies about [the risks of joining a subgroup]. It’s your reputation. But they’re young kids. They’re not doing it because they mean harm, they just think it’s cool.” Yet another speaking of a subgroup member at their station called them “a moron and overly macho idiot,” adding, “We [LASD] are hiring everyone. You shouldn’t have [just] a GED [General Educational Development test] and be a cop. You can’t handle a pencil and now we’re going to give you a gun.”

In addition, a line-level representative mentioned the tendency of deputies to inflate their accomplishments to appear more impressive, adding,

Deputies will make things up, like “Oh, I jammed ten guys today.” They’re great at making up stories. A lot of it is BS. It’s like they’re not confident in themselves so they feel the need to pump their chest out and boost their egos. They want everyone to see them as this badass cop. And who doesn’t want to be that? It just depends on how far you are willing to go.

Thus, the perception that deputies in subgroups are superior to deputies who are not in subgroups is not universally shared.

The favors that respondents reported subgroup members performing included taking on additional tasks, sparing subgroup members tedious tasks (such as writing reports), and providing off-duty favors (such as hosting parties) or obliging egregious demands (such as “paying rent to work at a station”). Some line-level and midlevel representatives were adamant that membership in some subgroups is contingent upon simply being liked. A representative of command staff added that this could be tied to the tenure and reputation of field training officers, who are “great leaders” and work hard but “unfortunately can act like bullies, too.” The “popularity contest” dimension of subgroups can lead to splintering of subgroups and the formation of new subgroups.

Race and Gender Diversity in Subgroups
LASD representatives also weighed in on the importance of race and gender in being invited to join a subgroup. Several adamantly maintained that race was not a factor and that certain subgroups were racially diverse. Others perceived Black deputies to be less likely to be invited to join a subgroup. Still others stated that some subgroups, especially in the past, were predominantly White in membership and were located at stations that patrolled areas that were mostly Black or Hispanic. For a period of time, LASD was required to promote female deputies in at least 25 percent of promotions, making their upward mobility much faster and therefore possibly making them less likely to be considered for these groups. Some, however, thought that women were either not invited or were less likely to be invited to join on account of gender, although it was clear in the interviews that at least some women have been asked to join some subgroups and did get tattooed. Other line-level staff speculated that a female supervisor actually leads a certain subgroup. Some subgroups use masculine names, such as the
3000 Boys, Jump Out Boys, or Cavemen, suggesting a lack of female membership or ineligibility for female deputies to join. Another line-level representative recounted a story of a female deputy with a stellar work reputation at a fast station who was not invited to join a subgroup. When asked why, he replied, “Maybe they thought they were going to be rejected by her! It’s real-deal machismo.” Machismo or masculinity and “Type-A” personalities were occasionally noted in our interviews as characteristics of subgroup members and even deputies in general. As described in other research on attitudes of police, such outlooks reflect a desire to project strength and courage while seeking out dangerous situations (Herbert, 1998). This can develop into a “hard-charging” or aggressive approach to police work.

Avoiding Membership
As noted, not all hard-working deputies who are asked to join a subgroup accept the invitation. Command staff said that those setting their sights on promoting might be averse to joining a subgroup; one noted that these individuals want to ensure that “there is no dirt on them, ever.” This attitude toward subgroups stands in contrast to historical examples in which one’s membership in a subgroup, especially at specific stations, might have contributed to promotions. As noted, several others mentioned being invited to join a subgroup but opting out to focus on their personal lives, such as being a spouse or parent, and not wanting to spend their free time with colleagues. The several command-line representatives who noted this were also quick to say that they never faced any perceived interpersonal issues or impediments to their mobility on account of turning down the invitation to join a subgroup.

Actions and Functions of Subgroups
Based on the survey responses and interviews, the existence and persistence of subgroups appears to serve a unique role in LASD. A widely shared viewpoint was that the formation of subgroups was “human nature” in a large, diverse, hierarchical organization where tensions often run high and resources are constrained. Subgroups could function as a workaround technique through which deputies can secure support, identity, recognition, and belonging. As a line-level staff member articulated, “Why would people join a subgroup? Humans are herd animals. We seek to have connections. We look for identity.” In addition, subgroups can serve as a means of recognizing a shared, difficult experience and reinforcing solidarity.

Raising the Bar
Several interviewees spoke of subgroups as a means of upholding accountability among deputies and symbolizing a high bar for performance. A member of command-level staff noted,

> A lot of subgroups are based on commonalities. They all like to work really hard. They do their jobs. They’re the top performers. They want others who can provide guidance and mentorship. But if they stop doing that for each other, that’s where it can go wrong.

In other words, interviewees spoke of the positive aspects of subgroup membership but also as if these positive aspects could devolve, which will be discussed in the following section. A survey respondent additionally noted,
As in most facets of society that involve teamwork and partnership . . . there is always going to be strong bonds and subgroups . . . especially with the younger folks. As we age, get married and have children, then for most of us, we tend to be less into the camaraderie aspects of our careers and more about our family. It’s a natural cycle of life. The cliques will usually be found with the younger units of assignments and/or hard-charging stations . . . . at places where you have older crowds, like where I work, it’s way less of a factor. Either way, it’s just another thing now, which is heavily being propagandized and exploited for political reasons. There are benefits and risks to everything, and always two sides of the story.

Some saw subgroups as a means of reinforcing the standards of being a top-performing deputy, which raises the question of how similar subgroup standards are to LASD standards. A command-level staff member explained:

You’re not going to get any points for easy arrests. You have to go after the most dangerous people and stop them before they can really hurt someone. The deputy cliques is about asking, “Are you someone who goes to seek out the real bad guys—the hardcore gangsters?” You could build a reputation and get asked to be a part of the group. It’s a hierarchy and it’s a way to recognize who’s who and what’s what.

Additionally, a command-level representative reiterated this point:

I mean, there are groups. Just because there are groups it doesn’t mean they’re out committing crimes to better themselves. It’s kind of like in a college fraternity—a group of people with a similar work ethic who keep pushing each other. To come into work and do the same thing every day, sometimes it takes an extra push. That creates a culture because not everyone works the same, there are lazy people everywhere.

Having one’s reputation as a top-performing deputy solidified through subgroup membership can benefit members by providing pathways to desirable promotions and positions, such as the Special Enforcement Bureau. A survey respondent added that an “advantage of joining [a subgroup] is if there is a unit of assignment you would like to go to and that unit has members of the same clique, it will be an easier transition and adjustment because they advocate for you to be selected. Once you become a member, you remain a member even after you transfer and/or promote to a higher rank.” Another line-level staff member spoke about the role of subgroups in promoting, adding,

The only way to move up is to test for a position. But it doesn’t mean that you’re a good sergeant or a good senior deputy. Your skills don’t really matter, but if you know the right people, you can get the answers to the test! But once you’re in the position, if something happens, you had better be ready. That’s where the clique benefits you—if something happens to you, you know who to call. If you’re a loner and you’re not in a clique, then you had better know the job.

Social Connection
Respondents also described the social components of subgroups, such as playing sports, donating to local charities, going out for beers, having barbecues, and taking trips together. Others
spoke more directly to the role that subgroups play as a means of decompressing from the demands of police work. A survey respondent with decades of experience noted,

This job, especially patrol, is very stressful. We see and deal with crazy shit every day. . . . We see the worst in humanity, and there needs to be a way to destress and decompress from all of this.

Interviewees across ranks echoed the sense that subgroups “are just the way to decompress” and not an avenue for adverse actions.

A command-level representative spoke about the role of healthy competition among stations that can exist without secretive subgroups, but also how this competition can exist along a continuum:

Camaraderie, baseball tournaments, stations competing against each other—there’s nothing wrong with that. But it can’t be how many broken bones they get and how many shootings they get into. You have to keep the competition positive and there definitely can be a fun way of being competitive, but it can’t be that deputies are saying “you’re a POS if you don’t work in a fast station.”

Hence, interviewees described the camaraderie and social support that stems from competition among deputies but acknowledged that competition can take a negative turn.

**Subgroup Tattoos**

Much of the media coverage on deputy subgroups has focused on the tattoos that members often share. This section describes various perspectives on the tattoos. First, it is important to reiterate that the department permits tattoos with official station symbols. These differ from the subgroup symbols or mascots that LASD does not approve.

Many interviewees noted that tattoos are more common and more socially acceptable than in the past, making it difficult to differentiate between a tattoo that reflects membership in a deputy subgroup from a tattoo that represents something else. Tattoos might be considered artifacts of organizational culture (e.g., rites, rituals, stories, humor, objects; Schein, 2004), which are not indicative of values per se but can be linked to social expectations (Hatch, 1993). In this case, group members could express their bond and acceptance of each other by sharing a tattoo and welcome new members by offering them a tattoo.

According to our interviewees, the process for getting a shared tattoo ranges from formal to informal. Groups that follow a more formal approach might have an informal committee that determines whether to invite someone to get the group’s tattoo. Groups that control who gets a tattoo in this formal way might also keep a roster of who has the tattoo, and tattoos themselves might be numbered. On the other end of the spectrum, some groups offer people a tattoo over drinks or without much thought behind the decision. Interestingly, there were varying perceptions of the importance of tattoos for being members of a deputy clique.

Some interviewees expressed negative views about tattoos or associated them with negative consequences for LASD or the individuals who get them. Some saw the tattoos as divisive, and some linked the tattoos to the groups themselves being divisive, with the potential to create a workplace environment in which certain people are invited to things because they have
a tattoo while others are not. To others, the divisiveness comes from the exclusivity associated with certain tattoos, which conflicts with the idea that the tattoos are supposed to represent unit pride. It also could contribute to individuals feeling like they need to be asked to get a tattoo to be accepted, as captured in this quote from a midlevel LASD representative: “I saw guys ingratiate themselves for two years because they felt they had to be part of it.” Such people are said to be “chasing ink.”

Interviewees also discussed tattoos and their relationship to shootings, as well as add-ons to tattoos for committing shootings. Some interviewees saw an association between tattooed deputies and shootings but acknowledged that this association could be the result of myriad other factors (e.g., the deputy is more proactive, uses poor tactics, or has a “mindset that everyone is out to get you”). Many believed that getting a tattoo was not a motivating factor for shootings and that the tattoo could be perceived negatively later on. Those who mentioned getting add-ons to subgroup tattoos for committing shootings saw the add-ons as a very personal thing that is hard to speculate on. As one deputy explained, “I think it’s just different people have different ways of symbolizing events.” However, a midlevel supervisor who was supportive of tattoos generally saw an add-on for a shooting as misplaced and crossing a line: “You don’t take pride in having to kill people, though. There’s a humility factor.”

Those who believed that shared tattoos could lead to negative consequences for LASD and for individuals with tattoos pointed to civil litigation and community perceptions as potential risks. Less frequently, respondents noted that having a tattoo could work to a deputy’s detriment in criminal cases. Another concern was whether having a tattoo would affect an individual’s ability to get promoted. Interviewees holding these views tended to think that subgroup tattoos should be a thing of the past. Few LASD interviewees found the content of the tattoos to be offensive or improper. However, community perceptions of subgroup tattoos as offensive or intimidating have surfaced over time. The example in Figure 7.1 is associated with the most recent group identified in a lawsuit, reportedly named the Executioners. Media reporting and the Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy report voiced concerns that the helmet depicted in the tattoo is similar to helmets (called Stahlhelm) worn by German troops in World War I and World War II (Tchekmedyian and Lau, 2020; Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, 2021).

Others believed that the tattoos recognize hard workers and celebrate pride in one’s work or the station and that a tattoo or absence of one does not necessarily impact how people are treated. Recognizing hard workers was a common explanation for asking someone to get a tattoo, and the offer was often made by respected deputies at the station. As one respondent said:

“When you get to patrol, the cool group are the two-stripe deputies (Bonus Deputies). Subgroups revolved around field training officers because getting this position was more based on the assessment of you being a good deputy. No written criteria; if you were considered a good police officer, they would ask you to get a tattoo. Some people got them, and some didn’t. When asked to be part of the group you will be asked, “Would you like to represent the station?”
Risks Associated with Subgroups

It is clear that subgroups are a polarizing topic for LASD. On one end of the spectrum, some deputies emphasized that subgroups encourage deputies to perform the best possible law enforcement work and recognize excellence. Others view subgroups as engaging in problematic behavior that is detrimental to both the community and the department as a whole. A member of command-level staff stated succinctly, “It’s fair to say that there’s a continuum of types of subgroups.” Another line-level deputy noted the benefits of being in a subgroup: “Deputies join the cliques despite their best interest, except for being recognized as one of the best.” Most deputies fell somewhere along this spectrum, citing the benefits of group membership (e.g., camaraderie) while acknowledging that subgroups create the potential for problematic behavior. High-level findings on LASD perceptions of potential risks of subgroups are depicted in Figure 7.2. In general, the more serious outcomes associated with subgroups were perceived to be less common by our interviewees.

Litigation

An important consequence of subgroups to LASD on the whole is the financial loss from settling lawsuits involving LASD deputies with subgroup tattoos. Since 1990, the losses have mounted to $54 million—$20.8 million since 2010, according to the Los Angeles Times (more details on this issue can be found in Chapter Two). As a member of command-level staff said, “the issue for the county is really a money issue. They have to settle because the tattoos are raised as the issue, even if the deputies didn’t engage in illegal behavior. Anytime a lawsuit is raised, it becomes an issue. This is really a fiscal problem.” Another command-level representa-
tive noted that “the perception is not good. The litigation is a problem. There really is no place for it anymore in the department.”

**LASD’s Reputation**

Another risk to LASD as a whole is that subgroups can undermine public trust in law enforcement. As noted in the content analyses of *Los Angeles Times* articles in Chapter Two, the news coverage conveys the sense that deputies in subgroups are prone to using excessive force, might abuse other deputies, and are branded with tattoos that can glorify shootings committed by deputies and include other offensive symbols. Irrespective of whether the perceptions hold true across LASD, several command-level staff members voiced sentiments such as “so much of law enforcement relies on public trust, and this hurts it.” In other words, the risk of losing public trust in law enforcement (during a period of unrest and heightened sensitivities among law enforcement and community members) makes good policing harder. One line-level staff member spoke of the frustration that harmful deputies create, noting, “it makes it hard for most of the folks in uniform to do their job. There’s not a lot of love for these folks.” Another midlevel representative voiced this strong criticism:

How can I be a cop who hates other cops? It’s just common sense. If your parents raised you to be decent you know this to be true—we have to eradicate this thing [subgroups]. It’s not just a bunch of guys hanging out. Horseshit. Especially when they want to start shooting people. It’s happened. And to get a tattoo? Either you wear a badge or you’re a gangster.
There was a shared sense across ranks that the work is demanding enough, resources are already constrained, and the negatives of subgroups outweigh any stated benefits. As one command-level staff member said, “We have enough stress in the department—dealing with [subgroups] is not something we need.” When another command-level staffer was asked how he would advise deputies on the topic, he responded, “I would say, ‘does the peer approval now outweigh the potential consequences in the long run?’ I’d encourage that deputy not to get the tattoo.”

Creating Divisions

In addition to the potential for subgroups to create rifts between the community and LASD, representatives across ranks bemoaned the divisions that subgroups can create within the department. Some were concerned that subgroups are by nature exclusionary. As one command-level representative said, “The tattoos are by invitation—this is divisive because it’s not all inclusive. This creates a wedge between the partners. Even though it’s not a problem, it just isn’t good for the department.” In some cases, this meant one subgroup splintering into two or more factions, or new groups forming. A command-level representative added, “Some people will create their own subgroups within stations because they aren’t part of the existing group. Sometimes this causes some infighting.” Other representatives described fractures occurring as group members age and come to disagree with the actions of the younger deputies. One midlevel representative mentioned a shift in purpose, stating, “these guys went in on the Lynwood Vikings and it was about doing good work, but as the years went on and the guys promoted, it started morphing into a social club.” This transition was also mentioned with respect to the Banditos, the Cavemen, the Regulators, and the Taz (Tasmanian Devils).

Other command-level staff described having to instruct deputies—whom one described as “all kids and young boys”—that they were not to “let outside stuff [subgroups] interfere with work. We treat everyone equally at [this station]. Behavior here is what we watch. Put the patrol station first, not the subgroup.” Several command staff recounted instances when they moved deputies in response to subgroup-related behavior or they encouraged deputies to move stations to prevent them from being asked to join a subgroup. A retired LASD member added, “When you work for LASD, it should be one symbol. When people align with other symbols, that’s when the wheels come off.” In other words, diverting allegiance to a subgroup can create negative factions and frictions within the department. Although internal rifts within and among subgroups were not the primary concern of our interviewees, ostracizing and bullying of fellow deputies was a sore point for many. In addition, a command-level staff member asked, “How can we make a bridge to the public when we can’t do it ourselves?” meaning that a lack of cohesion at LASD patrol stations can compromise efforts to build a working relationship with the surrounding community to promote safety.

Respondents also spoke of the role of TOs in orchestrating subgroup membership for some groups, in addition to their critical role in training deputies. The confluence of these two roles creates a precarious situation in which TOs can dictate which deputies should be asked to join a subgroup, and yet they must also keep other trainees under their command, in turn exacerbating divisions within a station. TOs, particularly those who have been at the same station of a longer duration, could act as “shot callers,” hand-selecting and influencing deputies to join a subgroup. TOs can also report on a deputy’s performance, and interviewees said that they felt pressure “to please the TO.” A line-level representative described training as follows:
You’re put in this spot where you have to do whatever you have to do to get off training, which puts a lot of pressure and stress. Not only to train to do your job, you have to worry that they [TOs] like me. They could fail you on training no matter what. You hear the stories. They tax trainees, they play games. “Play the game” means shut your mouth and do whatever you’re told and get off training. People may think, “Why are you putting up with it? You’re a grown-ass man!” But you have to succumb to it . . . they’ll do whatever it takes to get you to quit. If that means taking and doing everyone’s reports. They’ll slam you with work; I remember staying for over 24 hours sometimes and I wouldn’t put in for overtime.

One interviewee spoke about abuse of power among TOs, recounting,

You have to watch the leaders of the station, and those are usually the senior TOs. Those tend to be senior, and they are at the top of their game. They get a lot of respect from their peers. But you have to watch them and make sure they are delivering the right message. . . . I was told there may be an issue with senior TOs in that there may be the start of a division forming. . . . Some people broke down in tears about one person because they were being bullied by one of them. He was telling people when they should be making an arrest and when they shouldn’t. He would tell other people that if they made training officer, they shouldn’t put on their two stripes until everyone else agrees they are part of the group, so that was problematic. . . . Once that was done [the TO transferred], morale went up immediately.

Another command-level representative spoke of the positive influence of a TO:

My training officer instilled that it’s not about you. It’s about the community, and making sure your partner is doing the right thing, and doing things the right way. After one and a half years as a deputy, the training officers said, “We like how you carry yourself and you do the right thing even when you don’t know we’re looking,” and then they invited me to get the tattoo.

Others explained how TOs can use their influence to reject trainees who don’t conform to the expectations of the subgroup. As one command staff member explained,

They controlled the supervisors. It allowed them to place people where they wanted to place them. Not part of my group, we’ll send you to some less desired place. Controlled scheduling. Controlled who trained who. “Only the strong trainees come to my TOs.” The TOs not in the group got the weak trainees.

At another station, a midlevel supervisor described the treatment a trainee experienced:

He was hit up by the guys right away. . . . He didn’t start playing with the guys in the clique. They have the brass thinking they’re squared away and let them do anything they want. They tried to get him to sign off that he was failing patrol. I got him transferred.

This quote describes how subgroup members have reportedly tried to “roll up” trainees who do not go along with the clique, creating selection effects for people who are trained by group members or those who finish training at the station. The influence that TOs can have on deputies can also certainly be positive, but this influence also has the potential to exacerbate the effects of nefarious subgroups.
Disrespect and the Downward Spiral of Incivility

Although many people reported that subgroup membership often had no consequences, several interviewees described subgroup behaviors that ranged from incivility or disrespect to intimidation, bullying, harassment, and violence. They also viewed ostracism as a kind of disrespect, which can lead to disrespect in return and can promote a downward spiral of workplace incivility (Andersson and Pearson, 1999) that leads to more serious behavior, such as bullying, harassment, intimidation, retaliation, interfering with others’ work, or even violence. As one command staff described a recent example:

> It has to do with respect in the workplace. Respect me because I’ve been here. This involved the treatment of newly hired deputies. Newly assigned people stood up to someone who’s been there longer and is deserving of more respect, but there’s also the perception that “I’m a deputy too.”

In this case, because a newer deputy might have felt mistreated, they might have violated the norm of showing respect to a more senior deputy, leading to a toxic situation. In another example, one patrol trainee’s TO told dispatch to assign every call in their jurisdiction to the trainee because the person had disrespected the subgroup. Few interviewees believed that deputies would not back each other up, but some noted that it was possible. As one command staff said, “those with the [subgroup] tattoo and those with the station tattoo didn’t respect each other.” He added, “It might have been the case that ‘I don’t like you, but I’ll back you up.’ It’s horrible to the hearts of most of us. It’s an abhorrence when someone refuses to back someone up. It doesn’t reflect our deepest culture.”

Unit leadership has the ability to either exacerbate or disrupt these cycles of disrespect, but some argue that this ability is not adequately leveraged. As one interviewee noted:

> Unfortunately, you’ll always have a couple of people who are problems or bullies. When that started to surface, the bullies weren’t checked. If you don’t check a bully, it will spread. The supervision was lacking. We all need supervision. They may be grown adults, but they still need to be supervised. . . . The two or three [bullies] who were extremely loud and powerful, they created chaos.

This interviewee noted that the individuals in question were also perceived to be hard workers, so other aspects of their job performance were not an issue. Some participants suggested that ignoring this behavior makes LASD part of the problem. A county stakeholder said, “I’ve heard arguments that subgroups [are] . . . a way for some deputies to exert greater control over their work environment.” When there is a group element, it creates a power imbalance that can grow when others are brought into the behavior. This can lead to what is known as workplace mobbing—that is, discrediting and humiliating targets with the goal of removing them from the workplace.² Workplace bullying and workplace mobbing are documented in several public service professions, such as nursing, education, and government (Vickers, 2010).

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² A more formal definition (Duffy and Sperry, 2012, p. 52) explains, “Workplace mobbing is nonsexual harassment of a coworker by a group of members of an organization for the purpose of removing the targeted individual(s) from the organization or at least a particular unit of the organization. Mobbing involves individual, group, and organizational dynamics. It predictably results in the humiliation, devaluation, discrediting, and degradation; loss of professional reputation; and, often, removal of the victim from the organization through termination, extended medical leave, or quitting. The results of
These issues can be difficult for leadership to detect, however, because there are disincentives for deputies to report these types of behaviors because of their own involvement, the pressure to not be labeled a “snitch” or “lazy,” or the belief that a deputy should “be tough” and handle it. This puts pressure on the individual(s) being mistreated to resolve the situation themselves. Thus, these disrespect spirals can escalate to a point that, by the time someone does come forward, they look as though they are acting irrationally, or they might try to handle it in ways that could be perceived as bullying as well (Köhler et al., 2018). As one supervisor explained to us:

I started leaning on these guys and calling them out for mistakes. There were a few of us trying to bring this thing back in . . . these kids went to their sergeant and they told him I was a bully.

The interviewee then explained to this sergeant why he had been pressuring these deputies by describing a dangerous situation they put him in. The sergeant had not been told about that situation. Thus, to the person less familiar with the situation, this interviewee’s behavior was perceived as hostile, and because he had not told anyone about the prior negative experience, his concern and reaction were perceived as inappropriate.

**Supervision Issues**

LASD representatives across staff levels described the intrinsic role of supervision as being either complacent or complicit in the formation and persistence of subgroups. A midlevel representative stated, “The slippage happens when supervisors start to turn a blind eye.” Another member of command-level staff likened the persistence of subgroups to supervisors overlooking and failing to address them early on:

There are groups of people who will bully people who are too weak to stand up for themselves. They flourish because supervisors are turning a blind eye or just not believing that it’s possible. But when you hear grumblings of something going on, then hmmm. Supervisors need to be there to say, “knock that shit off.” You have to be there; you have to acknowledge the behavior and correct it. There’s some truth to it. When you hear rumblings of it you have to address it.

The issue of supervision being complacent or complicit is complicated, however, by the fact that deputies who recruit to their station (and ostensibly to their subgroups) “keep it from the lieutenants and the sergeants, so it’s hard.” This can happen because subgroup members might take instructions from senior members, or “shot callers,” who have “been there a long time and have ultimate respect” but also “have to boss people around.” As one command staff member explained, “When you have cliques, they become harder to supervise. No one wants to see a shot caller at their station. I’m very in tune to people trying to puff their chest out.” At least in the past, some groups have admitted to raising funds from others at the stations to support deputies who have received a suspension without pay (Pfeifer, 2007). This undermines the authority of supervisors who impose discipline.

*This typically protracted traumatizing experience are significant financial, career, health, and psychosocial losses or other negative consequences.*
A line-level staff member elaborated on how preserving and assisting members of the sub-group is prioritized over policies and sound policing practices, stating,

Cliqués exist where they have a station tattoo. Fast stations give people a level of respect that you’re a badass deputy. You’re kind of looked after. If you get in trouble, they’ll come to help you. They’ll change things on a report. They’ll do anything to keep you. They keep the tradition of being gung-ho, in charge, the traditional culture—it makes no sense; it’s not critical thinking, it’s not common sense, it’s just there. They’re like soldiers and just do what they’re told. If you follow the traditions and you’re automatically in that clique. If you question things and do policy by the books, then you’re a troublemaker.

The statement that one who goes “by the books” would be a “troublemaker” is a striking contrast to the reports from some other interviewees that subgroup members are seen as the do-gooders who are unwilling to go against policy to accomplish their work. One interviewee recounted a past example of having to supervise deputies who had committed a string of shootings, saying,

There was a shooting and we couldn’t find a gun on the suspect who got shot. We were told that one of [the suspect’s] friends probably grabbed the gun . . . [then] there was another shooting. Again, the explanation was that a friend threw the gun over a fence.

The interviewee recounted directly confronting a group of deputies about the shootings, suggesting that they should transfer out of patrol. One deputy challenged the interviewee, which violates the usual deference to rank that is common in law enforcement. The interviewee believed that the group element gave this deputy the support he needed to do this, by saying, “The kid was willing to let me know what he thought, and he had backup in the room.” In short, a supervisor who tried to clamp down on potential foul play among deputies faced animosity and pushback. When his efforts were met with disrespect, he responded with disrespect, which provides another example of how incivility can spiral.

Other interviewees intimated that some members of leadership were in (or had been in) a subgroup. A county stakeholder representative said:

I can’t say whether the Regulators or Vikings or Banditos are a criminal street gang, but they’re close to it. The reason you can’t answer that is that it’s never been investigated. . . . The culture is so pervasive within the department. There are many people who are in places of management that may have been part of the same cliques or precursors of them.

This perspective suggests that if supervisors have benefited from participation in a subgroup, they might have a conflict of interest with respect to curbing subgroups. There is also a sense that subgroups’ negative behavior has never been investigated with the goal of investigating the role of the group.

Risk of Illegal or Problematic Behavior
As mentioned, interviewees spoke of subgroups—their members, behaviors, symbols, and customs—along a continuum. Interviewees cautioned that subgroups could be damaging for LASD (and by extension, the community) when they move beyond simply serving as a social club to devising their own codes of conduct with respect to their work roles and engaging in
nefarious actions. These included intimidating or harassing fellow deputies, not following protocols with respect to writing reports, planting evidence, bending the rules or cutting corners to justify aggressive policing, cutting corners on reporting, not providing sufficient backup when calls are made, and excessive or unnecessary use of force. A member of command-level staff echoed several other representatives who were “not in favor of saying [subgroups in general] are a problem” but still acknowledged the risk of the separate codes of conduct that certain subgroups have orchestrated. “Any group that sets separate rules should not be allowed,” he said. “The job isn’t about serving ourselves, but rather serving others. Following department policy is part of employment.” Said another, “The tattoos are used for a sense of camaraderie, but it all could go backwards, like the Jump Out Boys and their manifesto.”3

In an interview, a line-level staff member described the potential for abuse of power that can occur within a subgroup:

The guys in a group get together and drink after work. . . . The cliques are a culture within a culture. You go out and drink a few beers and unwind after the day. But with that, the way you look at humanity, your brain gets skewed. . . . When you hire a 20-year-old and you give them that much power and surround them with other people [deputies] who don’t do the right thing, well . . . younger people are more prone to make mistakes. You can abuse that power.

A midlevel representative added:

My fear is that some of these problems . . . they’re like weeds in fertile ground and so much has happened that they’re [supervisors] missing or won’t address. . . . I think our culture is becoming bad. . . . Put the wrong people in the position I’m in, you can get away with anything. The shit I could get away with is crazy because people think so highly of us; there’s more and more people who don’t know how to handle and police ourselves. The Baca-Tanaka stuff was just publicized, but it was going on then and now.

Another midlevel representative provided a more positive perspective:

Some subgroups hold people accountable so that they don’t tarnish the badge. There are two sides, and the media has gripped onto the negative dynamic. Yes, those [the negative] subgroups absolutely provide a harmful look at law enforcement, but there are others who don’t. Some see their profession as part of the LASD as a whole. But once their value system changes from LASD, that’s when you run into problems.

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3 The Jump Out Boys was a group of Operation Safe Streets Gang Enforcement Team deputies that was revealed in 2012 after they left a written creed in the trunk of a patrol car (Cunningham, 2021). This creed said in part, “We are alpha dogs, who think and act like the wolf, but never become the wolf.” This statement was attributed to a briefing from executive leadership at the time. It continued, “They understand when the line needs to be crossed and crossed back,” which was explained by a Jump Out Boys member as a typo (LASD, undated-a). “Sometimes they need to do things that they don’t want to do, in order to get where they want to be” was explained by Jump Out Boys members as things like death notifications or taking kids from parents. “The Jump Out Boys are not afraid to get their hands dirty without disgrace, dishonor, or hesitation” meant working late and not complaining, according to members of the group. The department did not agree that this creed reflected the values of the department, and several members or associates of the subgroup were terminated. Several also challenged their termination and were subsequently reinstated. The entire creed can be found at Castle, 2021.
A line-level representative spoke about this fine line between ethical deputies and harmful deputies metaphorically:

There is a fine line between being a very good deputy and bad deputies. The like-mindedness of the criminal element of a deputy in a clique versus just a hard worker, but the hardwiring is the same. . . . It’s like a computer that has a virus. And the computer cannot identify that it has the virus. It’s myopic and blinded in how it’s acting. It’s different means to the same end. The means don’t justify the ends. Clique members embody everything good about how they are deputies, but the more interesting thing is how they take power, how they take root.

Although some deputies adamantly stated that subgroups are not engaging in problematic actions, others noted that if they were not engaging in problematic behavior, they would not have to exist in secrecy.

An Anomaly or a Pattern?

Despite the complexity and nuance offered on the slippery slope between the benefits and risks of subgroups, interviewees nearly universally mentioned the East Los Angeles Banditos as a present-day example of subgroups “going down the wrong path,” where “deputies run the station,” “put peer pressure on other deputies” to a “mind-boggling” degree, and “have no respect for chain of command and their own written rules.” Often, the Banditos were mentioned as a way to distinguish subgroups that were perceived to serve a positive function from those that do not. Again, East Los Angeles emerged as an extreme case of alleged workplace harassment, incivility, intimidation, and retaliation, leading to “brawls in the parking lot.”4 In addition, a midlevel staff member spoke about use of force in custody as an isolated case, adding,

So you have a kid who wants to be accepted, they would ask are you ready to get your ink? And that meant you had to get into a use of force and send an inmate to the hospital, sometimes by breaking the orbital bone. Some supervisors didn’t even write the use of force, or some of the uses of force “disappeared.” Time goes on and they’re used to this madness in custody.

The potential risk of unnecessary use of force stems from the emphasis on proactive policing on one end of the spectrum and committing a shooting on the opposite end. Line-level and midlevel representatives emphasized that deputies can be “hard chargers” without necessarily being overly aggressive. Additionally, a command-level representative spoke about subgroups as an isolated, historical issue:

The Viking5 issue was an anomaly. I’m unsure how that occurred, but I haven’t seen that type of non-community policing, racism, et cetera, since I’ve worked for LASD. This isn’t

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4 This includes the Kennedy Hall incident, as well as mentions of other incidents in the station parking lot or the parking lot of the bar across the street from the station.

5 In 1991, a series of revelations alleged that a clique of deputies at Lynwood station sported matching tattoos—the Vikings. They were reported to have engaged in discriminatory policing and excessive force, to have intimidated supervisors, and to have damaged other employees’ property in the station parking lot. Eventually, two cases connected to this group, the Thomas (discrimination and excessive force) and Carrillo (civil rights violation and wrongful prosecution) lawsuits, would settle for $6 million and $10 million, respectively. These allegations led to the formation of the Kolts Commission.
the intent of most people. I haven’t heard of groups running the stations. . . . This wouldn’t have been surprising back in the day when the sergeants didn’t have as much control. Peer support was more important then.

In addition, a midlevel representative mentioned how people have explained away the potential harms that subgroups have committed, noting, “The Banditos will try to tell you it was a simple drunken brawl and the newspaper [is] making a big deal about it, but a gangster will tell you, ‘Man, I’m in here on some bullshit.’” In other words, it might only seem like an inconsequential incident to those who did not face the brunt of it. Although several respondents spoke about problematic actions of subgroups as isolated incidents, these incidents might not be as rare as some LASD respondents report, especially if they happen across different parts of LASD.

(Un)healthy Coping
Interviewees who defended subgroups spoke about the sense of camaraderie and support for the stresses of patrol work that the groups can provide. However, several were quick to talk about the tendency of deputies in subgroups to lean heavily into the “hard charger” identity. A line-level staff member stated:

Cliquies are their [deputies’] support system. I’m sure the people [hard chargers] who do these things are tired. They are dealing with the worst of the worst. They want to vent to someone who understands. When you form this clique, you have people who can understand you and relate to you. Instead of moving on when the work is done, you kind of continue with the work. They just become completely deputy—they never turn it off. There’s no balance. Even when they’re out and about, they always carry their gun. Twenty-four hours a day, they’re deputies. If you are in a clique, you have protection. . . . It’s no wonder they’re drinking so much and their divorce and suicide rates are so high.

The previous quote and the next quote both highlight how the solidarity and support provided by being in a subgroup can contribute to social isolation. A member of command-level staff mentioned the negative impacts of being overly entrenched in a subgroup identity:

I think you’ll find it’s males and females that can’t get away from the job. All they do is talk cop talk shop. They don’t have anything outside of law enforcement, and that’s where they feel most comfortable. And that can be very disruptive, even ruining marriages, because you’re so entrenched in your job that when you take your uniform off and try to have conversations with folks outside of the job, you can’t do it. And I think that’s where we lose some folks. There’s something to be said for unit pride or whatever you want to call it—and there should be—but the longer people stay, especially in custody, the longer they’re fester- ing and building these friendships within these modules and the less tolerant they become of these inmates. Five or six years stuck in jail when they want to go on patrol, they start to become less tolerant of the people they’re sworn to protect. And there are these new guys coming in, trying to prove themselves to the old guys, the OGs [an abbreviation for “original gangsters” that also means “originals” or “old school”]. It may not be a clique, but it turns into people competing for who can do the most, who can have the best party, you know. They need that acceptance.
A retired member of LASD staff spoke directly to the issue of deputies who had committed shootings joining subgroups:

A shooting is something no one should have to live through on the deputy side or the family side and it’s celebrated. It’s celebrated! They celebrate the fact that they got the bad guy, they put it up on the pedestal. It’s coping. But we should be asking how the deputy is doing. The subgroups happen organically after a deputy is involved in a terrible shooting where he took out a 16-year-old, and it’s eating away at him and what do they do? His buddies take him out, get some drinks—but he’s got PTSD [posttraumatic stress disorder] from it. The focus needs to be different.

In other words, what may begin as a means of support for the difficult challenges of LASD service could devolve into what some view as a counterproductive coping mechanism. “Workaholism” and the social isolation that comes with it could be factors in clique formation and/or behavior (Balducci et al., 2012; Clark et al., 2016).

Despite an overall perspective that subgroups are not a major issue, nearly all interviewees reiterated that subgroups run the risk of going from a manifestation of camaraderie to one of problematic behavior. “Subgroups open up the department to risk. If there’s enough smoke there’s probably fire,” a command-level staff member stated succinctly. The running thread throughout interviews is that subgroups allow for deputies to devise their own codes of conduct and systems of accountability and divert their loyalty to their internal system rather than to LASD as a whole. Another added, “if we aren’t learning from the gangs in the department, they are going to keep going decade after decade. The tattoo is part of you. There is a mentality tied to it. This carries over as they promote. This perpetuates.”

Conclusion

Our findings on the characteristics of subgroup members; the role of tattoos; and the functions, potential member advantages, and risks of subgroups are complex. Notably, many but not all of the examples of potential risks cited here were attributed to historical and current subgroups that exist within the Central Division. A line-level representative described subgroups as a “touchy subject. People make assumptions. Sometimes these assumptions are right, but they’re not absolutes. One bad deputy does not mean all deputies are bad.” The risks and benefits of subgroups appear to exist along a continuum. Many LASD deputies who defended subgroups often also noted the slippery slope leading to the downsides of subgroups. Some might begin with the best intentions of promoting hard work, social cohesion, and recreation, but, over time, the exclusionary aspects of some subgroups can promote perverse incentives that work counter to ethical, productive law enforcement and create supervisory issues and divisions within the department, as well as between the department and the communities it serves. Moreover, although the benefits accrue to individuals in the groups, many of the risks are borne by the organization. The high-profile nature of cases in which subgroup members are accused of misconduct or illegal activity contributes to substantial reputational and litigation risks for LASD. Moreover, many of the deputies with whom we spoke placed more emphasis on the internal issues or negative public perceptions caused by the existence of subgroups and did not make the connection or downplayed the potential connection between community harm and subgroups, despite the connection to aggressive policing or concerns about improper use-of-force incidents.
This chapter presents the results of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Survey, which gathered information from sworn personnel currently employed by LASD about their perceptions and experiences with deputy subgroups within LASD. The goal of this survey was to examine whether our interviewees’ views about LASD or subgroups are widely held by members of LASD more broadly. More specifically (and as was detailed in Chapter Four), the survey focused on survey respondents’ experiences with deputy subgroups, including

- who gets invited to join these subgroups and the criteria for being invited
- where within LASD these subgroups are typically found
- what advantages there are to joining these deputy subgroups
- views regarding the conduct, attitudes, and behavior of deputies who belong to a subgroup
- views about the impact of not belonging to a deputy subgroup
- views about ways in which deputy subgroups have impacted LASD as a whole.

In addition, the survey asked respondents for their views about supervisors’ approach to deputy subgroups and what, if anything, LASD should do about deputy subgroups. The survey includes the perspective of both deputies and supervisors, as well as respondents from all units and patrol stations within LASD. The survey results often align with our interview results, including views about the secrecy of these groups and mixed perspectives about their role in the organization. The mix of perspectives leaves the overall impression that a deputy’s perspective depends to a large extent on their work experiences and the types of subgroup(s) they have encountered during their career.

Our survey addressed the following questions, which we present below with a preview of key findings.

- **Who gets invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique?** Overall, 16 percent \((n = 254)\) of survey respondents had ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup, with the majority of them being invited to join over five years ago. The longer the tenure a respondent had with LASD, the more likely they were to be invited to join a subgroup at some point in their career. For example, 25 percent of survey respondents who had been in the department for 21 or more years reported having been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique. Most invitees indicated that the invitation came while they were at a patrol station assignment.
What are the criteria for being invited to join a subgroup, and at what stage in one's career is one most likely to be asked to join? Subgroup invitees suggested that the three criteria cited most frequently were being known as a hard worker, being willing to work challenging assignments, and helping other deputies with their work. Between half and two-thirds of midlevel managers cited these three criteria as well. In addition, half of midlevel managers also referenced the criterion of willingness to engage in social activities with other subgroup members outside of work. Respondents also cited illegal or problematic behaviors as criteria for being invited to join subgroups; for example, nearly half of midlevel managers and subgroup invitees cited a willingness to engage in specific behaviors (such as being aggressive about making arrests) as a criterion.

Where within LASD are deputy subgroups or cliques typically found? Two-thirds of subgroup invitees and two-thirds of midlevel managers agreed that deputy subgroups exist in some, but not all, LASD stations. Half of each set of respondents agreed that deputy subgroups are common at LASD stations in high-crime areas. Fewer cited custody locations—only a third of each group of respondents agreed that subgroups typically exist in some, but not all, LASD custody facilities.

What are the advantages of joining a deputy subgroup? Nine out of ten subgroup invitees indicated that these groups provide a sense of camaraderie or fraternity; three-quarters of midlevel managers also cited this as an advantage. In addition, 55 percent of midlevel managers and 65 percent of invitees indicated that deputies join subgroups to get respect among their peers; about half of each set of respondents also cited “fitting in” at their work assignment as another advantage of joining these subgroups.

How do tattoos fit into the overall picture? One concern is the role that tattoos could play with respect to deputy subgroups. About half of subgroup invitees and a third of midlevel managers agreed that, in order to be a member, a deputy must get that subgroup’s tattoo. About two-thirds of invitees and half of midlevel managers agreed that having a tattoo was an acceptable way to show pride in a subgroup. Seventeen and 25 percent of these two groups (invitees and midlevel managers, respectively) agreed that subgroup tattoos were perceived as offensive or intimidating to other deputies.

How do survey respondents characterize the conduct, attitudes, and behavior of deputies who belong to a subgroup? About 40 percent of midlevel managers and three-fourths of subgroup invitees disagreed that membership was restricted based on race/ethnicity; one out of three midlevel managers and two-thirds of subgroup invitees disagreed that membership was based on gender. That said, nearly one out of four midlevel managers indicated that they did not know whether subgroups restricted membership based on race/ethnicity or gender.

– Two-thirds of midlevel managers and eight out of ten subgroup invitees agreed that deputy subgroups encourage members to be proactive at work. However, they also cited adverse conduct and behaviors, including that (1) subgroups have their own code of conduct (38 percent of midlevel managers and 42 percent of subgroup invitees) and (2) subgroups encourage members to work outside the chain of command in situations that normally require supervisor involvement (22 percent of midlevel managers and 19 percent of subgroup invitees). With respect to how deputies in subgroups treat nonmembers, nearly one-third of midlevel managers and invitees agreed with the statement that deputies in subgroups look down on non–group members, and 30 percent of midlevel managers and 20 percent of invitees agreed with the statement that deputies
in subgroups bully or harass nonmembers. Roughly one out of five midlevel managers agreed with the statements that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that could endanger other deputies or that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that might offend, intimidate, or endanger community members. Among subgroup invitees, 18 percent agreed with the statement that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that could endanger other deputies; about 16 percent agreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that might offend, intimidate, or endanger community members.

- **What is the impact at the individual level of not belonging to a deputy subgroup or clique?** Two-thirds of subgroup invitees indicated that not belonging to a subgroup did not negatively impact a deputy’s training opportunities, work assignments, or opportunities for career advancement or promotion. That said, between 20 and 25 percent of those who had never been invited to join a subgroup indicated that not belonging negatively impacted all three areas. Midlevel managers’ assessment of the impact at the individual level varied somewhat: One out of five indicated that not belonging to a subgroup limited a deputy’s training opportunities, one out of three indicated that not belonging negatively affected a deputy’s work assignments, and one out of four indicated that not belonging limited deputies’ opportunities for career advancement and promotion.

- **What is the impact of deputy subgroups or cliques on the workplace and LASD as a whole?** A majority of midlevel managers and subgroup invitees agreed that subgroups had no effect on the daily operations of their station or unit. Further, two-thirds of both set of respondents agreed that most deputies know who is in the group and who is not.
  - In terms of positive impacts, two-thirds of subgroup invitees agreed with the statement that deputy subgroups help motivate others within the station or unit, while a third of midlevel managers agreed with this statement.
  - In terms of negative impacts, a third of midlevel managers and a quarter of subgroup invitees agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups can hurt morale within the station or unit. A third of both groups of respondents agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups or cliques can make nonmembers want to leave or avoid certain stations or units. In addition, two-thirds of midlevel managers and half of invitees agreed that deputy subgroups’ behavior had negatively impacted community perceptions of LASD.
  - With respect to the media’s portrayal of subgroups, half of midlevel managers and 78 percent of subgroup invitees agreed that subgroups were not as harmful as the media makes them out to be.

- **What are their views regarding supervisors’ approach to deputy subgroups or cliques?** Half of midlevel managers and two-thirds of subgroup invitees agreed that supervisors were aware of subgroups’ conduct. One out of four midlevel managers and two-thirds of invitees also agreed that supervisors formally discipline improper or unethical behavior by subgroup or clique members. However, a third of midlevel managers and half of invitees indicated that supervisors do not consider deputy subgroups or cliques to be problematic. Fifteen percent of midlevel managers and 16 percent of subgroup invitees agreed that supervisors are too lenient on deputy subgroup or clique members. When asked whether supervisors should discourage deputies from joining subgroups or cliques, 19 percent of midlevel managers and 16 percent of subgroup invitees responded that they should.
• **What are their views about what LASD should do about deputy subgroups or cliques?**

About half of subgroup invitees and 22 percent of midlevel managers indicated that LASD should not do anything about subgroups. In contrast, about two-thirds of midlevel managers and half of subgroup invitees agreed that LASD should break up problematic deputy subgroups or cliques by moving members to different stations or units. Thirty-four percent of midlevel managers and 23 percent of subgroup invitees agreed that a mandatory station/unit rotation policy could limit the influence of subgroups or cliques. In addition, about half of midlevel managers and invitees favored LASD discouraging deputies from joining these subgroups or cliques. When asked whether deputy subgroups or cliques should be prohibited altogether, about half of midlevel managers and subgroup invitees agreed, while a third of midlevel managers and 23 percent of invitees disagreed. Lastly, two-thirds of midlevel managers and about half of subgroup invitees favored LASD providing training and support to supervisors on how to address any improper or unethical behavior by deputy subgroups or cliques.

The overall response rate was 16.8 percent. Table 4.1 in Chapter Four summarizes the response rate for the different major LASD unit groupings. To better understand the phenomena of subgroups, we present the survey findings in two ways: (1) those respondents who had ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup and, thus, are more likely to be familiar with these subgroups and (2) those who are midlevel managers. We do so because these two groups are more likely than other deputies to have familiarity with these subgroups and, therefore, to be able to provide more insights as to the subgroup phenomena. Further, as discussed below, midlevel managers are more likely than deputies to have been invited at some point in their career to join a subgroup.

Lastly, to report on survey respondents’ assessment of the impact of subgroups on LASD and individuals, as well as their recommendations for what (if anything) LASD should do about subgroups, we first compare those who had ever been invited to join a subgroup with those who have not; we then compare the responses of midlevel managers and deputies, because these two groups tend to have different assessments on subgroups’ impact and what should be done.

**Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents**

Table 8.1 compares the demographic characteristics of the survey respondents with those of sworn personnel within the overall department. The major differences were with respect to rank, gender, and the percentage of Hispanic respondents. Although deputies account for approximately 83 percent of LASD’s sworn personnel, about 72 percent of survey respondents were deputies. At the same time, midlevel managers were overrepresented in the survey; they account for approximately 16.8 percent of LASD’s sworn personnel but 25.4 percent of the survey respondents.

With respect to gender, 82 percent of LASD’s sworn personnel are men, but in our survey they represented 73.7 percent of the respondents. Women were slightly overrepresented in the survey compared with their representation in the department as a whole (20 percent versus 18 percent).
Table 8.1
Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents and Overall LASD Sworn Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristics</th>
<th>Survey Respondents&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>LASD Sworn Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>7,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>1,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>3,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>4,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
<td>7.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>5.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Filipino, Alaskan, Native American)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>7.17%</td>
<td>2.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rank</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>6,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Survey percentages might not add to 100 percent because of missing values.
With respect to race/ethnicity, Hispanic personnel were underrepresented in the survey. They are 50.5 percent of LASD deputies but were just 40.3 percent of survey respondents.

Findings by Whether a Respondent Had Ever Been Invited to Join a Deputy Subgroup

Below we present the findings highlighting the results for those respondents who indicated that they had ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup. We also include in the tables the results for those respondents who had never been invited so that the reader can compare the responses; however, the text focuses on highlighting the findings for those who had ever been invited because they are more likely to be familiar with subgroups. This is underscored by the fact that the percentage of respondents who indicated “don’t know” for a particular response category was much higher for those who had never been invited. Deputies with fewer years of experience more commonly responded “don’t know” to questions about subgroups. Thoughout, we report Likert scale findings as either “agree” (which includes “strongly agree” and “agree”) or “disagree” (which includes “strongly disagree” and “disagree”).

Who Gets Invited to Join Deputy Subgroups?

Overall, 16 percent (n = 254) of deputies who responded to our survey had ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique at some point in their career (Table 8.2). Of the deputies who had been asked to participate in a subgroup or clique at some point in their career, 25.7 percent indicated that they had been invited to do so within the last five years.

Those who are new to LASD were less likely to have had experience with subgroups (Table 8.3) Almost 25 percent of survey respondents who had been in the department for 21 or more years reported ever having been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique. This compares with 4 percent of those who had been with the department seven years or less and 14.9 percent of respondents who had been with the department between eight and 20 years (Table 8.3).

At What Career Stage Were Deputies Invited to Join a Subgroup?

Among subgroup invitees, most indicated that deputies were first invited to join while they were at a patrol station assignment (Table 8.4). Twenty percent indicated that this occurred during the first two years at a patrol station, and 48.8 percent indicated that it occurred after two years at a patrol station. Of those who had never been invited to join a deputy subgroup, 66.9 percent said that they did not know the stage in a deputy’s career when most deputies were first invited to join.

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1 The 356 deputies with less than seven years of experience responded “don’t know” 49 percent of the time on average to items in questions 11 through 15, compared with an average of 35 percent for those with more than seven years of experience. The 434 respondents at the rank of sergeant and above answered “don’t know” 22 percent of the time on average for these same items. In contrast, those who responded that they had been invited to join a group answered “don’t know” to 5 percent of these items on average, compared with an average of 40 percent for those who had not been invited.
What Are the Criteria for Being Invited to Join Deputy Subgroups or Cliques?
Among subgroup invitees, the three most frequently cited criteria for being invited to join a subgroup were (Figure 8.1)

- being known as a hard worker (91 percent)
- being willing to work challenging assignments (86 percent)
- helping other deputies with their work (85 percent).

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**Table 8.2**
**Whether a Survey Respondent Had Been Invited to Join a Deputy Subgroup**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the last five years, have you been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q4 and Q5. Have you ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique? In the last five years, have you been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique? For each question, survey respondents were asked to check either “Yes” or “No.” Q5 respondents are those who responded “Yes” to Q4.

**Table 8.3**
**Who Has Ever Been Invited to Join a Deputy Subgroup, Overall and by Tenure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q4. Have you ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0–7 years</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–20 years</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21+ years</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>75.2%</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our interviews suggested that all of these things could factor into being invited. Working hard and being liked are supported by the most survey respondents. A few interviewees noted that as groups change over time, they might be more likely to require people to engage in specific behaviors outside of work, which has less agreement here.

Figure 8.1 also presents the results for criteria involving problematic behaviors. Among subgroup invitees, 47 percent reported a willingness to engage in specific behaviors (e.g., being aggressive about making arrests). Less frequently reported criteria were a willingness to engage in behavior that violates current LASD policy and practices (14 percent) and a willingness to look the other way when others engage in improper or unethical behavior (22 percent). These findings are consistent with our interview findings that “hard-charging” or aggressive policing is often valued by subgroups. They are also consistent with some of our interviewees’ reports that misconduct and unethical behavior were rare but had occasionally happened.

**Where Within LASD Are Deputy Subgroups or Cliques Typically Found?**

Two-thirds of survey respondents who were subgroup invitees reported that these subgroups exist in some, but not all, LASD stations (Table 8.5). Only 24.7 percent responded that deputy subgroups exist in all LASD stations. In addition, 55.6 percent reported that these subgroups are common at LASD stations in high-crime areas.

With respect to custody, the presence of deputy subgroups in custody facilities was thought to be less prevalent. Among subgroup invitees, 31.8 percent indicated that deputy subgroups typically exist in some, but not all, LASD custody facilities (Table 8.6).

**What Are the Advantages of Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique?**

Nine out of ten subgroup invitees indicated that these groups provide a sense of camaraderie or fraternity (Figure 8.2). Nearly three-fifths of invitees indicated that deputies join these subgroups to get respect among their peers. Other reasons for joining deputy subgroups included

- to fit in at their work assignment

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**Table 8.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>In Custody Assignment</th>
<th>First Two Years at Patrol Station</th>
<th>After Two Years at Patrol Station</th>
<th>Other (Please Specify)</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>1310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>83.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>1562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q6. As far as you know, at what stage in their career are most deputies first invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique? Survey respondents were asked to check only one option.
Figure 8.1
What Were the Criteria for Being Invited?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Invited (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being known as a hard worker (e.g., responding to a lot of calls, making arrests)</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping other deputies with their work</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to work challenging assignments</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging in social activities with other subgroup members outside of work</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage in specific behaviors at work (e.g., being aggressive about making arrests)</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage in specific behaviors outside of work (e.g., paying for things of value)</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage in behavior that violates current LASD policy and practices</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to look the other way when others engage in improper or unethical behavior</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Text for Q7 from the survey: “In your view, what are the criteria for being invited to join these deputy subgroups or cliques?” Survey respondents were given a series of statements and asked to mark one of three response options for each statement: Yes, No, or Don’t Know.

- to be mentored by more-senior deputies
- to get special privileges at work, such as choice of assignments, choice of shifts, time off, etc.
These findings conform to our interview findings, although the interviews placed slightly more emphasis on the idea that joining a subgroup is associated with respect than is reflected here.

**Deputy Subgroups and Tattoos**

One of the concerns is the role that tattoos play with respect to deputy subgroups. Among subgroup invitees, 47 percent agreed that in order to be a member, a **deputy must get that subgroup’s tattoo** (Table 8.7). In addition, two-thirds agreed that having a tattoo was an
acceptable way to show pride in a subgroup. Seventeen percent agreed that deputy subgroup tattoos were perceived as offensive or intimidating to other deputies.

**Conduct, Attitudes, and Behavior of Deputies Who Belong to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique**

Eight out of ten subgroup invitees agreed that **deputy subgroups encourage members to be proactive at work** (Table 8.8). This is consistent with feedback from several interviewees who commented that subgroups often can serve to motivate other members to be proactive about making arrests.
With respect to conduct, 42.1 percent agreed with the statement that these subgroups have their own code of conduct (Table 8.8). And 18.5 percent indicated that subgroups encourage members to work outside the chain of command in situations that normally require supervisor involvement (e.g., incident involving use of force).

With respect to restrictions on subgroup membership, 74 percent of subgroup invitees disagreed that membership was restricted based on race/ethnicity (Figure 8.3). Also, two-thirds disagreed that membership was restricted based on gender. Still, nearly one out of five agreed that membership was restricted based on gender, and 11 percent agreed that it was restricted based on race/ethnicity.

With respect to how deputies in subgroups treat nonmembers, one-fourth of subgroup invitees responded that deputies in subgroups look down on non–group members (e.g., ignore them, speak ill of them; Figure 8.3), and one-fifth indicated that deputies in subgroups bully or harass nonmembers (e.g., humiliate, set unreasonable expectations, give unwanted tasks). This is consistent with a common finding from our interviews that deputies in subgroups could consider nonmembers to be “lazy;” however, a number of interviewees noted that

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2 Note that for a period of time, LASD was required to promote female deputies in at least 25 percent of promotions (the Beauman consent decree), making their upward mobility faster and therefore possibly reducing their likelihood of being considered for these groups.
people were not treated differently based on subgroup membership. Bullying and harassment were framed similarly. This suggests that these actions are possibly rare, albeit quite harmful.

With respect to deputies in subgroups engaging in dangerous or offensive behavior, 18 percent of subgroup invitees agreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may endanger other deputies (Figure 8.3). Furthermore, 15.8 percent agreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may offend, intimidate, or endanger community members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8.7</th>
<th>What Do Survey Respondents Consider the Role of Tattoos and Deputy Subgroups or Cliques to Be? (Invited Versus Not Invited)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent Type</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strongly Disagree</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In order to be a member of a subgroup or clique, a deputy must get that group’s tattoo</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Having a tattoo is an acceptable way to show pride in a subgroup or clique</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subgroup or clique tattoos are perceived as offensive or intimidating to other deputies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q10 (a, b, c). The following statements are about tattoos. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a “Don’t Know” option.)
Table 8.8
Views About the Conduct, Attitudes, and Behavior of Deputies Who Belong to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique (Invited Versus Not Invited)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subgroups or cliques have their own code of conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>1,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>1,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroups or cliques encourage members to be proactive at work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>1,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>1,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroups or cliques encourage members to work outside the chain of command in situations that normally require supervisor involvement (e.g., incident involving use of force)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>1,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>1,575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q11 (a, b, c). The following statements are about the conduct, attitudes, and behavior of deputies who belong to a deputy subgroup or clique. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a “Don’t Know” option.)

Overall Findings Regarding the Impact of Subgroups on the Department and Individuals and Suggestions as to What LASD Can Do About Subgroups

Earlier, we presented the survey findings about who gets invited to join these subgroups, the advantages of belonging, and the characteristics of these subgroups, focusing on those survey respondents whom we believed had the most experience with subgroups: those who had been invited to join a subgroup.
In this section, we present the overall survey findings about the impact of subgroups and suggestions about what LASD can do about subgroups comparing the responses of those who had ever been invited versus those who had never been invited to join these groups. We do so because there are significant differences in the views of these two groups.

Impact of Not Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup on the Individual

We asked about the possible impact that not belonging to a subgroup could have on the individual in terms of training opportunities, work assignments, and opportunities for career advancement or promotion.

Of those who had been invited to join a subgroup, the majority indicated that not belonging to a subgroup had no negative impact (Table 8.9). Specifically, about two-thirds of these respondents

• disagreed that not belonging limits a deputy’s training opportunities
Table 8.9
Survey Respondents’ Views Regarding the Impact of Not Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique on an Individual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

. . . can limit a deputy’s training opportunities

. . . can negatively affect a deputy’s work assignments

. . . can limit a deputy’s opportunities for career advancement or promotion

Q12 (a, b, c). The following statements describe the impact that NOT belonging to a deputy subgroup or clique can have on an individual. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a “Don’t Know” option.)

- disagreed that not belonging can negatively affect a deputy’s work assignments
- disagreed that not belonging limits a deputy’s opportunities for career advancement or promotion.

In contrast, about 20 percent of those who had ever been invited and about 25 percent of those who had never been invited to join a subgroup perceived that not belonging had negative effects (despite a large proportion of “don’t know” responses for those who had never been invited). Specifically, these respondents (Table 8.9)
• agreed that not belonging negatively impacted a deputy’s training opportunities
• agreed that not belonging negatively affected one’s work assignments
• agreed that not belonging negatively affected opportunities for career advancement or promotion.

Impact of Deputy Subgroups or Cliques on the Workplace and LASD as a Whole

Subgroup invitees were more likely than non-invitees to respond that subgroups had no impact or a positive impact and were more likely to disagree that subgroups have a negative impact on the work environment (Figure 8.4).

A majority of invitees agreed that subgroups have no effect on the daily operations of their station or unit. In addition, about two-thirds reported that most deputies know who is in the group and who is not, and another two-thirds indicated that deputy subgroups help motivate others within the station or unit (e.g., make more arrests, maintain better order of custody inmates).

Still, some subgroup invitees noted a negative impact of these groups. A quarter indicated that the presence of deputy subgroups can hurt morale within the station or unit; a third indicated that the presence of deputy subgroups or cliques makes nonmembers want to leave or avoid certain stations or units (Figure 8.4).

Survey respondents who had never been invited to join a deputy subgroup had a different perspective about the effects of the subgroups on the workplace and LASD as a whole. They were less likely than invitees to agree with the statement that deputy subgroups had no effect on the daily operations of a station or unit (Figure 8.4). They also were less likely to agree that most deputies know who is in a subgroup. And one out of five respondents who had never been invited to join a deputy subgroup agreed that deputy subgroups motivated others within the station or unit (compared with five out of five who had ever been invited).

However, a similar percentage of both groups agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups can hurt morale and make nonmembers want to leave or avoid certain stations or units (Figure 8.4). Specifically, about a quarter of both groups (those who had ever been invited to join a subgroup and those who had not) agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups can hurt morale within the station or unit. And about a third of both groups agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups or cliques makes nonmembers want to leave or avoid certain stations or units.

In addition, about half of respondents who had ever been invited to participate in a subgroup and those who had not agreed that deputy subgroups’ behavior had negatively impacted community perceptions of LASD. Note, though, that one-third who had never been invited to join a subgroup indicated that they did not know what impact it had on community perceptions of LASD.

With respect to views regarding the media, there was a clear difference between the two groups. Among invitees, 78.4 percent agreed that these subgroups were not as harmful as the media makes them out to be (Figure 8.4), compared with 35 percent of non-invitees (with 37 percent indicating that they did not know).
Survey Respondents’ Views Regarding Supervisors’ Approach to Deputy Subgroups

We asked survey respondents about supervisors’ approach and conduct toward deputy subgroups. Again, we compare the responses of those who had been invited to join a subgroup with those who had not.

More than half of invitees agreed that (Table 8.10)

- supervisors were aware of subgroups’ conduct
- supervisors formally discipline improper or unethical behavior by subgroup or clique members
- supervisors do not consider deputy subgroups or cliques to be problematic.
Table 8.10  
Survey Respondents’ Views Regarding Supervisors’ Approaches to Deputy Subgroups or Cliques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors are aware of subgroups’ or cliques’ conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors formally discipline improper or unethical behavior by subgroup or clique members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>1,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors do not consider deputy subgroups or cliques to be problematic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>1,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>1,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors are too lenient when deputy subgroup or clique members violate LASD policies or procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>1,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>1,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors discourage deputies from joining subgroups or cliques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>1,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>1,576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q14 (a, b, c, d, e). Now we want to ask you specifically about supervisors’ (Lieutenants or Sergeants) approach to deputy subgroups or cliques. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a “Don’t Know” option.)
In comparison, 20 to 33 percent of those who had never been invited to join a subgroup agreed with these statements about supervisors, and nearly half indicated that they did not know the answer (Table 8.10). The two groups of respondents also assessed supervisors’ response to subgroups (Table 8.10). Subgroup invitees were more likely to disagree that supervisors are too lenient toward subgroup or clique members, while those who had never been invited were more mixed, and half did not know. In contrast, many respondents answered “neither agree nor disagree” that supervisors discourage deputies from joining subgroups or cliques. This might suggest mixed messages across supervisors or over time. The two groups were similar in their agreement to this item.

**Survey Respondents’ Views About What LASD Should Do About Deputy Subgroups**

There was a stark difference between subgroup invitees and non-invitees as to whether LASD should do anything about subgroups. Specifically, 45 percent of subgroup invitees indicated that LASD should not do anything about these groups, while 14 percent of non-invitees indicated that LASD should not do anything about these groups.

About half of survey respondents agreed with the statement that LASD should break up problematic deputy subgroups or cliques by moving members to different stations or units (Figure 8.5).

Respondents who had never been invited to join a subgroup were more likely than those who had been invited to agree that LASD should discourage deputies from joining these subgroups or cliques and that LASD should prohibit deputy subgroups or cliques.

Between 23 and 32 percent of respondents agreed that a mandatory station/unit rotation policy could limit the influence of subgroups or cliques.

Lastly, about half of both invitees and non-invitees agreed that LASD needs to provide training and support to supervisors on how to address any improper or unethical behavior by deputy subgroups or cliques.

**Findings by Whether a Respondent Was a Midlevel Manager or a Deputy**

**Who Gets Invited to Join Deputy Subgroups**

Midlevel managers were more likely than deputies to have ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique (26.4 percent versus 11.9 percent, respectively; see Table 8.15). Of those who had been invited to join, the majority of midlevel managers and deputies indicated that the invitation had occurred prior to the past five years (Table 8.11).

**At What Point in Their Career Are Most Deputies First Invited to Join a Subgroup?**

Just under half of midlevel managers and nearly one-fourth of deputies indicated that most deputies were invited to join a deputy subgroup while they were at a patrol station assignment (Table 8.12). Two-thirds of deputies indicated that they did not know at which career stage deputies were most likely to receive their first invitation to join a subgroup.

**Criteria for Being Invited to Join Deputy Subgroups or Cliques**

For midlevel managers, the four most frequently cited criteria were
• being known as a hard worker (67 percent)
• being willing to work challenging assignments (60 percent)
• helping other deputies with their work (53 percent)
• engaging in social activities with other subgroup members outside of work (50 percent) (Figure 8.6).

In comparison, roughly a third of deputies cited these four categories as being criteria for being invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique.

In terms of negative behaviors, nearly half of midlevel managers and a third of deputies cited a willingness to engage in specific behaviors at work (e.g., being aggressive about making arrests; Figure 8.6). Midlevel managers and deputies also cited a willingness to engage in behaviors that violate current LASD policy and practices (17 percent of midlevel managers and 15 percent of deputies) and a willingness to look the other way when others engage in improper or unethical behavior (22 percent of midlevel managers and 20 percent of deputies).
### Table 8.11
Whether a Respondent Had Ever Been Invited to Join a Subgroup or Had Been Invited Within the Last Five Years (Midlevel Managers Versus Deputies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>88.1%</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>1262</td>
<td>1,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the last five years, have you been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>93.7%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q4 and Q5. Have you ever been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique? In the last five years, have you been invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique? (For each question, survey respondents were asked to check either “Yes” or “No.”)

### Table 8.12
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding at What Stage in Their Career Most Deputies Are First Invited to Join a Deputy Subgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>In Custody Assignment</th>
<th>First Two Years at Patrol Station</th>
<th>After Two Years at Patrol Station</th>
<th>Other (Please Specify)</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q6. As far as you know, at what stage in their career are most deputies first invited to join a deputy subgroup or clique? (Survey respondents were asked to check only one option.)
**Figure 8.6**
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding the Criteria for Being Invited to Join a Deputy Subgroup or Clique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Midlevel Management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being known as a hard worker (e.g., responding to a lot of calls, making arrests)</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping other deputies with their work</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to work challenging assignments</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaging in social activities with other subgroup members outside of work</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage in specific behaviors at work (e.g., being aggressive about making arrests)</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage in specific behaviors outside of work (e.g., paying for things of value)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to engage in behavior that violates current LASD policy and practices</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to look the other way when others engage in improper or unethical behavior</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Items represent Q7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 7f, 7e, 7g, and 7h from the survey. Survey respondents also were given the option of marking “Don’t Know.”

**Where Deputy Subgroups or Cliques Are Typically Found Within LASD**

Midlevel managers were more likely than deputies to agree that deputy subgroups exist in some, but not all, LASD stations and are common at LASD stations in high-crime areas. Specifically, nearly three-fifths of midlevel managers either somewhat or strongly agreed that these subgroups exist in some, but not all, LASD stations (Table 8.13); 17.2 percent responded
Table 8.13
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding Where Within LASD Deputy Subgroups or Cliques Are Typically Found

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. . . exist in some but not all LASD stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>391</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . exist in all LASD stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>389</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1,491</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . are more common at LASD stations in high-crime areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>391</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . exist in some but not all LASD custody facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>390</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that deputy subgroups exist in all LASD stations; and 53.2 percent reported that these sub-
groups are common at LASD stations in high-crime areas.

In comparison, two-fifths of deputies agreed that these subgroups exist in some, but not
all, LASD stations, and 13.8 percent responded that subgroups exist in all LASD stations
(Table 8.13). More than a third of deputies agreed that these subgroups are common at LASD
stations in high-crime areas. Note the higher percentage of deputies that marked “don’t know”
for the statements in Table 8.13, suggesting that they are less likely than midlevel managers to
be familiar with deputy subgroups.

With respect to custody, deputy subgroups were thought to be less prevalent in custody
facilities than at patrol stations (Table 8.13). Thirty-nine percent of midlevel managers and
29.3 percent of deputies disagreed with the statement that subgroups exist in all LASD custody
facilities. Note that 42 to 53 percent marked “don’t know” to items asking about subgroups in
non-patrol assignments.

Table 8.13—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>. . . exist in all LASD custody facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>. . . are more common in work assignments other than patrol and custody</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q8 (a, b, c, d, e, f). The following statements are about where in LASD these deputy subgroups or cliques are
typically found. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
(Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a
“Don’t Know” option.)

The Advantages of Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique

Midlevel managers were more likely than deputies to agree that the advantages of belonging to
a deputy subgroup included
• to experience the camaraderie or fraternity that these subgroups provide
• to get respect among their peers
• to fit in at their work assignment (Figure 8.7).

Midlevel managers and deputies were similar in that roughly 25 to 30 percent agreed with the other reasons for joining deputy subgroups listed in Figure 8.7:

• to be mentored by more-senior deputies
• to get special privileges at work, such as choice of assignments, choice of shifts, time off, etc.

Note that, except for the sense of camaraderie or fraternity category, almost twice as many deputies as midlevel managers marked “don’t know” for the statements listed in Figure 8.7. This again suggests that midlevel managers appear to be more familiar with subgroups than deputies as a whole.

Figure 8.7
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding the Advantages of Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique

Deputies join these subgroups or cliques to be mentored by more senior deputies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Midlevel management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deputies join these subgroups or cliques to get respect among their peers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Midlevel management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Members of these deputy subgroups or cliques get special privileges at work (e.g., choice of assignments, choice of shifts, time off, etc.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Midlevel management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deputies join these subgroups or cliques to “fit in” at their work assignment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Midlevel management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deputy subgroups or cliques provide a sense of camaraderie or fraternity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Midlevel management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Items represent Q9a, 9b, 9c, 9d, and 9e from the survey. The "Agree" category represents "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" responses, while the "Disagree" category represents "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree." Respondents also had the option of "Neither Agree nor Disagree" and "Don’t Know."
**Deputy Subgroups and Tattoos**

As noted earlier, one concern has been the role that tattoos play with respect to deputy subgroups. Midlevel managers (48.2 percent) were more likely than deputies (33.7 percent) to agree that having a tattoo was an acceptable way to **show pride in a subgroup** (Table 8.14). More than one-third of midlevel managers and one-fifth of deputies agreed with the statement that in order to be a member, a **deputy must get the subgroup's tattoo**. And almost half of midlevel managers and a third of deputies **disagreed that deputy subgroup tattoos are perceived as offensive or intimidating to other deputies** (Table 8.14). As seen in prior tables,

---

**Table 8.14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In order to be a member of a subgroup or clique, a deputy must get that group’s tattoo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having a tattoo is an acceptable way to show pride in a subgroup or clique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroup or clique tattoos are perceived as offensive or intimidating to other deputies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q10 (a, b, c). The following statements are about tattoos. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. (Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a “Don’t Know” option.)
deputies were much more likely than midlevel managers to mark “don’t know” for each of the categories in Table 8.14.

Conduct, Attitudes, and Behavior of Deputies Who Belong to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique

Two-thirds of midlevel managers and about one-third of deputies agreed with the statement that deputy subgroups encourage members to be proactive at work (60.4 percent of mid-level managers and 34.8 percent of deputies; Table 8.15). As noted earlier, this is consistent with comments from several interviewees that subgroups can motivate other members to be proactive about making arrests.

With respect to conduct, midlevel managers were more likely than deputies to agree with the statement that subgroups have their own code of conduct (Table 8.15). One out of five midlevel managers also agreed that subgroups encourage members to work outside the chain of command in situations that normally require supervisor involvement (e.g., use-of-force incidents).

With respect to restrictions on subgroup membership, 40 percent of midlevel managers and 26 percent of deputies disagreed that membership was restricted based on race/ethnicity (Figure 8.8). Also, one out of three midlevel managers and one out of five deputies disagreed that membership was restricted based on gender. Nearly one out of four midlevel managers agreed that membership was restricted based on gender; fewer agreed that it was restricted based on race/ethnicity.

With respect to how deputies in subgroups treat nonmembers, nearly one-third of midlevel managers and one-fourth of deputies agreed with the statement that deputies in subgroups look down on non–group members (e.g., ignore them, speak ill of them) (Figure 8.8). One-fourth of midlevel managers and one-fifth of deputies agreed that deputies in subgroups bully or harass nonmembers (e.g., humiliate, set unreasonable expectations, give unwanted tasks, etc.).

With respect to whether deputies in subgroups engage in dangerous or offensive behavior, 39 percent of midlevel managers and 23 percent of deputies disagreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may endanger other deputies (Figure 8.8). Further, 37 percent of midlevel managers and 25 percent of deputies disagreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may offend, intimidate, or endanger community members. That said, roughly one-fifth of midlevel managers agreed with the statement that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may endanger other deputies or engage in behavior that may offend, intimidate, or endanger community members (Figure 8.8). Also, a third of midlevel managers and a quarter of deputies indicated that they did not know the answer to these two questions.

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3 We note again here that for a period of time, LASD was required to promote female deputies in at least 25 percent of promotions (i.e., the Bouman consent decree), making their upward mobility potentially faster and therefore making them possibly less likely to be considered for these groups.

4 20.8 percent of midlevel managers and 16.8 percent of deputies agreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may offend other deputies (Figure 8.8). 17.8 percent of midlevel managers and 14.7 percent of deputies agreed that sometimes deputies engage in behavior that may offend, intimidate, or endanger community members (Figure 8.8).
Earlier we compared the responses of those who had been invited to join a subgroup and those who had not. In this section, we compare the responses of midlevel managers with those
of deputies about the impact of subgroups and suggestions about what LASD can do about subgroups.

**Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding the Impact of Not Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup on the Individual**

Some midlevel managers and deputies indicated that not belonging to a subgroup negatively impacted individuals (Table 8.16). Specifically:

- One out of five midlevel managers and deputies agreed that not belonging to a subgroup limited a deputy’s training opportunities.
- One out of four midlevel managers and deputies agreed that not belonging negatively affected a deputy’s work assignments.
- One out of four midlevel managers and one out of five deputies agreed that not belonging limited a deputy’s opportunities for career advancement or promotion.
That said, about one out of five midlevel managers and a third of deputies indicated that they did not know what impact not belonging to a subgroup had on an individual’s law enforcement career.

**Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding the Impact of Deputy Subgroups or Cliques on the Workplace and LASD as a Whole**

Two-thirds of midlevel managers and nearly half of deputies indicated that these subgroup have no effect on the daily operations of their station or unit (Figure 8.9). Nearly two-

---

### Table 8.16
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding the Impact of Not Belonging to a Deputy Subgroup or Clique on an Individual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Q12 (a, b, c). The following statements describe the impact that NOT belonging to a deputy subgroup or clique can have on an individual. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (Survey respondents were given a five-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree,” plus a “Don’t Know” option.)
thirds of midlevel managers and more than a third of deputies indicated that most deputies know who is in the subgroup and who is not.

In terms of a positive impact on the workplace, about a third of midlevel managers and one out of five deputies agreed with the statement that deputy subgroups can help motivate others within the station or unit (e.g., make more arrests, maintain better order of custody inmates; Figure 8.9).

Still, some survey respondents noted a negative impact of these subgroups on the workplace. A third of midlevel managers and nearly one out of four deputies agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups can hurt morale within the station or unit; roughly a third
of midlevel managers and deputies agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups or cliques makes nonmembers want to leave or avoid certain stations/units (Figure 8.9).

In addition, about two-thirds of midlevel managers and 40 percent of deputies agreed that deputy subgroups’ behavior had negatively impacted community perceptions of LASD (Figure 8.9). Note that deputies were twice as likely as midlevel managers to report that they did not know what impact subgroups had on community perceptions of LASD.

With respect to the media’s portrayal of subgroups, there was a large percentage of respondents who agreed that subgroups were not as harmful as the media makes them out to be. Specifically, half of midlevel managers and more than a third of deputies agreed with this statement (Figure 8.9). Still, 17.8 percent of midlevel managers and 35.8 percent deputies indicated that they did not know whether these subgroups were as harmful as the media made them out to be.

**Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding Supervisors’ Approach to Deputy Subgroups**

We asked survey respondents about supervisors’ approach and conduct toward deputy subgroups. Again, we compare the responses of midlevel managers and those of deputies (Table 8.17):

- Half of midlevel managers and more than a third of deputies agreed that supervisors were aware of subgroups’ conduct.
- Midlevel managers were more likely than deputies to agree that supervisors formally discipline improper or unethical behavior by subgroup or clique members.
- A third of midlevel managers and a quarter of deputies agreed that supervisors do not consider deputy subgroups or cliques to be problematic.

However, 42.7 percent of midlevel managers and 20.6 percent of deputies disagreed that supervisors are too lenient when deputy subgroup or clique members violate LASD policies or procedures (Table 8.17). And only 19 percent of midlevel managers and 12 percent of deputies agreed that supervisors discourage deputies from joining subgroups or cliques. Note that midlevel managers appeared to have more knowledge of supervisors’ different approaches to these subgroups than did deputies.

**Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views on What LASD Should Do About Deputy Subgroups**

Midlevel managers and deputies were similar in their views about whether LASD should do anything about subgroups (Figure 8.10). Specifically:

- Roughly half of midlevel managers and deputies disagreed with the statement that LASD should not do anything about these groups.
- Only one out of five midlevel managers and deputies agreed that LASD should not do anything about these groups.

About two-thirds of midlevel managers and half of deputies agreed that LASD should break up problematic deputy subgroups or cliques by moving members to different stations or units (Figure 8.10).
Table 8.17
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views Regarding Supervisors’ Approaches to Deputy Subgroups or Cliques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors are aware of subgroups’ or cliques’ conduct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors formally discipline improper or unethical behavior by subgroup or clique members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors do not consider deputy subgroups or cliques to be problematic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>51.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors are too lenient when deputy subgroup or clique members violate LASD policies or procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Roughly half of midlevel managers and deputies favored LASD discouraging deputies from joining these subgroups or cliques (Figure 8.10). Slightly more than a third of midlevel managers and deputies also favored LASD prohibiting deputy subgroups or cliques altogether. However, a sizable percentage of respondents disagreed with prohibition of these subgroups (Figure 8.10).

Only one out of three midlevel managers and one out of five deputies agreed that a mandatory station or unit rotation policy could limit the influence of subgroups or cliques (Figure 8.10). However, 40–45 percent of deputies and midlevel managers disagreed that implementing a mandatory station or unit rotation policy could limit the influence of subgroups.

Lastly, nearly three-fifths of midlevel managers and nearly half of deputies were in favor of LASD providing training and support to supervisors on how to address any improper or unethical behavior by deputy subgroups or cliques (Figure 8.10).

Views of Organizational Features That Could Contribute to Subgroup Formation

In this section, we present survey results for items pertaining to organizational factors that could contribute to subgroup formation. Some interviewees noted that subgroups are a way to recognize high-performing deputies, that the formal performance evaluation process was lacking in terms of being able to properly reward positive performance or correct poor performance, and that evaluations were not used for promotions. Others noted instances when “who you know” could lead to favorable outcomes in promotions or disciplinary decisions. Interviewees discussed challenges with coveted testing and testing for supervisory positions, as well as how those positions are assigned. Other interviewees discussed how promotions at the top of the organization can be perceived negatively if people who do not match stated criteria are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Type</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel managers</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>1,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>1,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>10.60%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>23.80%</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
<td>7.30%</td>
<td>43.60%</td>
<td>1,503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8.10
Midlevel Managers’ Versus Deputies’ Views About What LASD Should Do, if Anything, About Deputy Subgroups or Cliques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LASD shouldn’t do anything about deputy subgroups or cliques.</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midlevel</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASD should discourage deputies from joining subgroups or cliques.</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midlevel</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASD should break up problematic deputy subgroups or cliques by moving members to different stations or units.</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midlevel</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASD should prohibit deputy subgroups or cliques.</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midlevel</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A mandatory station/unit rotation policy could limit the influence of subgroups or cliques.</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midlevel</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASD needs to provide training and support to supervisors on how to address any improper or unethical behavior by deputy subgroups or cliques.</td>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midlevel</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Items represent Q15a, 15b, 15c, 15d, 15e, and 15f from the survey. The "Agree" category represents "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" responses, while the "Disagree" category represents "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree." Respondents also had the option of "Neither Agree nor Disagree" and "Don't Know."

promoted. Additionally, several interviewees noted that people in LASD are often more loyal to the unit where they trained—patrol training in particular—than they are to LASD overall. This is partially due to the fragmented structure of LASD, but it is also because people can often remain in their assignment for long periods of time. We present results for these items in Figure 8.11 by whether the survey respondent reported having been invited to join a subgroup and whether the survey respondent was a deputy or midlevel supervisor.

On the question of whether performance evaluations accurately reflect employee’s work quality, deputies and those who had not been invited to join a subgroup were slightly more in agreement (64 and 66 percent agreed, respectively) compared with subgroup invitees and midlevel supervisors (52 and 54 percent agreed, respectively). Next, all groups were in similar agreement about whether promotions are handled fairly (40 to 49 percent agreement), while invitees and midlevel managers were more likely to disagree (41 and 37 percent, respectively). On the consistency of disciplinary action, 44 percent of subgroup invitees disagreed that formal disciplinary actions are consistently applied, while 24 percent of those who had never
been invited disagreed. At the same time, 33 percent of survey respondents agreed that supervisors often make personnel decisions based on favoritism; deputies (35 percent) were more likely than supervisors (27 percent) to agree with this statement. Some interviewees noted historical examples of favoritism that was perceived to be widespread within LASD.

Next, we asked respondents to give their views of LASD executive leadership and asked about sources of loyalty within the organization. These items as a whole tap into broad factors that could have department-wide influence, such as leadership, individualism, and loyalty. Our interviewees explained that often people will feel more loyal to the unit (if still in custody) or patrol station where they trained than to LASD because it has traditional and reputational significance. Additionally, perceptions of ethical leadership have been found to affect multiple levels of the organization. For instance, in a study of ethical leadership in the Army, percep-
tions of ethical leadership at the company level trickled down to the platoon and squad levels and were associated with a variety of ethical behaviors (Schaubroeck et al., 2012).

Figure 8.12 indicates that deputies and those who had not been invited to join a subgroup were more positive about executive leadership. Subgroup invitees were the least positive about leadership, with 41 percent disagreeing that executive leadership represents high ethical standards. Midlevel managers were slightly less positive than deputies.

With respect to loyalty, respondents generally agreed with the perspective that people feel a sense of loyalty for where they have trained, and (to a lesser extent) for their current assignment, compared with LASD overall. About one-fifth to one-fourth of all respondents disagreed with these items.

**Conclusion**

These survey analyses focused on the responses of subgroup invitees and midlevel managers because we expected them to have the most knowledge of subgroups and felt that their responses in particular provided important insights about subgroups’ characteristics and their impact on the department. However, because this population was invited to join subgroups,

---

**Figure 8.12**

**Views of Leadership and Sources of Loyalty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executive leadership within LASD represents high ethical standards.</th>
<th>Invited</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel management</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputies typically feel more loyal to the station/unit where they trained than to LASD overall.</th>
<th>Invited</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel management</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deputies typically feel more loyal to their current assignment than to LASD overall.</th>
<th>Invited</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invited</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not invited</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlevel management</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES: Items represent Q3a, Q3c, and Q3d from the survey. The “Agree” category represents “Strongly Agree” and “Agree” responses, while the “Disagree” category represents “Strongly Disagree” and “Disagree.” Respondents also had the option of “Neither Agree nor Disagree” and “Don’t Know.”
these responses could also reflect a more positive view of subgroups. The survey results provide a way to understand the extent to which various perspectives are represented within LASD, but they represent one source of data on this subject and should therefore be viewed as one piece of the overall picture when considering recommendations or options for change.

Our interview and survey findings speak directly to LASD personnel’s perspectives on (1) why and where subgroups are likely to form, (2) what subgroups do and how they can impact LASD, and (3) what actions should be taken by LASD.

**Why and Where Do Subgroups Form? Who Gets Invited?**
Subgroups are most likely to be found at LASD patrol stations in high-crime areas. According to interviewees, these areas have a reputation for being challenging, and recruitment into subgroups is more likely to occur when deputies are in patrol station assignments. And our analyses supported insights from the interviews that, according to survey respondents, those who were invited to join subgroups were typically deputies who are known as hard workers, are willing to work challenging assignments, and, in some cases, show a willingness to engage in specific behaviors (such as being aggressive about making arrests). With respect to race/ethnicity and gender as factors influencing subgroup membership, about 40 percent of midlevel managers and 73 percent of subgroup invitees disagreed that membership was restricted based on race/ethnicity; one out of three midlevel managers and two-thirds of subgroup invitees disagreed that membership was based on gender. This leaves a substantial number of respondents who indicated that subgroup membership is restricted by race/ethnicity and gender.

**What Do Subgroups Do, and How Do They Impact LASD?**
These survey respondents also provided insights (again confirming interview findings) about some of the benefits provided to deputies by joining these subgroups, including a sense of camaraderie, fitting in at work assignments, and gaining respect of peers. At the same time, some respondents noted that subgroups can have a negative impact on the department, including the fact that some groups have their own code of conduct and that some deputies in subgroups look down on non–group members or engage in bullying or harassing behavior toward nonmembers. Such behavior would violate policy and could be illegal. In addition, one out of five midlevel managers agreed that deputies in subgroups sometimes engage in behavior that may endanger other deputies or that may offend, intimidate, or endanger community members, which is also problematic.

Although many midlevel managers and subgroup invitees indicated that subgroups had no effect on the daily operations of their station or unit, about a third of these respondents agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups can make nonmembers want to leave or avoid certain stations or units. Furthermore, a third of midlevel managers agreed that the presence of deputy subgroups can hurt morale within the station or unit. In addition, two-thirds of midlevel managers and half of subgroup invitees agreed that deputy subgroups’ behavior had negatively impacted community perceptions of LASD.

**What Potential Actions Should LASD Take?**
The survey respondents had a number of suggestions related to what LASD could do about subgroups. About half to two-thirds of midlevel managers and half of subgroup invitees agreed that LASD should break up problematic deputy subgroups by moving members to different stations or units and/or provide training and support to supervisors on how to address
any improper or unethical behavior by deputy subgroups. In contrast, half to two-fifths of midlevel managers and those who had not been invited to join a subgroup agreed that LASD should discourage deputies from joining subgroups or cliques and/or prohibit subgroups altogether. Among subgroup invitees, one-third agreed with discouraging deputies from joining subgroups, while one-quarter agreed with prohibiting groups altogether. These results suggest that this subject is divisive within LASD.

Combining LASD Interview and LASD Survey Findings

Combined with our interview findings, these survey findings suggest that, at least for some parts of LASD, subgroups exhibit features of being normalized, or “embedded in organizational structures and processes, internalized by organizational members as permissible and even desirable, and . . . passed on to successive generations of members” (Ashforth and Anand, 2003, p. 3). The history of subgroups existing in certain parts of LASD over long periods of time, the creation and enduring nature of subgroup identities, the perception that at least some group members further LASD’s goals (e.g., motivate hard work, camaraderie), and the localized nature of subgroups in LASD all contribute to this normalization. This normalization is supported by explanations provided for subgroup formation (e.g., unit pride, camaraderie, and recognition of hard work), in justifications for excluding other deputies or why people complain about subgroups (e.g., that some deputies are lazy and they are the ones who complain), and in views that emphasize the protection of each other and the community (e.g., pursuing a criminal down an alley). Subgroups could also be normalized in some stations because subgroups tend to consist of more-tenured deputies who could be in positions that involve teaching newcomers about both the technical and social aspects of the job (e.g., the social cocoon; Ashforth and Kreiner, 2002; Greil and Rudy, 1984).

This normalization of subgroups is a problem for LASD. Even interviewees and survey respondents who emphasized the positive aspects of subgroups often noted behavior by subgroups that is highly detrimental to police-community relations (e.g., violence toward inmates, eagerness to engage in use of force) and probably illegal. They also noted instances of behavior that is inconsistent with a well-managed force (e.g., favoritism, extortion of payments from deputies, corruption of the disciplinary process). Similarly, a significant number of deputies viewed subgroups as discriminating on the basis of race/ethnicity and gender. The fact that groups associated with such behaviors appear to be normalized in a law enforcement agency is troubling.

The survey results also show that a mix of perspectives exist within LASD and that this subject is divisive. This could partially be due to differential exposure to various types of subgroups. Some interviewees and survey commenters held the view that individual groups and individuals within those groups should be accountable for their own behavior and that it was unfair to label all groups or all people within a group based on the actions of others. This parallels some of the history and heterogeneity among motorcycle clubs. As Lauchs, 2019, discusses, there is a typology of motorcycle enthusiast clubs that ranges from conventional to deviant, as well as a demarcation within clubs among “weekend warrior” types—those who embrace conservative values associated with a “saloon” culture (trouble-seeking, toughness, and individualism)—and those who embrace a criminal lifestyle. The secrecy and loyalty mandated by the clubs protects radicals and conservatives who engage in criminal behavior (Lauchs, 2019). Similarly, people did not overwhelmingly attribute problematic behavior to deputy subgroups, but they recognized the potential for such behavior to develop over time.
or to be associated with select individuals within the group. Research on subgroups within organizations also states that groups that form for specific reasons (e.g., shared values, identity) can also develop other priorities (e.g., resource control, dominance; Carton and Cummings, 2012). This makes it difficult to predict how subgroup priorities and behaviors will develop over time. Combined with our interview and community results, these survey findings suggest that LASD personnel recognize that perceived negative outcomes associated with subgroups severely impact LASD’s mission and that these outcomes, however rare, are unacceptable at any frequency.
Both the community and many deputies spoke of the risks that subgroups pose to the department and to the community, and some reported on the subgroups’ contributions to deplorable and sometimes illegal behavior. Despite this, many LASD personnel defended subgroups as providing camaraderie and incentives for excellent policing. But the purported benefits of subgroups—solidarity, stress relief, social connection, and promotion of hard work—are all functions that can and should be fulfilled without exclusive, semisecret subgroups. Indeed, many of the purported benefits that subgroups provide undermine LASD management processes, and common behaviors promoted by some subgroups are detrimental to LASD’s mission of building trusting relationships with the community. This chapter draws on all the data collected through the course of our research to summarize findings across data sources and identify the findings that directly contribute to our recommendations in the next chapter. We summarize our key findings in Table 9.1 by providing example interview excerpts and presenting our survey results where applicable. Not all of the findings are comparable across all sources of data collection, so we also identify the findings that most prominently informed our recommendations after Table 9.1. This is then followed by a discussion of the main limitations of this study.

We base our recommendations on the following key findings:

• Community leaders and members were mostly critical of current department leadership, expressing concerns about a lack of transparency, a lack of trust, and a culture of aggressive policing. Some stakeholders said that LASD could learn from other law enforcement agencies how to better engage the community.

• Community stakeholders desire more engagement with LASD that is genuine, sincere, and compassionate and that prioritizes their needs. The qualities that stakeholders praise and prioritize (i.e., deputies serving as guardians) appear to be antithetical to the qualities they believe are prioritized by many LASD personnel (i.e., deputies acting as warriors).

• Although there were varying levels of awareness of subgroups among community stakeholders, most who were aware of these groups expressed concern about the negative effects on the community, including fear, trauma, and lack of trust in LASD. They also emphasized the need for greater oversight and accountability. The continued existence of these groups undermines the perceived legitimacy of LASD.

• Subgroups are identifiable within LASD, yet there are many LASD personnel who indicate that they have not personally encountered subgroups or have never seen any problematic behavior associated with them. There is a sense that attention to this issue ebbs and flows over time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Findings</th>
<th>Survey Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is subgroups’ impact on the community?</strong></td>
<td><strong>LASD perceptions of the impact on community perceptions and treatment:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subgroups and problematic behavior associated with them have negatively impacted the community and their perceptions of LASD</td>
<td>• Subgroups’ behavior has negatively impacted community perceptions of LASD (47 percent overall agreed; 56 percent of those invited agreed; 62 percent of midlevel management agreed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“You have to be willing to do certain things—beat people up, use excessive force, shoot people. A lot of illegal things. It’s not like joining the Boy Scouts. . . . if you’re celebrating people getting killed with tattoos, it’s out of hand.” (community leader interview)</td>
<td>• Subgroups engage in behavior that may offend intimidate or endanger community members (15 percent overall agreed; 16 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“I bet the guys in cliques’ rate of being in shootings is higher. . . . if you feel like you have to join, you’re likely to feel that you have to shoot someone to be a cop. . . . But it’s not clear whether guys in cliques are involved in more shootings because they put themselves in the tactical position or because they have a mindset that everyone is out to get you.” (command-level interview)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Why do unofficial, exclusive subgroups form?**

**LASD is fragmented, and unit loyalty or unit identity takes precedence over loyalty to LASD overall**

“That’s the beauty of the Sheriff’s Department. It takes different deputies to handle different places. Not all can do Compton, Lennox. Some can do Marina. Different people for different places. A deputy will learn at Century in a year what will take three or four years in other places. It doesn’t make you better, though. LASD stations operate as independent police departments.” (command-level interview)

Deputies typically feel more loyal to the station or unit where they trained than to LASD overall:

• 58 percent of all respondents agreed; 71 percent of those who had been invited to join a subgroup and 65 percent of midlevel managers agreed

**Subgroups often form at “fast” or high-crime stations**

“You see more in two years than you would elsewhere in eight years. There are rough neighborhoods and gang violence. It exposes you to a lot. You test yourself. A lot of people can’t make it. There’s a lot of violence, and you gotta know to expect it. I wanted to learn from the best and go where there’s stuff going on and some excitement.” (line-level deputy interview)

Subgroups are more common at stations in high-crime areas:

• 40 percent of all respondents agreed; 55 percent of those who had been invited to join a subgroup and 53 percent of midlevel managers agreed

**Some subgroups form to recognize hard workers or high performers**

“To be a member of those groups, you couldn’t be a ‘glad-hander’ or a slug. The people who are getting the tattoos are seizing drugs, finding shot-caller gang members, putting people in prison, and getting those who are trying to kill us.” (command-level interview)

Those who had been invited to join a subgroup responded that those who get invited had the following characteristics:

• being known as a hard worker (91 percent agreed)
• helping other deputies with their work (85 percent agreed)
• willingness to work challenging assignments (86 percent agreed)

Reasons for being invited to join:

• engaging in social activities with other subgroup members outside of work (51 percent of those who had been invited agreed)
• engaging in specific behaviors outside of work (e.g., paying for things; 27 percent of those who had been invited agreed)

**Other groups form based on more-social reasons**

“As time went on, it wasn’t about rewarding the hard workers; it became an ‘if we like you or not’ group, and if I like you or if you will do something for the group or for me, we may or may not give you a tattoo.” (midlevel supervisor interview)
Summary of Key Findings and Limitations

Table 9.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Findings</th>
<th>Survey Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some perceive that subgroups encourage undesirable behavior</td>
<td>Reasons for being invited:</td>
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<tr>
<td>“If you get involved in a shooting or a fight, that’s it. You’re in. [In custody], if a deputy was involved in a physical fight with an inmate, that was huge [for getting asked to join a subgroup]—even though you could have de-escalated the situation!” (line-level interview)</td>
<td>• behavior that violates current LASD policy and practices (15 percent agreed)</td>
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<td>• willingness to look the other way when others engage in improper or unethical behavior (22 percent of those invited agreed; 19 percent not invited agreed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>What do subgroups do? What is their impact on LASD?</td>
<td>Reasons why people join subgroups:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some view the main purpose of subgroups as providing guidance, security, and support</td>
<td>• to get respect among their peers (43 percent overall agreed; 57 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<td>“They all like to work really hard. They do their jobs. They’re the top performers. They want others who can provide guidance and mentorship. But if they stop doing that for each other, that’s where it can go wrong.” (command-level interview)</td>
<td>• to be mentored by senior deputies (23 percent overall agreed; 36 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“This job, especially patrol, is very stressful. We see and deal with crazy shit every day. . . . We see the worst in humanity, and there needs to be a way to destress and decompress from all of this.” (survey respondent with a long tenure)</td>
<td>• for privileges at work (30 percent overall agreed; 28 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<td>• to “fit in” (41 percent overall agreed; 45 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• to provide a sense of camaraderie (55 percent overall agreed; 91 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusivity and a sense of superiority create an informal hierarchy, which can be formalized if the subgroup embraces a status- or dominance-driven outlook</td>
<td>Subgroups’ impact on the station and nonmembers:</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The deputy cliques are about asking, ‘Are you someone who goes to seek out the real bad guys—the hardcore gangsters?’ You could build a reputation and get asked to be a part of the group. It’s a hierarchy and it’s a way to recognize who’s who and what’s what.” (command-level interview)</td>
<td>• can hurt morale (26 percent overall agreed; 26 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>“They controlled the supervisors. It allowed them to place people where they wanted to place them. ‘Not part of my group, we’ll send you to some less desired place.’ Controlled scheduling. Controlled who trained who. ‘Only the strong trainees come to my TOs.’ The TOs not in the group got the weak trainees.” (command-level interview)</td>
<td>• make people want to avoid or leave certain stations (30 percent overall agreed; 32 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<td>• negatively affect work assignments (25 percent agreed; 27 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• limit training opportunities (22 percent overall agreed; 23 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• limit opportunities for career advancement or promotion (22 percent overall agreed; 25 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subgroups might start out with honorable intentions, but there is a risk of this changing over time</td>
<td>The work outlooks of subgroups:</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Some subgroups hold people accountable so that they don’t tarnish the badge. Yes, those [negative] subgroups absolutely provide a harmful look at law enforcement, but there are others who don’t. Some see their profession as part of the LASD as a whole. But once their value system changes from LASD, that’s when you run into problems.” (command-level interview)</td>
<td>• Subgroups encourage members to be proactive (42 percent overall agreed; 81 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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<td>“. . . leaders can sometimes watch out for themselves and not the group. That’s where it goes bad.” (command-level interview)</td>
<td>• Subgroups have their own code of conduct (30 percent overall agreed; 42 percent of those invited agreed)</td>
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</table>
At least for the present and near future, subgroups are more likely to be more prominent in “fast” stations or high-crime areas where there is more perceived danger and more conventional crime-fighting. Some stations, such as Century and East Los Angeles, have long traditions of deputy subgroups, which tends to perpetuate them. Our survey findings suggest that the proportion of individuals who say that they have been invited to join a subgroup in the last five years is low (3.8 percent of respondents), and newer deputies (0–7 years at LASD) consistently reported having less knowledge of subgroups than more-experienced deputies (8+ years at LASD).

Although some subgroups can contribute to camaraderie or seem comparatively benign, they can evolve over time to be motivated by dominance, exclusivity, or problematic actions (Carton and Cummings, 2012). Secrecy is another form of control that enhances group cohesion and group identity (Costas and Grey, 2014). Problematic behaviors identified by interviewees often target select individuals but could also contribute to lowered unit morale. Some groups label targeted individuals as lazy or weak, which might lead to them being ignored, ostracized, disrespected, bullied, threatened, or subjected to other forms of workplace aggression and even violence. Subgroups that emphasize dominance might try to control supervisors, assignments, scheduling, training assignments, and social events. Our survey results indicate that roughly 15–20 percent of our sample considered these behaviors to be associated with subgroups.

Some community members and deputies expressed concerns about shootings committed by deputies and unnecessary force as associated with being invited to join a subgroup. Other deputies noted that such a motive would be difficult or impossible to prove.

LASD leadership recognizes that subgroup behavior can become problematic. It has been discouraging deputies from joining such groups and has developed a policy to counter negative subgroup behaviors. However, despite LASD acknowledging risks posed by groups, the department’s current approach was unsystematic in that there was no formal guidance for captains at the time of our interviews (our interviews predated the new policy). Many in the department maintain that negative acts are attributable to a few “bad apples” in a subgroup. This ignores the role of the occupational culture and the group dynamics involved in fostering and failing to prevent this behavior.

### Problematic behavior starts out minor and escalates over time if not addressed

“When that started to surface, the bullies weren’t checked. If you don’t check a bully, it will spread. The supervision was lacking. We all need supervision. They may be grown adults, but they still need to be supervised . . . . The two or three [bullies] who were extremely loud and powerful; they created chaos.”

(Comment-level interview)

Problematic behaviors that can escalate include
- looking down on, ignoring, or speaking ill of others (27 percent overall agreed; 28 percent of those invited agreed)
- bullying others (21 percent overall agreed; 22 percent of those invited agreed)
- potentially endangering other deputies (17 percent overall agreed; 18 percent of those invited agreed)
- working outside the chain of command in situations that require supervisor involvement (17 percent overall agreed; 19 percent of those invited agreed)
nizational processes, such as hiring, training, promotions, discipline, and staffing, all can factor into group formation, group member behavior, and supervision to control group behavior.

- Problematic subgroup behavior seems to start small and build over time. Supervisors who are attentive, know what to look for, and feel supported in taking action will play a critical role in preventing the development of more-egregious behavior. This can be a challenge when those engaged in undesirable behavior (e.g., social exclusion, disrespect, humiliation, excessive use of force) might also be high performers in some areas (e.g., arrests), are hard workers, or are more senior. Deputies and supervisors of all ranks can play a role in intervening to disrupt unacceptable behavior.

- Some captains have developed their own approaches that engage the entire unit—from lieutenants to deputies—to address problematic behavior by subgroups. A key element of this approach involves emphasizing unit identity over subgroup identity.

- Even though several respondents downplayed the risks of subgroups, many also said that the benefits did not outweigh these risks and said that they would advocate for telling deputies to not join subgroups. Many survey respondents recognized the negative community perceptions associated with subgroups. Lastly, survey respondents tended to indicate that something should be done, with 37 percent saying that subgroups should be prohibited.

Limitations

This is a controversial subject with a long history and a wide range of preexisting perspectives. We committed to uncover these perspectives and experiences with subgroups and to report them in a neutral, unbiased manner. Although several participants were forthcoming and offered detailed accounts of the impacts of subgroups on LASD, our outsider status might have affected what participants were willing and able to express to us in interviews, focus groups, and the survey, both within LASD and the communities who took part in the study. For instance, we were not able to directly ask deputies who had engaged in problematic behavior why they had done so. Some study participants might have been reluctant to share their perspectives on account of skepticism or concerns of retaliation, but our independence and confidentiality protections might have helped minimize the latter.

The sensitivities involved in this subject also might have affected participation and, because participation was voluntary, might have affected the types of people who chose to participate in an interview or complete a survey (i.e., selection bias). The response rate meant that a significant portion of LASD deputies did not participate, and there is a chance that the views represented in our survey findings do not reflect the views of LASD overall. It is difficult to determine the extent or direction of this response rate bias because the survey findings did show variability in perspectives. However, statistical analyses described in Appendix A (available online at www.rand.org/t/RRA616-1) suggest that systematic survey response bias was minimal, at least according to the information we had available to compare with LASD overall (gender, race/ethnicity, rank).

Similarly, our qualitative data collection, while diverse, was not intended to be representative of either LASD or the community. For instance, many of our LASD interviews reflect the perspectives of command staff. Although this can be viewed as a positive because these
individuals might have more knowledge about the organization and behaviors of a wider range of personnel than could be contacted directly, their perspectives could also be inaccurate, outdated, or shaped by their position.

Finally, this study provides only a snapshot of perspectives at this particular point in time. The dynamic nature of this subject suggests that views and experiences will change over time.
CHAPTER TEN

Recommendations

LASD is not the only law enforcement agency that has been confronted with reexamining its policies and practices in the wake of scandal, nor is it alone in its need to show that it can be accountable to the public and acknowledge negative outcomes for community members. Scandals associated with deputy subgroups reflect on LASD as a whole, which affects public figures’ and community members’ perceptions of LASD. The repeated revelations about subgroups, despite their secretive nature, only make these perceptions and further criticisms of the department worse.

For community members, a lack of progress on this issue, combined with tenuous police-community relations overall, signals that LASD does not prioritize community needs or does not recognize the actual and potential harms. LASD leadership appears to recognize the public perception and litigation issues, as well as the personnel issues that can develop when problematic behavior by subgroup members goes unaddressed. However, a substantial portion of our survey respondents reported that they did not have knowledge of these groups nor did they engage in providing an opinion, and some did not perceive that the groups they were aware of could be seen as problematic. Thus, although these issues might be discussed internally, promoting change and preventing future scandals is difficult because there is not enough agreement or momentum to create change, and the existence of subgroups has become normalized in some parts of LASD (McKay, 2014). This presents a challenge for leadership to communicate the urgency of the situation and to make the case for change (Barratt-Pugh and Krestelica, 2019).

Recommendations for Subgroups

Although subgroups have become normalized in parts of LASD, there is also recognition of the problems that subgroups create. Many of the personnel we surveyed said that they wanted LASD to do something about the existence of subgroups. LASD has taken the initial steps to begin to address this subject, most visibly by creating a policy that directly addresses employee groups that mistreat others. In February 2021, Sheriff Villanueva further elaborated that the policy is intended to prohibit people from joining subgroups or inviting others to join (although this has been contradicted in subsequent statements), noting that he would like County Counsel to offer a new legal analysis of this policy. Various other existing policies can also potentially be used to address issues that subgroups pose, such as the Policy of Equality, which includes policies against abusive conduct, inappropriate conduct toward others, and retaliation. However, at the time of our interviews, there appeared to be a lack of overall guid-
ance or information shared with captains about expectations and appropriate responses. Some captains have responded by developing their own approaches to addressing issues with subgroups, emphasizing direct communication and setting expectations. Although this approach could ameliorate problems in particular places, it introduces the risk of having inconsistent policies within LASD.

In a wide variety of organizations, it is common for formal policies to exist alongside informal practices or workarounds that could be derivatives of or even contrary to policy (Wieslander, 2019). Assumptions, stories, collective discourses, framings, and other cultural elements can subvert or ignore the intentions of formal policies. Additionally, as the policy landscape within an organization becomes more complex, divergence between policies and actual behavior is more likely (Crank, 2003). Thus, formal policies have to be reinforced through training, supervision, and review (the Policy, Training, Supervision, Review framework; Walker and Archbold, 2019). Moreover, challenges associated with subgroups sit within a broader organizational context that involves general challenges with supervision, training, discipline, and other department characteristics, such as fragmentation and the traditions that surround subgroups. This is particularly challenging in an organization as large and complex as LASD.

The secrecy and alternative hierarchy created by subgroups presents issues for team functioning (e.g., negative attitudes toward outgroups; Hornsey and Hogg, 2000) and requires additional effort for effective management. For instance, some of the reasons given to justify deputy subgroup formation involved a certain amount of negative attribution (Weingart et al., 2005) about some non-subgroup members (e.g., that they are “lazy”). Additionally, the act of forming a group can reduce respect, trust, and likability of nonmembers (Cronin, Weingart, and Todorov, 2011) and can increase suspicion of nonmembers, which can affect perceptions or experiences in the workplace (Insko et al., 1990; Miller, 2001) and can make favoritism or the appearance of favoritism more likely. The U.S. military discourages most socializing between different ranks on the grounds that it can undermine the chain of command and create the appearance of favoritism (Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-XX, undated). The same risk is true for deputies.

For deputies, the short-term benefits of peer acceptance might outweigh long-term risks of being involved in an internal investigation. And the financial risks of civil rights lawsuits are generally borne by the county rather than individual deputies. Shifting, controlling, or even abolishing such normative practices as subgroup membership is, of course, easier said than done. The adage familiar to those in policy research is that “culture eats policy for breakfast;” in other words, even the best-designed policies can fail if they are not aligned with cultural values and practices or if amending these values and practices does not make sense to the population that must adhere to them. Any strategy that does not recognize the significance of subgroups to a significant proportion of LASD is likely to fail. Decisionmakers would be wise to meet members of LASD staff “where they are at”—i.e., understand their constraints, desires, and concerns in crafting responses or directions for change. Thus, heavy-handed, top-down approaches that do not incorporate the cultural importance of subgroups in some parts of LASD and the factors that make the environment ripe for their existence and persistence are likely to fail. Moreover, given the independent nature of patrol stations and the localized

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1 The original quote attributed to Peter Drucker is “culture eats strategy for breakfast.” Or, from Schein, 2010: “Leaders should be conscious of culture; otherwise it will manage them.”
impact of subgroups, communication and efforts to address subgroups should be concentrated on units with known subgroups.

Although our focus is on challenges related to subgroups, and efforts should be targeted where there are identified issues or higher risks, some of these recommendations address more-general misconduct. As Punch, 2000, explains regarding corruption and misconduct, “there is consensus on effective measures to tackle it and to promote integrity. Ingredients are strong leadership, a multi-faceted organizational strategy, a well-resourced internal affairs unit, proactive techniques of investigation, and persistent efforts to promote professional standards. The essence is a judicious and sophisticated balance between negative and positive social control” (Punch, 2000, p. 301). Prevention and early detection are critical, and, to address problems with subgroups, proactive efforts will have to be coordinated across multiple levels of the organization.

Prevention and detection are particularly challenging in this context, as subgroups and any problematic behaviors by subgroups often are hidden, look minor or are difficult to interpret, or occur within a small group of insiders. Cases such as those involving excessive or deadly force against the community or assaults on other deputies are extreme, whereas fostering more-subtle behavior, such as disrespect, unit conflict, community harassment, and attempts to undermine the LASD management structure, was more common. These challenges create a risk that efforts to reduce problematic subgroup behavior could be ineffective or backfire. For instance, stronger supervision could either fail to detect problematic behavior or could create stronger ingroup tendencies to avoid supervisory interference. Supervision in general is a challenge because of the autonomy and low visibility of much patrol work, and, therefore, it is important to recognize that even the best supervision can be circumvented if there is motivation to do so.

Although it is worthwhile to uphold and enforce policies prohibiting subgroups, it is also important to consider that doing so could have unintended consequences. Prohibition has the potential to increase alienation and stigma of group members, which could drive existing subgroups further into secrecy, increasing the potential allure of exclusivity. If joining is a violation of policy, this might serve to reduce membership while also increasing selection effects for willingness to violate policy. Lastly, parts of LASD might see this prohibition as unfair, which could weaken the policy’s effect, at least in the short run.

LASD’s approach must also include more than just setting boundaries and punishing deputies when boundaries are crossed. There has to be attention and a sense that the department is taking a new interest in building up the workforce, emphasizing the integrity of its members, and welcoming exposure to different perspectives, including being open to community input (Blumburg, Papazoglou, and Creighton, 2018). Research on change management suggests that a critical aspect of successful organizational change involves managing the psychological contract between the employer and the employee by (1) involving employees in the change process and (2) developing and implementing an effective communication strategy (White and Robinson, 2014).2 Central to preserving the psychological contract and managing change is having clearly articulated expectations. These aspects of successful change manage-

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2 “The psychological contract refers to the shared beliefs and expectations staff have of their employer, and the beliefs and expectations the employer has of their staff” (White and Robinson, 2014, p. 259). These shared beliefs and expectations define the nature of the employer-employee relationship, so when beliefs or expectations are not in alignment, there can be damage to the relationship (Rousseau, 1989), which can take the form of perceptions of unfairness or a lack of trust (Morrison and Robinson, 1997).
ment suggest that any efforts that are rushed or half-hearted will easily be recognized and most likely rejected. These same factors are important for including the community in the change process and demonstrating sustained change.

Against this backdrop, we discuss a variety of recommendations for improvement in LASD’s approach to subgroups, noting that this issue connects to both inward-facing and outward-facing behaviors and perceptions. First, in light of the Sheriff’s clarification that the current policy intends to prohibit these groups, we discuss frameworks for organizational and cultural change, review potential considerations for the written policy as it currently exists, and consider potential negative unintended consequences and efforts that could mitigate or prevent them. Next, we focus on other ways that LASD could use a holistic approach to promote cultural change. This approach includes options for training, devoted resources, and efforts for transformation. A key training recommendation involves considering a novel program that focuses directly on peer relationships and redefining key values (e.g., loyalty, courage, integrity, trust). Many of these recommendations are focused on building up personnel within LASD and avoiding negative outcomes that sometimes arise with subgroups. Finally, we provide recommendations to improve LASD’s relationship with the communities it serves. Any organizational and cultural change efforts should integrate a community focus (i.e., “how will this help the community?”). Building trust is of day-to-day importance but also requires strategic planning and coordinated efforts over time, as well as measurement of outputs and outcomes. Moreover, building trust could require focused efforts to repair harm caused by past or contemporary misdeeds. We focus on this more in the community-facing recommendations section because this does not apply only to subgroups, but efforts to improve in these areas must also start in areas with more-serious community concerns, including concerns about subgroups (e.g., East Los Angeles).

The most promising method that LASD can use to reduce subgroups and their negative impact is to plan and follow a multipronged approach that involves various efforts to create lasting organizational change by improving the organization and the behavior of people within it. Creating a policy on subgroups is not enough, as deficiencies in organizational processes identified in Chapter Six (e.g., training, supervision, performance evaluation) and negative cultural norms (e.g., an “us versus them” mentality, a crime-fighter orientation) highlighted in Chapter Three could contribute to issues with subgroups or more generally. Moreover, some deputies reported relying on subgroups for support, for stress relief, or for mentorship and improvement of their career prospects. More support from the organization in these areas might reduce the appeal of these groups. In Table 10.1, we list factors that prior research has identified as the critical components of organizational and cultural change. In the first column, we list the factors identified by Fernandez and Rainey, 2006, as critical for promoting lasting organizational change in the public sector, and in the second column, we match concepts from those factors to what Meredith et al., 2017, identified as drivers of organizational cultural change. The most important short-term factors or drivers of change for LASD leadership are vision and goals, communication, and accountability. In the longer term, collaboration, stakeholders, training and resources will be important for driving lasting, sustainable change.

**Implementing the Policy on Employee Groups Which Violate the Rights of Other Employees or Members of the Public**

Sheriff Villanueva recently created a video to be distributed to all department members regarding Policy 3-01/050.83, “Employee Groups Which Violate Rights of Other Employees or
Members of the Public” (hereafter “policy on employee groups,” see Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Manual of Policy and Procedures, 2021b), in which he stated that the policy is designed to make membership in or recruitment for subgroups a violation of policy. This sets the goal of removing subgroups from the work environment; however, subsequent statements by the Sheriff have contradicted whether this is possible with the existing policy, instead focusing on misconduct by groups. Our findings suggest that removing subgroups from the work environment could be particularly challenging to achieve in some parts of LASD. There are a variety of considerations related to policy and vision, investigations and discipline, and communication, as well as why subgroups form and implications for individuals who belong to them.

**Vision, Goals, Communication, and Accountability**

Setting a clear vision is the primary responsibility for executive leadership and involves setting the mission for the organization, with clear goals and expectations (Meredith et al., 2017). To implement the vision, other components and systems must be in alignment (e.g., goals, communication, policies, accountability, training, etc.). The Sheriff’s recent video statement indicated that there is “zero tolerance” for deputies to join or solicit others to join any “non-approved department-sanctioned group.” This language is specific and communicates a vision of LASD without these groups, but it has yet to be incorporated into official policy. The Sheriff’s statement also refers to groups that have “engaged in any form of misconduct” and uses more ambiguous language that employees are “advised to avoid joining” these groups. Being firm in setting and enforcing standards will be critical for this issue and has been identified elsewhere as being essential when implementing programs to enhance ethical behavior and prevent wrongdoing (McDowall et al., 2015). As noted above, even subgroups that seem relatively innocuous can undermine LASD management, can create negative perceptions of LASD in the community, and could lead to violations of policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Change in the Public Sector (Fernandez and Rainey, 2006)</th>
<th>Drivers of Cultural Change (Meredith et al., 2017)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vision: Ensure and communicate the need for change</td>
<td>Communication</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Develop clear goals and a detailed plan</td>
<td>Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Build support for change and overcome resistance</td>
<td>Stakeholders, collaboration, trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Ensure top management support and commitment; create champions for change</td>
<td>Accountability, collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Build external support</td>
<td>Communication, resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Provide sufficient resources</td>
<td>Resources, training</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Integrate the change into formal doctrine or policy</td>
<td>Accountability, resources, measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Pursue comprehensive change by using a holistic approach</td>
<td>Goals, resources, training, transformation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Clarify policy language. To set expectations and to let deputies better understand policies that affect them, it is important that policy language is clear. It is also important to communicate the need for such a policy. Different groups within the department could interpret the current policy on employee groups differently (e.g., the policy bans subgroups writ large versus the policy focuses only on problematic behavior of some in groups) or might not understand the need for such a policy. First, LASD should add the necessary language into this policy to formally prohibit deputy subgroups or cliques, as seemingly indicated in the Sheriff’s video statement. Additionally, the policy should provide a clear explanation of what specifically is prohibited and a clear explanation of how the policy will be enforced. Finally, the policy on employee groups currently mentions damage to public trust and harm to morale as key factors associated with these groups. LASD should add language to the policy to reinforce how these, or other factors associated with subgroups, are related to LASD’s mission and core values.

Take steps to address secrecy. One of the most troubling aspects of subgroups is their secrecy. The secrecy of both membership and activities makes it more difficult to determine how big a subgroup is, what its activities are, and whether it has the potential to undermine unit management. LASD should consider requiring deputies to disclose their membership in all work-related groups or organizations. Although this could prompt dishonesty, it might also provide useful information about the size and scope of subgroups within LASD and discourage membership.

Implement new guidance related to internal investigations. Given this element of secrecy, when allegations do come to light, it is critical that they are investigated thoroughly and swiftly. However, secrecy also makes these investigations challenging because information can be limited to insiders. Internal Affairs investigators should receive guidance and training on how to investigate possible violations of the policy on employee groups. Also, because the policy on employee groups can become the focus of a secondary investigation from a primary complaint (e.g., a hazing complaint that reveals subgroup involvement), LASD should have a general policy that requires Internal Affairs investigators to notify a supervisor and to commence a separate investigation upon discovering collateral misconduct. This is a recommended best practice in police accountability (Walker and Archbold, 2019). Investigating and disciplining all misconduct associated with subgroup-related investigations are critical for addressing the potential group element involved in the misconduct.

Enhance the role of external oversight and external investigations. Accountability involves collaborating with external oversight. Some of our community-related recommendations also suggest improving relationships with external oversight bodies. Part of this should involve cooperating with the OIG in subgroup investigations. Given the OIG’s concerns about some deputies not being questioned and the lack of depth in subgroup-related questioning in internal investigations, the OIG’s role can add legitimacy to these investigations (OIG, 2020a).

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3 For example, the Department of Defense prohibits active participation in organizations that advocate the use of force or violence (Department of Defense Instruction 1325.06).
External oversight could provide recommendations for improvement and serves to provide a sense of transparency and accountability for these high-profile investigations. Alternatively, the OIG could use subpoena power to conduct a separate investigation. This course of action could lead to discrepancies with the internal investigation that need to be reconciled. A final alternative is to explore options for another external entity to investigate. The California State Attorney General recently announced a pattern or practice investigation, but it is not clear whether subgroups are a focus of this investigation (Office of the Attorney General, State of California Department of Justice, 2021).

**Further define a vision for cultural change within LASD.** Although clear vision and definitive policy are important for communicating expectations related to subgroups, other elements of the vision for LASD and related goals should also be articulated. For instance, the Sheriff’s recent statement mentions that prohibiting subgroups is a step toward “change in the culture of our organization.” This could be clarified to communicate a cultural stance on subgroups (e.g., how they might conflict with LASD mission and values) and the desired cultural change that the department is heading toward, which could include acknowledging and communicating a desire to separate the department from the past. A cultural stance on subgroups would convey the message that although not all groups have been problematic, their existence poses risks to the healthy functioning of the department and to the relationship with the community. As an example of desired cultural change, the fragmented nature of LASD, and the status attributed to certain assignments (e.g., working at fast stations), along with the justifications that devalue some non-subgroup members (e.g., “lazy,” “slugs”), LASD might begin moving toward a culture of respect, a culture of trust, or a just culture (e.g., as a component of a culture of safety; Klinger, 2020). A clear vision is implemented at lower levels of the organization through specific goals and communicating those goals. This is where ensuring top management support and commitment and overcoming resistance to banning subgroups is critical.

**Communication**

**Open lines of communication.** Messages from top leadership set the tone for communicating the importance of department policies and for orchestrating organizational change. This includes communicating a clear determination to discipline misconduct, encouraging people to come forward to report issues, and supporting those who do come forward. Given that interviewees expressed frustration with the fact that deputies convicted of misconduct had been reinstated, leadership needs to address cultural elements of cynicism, secrecy, and hypocrisy. Additionally, messages coming from the top should emphasize the importance of being part of LASD as a whole and should avoid signals that could be interpreted as showing a preference for certain units. This desired message emphasizes the superordinate organizational identity of being a deputy sheriff and could involve highlighting common goals (Gaerttner et al., 2000). Communicating an organizational identity applies not only to the Sheriff, but also to the entire command staff—assistant sheriffs, chiefs, commanders, and captains (Punch, 2000). Top leadership also supports leadership at lower levels, which requires open communication to inform and educate them about issues and to provide guidance and support. Historically within LASD, information was sometimes filtered on its way up to the top. Top leadership can reinforce that open truthful communication is valued over minimizing problems.

**Encourage reporting behavior.** Relatedly, leadership should create messaging and systems that encourage and convey support for people who come forward to report problems, both internally and externally. Leadership and supervisors must convey that reporting is a valued...
behavior of deputies, and they must denounce retaliation (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). Leadership must also clearly explain that retaliation will not be tolerated. For example, a recent anonymous report to Internal Affairs was leaked to personnel at the Compton station, which led to retaliation. This requires an investigation, along with an explanation for how this occurred and how it will be prevented from occurring in the future. The department should consider revising the existing anonymous reporting system or should create a separate anonymous hotline for internal complaints to assure respondents of anonymity. Some interviewees and survey respondents noted other challenges with existing reporting systems that might need to be reviewed (e.g., complaints about interpersonal problems could generate an automatic Policy of Equality report, which might lead to transfer of the subject of the compliant, which could lead to retaliation from the subject’s friends).

Collaboration
Clearly communicating a vision for the future and the standards that should be upheld sets the tone, but collaboration and accountability will be important for implementing change related to subgroups. Given the variation across the department, collaboration will be necessary to determine whether different assignments, divisions, or even individual units need to embrace slightly different goals or strategies for accomplishing those goals. Chiefs and commanders should work with unit commanders to develop strategic plans for dealing with subgroups by having established lines of communication and creating plans to manage existing groups. This process could include communicating these plans externally so that community members know that the department is taking the issue seriously and is attempting to be transparent.

Accountability
Collaboration across levels of leadership is important for understanding department conditions and developing plans for units across the department, which inform ongoing monitoring and accountability. Although chiefs and commanders should be accountable for ensuring that plans exist, unit commanders are responsible for implementing those plans, preventing and intervening in personnel issues, and ensuring that their lieutenants and sergeants are on the same page. The general features of effective leadership begin with fostering trust and respect through open communication (Clarke, 2011; Denti and Hemlin, 2012).

Increase responsibilities at the unit level. Unit commanders are directly responsible for managing personnel, involving employees in organizational processes, and setting expectations. Many of the captains with whom we spoke noted that communicating about the implications of subgroups openly and fairly was critical. Just as top leadership should communicate the importance of being part of LASD overall to promote organizational identification, unit commanders should emphasize the common identity of working in a particular unit.5 In-group

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4 Recently, two deputies at the Compton station filed lawsuits against LASD with allegations that a subgroup allegedly named the Executioners was attempting to control scheduling at the station, had assaulted one of the complainants, and supported the excessive use of force in the form of shootings by deputies. A confidential report to Internal Affairs by one of these deputies was apparently leaked, resulting in retaliation, one form of which was graffiti on the keypad to enter the employee parking lot that said “[deputy name] is a rat.” The group also placed its logo on at least one computer mouse and mouse pad at the station (Tchekmedyian and Lau, 2020).

5 The CCJV report contained a similar recommendation: “Avoid promoting or condoning a culture of allegiance to a subpart of the Department,” but it does not recognize the importance of promoting unit identity over subgroup identity. Although promoting allegiance to LASD overall is important, this recommendation is related to our finding that loyalty is higher to the unit where one trained or currently works than for LASD overall.
symbols, such as those associated with subgroups, promote in-group identification and can reduce team identification, which has implications for such team outcomes as performance, trust, and conflict (Han and Harms, 2010; Levine and Thompson, 2004). Communicating a shared identity and shared goals can help reduce intergroup conflict (Gaertner et al., 2000; Wenzel, Mummendey, and Waldzus, 2008). Managing subgroups at the unit level also involves addressing small issues before they became larger problems and not hesitating to take action. Moreover, failing to address even minor issues related to subgroups perpetuates what might be bad behavior and creates more problems. Unit commanders are ultimately accountable for this, but lieutenants and sergeants are also accountable for setting expectations and monitoring the work environment. Recommended practices related to subgroups include the following:

• Continue to explain that participation in cliques is prohibited and discuss the consequences of joining a group (short term versus long term). Give examples of cautionary tales in which issues with subgroups have led to negative outcomes and damaged LASD’s reputation (this could be facilitated by a “Lessons Learned” program in general).

• Set clear expectations for acceptable and unacceptable behavior, whether subgroup-related or not. Behavior that is exclusionary or divisive could trigger a slippery slope leading to disrespect, ostracism, gossip, rumors, false information, degrading and discrediting someone’s workplace commitment and contribution, character attacks, humiliation, vandalism, false claims, and other behaviors that are signs of abusive conduct or bullying. Supervisors should understand and know to look for these behaviors and signs of conflict.

• Supervisors should also be made aware that their current or prior membership in a deputy subgroup is a reportable conflict of interest should they supervise other subgroup members, which should not be allowed. See Manual of Policies and Procedures 3-01/075.00.

• Continually scan the environment for signs of internal conflict, such as people ignoring each other; asking to change assignments; or rumors, gossip, or efforts to pressure or force individuals to leave the unit.

• Normalize and incentivize documentation of problems and issues to address adverse behavior. This does not require an inquiry or a performance log entry, but simply documenting employee behavior can help should disciplinary action be required. This might help avoid institutional knowledge loss that could occur during supervisor transitions (e.g., a new captain). Both the Kolts report and the Special Counsel previously recommended similar practices.

Develop a Holistic Approach for Improving the Workplace and Preventing Misconduct

It is important for LASD to develop a holistic approach to institutionalize and promote comprehensive change, which often requires system change (Fernandez and Rainey, 2006; Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie, 2001; Shareef, 1994). Many organizational change efforts backslide because they are not supported by surrounding systems (as noted in Table 10.1, drivers of cultural change will involve resources, training, transformation measurement, and engaging internal and external stakeholders). As noted above, the various components of a holistic approach need to be aligned with the vision and goals for LASD. Adopting a broader framework or plan for change could help communicate why other changes are necessary and how they can be beneficial more broadly. Additionally, such a framework may explain why and show how LASD is working to make subgroups a thing of the past.
Table 10.2 provides a list of potential efforts to support change with resources, training, and transformation (Meredith et al., 2017). In general, the potential training efforts listed here should begin by being targeted toward the highest need (e.g., units with known subgroups).

**Implement Training for Recognizing Problematic Behavior and Intervening**

Training efforts should focus on prevention, prediction or early detection, and intervention to disrupt some of the problematic behaviors identified above (e.g., aggression; Barling, Dupré, and Kelloway, 2009; Dillon, 2012). Training for supervisors to recognize issues and intervene early might be useful, but research in this area is limited (Gilin Oore, Leiter, and LeBlanc, 2015; Tricco et al., 2018). Developing or enhancing formal or informal mentoring programs for sergeants to enhance supervisory behavior in general was recommended by several interviewees, although, again, research evidence is limited (Herrington and Schafer, 2019; Pearson-Goff and Herrington, 2014). Lastly, LASD should consider implementing a peer intervention program. This would require readiness and a substantial commitment by LASD, but it would also provide a framework for positive change.

**Develop a Peer Intervention Program to Help Personnel Intervene in Misconduct**

As a clear example of how peer nonintervention contributed to unnecessary force and death, the police killing of George Floyd in May 2020 shocked the collective conscience of many Americans. Many law enforcement leaders immediately and publicly denounced this act. Moreover, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey of law enforcement officers nationwide,

### Table 10.2
#### Recommendations for a Holistic Approach to Change

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Drivers of Change</th>
<th>Recommendations for Change</th>
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| Training: develop personnel through training (skills, education) | • Implement peer intervention training to prevent misconduct.  
• Train supervisors to better monitor the workplace and intervene.  
• Improve mentoring for sergeants. |
| Transformation: promote openness to change, adaptability, learning orientation | • Implement a lessons-learned program and disseminate best practices. This could take the form of more-formal Sentinel Event Reviews for significant events, summaries of key findings from investigations, and/or releasing redacted transcripts. Ideally, “near misses” would also be subject to review.  
The most immediate action LASD could take is to disseminate the overarching findings, lessons learned, and/or transcripts from the internal investigation of the Banditos.  
• Review and improve performance evaluation practices; incorporate community policing metrics.  
• Review unit assignment processes and consider options for increasing movement of personnel.  
• Review and improve unit-level training programs (e.g., 360-degree reviews). |
| Resources: devote sufficient resources to change efforts (staffing, time, etc.) | • Develop or enhance a long-term health and wellness program that encourages regular use of psychological services.  
Enhance the peer support program. Improving these supports can provide outlets for dealing with stress and could give deputies other sources of support in addition to their peers.  
• Develop a career planning program.  
• Identify priorities for other research, focusing on pressing organizational challenges and changes (e.g., body-worn cameras), as well as further study of subgroups or related topics (e.g., workplace harassment, workplace bullying). Consider working with an organizational consultant. |

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a The link between psychological services and cliques has been noted in the past. A Los Angeles Times article from 2000 interviewed LASD’s chief psychologist at the time, who mentioned efforts to get ahead of problems associated with cliques, although the article did not discuss what those were (Avins, 2000).
84 percent of those at all ranks support a requirement to intervene if another officer is about to inappropriately use force (Morin et al., 2017). Many agencies are enacting policies that mandate such intervention, particularly as it relates to use of force. Often, however, these policies are enacted without appropriate training on what police peer intervention means or how to do it, creating a critical gap.

LASD interviewees frequently noted that issues with subgroups develop because the issues are often overlooked, ignored, or left for someone else to deal with. This approach resembles passive bystandership, suggesting that it is likely that people either do not know what to do or do not think they will be supported if they try to intervene. Interviewees also noted the importance of peers for line-level deputies. Additionally, interviewees had concerns over the use of force, shootings committed by deputies, and a code of silence as potential ways to enhance status within the group. Instead of relying only on increasing punishment to resolve these issues, which can backfire (Ivković, Peacock, and Haberfeld, 2016), a focus on peer intervention draws from the idea that prevention is the best medicine and emphasizes that anyone can intervene with anyone else to protect their career, health, or safety. There is likely substantial distance in LASD between those who ostracize and those who are ostracized, but our interview and survey findings suggest that there is a large middle ground of people who are respected and could also recognize the need to intervene.6

Project Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (Project ABLE) is a novel peer intervention approach to reduce misconduct and is based on NOPD’s experience and development of the Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC) Peer Intervention Program. Project ABLE is an active bystander and peer intervention program based on the assumption that preventing misconduct and mistakes largely is the responsibility of those who are present during the event (Aronie and Lopez, 2017). Free training has been provided by the Georgetown Innovative Policing Program and the law firm Sheppard Mullin, both of which were involved in the development of EPIC as part of the New Orleans Consent Decree.

Project ABLE directly focuses on cultural change to prevent misconduct, avoid police mistakes, and promote officer health and wellness. It provides guidance on measures to create and sustain a culture of peer intervention, but it also requires a firm and clear commitment (e.g., policies, training, accountability) from leadership. The intervention can be incorporated into a broader employee wellness program.

Practically, for peer intervention to be effective, the most critical factor is that deputies know they will be supported if they intervene, which is the responsibility of leadership (Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran, 2005). Additionally, the goals of Project ABLE include redefining various features of law enforcement culture. One example is redefining courage as moral courage and recognizing that it takes high levels of moral courage to intervene with a peer. Another is redefining loyalty, from unwavering loyalty to peers to an affirmative loyalty that protects peers’ health, safety, and career. Instead of having a punitive focus, peer intervention emphasizes something that is already defined as important—protecting one another.

Intervening to prevent misconduct or mistakes could save someone’s career, might reduce exposure to stressful or traumatic events (e.g., unnecessary use of force), or could increase safety by correcting improper tactics or conduct. As incidents are increasingly captured on video, evidence of proper peer intervention can provide the community with examples of restraint and

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6 As an example, the Banditos incident at Kennedy Hall reportedly involved several LASD bystanders who either did not recognize the need to intervene or failed to effectively intervene.
de-escalation. The active bystandership research literature identifies how inhibitors (e.g., fear of retaliation, situational ambiguity, the pressure to not second-guess a colleague), the actions or inaction of others, and prior nonintervention can lead to patterns of passive bystandership (Staub, 2003).

Simply receiving bystander intervention training can increase the likelihood of intervention. ABLE has not yet been formally evaluated, so some caution is warranted; however, bystander training in other areas has revealed positive behavioral outcomes (e.g., sexual violence prevention; Mujal et al., 2019). Additionally, it is likely that some personnel will be resistant. However, there need not be rampant excessive force, a push for increased discipline, a strong code of silence, or unfamiliarity with peer intervention within an organization for a peer intervention program to be helpful. Critically, leadership has to provide full support, and key people throughout the organization should be brought in to provide guidance, support, and advance the idea that this training would provide positive change for LASD (Lassiter, Bostain, and Lentz, 2018). The pressure to change has to come from within. Within LASD, there will certainly be challenges to effective implementation, including its decentralized structure, its command structure (e.g., all assistant sheriffs, chiefs, commanders, and captains need to be on board), its diversity of tasks and challenges across Los Angeles County, and the ostracism that already exists of some departmental members (e.g., peer intervention requires that anyone can intervene with anyone else, regardless of rank or status).

Transform How the Department Shares and Generates Information

Lessons Learned

From our interviews and survey findings, we were struck by how many participants denied any knowledge of subgroups. We expected at least some familiarity with the public examples, particularly among command staff. This suggests either an unwillingness to grapple with a critical challenge or a potential loss of important knowledge about how problematic high-profile events occurred and lessons for how they can be prevented. Therefore, we recommend a lessons-learned or knowledge management program specifically related to subgroup investigations, but ideally for personnel management issues in general. This could include various forms of evaluation and best practices generation. For instance, captains gave us many examples of how they effectively handled personnel issues or how they were prevented from doing so. Across captains’ perspectives, there could be some triangulation of best practices. Patton, 2001, gives a set of conditions for developing high-quality lessons learned (e.g., triangulation across various sources), but starting with internal expertise is a good first step.

Review Internal Processes

Other department processes were potentially related to subgroups or were seen as a general challenge by some of our research participants, including performance evaluations, personnel rotation, and unit training programs. Making changes to these processes requires thorough assessment and coordination with employee unions. Potential deficiencies in formal performance evaluations could contribute to the perceived need for informal peer evaluations. Performance evaluations were also considered by some to be “not used for anything,” and there were perceptions that it was difficult to lower someone’s evaluation rating year-over-year. Incorporating community engagement into performance reviews is another potential area for improvement. Personnel rotation was identified as something that other departments do more frequently. Additionally, the ability for personnel to have choice in their assignments was per-
ceived to contribute to subgroup formation. Remaining in certain assignments for too long was also identified as a potential issue. Finally, variation across unit training programs was identified as a potential issue in general and for subgroups. Incorporating anonymous 360-degree review of training officers and sergeants is one potential option for identifying successes and challenges across the department (French and Stewart, 2001; Hassan, Park, and Raadschelders, 2019). Similarly, exit interviews should be conducted with all deputies when they leave a unit of assignment, as well as when they leave the department. Given the multiple instances of subgroups pressuring individuals to leave a unit, this procedure could identify issues early. Information from these interviews should be reviewed regularly.

**Devote Resources to Enhancing Support for Employees**

Lastly, ongoing devotion of resources to change and improvement efforts is critical. An easy place to start would be to enhance employee support programs, such as the peer support program. This enhancement could include specific support services for deputies who are victimized by subgroups. Additionally, developing a career planning support program to help new deputies build a plan for their careers could reduce the allure of subgroups as a source of mentorship and career building. Finally, we recommend devoting resources to research other pressing organizational challenges or desired changes. Resources could also be devoted to further study workplace issues associated with subgroups (e.g., workplace bullying). For example, analysis of use-of-force incidents, civilian complaints, the effectiveness of discipline, and the use of the Performance Reporting and Monitoring System (PRMS) could be beneficial to the department and oversight bodies. Understanding specifically whether there are peer network or shift-based patterns to use of force and complaints, conducting a thorough review of whether discipline is associated with reduced problematic behavior, and using the PRMS across the department could improve early recognition and management of problems.

**Recommendations for Strengthening Ties Between LASD and the Communities It Serves**

Each individual law enforcement agency’s approach to community policing and community engagement starts with a vision and goals and ultimately requires a strategic plan and clear measures of outputs (Cordner, 1999). Implementing and reviewing these goals and strategies requires systematic measurement and ongoing effort (Goldstein, 1987; Mastrofski, Willis, and Kochel, 2007). Any efforts or promises should only be made if the purpose is genuinely to improve relations with the community and there are intentions and the capability for following through with concrete action (Adams, Rohe, and Arcury, 2002; Chappell, 2009). Below, we provide some examples of existing practices that other law enforcement agencies are using to improve community trust, many of which have been evaluated. LASD should start by developing a strategic vision and strategic plan specifically for community policing (Cordner, 1999), which will likely need to include station-specific planning. Indeed, we recognize and our findings show that the needs, challenges, and solutions will vary across LASD. Stations

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7 The Kolts, CCJV, Antelope Valley settlement agreement, and Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy reports (Loyola Law School Center for Juvenile Law and Policy, 2021) all recommend improving community policing and improving respectful interactions with community members or inmates.
with higher workload, more serious crime, and/or subgroups that prioritize aggressive crime-fighting, as well as already strained relationships with the community, could face more challenges in implementing reforms related to community relations. It will also be important to examine how messages about the importance of aggressive crime-fighting are emphasized by LASD overall. Stations with strained community relations will require extra effort to show tangible progress. In the following sections, we note areas that our community participants suggested were important or in need of improvement, and we provide examples of practices that have been suggested or evaluated in research literature. Proposed recommendations focused on improvements in three main areas: training, community engagement, and accountability.

**Training**

Community stakeholders in more than a third of the discussion groups and interviews recommended changes to LASD training. In the majority of these comments, participants stated that deputies need to improve how they treat and interact with people of color, victims, and special populations (e.g., those with mental illness or developmental disabilities). Community members also noted the potential impact of jail experience on deputies' outlooks. The 1992 Kolts Commission recommended a mandatory annual community service requirement for custody personnel, which might be worth reconsidering. Additionally, there are a variety of related pathways to improving community trust in LASD, one of which involves reducing antagonistic outcomes. For example, other efforts to improve community outcomes include reducing overall use-of-force incidents (Worden and McLean, 2017) and minimizing the use of pretextual stops (Blanks, 2016). Nevertheless, many of the community members' comments related to their perceptions of procedural justice in their interactions with deputies. Indeed, discourtesy is a common public complaint, according to the watch commander service reports released by LASD (LASD, undated-c). To address these persistent issues, we recommend institutionalizing procedural justice starting in the academy and reinforced as a core aspect of LASD's mission to “enhance the public's trust.” Additionally, the positive effects of procedural justice should be emphasized, which include increased satisfaction, legitimacy, willingness to cooperate, perceptions of disorder (Gill et al., 2014; Hough et al., 2017), and legal compliance (Walters and Bolger, 2019). In the correctional setting, potential effects include reduced recidivism (Beijersbergen, Dirkzwager, and Nieuwbeerta, 2016; Jenness and Calavita, 2018; Wright and Gifford, 2017).  

**Change the Mindset from “Warriors” to “Guardians” Starting in the Academy**

As noted above, organizational and cultural change needs to be built into organizational processes where possible. Rahr and Rice, 2015, contend that shifting to more of a guardian mindset and recommitting to democratic ideals begins with academy training. They note that in order to ensure organizational alignment with procedural justice or guardian principles, leadership must “ensure that their organizational culture is not in conflict with these same principles” (p. 4). Rahr and Rice provide recommendations for changing the academy structure that could be useful for LASD to consider. For instance, instead of recruits being required to salute and remain silent when in the presence of academy staff, they were instead instructed to initiate a conversation with any staff member they encounter, make eye contact, and lead with

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8 It will be important to examine the work and task environments to identify potential barriers to implementing procedural justice. As Sherman, 2020, notes, time pressures (e.g., from dispatchers, from peers) could be one potential barrier.
respect. Fear, humiliation, and berating were replaced with coaching and encouragement. New training modules were focused on procedural justice, crisis intervention training, respect, and social interaction skills.

**Institutionalize Procedural Justice Through Training, Performance, and Accountability**

Additionally, emphasizing procedural justice in interactions with the public is a well-recognized strategy for improving interactions and perceptions of law enforcement. It also recognizes building public trust as a valued goal and outcome of law enforcement activities. A recent evaluation of the Chicago Police Department’s department-wide training in procedural justice found it to be associated with a 10-percent reduction in complaints and a 6.4-percent reduction in the use of force (Wood, Tyler, and Papachristos, 2020). A critical element for successfully institutionalizing procedural justice is ensuring that officers slow themselves down in order to properly respond to the situation (Sherman, 2020). This is sometimes easier said than done, when officers frequently receive demands from dispatch, other officers, and command staff to be as efficient as possible. This is the case for some stations in LASD, as deputies often start their shifts with multiple calls for service to which they must respond. One promising practice to address this involves a supervisor review meeting with deputies to discuss positive encounters and how procedural justice was used (Owens et al., 2018). The interaction is based on three components of the LEED (listen and explain with equity and dignity) procedural justice model: (1) discussing a benign encounter, (2) focusing on officer thought processes and actions during the encounter, and (3) the supervisor modeling procedural justice components to the officer. This approach has the added benefit of creating interactions between supervisors and subordinates that are positive (i.e., nondisciplinary) while also training to reinforce procedural justice and positive behavior. This brief intervention was associated with similar levels of officer activity but lower levels of incidents ending in arrest or use of force, although there is a need for further evaluation (Owens et al., 2018).

The recent introduction of body-worn cameras within LASD provides a potential new tool for building in systems of continuous improvement. Most importantly for community relations, LASD should consider implementing a systematic approach to reviewing videos from the cameras to help deputies improve performance and to identify outstanding work.

For example, the NOPD has both policy statements and review and audit forms (Body-Worn Camera Training and Technical Assistance, undated) to evaluate officer and district performance in relation to the NOPD’s procedural justice policy (NOPD, 2018). The NOPD Audit and Review Unit provides quarterly updates comparing performance across districts. LASD should consider creating a community policing and procedural justice policy that clearly explains the department’s approach to community policing and procedural justice and explains how such activities will be assessed. Ideally, any of the above practices would be subject to process and outcome evaluations. An evaluation of LASD’s new body-worn camera program could be informative as well.

**Community Engagement**

The community members with whom we spoke had a strong desire to improve or increase community interaction with LASD, particularly outside of traditional law enforcement activities. Some participants spoke favorably about the “Town Sheriff” program but noted that it is limited to one station representative.
In general, non-enforcement contacts can improve positive contacts between law enforcement and community members. Informed by intergroup contact theory, positive intergroup contact can start to break down negative perceptions of outgroup members and works bidirectionally (e.g., deputies’ perceptions of community members are improved and vice versa; Peyton, Sierra-Arévalo, and Rand, 2019). LASD should consider mandating non-enforcement contacts early in field training for a specified amount of time (Stoughton, 2014). This activity can then be paired with an ongoing emphasis on continued nonenforcement contacts during patrol. The above discussion on procedural justice also applies here.

Compton Community Empowerment Program. As one example of an improved community engagement program in LASD, the Compton station issued a unit order directing deputies to “make regular attempts to initiate social contacts with citizens and document the contact in the MDC [mobile data computer] system with a clearance code of 755 (community relations).” The order instructed deputies to provide contact cards and instructed sergeants to brief and review deputy activities in this area. This is the same general idea used in a recent field experiment to initiate positive community encounters (Peyton, Sierra-Arévalo, and Rand, 2019). This unit order might be modified to give guidance about factors that promote positive intergroup contact (equal status between groups; cooperation toward a common goal; support of authorities, law, or custom; personal interactions) and procedural justice (providing voice and encouraging citizen participation, communicating dignity and respect, communicating trustworthy motives). Peyton, Sierra-Arévalo, and Rand, 2019, used instructions for officers to extend a formal greeting within the first 20 seconds of an interaction to signal that it was not a law enforcement engagement, followed by asking questions that emphasize connections (e.g., using “we” and “our community”). Officers were also instructed to anticipate complaints and to acknowledge the resident’s perspective. Using a pre-post survey, this intervention improved community member attitudes toward police, perceptions of legitimacy, and willingness to cooperate up to 21 days after the brief interaction.

In a similar vein, community participants recommended that LASD overall engage in more COP and community partnerships. We note that this effort should coincide with an emphasis on problem-oriented policing as well (Goldstein, 1990; Hinkle et al., 2020; Reisig, 2010). Critical to improvement in these areas will be developing a strategic vision and strategic planning for what this should look like (e.g., vision, goals, accountability, training). Additionally, one of the potential reasons why COP fails or does not lead to profound organizational and cultural change is that measuring COP is more difficult than measuring traditional measures, and it is said that what gets measured is what gets done (Moore and Braga, 2004; Worden and McLean, 2018). Part of the difficulty in measuring COP or related types of community-facing concepts is choosing what to measure. Theoretically, it is possible to measure community engagement, community satisfaction, community trust and perceived legitimacy, fear of crime, physical and social disorder, response times, crime clearance, and a multitude of other measures that could indicate how well police are serving to the community and improving community well-being and safety. Although such factors would ideally be weighed, in practice, there are few agreed-upon high-quality community policing performance measures. Some efforts in this area suggest that performance measures should be based on collaborative efforts to solve problems identified by community members (Fielding and Innes, 2006). Such measures consist of key activities and outcomes identified as relevant to the given problem and solution (Alpert, Flynn, and Piquero, 2001). Common measures and methods for assessing community engagement, service, and trust include the following:
• calls for service, crime, and victimization
• crime clearance
• community surveys and contact surveys
• tracking community meeting attendance, events, and presentations
• documenting community policing and problem-solving projects (e.g., tracking inputs, outputs, and outcomes)
• adding fields to the Records Management System/Computer-Aided Dispatch.

Without adequate measurement, it is unlikely that community policing will be assessed as part of an individual officer’s performance evaluation. Notably, performance evaluations are one of the most useful ways to set expectations and send clear signals about responsibilities for patrol officers and the performance of individuals or units (Oettmeier and Wycoff, 1999). The major purposes of collecting data relevant to community policing are that it helps administrators and managers make informed decisions, allows managers to provide clear feedback, and can assist with evaluating strategic programs. It also aids in conveying expectations and socializing patrol officers into a community policing–focused mission and assists in identifying community problems and barriers to success. However, it is critical that any performance evaluation be valid, reliable, equitable, legal, and useful. An evaluation that does not reflect job responsibilities or is perceived as an end in and of itself is not useful and can backfire (Oettmeier and Wycoff, 1999). Importantly, evaluating unit performance in community policing should include at least some measure retrieved externally from the community, beyond citizen complaints. Although there are examples of success in this regard, incorporating community policing into job performance is difficult and requires strategic planning to fit local needs.

Accountability to the Public
Some community leaders and members recommended increased accountability for LASD. At the department and station levels, participants recommended that external groups monitor department policies, spending, investigations, or other activities. Having a working relationship with external review agencies is critical for community trust and is a recommended best practice in police accountability (Walker and Archbold, 2019). Recommendations to hold individual deputies accountable included hiring independent investigators to review excessive force cases, mandating that deputies wear body cameras, and creating a way for the public to anonymously report complaints regarding deputy behavior.

Although anonymous reporting options do exist through the OIG, the OIG has noted that it will probably not be able to investigate these complaints (OIG, undated). Additionally, it is not clear from its website how LASD handles anonymous complaints. Anonymous complaints can be valuable for documenting behavior, but that is likely the main benefit (Walker and Archbold, 2019). Complaints are, however, tracked in LASD’s Performance Recording and Monitoring System, suggesting that they are used to evaluate employee performance. Research on external complaints against law enforcement is limited, but at least one study found that rates of verbal discourtesy complaints and discourtesy and force complaints combined are associated with higher levels of observed use of force in encounters with civilians. This suggests that external complaints focused on deputies who are apt to resort to force or are less likely to behave respectfully and negotiate verbally can be useful for identifying potentially problematic behavior (McCluskey, Terrill, and Paoline, 2005; Harris, 2010). As noted above, discourtesy is one of the most frequent types of public complaints received by LASD. Other work on citizen
complaints suggests that agencies with internal affairs units acting in an investigative capacity with external civilian oversight are more likely to sustain complaints (Terrill and Ingram, 2016). To increase transparency, some law enforcement agencies have begun publishing complaint data in tabular format. For instance, Philadelphia publishes the location, the complaint classification, a narrative, and its investigative findings (City of Philadelphia, 2017). LASD might benefit from an analysis of their complaints process (as is being done for the Antelope Valley settlement agreement) and/or research to understand whether and how internal or external complaints relate to future behavior (e.g., serious misconduct, use of force). Additionally, LASD could consider using external investigators for public complaints, much like NYPD’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, although more research is needed to determine the effects of different civilian oversight models on key outcomes (e.g., sustained complaints; Terrill and Ingram, 2016).

Past and current events that are particularly detrimental to community trust are likely to continue to factor into community perceptions of LASD (Weitzer, 2002). Importantly, recognizing the past mistakes can be useful for separating the organization from past scandals. Therefore, LASD might consider engaging in a reconciliation process. The National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice identifies seven elements that must be addressed in the reconciliation process:

1) a recognition of past harms; 2) sustained listening to members of the public comprising important constituencies and stakeholders; 3) an explicit commitment to changing policing in specific ways and in accordance with a clear normative vision; 4) fact-finding; 5) the identification and promulgation of key experiences and narratives on both sides; 6) the specification of concrete changes in policies and practices that will move toward new policing practices and new relationships; 7) a mechanism for driving the implementation of those changes. (National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, 2016, p. 1)

**Recommendations for Other Internal Activities**

**Examine Hiring Practices**

Several community members mentioned improving hiring to ensure that deputies are passionate about the work, are educated, and show evidence of cultural sensitivity. Although we do not know whether the link is causal, the link between education and improved officer performance is well established (e.g., Chapman, 2012; Hayeslip, 1989; Rydberg and Terrill, 2010). More-recent evidence suggests that simply hiring more minority candidates might not have the desired effects on certain outcomes. However, screening for conflict management skills, combined with screening for sensitivity to diverse cultures, is associated with reduced disproportionate discretionary arrests (by race) and lower use of lethal force (Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, and Li, 2019). Generally, research on hiring in law enforcement is limited but growing.

**Give the Community a Greater Voice and More Points of Contact**

As a general recommendation, one of the simplest approaches to giving community members a voice is an online form that allows public comment on policy proposals. Although part of the

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9 It should be noted again that intentions are important, and reconciliation efforts should only be engaged in if there is full commitment to engaging in the process.
policy proposal process should include review and discussion with the COC, this should be open to the general public as well. The New York (NYPD, undated-a) and Baltimore (Baltimore Police Department, undated) police departments provide clear examples of how this can be implemented. Another hallmark of openness is publicly available contact information, such as email addresses or phone numbers for departmental leadership. For example, LAPD command staff from the rank of captain and above have a link to their department email address in their staff biography.

**Conduct Community Surveys About Perceptions of LASD**

Although this study was focused on understanding the variety of community perspectives about LASD, our findings do not necessarily apply broadly to the entire population of the communities it serves. To understand and quantify people’s perspectives about LASD, the county and/or LASD would need to field a representative community survey. The questions could be developed directly from our findings or could cover more general police-community relations topics, such as procedural justice, trust, legitimacy, effectiveness, and safety. For instance, Loyola Marymount University’s StudyLA project has surveyed county residents about their general perceptions of LASD in the recent past, but its more-detailed recent survey on perceptions of LAPD could be replicated for a sample of county residents to ask about their perceptions of LASD (Guerra et al., 2020). These data should be analyzed to account for the different communities that LASD serves and for stations that operate largely independently of one another. Alternatively, LASD should consider fielding contact surveys. After a contact (e.g., call for service, traffic stop, or other nonarrest activity), deputies would provide the community member with instructions on how to complete a brief survey about the quality of service they received. Handing out these surveys should not be based on the deputies’ discretion but should be done randomly or based on a formula.

*Antelope Valley settlement agreement.* Leveraging the work done and lessons learned from community engagement and community relations efforts in the Antelope Valley could provide useful information for improving practices in other areas of the department. The settlement agreement included provisions for establishing community advisory committees, community engagement plans, and reviews of complaints and audits of the complaint process. These efforts included conducting multiple surveys of Antelope Valley residents and at least one survey of deputies. Institutional knowledge and lessons learned from this effort could be identified and disseminated across the department.

10 “How much of the time do you think you can trust the following groups to do what is right?” (Guerra, Gilbert, and Vizreanu, 2020).
Exclusive subgroups pose a difficult challenge for LASD and the county. At their worst, subgroups encourage violence, undermine the chain of command, and gravely harm relationships with the communities that LASD is dedicated to serve. Their secret or semisecret status makes eliminating subgroups and their pathologies extremely difficult. In many instances, subgroup activities serve as an informal socialization mechanism for people with a difficult and dangerous occupation that is under heightened scrutiny. It is not practicable to ban every group of deputies who occasionally socialize together. Making matters more complicated still, we heard several accounts of groups with innocuous beginnings that became more harmful over time. When does a group of deputies who enjoy each other’s company start to become a harmful subgroup? Even if there were clear standards on the point at which a group of deputies becomes problematic, the secrecy involved in subgroup membership and their activities makes it difficult to determine whether that line has been crossed.

Still, there are important steps that LASD and the county should take. As discussed in detail in this report, the long-term solution involves mitigating the pressures and assumptions that lead deputies to create exclusive subgroups in the first place and addressing the normalizing features that sustain subgroups (e.g., rationalization, socialization). This change will likely take sustained effort over many years. However, committing to and allocating resources for implementing change in this area, as well as in broader efforts to repair harm and earn community trust, are worthwhile and central to LASD’s mission.

In the shorter term, clear policy and messaging about subgroups from every level of LASD management are critical. Currently, most messaging and policy about subgroups imply that only subgroups that have engaged in problematic behavior are banned. This prohibition could be too narrow. Even a subgroup that encourages good policing can contribute to a sense of favoritism and undermine unit discipline, cohesion, and management. A clearer policy and messaging on exactly when a group that socializes regularly is prohibited would be helpful. The policy might be based on the size of the group or its activities, such as whether it imposes restrictions on membership.

LASD should also take steps to address the secrecy of subgroup membership while recognizing the organizational context (e.g., traditions, complexity, trust; Costas and Grey, 2014) in which subgroups exist. Secrecy makes it more difficult to determine the size of subgroups; their activities; and their risk of undermining LASD cohesion, discipline, and management. LASD should consider requiring deputies to disclose their membership in any work-related organization or group. Small, informal social groups would have nothing to fear from such a requirement, but the information would help management better understand the scope of subgroup activities in a particular station.
None of this will be easy. Because deputy subgroups have existed for so long, they might feel like an intractable issue. Efforts for change will likely be met with some internal resistance, and lasting change will take years. However, the potentially corrosive effect of subgroups on LASD and its relationship with the community compels action. This is a transitional moment in law enforcement in which LASD can begin building an organization for the future that embeds accountability and dedication to 21st-century policing and to the communities it serves.
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