



Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

October through December 2025

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ABOUT QUARTERLY REPORTS

Quarterly reports provide an overview of the Office of Inspector General's regular monitoring, auditing, and review of activities related to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Sheriff's Department) over a given three-month period. This quarterly report covers Department activities and incidents that occurred between October 1 and December 31, 2025, unless otherwise noted. Quarterly reports may also examine issues of interest. This report includes special sections on the following topics:

- *Rosas Compliance*
- Sheriff's Department's Policies on Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities
 - Joint Regional Intelligence Center
 - Automatic License Plate Readers
- Public Records Act Requests to the Sheriff's Department
- Law Enforcement Gang Update
- Jail Employment Opportunities at Century Regional Detention Facility

MONITORING SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT'S OPERATIONS

Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Office of Inspector General reports on all deputy-involved shootings in which a deputy intentionally fired a firearm at a human, or intentionally or unintentionally fired a firearm and a human was injured or killed as a result. During this quarter, there were three incidents in which people were shot or shot at by Sheriff's Department personnel. Two people were fatally struck by deputies' gunfire. The Office of Inspector General staff was notified of the deputy-involved shootings but did not respond per the suspension of rollouts as stated in a [memorandum to the Board of Supervisors dated June 11, 2025](#).

The Sheriff's Department [maintains a page on its website](#) listing deputy-involved shootings that result in injury or death, with links to incident summaries and video.

The information in the following shooting summaries is based on the information provided by the Sheriff's Department at the Critical Incident Reviews (CIR).¹ The information presented at CIR is preliminary in nature. Statements of deputies and witnesses are not provided until the Sheriff's Department completes its investigation.

Special Enforcement Bureau: Hit Shooting – Fatal

On October 22, 2025, at approximately 5:05 p.m., deputies from the Temple Station responded to a call regarding a mentally unstable person at a home on Sullivan Avenue in the city of Rosemead. The caller stated that the person was armed with a high-powered assault rifle, was suicidal, and wanted to harm persons inside the home.

When deputies arrived at the location, they made telephonic contact with the suspect, a 41-year-old Asian man. The suspect threatened to harm himself and any deputies who came on his property. He told the deputies that he was holding his juvenile son and his elderly father as hostages and would not release them. Mental Evaluation Team (MET) deputies and Special Enforcement Bureau deputies (SEB) were called to the scene to communicate with the suspect. The SEB Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) also communicated with the suspect for several hours in an effort to convince him to release the hostages and surrender. The suspect told them he was armed and intended to kill his family members at a specific time.

Approximately four hours after the initial call for service, the suspect abruptly cut off communication and walked out of the home armed with the assault rifle. He proceeded to walk toward SEB personnel armed with the rifle, at which time three deputies shot at the suspect a total of 13 times.

The deputies rendered medical aid until Los Angeles County Fire Department personnel arrived on scene. The suspect was pronounced dead at the scene.

The Sheriff's Department posted a [Critical Incident Briefing](#) on its website, which includes audio from a 911 caller and video from body-worn cameras.

Lakewood Station: Hit Shooting – Fatal

On December 4, 2025, at approximately 9:30 p.m., deputies from the Lakewood Station responded to a call reporting a man armed with a gun inside a vehicle on Alhambra Avenue in the city of Paramount. Upon arrival, deputies encountered the suspect on the porch of a residence. The suspect, a 35-year-old Hispanic man, held a gun in one hand while holding his 2-year-old son in his opposite arm. Deputies attempted to negotiate

¹ [Manual of Policy and Procedure \(MPP\) section 3-09/330.00 Critical Incident Review Panel](#) identifies what is a critical incident and describes the process for reviewing such incidents.

the release of the toddler and relinquishment of the handgun for approximately a half-hour. The suspect refused to comply and pointed the handgun toward the deputies, at which point a deputy-involved shooting occurred.

One deputy fired one round from a rifle, striking the suspect.

Deputies rescued the toddler who was unharmed. Deputies rendered medical aid to the suspect until the arrival of Los Angeles County Fire Department personnel. The suspect was transported to a local hospital, where he was later pronounced dead. No deputies or other persons were injured during this incident.

A 9mm semiautomatic handgun and a loaded magazine were recovered at the scene.

The Sheriff's Department posted a [Critical Incident Briefing](#) on its website with audio from a 911 caller and video from deputies' body-worn cameras.

Areas for Further Inquiry

Was there any tactical communication between the shooting deputy and other on-scene deputies prior to the shooting?

Industry Station: Hit Shooting – Non-Fatal

On December 21, 2025, at approximately 5:33 p.m., deputies from the Industry Station responded to a priority call for service for a disturbance by a possibly mentally ill person at a fast-food restaurant located on Workman Mill Road, in Bassett. The call stated that a Hispanic male transient entered the employee service area of the business and refused to leave.

Deputies arrived and observed the man standing in the doorway of the south entrance. As deputies approached the suspect, a 34-year-old Hispanic man, he retreated into the business near the service counter area. The deputies ordered the man to stop moving and remove his hands from his pockets, but he refused to comply. The man then retrieved what appeared to be a firearm from his jacket pocket and pointed it at the deputies, at which time a deputy-involved shooting occurred. Two deputies fired a total of 10 rounds at the suspect.

The man was struck by gunfire and the deputies rendered medical aid until the arrival of LA County Fire Department personnel.

The man was transported to the hospital where he received medical treatment for his injuries.

One replica Glock 17 pellet handgun and one magazine with unfired 9mm cartridges were recovered at the scene. The replica handgun had been modified to accept a magazine with live rounds but was incapable of firing them.

The Sheriff's Department posted a [Critical Incident Briefing](#) on its website, which includes body-worn camera video of the shooting.

District Attorney Review of Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Sheriff's Department's Homicide Bureau investigates deputy-involved shootings in which a person is hit by a bullet, except for deputy-involved shootings that result in the death of an unarmed civilian, which California law requires the Attorney General to investigate.² For those shootings it investigates, the Homicide Bureau submits the completed criminal investigation of each deputy-involved shooting in Los Angeles County that results in a person being struck by a bullet to the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (District Attorney's Office or District Attorney) for review and possible filing of criminal charges.

Between October 1 and December 31, 2025, the District Attorney's Office posted memoranda on its website for four findings on deputy-involved shooting cases involving the Sheriff's Department's employees.³ The District Attorney's Office declined to file charges in each case, as they determined that the use of force was not unlawful. The memoranda may be found on the [District Attorney's website page for Officer-Involved Shootings](#). The following are the deputy-involved shootings posted:

- [The July 19, 2023, fatal shooting of Benjamin Chin by Detective Hector Vasquez and Deputy Marisol Barajas.](#)
- [The January 13, 2024, fatal shooting of Noor Sherif Ramsis by Deputy Jonathan Sandoval.](#)

² In 2020, the California Legislature passed AB 1506, which requires that a state prosecutor investigate all shootings involving a peace officer that result in the death of an unarmed civilian. See [A.B. 1506 \(McCarty 2020\)](#) (codified at [Govt. Code § 12525.3](#)). The Attorney General's findings in these investigations are reported in the section of this report below entitled *California Department of Justice Investigations of Deputy-Involved Shootings Resulting in the Death of Unarmed Civilians*. Until the law took effect in 2021, the Sheriff's Department's Homicide Bureau investigated all deputy-involved shootings in which a person was hit by a bullet.

³ The District Attorney's Office posts its decisions on deputy and officer-involved shootings on its website under [Officer-Involved Shootings](#). The Office of Inspector General retrieves the information on District Attorney decisions from this webpage. Two of the listed cases were posted on the website within the second quarter of 2025, are dated during the first quarter of 2025.

- [The June 13, 2024, fatal shooting of Jerman Magana by Deputies Omaar Covarrubias and Emmanuel Mercado.](#)
- [The July 20, 2024, fatal shooting of Cody Dodd-Thompson by Deputies Daniel Ike and Brandon Campos.](#)

California Department of Justice Investigations of Deputy-Involved Shootings Resulting in the Death of Unarmed Civilians

Under California law, the state Department of Justice (CA-DOJ) investigates any peace officer-involved shooting resulting in the death of an unarmed civilian and may issue written reports or file criminal charges against a peace officer, if appropriate.⁴ CA-DOJ [is not currently investigating](#) any shootings involving deputies from the Sheriff's Department. During the fourth quarter of 2025, DOJ [issued no written reports](#) regarding shootings involving Sheriff's Department deputies.

Homicide Bureau's Investigation of Deputy-Involved Shootings

For the present quarter, the Homicide Bureau reports that it has seven shooting cases involving Sheriff's Department personnel open and under investigation. The oldest case in which the Homicide Bureau maintained an active investigation at the end of the quarter relates to a June 7, 2025, shooting in the jurisdiction of Lancaster Station. For further information as to that shooting, please refer to the Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department - April through June 2025](#). The oldest case that the Homicide Bureau has open is a 2019 shooting in the city of Lynwood, which was submitted to the District Attorney's Office and for which the Sheriff's Department still awaits a filing decision.

This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported it sent two deputy-involved-shooting cases to the District Attorney's Office for filing consideration.

Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau

The Sheriff's Department's Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) reports directly to the Division Chief and the Commander of the Professional Standards Division. ICIB

⁴ Government Code § 12525.3(b).

investigates allegations of criminal misconduct committed by Sheriff's Department personnel in Los Angeles County.⁵

The Sheriff's Department reports that ICIB has 84 active cases. This quarter, ICIB reports sending 8 cases to the District Attorney's Office for filing consideration. The District Attorney's Office is still reviewing 32 cases previously sent from ICIB for filing. The oldest open case that ICIB submitted to the District Attorney's Office and still awaits a filing decision relates to conduct that occurred in 2018, which ICIB presented to the District Attorney in 2019.

Internal Affairs Bureau

The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) conducts administrative investigations of policy violations by Sheriff's Department employees. It also responds to and investigates deputy-involved shootings and significant use-of-force cases. If the District Attorney declines to file criminal charges against the deputies involved in a shooting, IAB reviews the shooting to determine whether Sheriff's Department personnel violated any policies during the incident and recommends discipline regardless of the District Attorney's decision not to prosecute. If the District Attorney files charges, IAB proceeds with a review following the prosecution and determines if discipline should be imposed up to and including termination depending on the outcome of the prosecution.

The Sheriff's Department also conducts administrative investigations at the unit level. The subject's unit and IAB determine whether an incident should be investigated by IAB or remain a unit-level investigation based on the severity of the alleged policy violations.

During this quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported opening 130 new administrative investigations. Of these 130 cases, 49 were assigned to IAB, 50 were designated as unit-level investigations, and 31 were entered as criminal monitors (in which IAB monitors an ongoing criminal investigation conducted by the Sheriff's Department or another agency). In the same period, IAB reports that 130 cases were closed by IAB or at the unit level. There are 465 pending administrative investigations, of which 334 are assigned to IAB and the remaining 131 are unit-level investigations.

Civil Service Commission Dispositions

The Civil Service Commission hears employees' appeals of major discipline, including discharges, reductions in rank, or suspensions of more than five days. Between October 1 and December 31, 2025, the Civil Service Commission issued final decisions

⁵ Misconduct alleged to have occurred in other counties is investigated by the law enforcement agencies in the jurisdictions where the crimes are alleged to have occurred.

in two cases involving Sheriff's Department employees. In these two cases, the Civil Service Commission sustained the Department's discipline in one case and overruled the Department in one case. The Civil Service Commission reports its actions, including final decisions, in [minutes of its meetings](#) posted on the County's website for commission publications.

The Sheriff's Department's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

According to [data posted by the Sheriff's Department](#), it deployed its Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 34 times between October 1 and December 31, 2025. The Office of Inspector General continues to recommend that the Sheriff's Department provide more specific information regarding the use of UAS for a "high risk tactical operation." Circumstances justifying use of a UAS might include exigent circumstances, a reasonable suspicion that a crime is occurring, probable cause to conduct a search, or the execution of a search warrant. The law recognizes these reasons for conducting a search as legal under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which does not have an exception for a warrantless search based on a "high risk tactical operation." Historically, members of the public have supported drone usage in law enforcement but have requested the activity be limited to areas of the most benefit to life and safety and that safeguards be in place to avoid usage encroaching into areas which are likely to result in excessive invasion of privacy. Imprecise categories and limited information can result in law enforcement action that undermines public trust.

Status of the Sheriff's Department's Adoption of an Updated Taser Policy and Implementation of a System of Tracking and Documenting Taser Use

Status of Taser Policy Implementation and Training

On October 3, 2023, the Board of Supervisors (Board) passed a [motion](#) instructing the Sheriff's Department to revise its Taser policies and incorporate best practices from other law enforcement agencies to ensure its policies complied with State and Federal law. The motion directs the Office of Inspector General to include in its quarterly reports to the Board the status of the Sheriff's Department updated Taser policy, deputy compliance with updated policies and training, and documentation on the Department's Taser use.

The Sheriff's Department reported the following information regarding training and policy implementation to date:

- The Department reported that from the Phase 1 purchase of 3,197 Taser 10s, approximately 2,965 are currently deployed.⁶
- The Tasers approved for use by the Department are the Taser 10, the Taser X26, and the Taser 7. The intention is to phase out the Taser X26 and the Taser 7.

Tracking Taser Use

In May 2024, the Sheriff's Department launched [a web dashboard reporting Taser usage](#) by date range with options to narrow the results by practice area (such as Patrol or Custody), patrol station or facility, incident type, or city. Beginning in July 2024, the Department began including in that data the "Result of the Use of Force" (i.e., whether the use resulted in serious injury or death). The Sheriff's Department provided the following information for Taser usage:⁷

- Since the deployment in 2024 there were approximately 326 field uses, including four jail uses with a reported 88% effectiveness rate.⁸
- During the 4th quarter there were 75 Taser uses: four in Custody and 71 in Patrol Operations.

⁶ This section on Tasers includes the information reported by the Sheriff's Department for the quarter covered in this report and does not include information reported previously. For information reported previously, see: [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department - July through September 2025](#), [Reform and Oversight Efforts - Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department - April through June 2025](#) and [Report on the Sheriff's Department's Taser Policy, Training, and Usage](#).

⁷ In a letter in response to a validation draft of this report, the Sheriff's Department noted that the statistics presented "reflect only Taser 10 activity rather than all conducted-energy weapon (CEW) usage across the Department. More specifically, the figures provided, such as total field uses, effectiveness rate, patrol vs. custody deployment, and signal activations, are all specific to the Taser 10 rollout and do not represent the full scope of Taser use in the Department." The report includes the information provided to the Office of Inspector General by the Department albeit in response to questions posed by us. Previous corrections were made to this section based on informal feedback from the Department, but the letter is the first time OIG was informed of this discrepancy. In the future, OIG requests that information on all Taser uses be provided for inclusion. The first sentence in this section contains a hyperlink to the Department's dashboard with the most accurate information. Finally, the bullet points in the report note that the BWC Unit tracks only Taser 10 usage while the dashboard tracks all usage.

⁸ According to the Sheriff's Department, effectiveness is determined by the assessment that a suspect was subdued as a result of the Taser usage.

- The Department reports that in the 21 incidents (28%) an individual was armed with a weapon. Two of these 21 incidents involved a firearm, 10 involved a knife and 9 involved another weapon.
- 50 Phase 1 Taser 10s have been deployed in Custody Division in Men's Central Jail and Inmate Reception Center.
- Each Taser 10 is equipped with technology that signals the BWC to activate when a deputy turns off the Taser 10's *Safe Mode* as the deputy readies the Taser to fire. The Department reported four such activations, referred to as signal activations, during this quarter.⁹ All four signal activations were for Tasers used in a custody setting. Due to the recent implementation of body-worn cameras in custody facilities, staff may still be getting used to activating the cameras.¹⁰
- The Sheriff's Department Body-Worn Camera Unit tracks only Taser 10 usage, while the Department's dashboard tracks all Taser usage.

Semi-Annual Report on Implementation of the Family Assistance Program

The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors [established the Family Assistance Program](#) (Family Assistance), first in 2019 as a one-year pilot that it later made permanent, with the aim of improving compassionate communication and providing trauma-informed support to families of those who died following a fatal use of force by a Sheriff's Department employee or while in the custody of the Sheriff's Department. The Office of Inspector General reports semi-annually on Family Assistance in its quarterly reports on the Sheriff's Department.

Family Assistance Status

On February 8, 2024, the administration of Family Assistance officially transitioned from the Department of Mental Health (DMH) to the Office of Violence Prevention (OVP)

⁹ Per Sheriff's Department policy, a deputy should activate their BWC in advance of enforcement or investigative contact. In those incidents where the TASER 10 was deployed but no signal activation occurred, it was because the deputy's BWC was already recording. Per a response from the Department, the signal activation feature on the TASER 10 serves as a fail-safe to account for situations that unfold rapidly, where a deputy may need to react immediately for officer safety before manually activating the BWC. It also functions as a secondary safeguard in cases where the BWC was not activated as required.

¹⁰ In patrol operations deputies are trained to activate the camera when interacting with civilians. Because custody staff interact with incarcerated persons throughout the day, the training for activating the cameras is not quite as straightforward.

within the Department of Public Health (DPH), pursuant to the plan to make Family Assistance permanent as recommended to the Board in 2022.¹¹ OVP has a webpage with an [overview of Family Assistance](#) with links to the Family Assistance [brochure in English](#) and [in Spanish](#) and to the [Family Assistance Application Form](#). DPH reported to the Board on the OVP Family Assistance Program in its report dated August 26, 2025, [Permanent Funding and Implementation of the Family Assistance Program](#). Additionally, Family Assistance received a [National Association of Counties \(NACO\) Achievement Award](#), a national recognition for innovative county government programs.

In March 2024, OVP formed a multidisciplinary work group that meets monthly to discuss program design and implementation, protocols, eligibility criteria, and reviews cases. The work group includes representatives from the Sheriff's Department, the Department of Medical Examiner's (DME), the Office of Inspector General, the Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission (COC), Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, Department Mental Health (DMH), Los Angeles County Correctional Health Services, and Los Angeles Office of the County Counsel. In collaboration with the workgroup partners, OVP drafted Family Assistance protocols. An updated draft of the protocols was circulated in December 2025 with a request for feedback to be submitted by January 9, 2026. The protocols are expected to be approved in February 2026.

Family Assistance Service Data

OVP reports that from July 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025, OVP was notified of 30 deaths to individuals under the jurisdiction of the Sheriff's Department. Out of these 30 deaths, 25 individuals lost their lives while in a custody facility and the remaining five individuals died due to a fatal use of force incident in the community. Three of the deaths were due to shootings by Sheriff's Department deputies and two involved uses of force by other agencies for which the Sheriff's Department Homicide Bureau assisted in the investigation.¹² OVP engaged with all 30 families referred to Family Assistance and each family received at least one of the following services: program information and access, crisis intervention, grief counseling, financial assistance, case management, advocacy, and referrals to additional resources. OVP distributed burial expenses to

¹¹ See [Office of Inspector General's Semi-Annual Report on Implementation of the Family Assistance Program and Report Back on Permanent Support for Families Affected by Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department: Identifying Sustainable Funding for and Streamlining the Family Assistance Program \(Item No.14, Agenda of July 9, 2019 and Item No. 9, Agenda of October 19, 2021\)](#) (Feb. 22, 2022).

¹² The Sheriff's Department Homicide Bureau sometimes assists other local agencies with homicide investigations including officer-involved shootings. The two agencies that the Department assisted for the last two quarters of 2025 are South Gate Police Department and Claremont Police Department.

sixteen families, with expenses ranging from \$1,000 to \$7,500 per family, totaling approximately \$86,810 for the period.

The Office of Inspector General previously reiterated the recommendation by DPH that the County align the burial expense limit with the state's California Crime Victim Compensation Board limit of \$12,818. At its [November 18, 2025 meeting](#), the Board approved a [motion](#) to increase the Family Assistance's funeral expense reimbursement cap from \$7,500 to \$12,818 to align with current state Victim Compensation Board cap.

Rosas Compliance

The Court appointed monitors for the [Rosas Settlement Agreement](#) evaluated compliance with the Action Plan for the period of January 1, 2024 to June 30, 2024 in a report to the court dated October 15, 2025. The [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#), noted significant progress towards compliance with the settlement agreement including noting the Sheriff's Department's issuance of clear and specific use-of-force policies applicable in the Department's custody facilities and using its force-review systems to focus on decreasing overall uses of force in the Department's Downtown Jail Complex. The report notes that the parties have been working to develop plans to achieve compliance in four key areas:

(1) eliminating impermissible head strikes; (2) proper use of the WRAP Restraint;¹³ (3) appropriate utilization of force avoidance and de-escalation techniques; and (4) accountability.¹⁴

In particular, the monitors note that this fifteenth report highlights two key areas necessary for achieving Rosas compliance:

¹³ Custody Division Manual section **7-03/050.00 WRAP RESTRAINT** describes the WRAP restraint: *The WRAP restraint device (manufactured by Safe Restraints, Inc.) is a Department approved security restraint device authorized for use within the Custody Services Division. The WRAP restraint device immobilizes the body and restricts the inmate's ability to kick. The WRAP restraint device restrains the inmate in an upright position and puts the inmate in a position for transport or movement.* Use of The Wrap restraint, especially on an agitated person, has been questioned by some use-of-force experts. A recent report by Bloomberg law identified 41 incidents in which law enforcement officers used The Wrap restraint on someone who died and that in 32 of those deaths the manufacturer's instructions were followed. The Office of Inspector General recommends that the Sheriff's Department review the report by Bloomberg Law and consider opinions of use-of-force experts to assess whether it would be a better practice to ban use of The Wrap. (See Alexia Fernández Campbell and Umar Farooq, ['I Can't Breathe.' Police Use Restraint With Fatal Results](#), Bloomberg Law (January 23, 2026).

¹⁴ [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#) at page 2.

(1) eliminating impermissible head strikes and (2) developing an effective system of accountability for impermissible uses of force.¹⁵

In noting the Department's resistance to opening administrative investigations for possible use-of-force violations the report notes:

The Panel continued to encounter resistance from Department leaders to opening administrative investigations in the face of apparent use of force violations, including impermissible head strikes. This resistance has been communicated in certain meetings with Department leaders and is highlighted by several cases reviewed by the Panel in the Fifteenth Reporting Period. Of the 50 cases the Panel reviewed for the Fifteenth Reporting Period, the Department used head strikes in 15 cases. The Panel found the Department's actions in 8 of the 15 cases met the criteria for 2.6 and were therefore compliant. In the 7 remaining cases, the Department concluded the actions of staff were objectively reasonable and within Departmental policy in all seven.¹⁶

Contrary to the Department's findings, the monitors found that in these seven cases, the head strikes violated Departmental policy. [In a December 16, 2025 letter from the ACLU to the Board of Supervisors](#), the ACLU calculated that the monitors find head-strike violations 15 times more than the Sheriff's Department.

The monitoring report points out that unlike other law enforcement agencies, the only Department members who are permitted to request an administrative investigation are Department Chiefs. In response to a draft of this report, the Sheriff's Department clarified that while only Department Chiefs may request an administrative investigation by IAB, unit commanders or higher-ranking executives have the authority to order administrative investigation conducted at the unit level. Nevertheless, the monitors identified the limitation on opening IAB investigations as a cultural problem, noting that some supervisors believe that identifying and referring a policy violation that could lead to an administrative investigation is not being "supportive" of staff.¹⁷ The Office of Inspector General agrees with this assessment as well as with the assessment in the

¹⁵ [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#) at page 2.

¹⁶ [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#) at page 6.

¹⁷ [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#) at page 7.

panel's report that the practice of having the facility where the force was used conduct the investigation "does not offer the independence that the Panel had hoped for and recommended."¹⁸

To achieve compliance with the *Rosas Settlement Agreement*, investigations must be unbiased and rigorous, and discipline must be imposed. Additional information on compliance and achieving compliance in the remaining provisions of the Action Plan are fully discussed in the [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#). The Office of Inspector General recommends that the Sheriff's Department consider the report and implement the changes necessary to achieve compliance.

Sheriff's Department's Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities

In 2017, during President Trump's first term, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors requested the Office of Inspector General to review, analyze, and make recommendations regarding the Sheriff's Department's policies as they relate to immigration issues. From 2017 to 2020, the Office of Inspector General issued several reports on the matter.¹⁹

While the Sheriff's Department has policies that limit cooperation with federal authorities on immigration enforcement, data collected by the Sheriff's Department is sometimes accessed by or provided to the federal government upon request and such data may have the effect of assisting immigration authorities without the intent to do so.²⁰

To date, the Office of Inspector General has not identified any data that has been used to assist the federal government with immigration enforcement.

¹⁸ [Panel's Fifteenth Report](#) at page 7.

¹⁹ See [Immigration: Public Safety and Public Trust](#) (October 2017); [First Report Back on the Sheriff's Department's Adherence to Policies Regarding Cooperation with Immigration Authorities](#) (June 2018); [Second Report Back – Sheriff's Adherence to Policies Regarding Cooperation with Immigration Authorities](#) (November 2018); [Inspector General's Monitoring of Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's Cooperation with Immigration Authorities](#) (February 2019); and [Report Back on Truth Act Forum – LASD Inmate Locater System and Public Access to Inmate Release Information](#) (December 2019).

²⁰ The Sheriff's Department's formal response to the validation draft of this report notes that it "does not proactively transfer data to federal immigration authorities and operates in compliance with the California Values Act, Senate Bill 54, which limits cooperation with federal immigration enforcement activities." The entire letter sent in response to the draft of this report is included at the end of this report.

Joint Regional Intelligence Center

The Sheriff's Department is part of the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC). Office of Inspector General staff met with Sheriff's Department and JRIC staff to discuss what, if any, information is provided through JRIC to federal authorities regarding immigration enforcement. According to the information provided, no information related to the immigration status individuals or relating to immigration enforcement is provided by any Sheriff's Department personnel to the federal government through JRIC.

In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security established fusion centers across the United States. A fusion center is intended to be "[a] collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity."²¹ In late 2005, the Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California, the California Department of Justice, and the FBI signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create the first fusion center in Southern California – the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC).²² Today, there are approximately 80 fusion centers nationwide, with JRIC being one of the largest, second only to New York in terms of both the volume of information processed and the area that it is responsible for handling. JRIC covers six counties – Los Angeles, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Ventura – covering nearly 40,000 square miles, approximately 16 million residents, and more than 200 public safety agencies, including law enforcement, fire services, and public health partners.²³

From its inception, the intent of JRIC has been to "improve coordination and intelligence sharing by putting all the important players together-not on a conference call or in a warren of cloistered cubicles, but in an open, collaborative bullpen that encourages back-and-forth exchanges."²⁴ This bullpen is located in an FBI provided office space in Norwalk. Housed within this facility are representatives from the Sheriff's Department, the LAPD, the FBI, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, among others.

²¹ [Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, "Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Areas Fusion Center, A Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines," United States Department of Justice \(September 2008\).](#)

²² [Joint Regional Intelligence Center \(JRIC\) Memorandum of Understanding \(MOU\), October 3, 2005.](#)

²³ [Joint Regional Intelligence Center, "About the JRIC."](#)

²⁴ [Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Hand-to-Hand Cooperation Intel Sharing Without Walls," August 14, 2006.](#)

The Sheriff's Department, LAPD, and the FBI comprise the largest of the participating entities at JRIC.

JRIC is governed by a board and managed by an Executive Director. The Governance Board is "responsible for determining JRIC's direction, setting policy, and maintaining accountability for the actions of JRIC."²⁵ The Board meets quarterly and includes among others, representatives from the FBI, Los Angeles Area Fire Chiefs Association, Sheriff's Department, LAPD, Long Beach Police Department, and the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health. The Board is tasked with identifying, agreeing upon, and articulating JRIC's goals and objectives.

JRIC does not conduct criminal investigations. When JRIC receives a tip, it adheres to applicable state, local, and federal guidelines for analyzing and documenting the information, as set forth in 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23.²⁶ All new tips entered into the system must be evaluated, scored, and rated in accordance with these guidelines. Information may only be retained if it is supported by a tip or lead based on reasonable suspicion or a criminal predicate.

If a tip includes information related to a person's immigration status or status as an undocumented immigrant, that information is neither entered into the database nor disseminated unless it is directly relevant to a *criminal investigation*. When a tip is submitted online, the user will receive a prompt asking whether the information provided by the user relates to immigration enforcement and advises the user that state and local laws prohibit law enforcement agencies from using their resources to support federal immigration enforcement.

All tips are automatically purged from the system within a year, and after staff review.²⁷ If information is deemed relevant and incorporated into an intelligence file, it is assigned a five-year review date to determine if the data is still relevant or if it can be deleted after that time.²⁸ All of this activity is input into a database, which is maintained by the Sheriff's Department. Any activity within the database is fully captured through an audit trail to ensure accountability and compliance.

²⁵ Letter from Robert Luna, Los Angeles County Sheriff, to Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (Nov. 7, 2023), <https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/185455.pdf>.

²⁶ Bureau of Justice Assistance, "28 CFR Part 23 A Guide to Criminal Intelligence Policies," United States Department of Justice, October 25, 2022.

²⁷ Robert Fox, [Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, \[PowerPoint slides\]](#).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

The Sheriff's Department maintains JRIC's databases and serves as the fiduciary for the funds used to operate and sustain the center. JRIC is funded primarily through grants provided by Urban Area Security Initiative, administered by the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Sheriff's Department has assigned one lieutenant, two sergeants, one deputy, and one civilian administrative employee to manage these grants and to provide training to law enforcement as outlined by JRIC's mission. Through its management of both the funding and the database, each of which is critical to the operation of JRIC, the Sheriff's Department plays an integral part in JRIC's day-to-day operation.

Pursuant to the original Memorandum of Understanding executed in 2005, and reaffirmed through subsequent signed iterations/updates, personnel assigned to JRIC remain subject to the rules, regulations, laws, and policies of their respective home agencies. All California agency designees working at JRIC are required to comply with Senate Bill 54, which prohibits the use of state and local resources to assist in federal immigration enforcement. In addition, the Sheriff's Department's internal policies prohibit the sharing of such information with federal law enforcement.

JRIC is not an investigative entity. Its role is limited to collecting tips and leads and disseminating credible information to appropriate participating agency for investigation. As the manager of the database, the Sheriff's Department stated that immigration-related information is not entered or maintained in the database unless it is directly pertinent to a criminal predicate, as defined by federal regulations and state laws. Tips that relate solely to immigration enforcement are not entered into the database. Sheriff's Department representatives stated that members assigned to JRIC have not participated in the recent federal enforcement activity by ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, nor have they disseminated or shared information to assist these federal immigration enforcements.

Sheriff's Department designees reaffirmed that JRIC's mission is limited to the dissemination of credible criminal and terrorist threat information – its mission does not include immigration enforcement activities, particularly those that would violate state or local laws, or internal Sheriff's Department policies. As such, the Sheriff's Department personnel do not share any such information with federal agents.

Automatic License Plate Readers

On September 16, 2025, the Board of Supervisors adopted the motion [Safeguarding Automated License Plate Readers \(ALPR\) Data to Restore Community Trust and Prevent Improper Civil Enforcement](#). The Board's aim was to ensure Los Angeles County residents "feel safe traveling from place to place without fear that their movements are being tracked, stored, and shared in ways that violate their privacy." In

support of this effort, the Board sent a letter to Governor Gavin Newsom advocating for Senate Bill 274.²⁹ If passed, the bill would have limited the retention of non-hit plates to 60 days, mandated annual audits, and instituted yearly privacy training for ALPR users. On October 1, 2025, Governor Gavin Newsom vetoed the bill, stating that it “does not strike the delicate balance between protecting individual privacy and ensuring public safety.”³⁰

Anticipating that the Senate Bill may not be adopted, the Board’s motion outlined steps the Sheriff’s Department should take independently, to address concerns within immigrant communities and prevent erosion of public trust. Among the key action items, the Sheriff’s Department was directed to update its ALPR policy. On November 10, 2025, the Sheriff’s Department provided the Office of Inspector General with a draft of its amended policy. Upon review, the Office of Inspector General found that the updated policy incorporated all of the action items required by the Board motion. The only concern raised is the timeline for data retention – how long the images captured by the ALPR cameras are stored. Even though the Board did not mandate a particular retention period, the Board motion expressed a desire for Los Angeles County to “lead” the State by adopting the provisions of SB 274.

Accepting the Board’s directive to reduce the retention period of these stored images, the Sheriff’s Department settled on a two-year period; the same retention period as LAPD.³¹ While aligning with the other major law enforcement agency in the Los Angeles area is one consideration, the major consideration should be the value in retaining the information. In order to find the optimal retention period, what is sometimes referred to as the *Goldilocks zone*, the Office of Inspector General continues to recommend that Department conduct a study to determine when the majority of retained images provide the most value in preventing crime and apprehending offenders, while ensuring all images outside this effective use period are deleted. (See [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department – April through June 2025.](#))

²⁹ Letter from Los Angeles County Board of Supervisor Hilda L. Solis, Holly J. Mitchell, Lindsey P. Horvath, and Janice Hahn to Governor Gavin Newsom (September 17, 2025). <https://file.lacounty.gov/SDSinter/bos/supdocs/207693.pdf>.

³⁰ Letter from Governor Gavin Newsom to Members of the California State Senate (October 1, 2025). <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/SB-274-Veto.pdf>.

³¹ [Los Angeles Police Department Automated License Plate Recognition Usage and Privacy Policy- Established, Section 568.53, Revised by Special Order No. 31.](#)

For example, if a significant portion of the images remain useful for two years in solving crimes, this may justify the Sheriff's Department's amended retention period.³² If most cases are resolved within a shorter or longer period, it may be the better practice to choose a timeframe that serves the purpose of crime solving while respecting privacy concerns by deleting images outside of the optimal timeframe.

Public Records Act Requests to the Sheriff's Department

California Public Records Act

The California Public Records Act (CPRA) is the statute that governs public access to government records in California. The legislation was enacted in 1968 and is codified in [Government Code sections 7920.000-7931.00](#). The CPRA recognizes that while being mindful of privacy concerns, to promote transparency in government, "access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person."³³

Upon request, government entities must disclose records to the public, unless the CPRA provides a specific reason for not providing the information, referred to as an exemption. For example, personnel or medical files are exempt from disclosure for privacy concerns.³⁴ Records related to pending litigation where the agency is a party are also exempt from disclosure.³⁵ Outside of a specific exemption, the government agency

³² Cities that installed fixed cameras in some of the jurisdictions patrolled by the Sheriff's Department have retention periods that are not aligned with the proposed Sheriff's Department policy. For example, Santa Clarita requires all ALPR data from fixed cameras, which the city funded, to be deleted within 30 days. (See Perry Smith, [City OKs contract to help LASD with license-plate readers](#), The Santa Clarita Valley Signal (November 13, 2024.) This misalignment in retention periods means that residents may have greater privacy protections in some areas as opposed to others and makes transparency difficult. The Sheriff's Department faces a unique challenge compared to other local agencies in the greater Los Angeles area, as it provides contract services to multiple cities and must honor each of their contract cities' retention, a complexity that agencies like the LAPD do not encounter. This misalignment should be another policy consideration when determining the optimal retention period.

³³ [Government Code § 7921.000](#).

³⁴ [Government Code § 7927.700](#).

³⁵ [Government Code § 7927.200](#).

may attempt to justify withholding a record under the catch-all exemption balancing test when “the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.”³⁶

Peace Officer Records

Specific provisions of California law apply to the disclosure of peace officer records. Historically, peace officer personnel records were considered confidential and exempt from disclosure under the CPRA pursuant to [Penal Code section 832.7](#).

However, peace officer names, employing departments, and the dates of employment are required to be disclosed because this information is not “personal data” within the meaning of Penal Code section 832.8(a), which defines “personnel records” as used in section 832.7. In *Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 299, the court noted:

We find no indication that the Legislature, in adopting sections 832.7 and 832.8, was concerned with making confidential the identities of peace officers or the basic fact of their employment. Rather the legislative concern appears to have been with linking a named officer to the private or sensitive information listed in section 832.8.

Additionally, changes in the law by [Senate Bill \(SB\) 1421](#), effective January 1, 2019, and [SB 16](#), effective January 1, 2022, made certain categories of peace officer records nonconfidential and subject to disclosure. Specifically, records may be released related to an incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer, where any use of force causes great bodily injury or death, and where there is a sustained finding of unreasonable or excessive force, including failing to intervene when another peace officer is using unreasonable or excessive force.³⁷ Records are also disclosable where there is a sustained finding against a peace officer for dishonesty in their reporting, investigating, or prosecution of a crime, for dishonestly directly relating to reporting or investigating misconduct of another peace officer, for committing a sexual assault on a member of the public, for discriminatory conduct, and for unlawful arrests or searches.³⁸

³⁶ [Government Code § 7922.000](#).

³⁷ [Penal Code § 832.7\(b\)\(1\)\(A\)](#).

³⁸ [Penal Code § 832.7\(b\)\(1\)\(A-E\)](#).

Sheriff's Department Deputy Exemption List

Government agencies may still use the catch-all exemption's balancing test and provisions in Penal Code section 832.7 to withhold peace officer records if "there is a specific, articulable, and particularized reason to believe that disclosure of the record would pose a significant danger to the physical safety" of the involved peace officer.³⁹ General assertions about the risks officers face, even after a shooting in which they are involved, are insufficient and there must be evidence presented of a specific safety concern particularized to the officer seeking exemption from disclosure in order to outweigh the public's interest in disclosure. (See *Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 74-75.) The justification for withholding any record is made in a "case-by-case balancing process, with the burden of proof on the proponent of nondisclosure to demonstrate a clear overbalance on the side of confidentiality." (*Long Beach Peace Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach*, *supra*, at page 67, citing *Michaelis, Montanari & Johnson v. Superior Court* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1065, 1071.).

In the past, the Office of Inspector General requested records concerning deputy unit assignments and was informed that certain employee names were exempt from public disclosure due to a deputy being on the departmental exemption list. Because the names of the deputies were given to Office of Inspector General staff, a search on Google was conducted for the exempt employees, each of whom was found in the search and some of whom were pictured in uniform in news reports or social media.⁴⁰ In response, the Sheriff's Department determined some employees were improperly noted as exempt on the Department's list.

This issue is not unique to the Sheriff's Department. In 2023, LAPD officers filed a [lawsuit](#) claiming that release of their information and photographs in response to a CPRA request put them in danger due to their undercover status.⁴¹ Upon review, however, many officers were similarly identifiable as LAPD employees via simple online

³⁹ [Penal Code § 832.7\(b\)\(6-7\)](#).

⁴⁰ The Office of Inspector General requested the information on behalf of the Civilian Oversight Commission but intended to withhold information for any deputy who qualified as exempt under the law.

⁴¹ Myung J. Chun, [Nearly 700 LAPD undercover officers sue city for releasing their photos](#), Los Angeles Times (September 13, 2023).

searches, negating the claim that disclosure of their status with LAPD put them in significant danger. The City Attorney subsequently requested dismissal of the lawsuit.⁴²

The Office of Inspector General reviewed the Department's protocols for placing a deputy on the exemption list given the concerns that deputies on the list provided in response to the Office of Inspector General's request were not exempt from disclosure.

The Department uses a system called the Exemption MANagement System (EXMAN) to store the information of exempted employees and is in the process of developing an updated version called Confidential Operators Verified Enrollment and Roster Tracking (COVERT).⁴³ The Department indicates the system aims to ensure a secure, transparent, and case-specific electronic process for managing exemption requests and disclosures. The exemption list and CPRA requests involving possible exemption of an employee's name are handled by the Office of Constitutional Policing – Risk Management Bureau's (RMB) PRA unit.

Any Sheriff's Department employee may request an exemption from having their name disclosed in response to a CPRA request. Department members are advised via email notifications and bulletins about the legal requirements and process to submit the request. In the advisements, the Department indicates that submission of a request does not guarantee approval and if the public already knows the person is a Department member for example, because they normally work in uniform or are identified as a Department member on social media, there is no legal justification for

⁴² Libor Jany, [Many 'undercover' officers in lawsuit over LAPD photos are just regular cops, city says](#), Los Angeles Times (November 13, 2024).

⁴³ In the attached letter response from the Sheriff's Department, the Department states that "the EXMAN system is no longer in use by the Department. The Department has created a new system called COVERT." The letter goes on to state that the COVERT system "has not yet launched, pending testing of the technological system." This report notes the development of COVERT but not its implementation nor the phase out of EXMAN. This information was based upon a January 28, 2026 communication from the Department that stated: "The transition from ExMan to COVERT is temporarily on hold. Our personnel who create these applications have been focused on launching a new PRA tracking system named ReqTrak. We finally launched ReqTrak and are expanding it to Custody division. Once that project has been fully finalized, we'll be reinitiating COVERT. ExMan is still in place and is still being used." While the response letter clarifies that EXMAN is no longer in use, the letter also states the new COVERT system has not yet launched. Therefore, it remains unclear from the response what system is in use currently given that EXMAN is no longer in use, but COVERT remains in the testing phase. It should also be noted that when transmitting drafts of reports to the Department, OIG asks routinely that any corrections to the report be provided prior to the Department sending a formal response. OIG depends on the accuracy of information received from the Department when we have no way to independently verify the information. No corrections were received regarding the information pertaining to PRAs until the Department's formal response.

placing the employee on the exemption list. The advisements also direct employees to submit an exemption request if they are transferred to an undercover assignment.

A Department member may complete their request to be on the exemption list via an online form, which creates an entry in the EXMAN system. In the application, the Department member must indicate they are involved in an undercover assignment and there are specific threats against them or their family because of that work.

Alternatively, if the employee does not work undercover but wishes to be on the exemption list, the employee must demonstrate that if their association with the Department were made public, they would be placed in danger. The Department notes that the latter is typically supported by documentation such as protective orders or related reports. Departmental guidelines also specify that the fact that an employee considers their work location or the population they serve to be dangerous is not in itself legal justification for approval. However, the email to Department employees states: “[g]enerally, those working in an undercover capacity are exempt.”⁴⁴ This statement could give employees the false impression that working in an undercover capacity **automatically** means they are exempt, rather than still requiring the case-by-case analysis as articulated in the case law. (See, *Long Beach Peace Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach*, *supra*, at page 67.).⁴⁵

The exemption request first goes to the requestor’s unit commander to make a preliminary determination. The unit commander can add comments into the EXMAN system to support the approval or rejection. If approved by the unit commander, the request then goes to the RMB PRA Unit Lieutenant or designee who makes the final determination after consulting with County Counsel as needed.

The EXMAN automated system updates the list regularly based on rejections, approvals, and weekly updates on employee transfers and assignments, noting the

⁴⁴ The Department’s response to this report notes that it does not include a discussion of [Assembly Bill 1178](#). The amendments to Penal Code section 832.7 addressed in this legislation “require a court in **an action to compel disclosure** pursuant to specified provisions, in determining whether there is a specific, articulable, and particularized reason to believe that disclosure of the record would pose a significant danger to the physical safety of a person, **to consider** whether the particular peace officer is operating undercover and their duties demand anonymity.” (Emphasis added.) As noted, being undercover is part of but not the only consideration. OIG staff reviewed the current version of Penal Code section 832.7 and thus found it unnecessary to research when certain amendments to the code section were made.

⁴⁵ It’s unimaginable that deputies working undercover are using their real name, so it is unclear why providing a deputy’s name without information that a deputy is working in an undercover capacity would automatically result in a threat to that deputy’s safety. Certainly, a request for a photograph of the deputy would put the deputy in danger in those circumstances.

employee's current position and whether they are approved for an exemption. If there is a discrepancy, the EXMAN system will initiate a recertification process that must be completed within thirty days. Failure to recertify results in non-exempt status. Any exempt personnel who subsequently promote to Captain or above will also automatically be set to non-exempt status as such ranks are considered public officials.

The Office of Inspector General recommends that the Department in consultation with County Counsel regularly audit the information stored in EXMAN to ensure accuracy and sufficient particularity of the potential threats pursuant to statutory and case law. Review of the documentation and justifications provided by Department members should also be conducted on a regular basis and not just when a CPRA request is submitted for specific information.

Law Enforcement Gang Update

In response to an Office of Inspector General inquiry about the Sheriff's Department identification of any group that meets the definition of a law enforcement gang pursuant to California Penal Code section 13670, the Department [responded](#) that, to date, no such group has been identified.⁴⁶ The Department reports that there are 10 pending administrative investigations with allegations relating to law enforcement gang or deputy subgroups. Information provided by the Department with regard to its open investigations shows that two of the pending investigations were opened over three years ago and three were opened over a year ago. The Department also reported that it has referred 213 allegations of participation in a law enforcement gang to the Commission on Peace Office Standards and Training (POST).

After an inquiry by the Office of Inspector General seeking to confirm that the Department has not identified any group that qualifies as a law enforcement gang, the Department [responded](#) that Penal Code section 13670 does not require the Department to identify groups *by name* and notes that "any suggestion that the Department should be identifying groups by name is a misreading of the Penal Code section which itself states that such groups 'may identify themselves by a name' but is not necessary that

⁴⁶ The [Department's response](#), which was received on December 26, 2025, explains the status of their investigations and cites to Penal Code section 13670. While the response does not explicitly state that no groups have been identified, when read as a whole, it is reasonable to conclude that no groups have been identified by the Department. The first question and the follow-up question posed to the Department are contained in the Department's [follow-up response](#). The first question also listed 20 names of possible subgroups that might qualify as law enforcement gangs and a reference to a possible unnamed subgroup at the Lakewood Station.

they do.”⁴⁷ The problem with this explanation is that there are allegations of the existence of law enforcement gangs that **use names**. In fact, the request to the Department listed the names of 20 such possible groups. While the Department may not be **required** by law to identify groups by name, if such groups use an identifying name, the Department **should** identify the group **by name**.

In its initial response the Department also noted that “there is no statutory requirement or mechanism for reporting alleged groups under POST’s certification and decertification process.” But in order to find that a department member belongs to such a group and that the group has engaged in “serious misconduct” as defined by the statute, it is necessary for the Department to **identify** the existence of such groups. Neither of the Department responses explain why no such group has been identified. While it is true that the request asked for the name of any such group, the Department could have responded that a group or groups have been identified but that no name is associated with the group or groups. But given the number of allegations of the existence of such groups with names, one would expect that at least one group with a name or even a common symbol has been identified.⁴⁸

In fact, the Undersheriff identified the Banditos as such a group in her testimony before the Civilian Oversight Commission. See [Los County Sheriff’s Department Legal Compliance: Deputy Gangs](#) (February 26, 2024) at pages 16-17. The Sheriff’s Department reported both to the Office of Inspector General and publicly that two deputies were fired for membership in a tattooed subgroup known as the Industry Indians and for engaging in conduct associated with the subgroup.⁴⁹ Given that these

⁴⁷ The [Department’s follow-up response](#) was received on January 6, 2026. The second response also inexplicably provides a discourse that a law enforcement gang should not be compared to a criminal street gang as defined in the Penal Code section 186.22(f). No such comparison was made nor did the questions asked of the Department conflate the two distinct laws. There was no reference by OIG to Penal Code section 186.22(f).

⁴⁸ The Sheriff’s response letter included at the conclusion of this report states that the question “was framed in a challenging manner.” If OIG poses a question that the Department does not understand, OIG staff welcome a discussion to clarify the information being sought. This report in no way claims that the Department is not investigating conduct associated with deputy subgroups that might qualify as law enforcement gangs. However, to the knowledge of anyone at OIG, the Department has not **identified** any group that would qualify as a law enforcement gang under Penal Code section 13670 by name or otherwise.

⁴⁹ The deputies were terminated as discipline for, among other things, a violation of [MPP section 3-01/050.83 Employee Groups which Violate the Rights of Other Employees or Members of the Public](#). This policy was

two groups have been publicly referred to by the Sheriff and the Undersheriff in 2024 that investigations have not led to identifying any group qualifies as a law enforcement gang under Penal Code section 13670.

Outstanding Requests to the Sheriff's Department

The Sheriff's Department provided responses to each of the requests made by the Office of Inspector General during the fourth quarter. However, one request remains outstanding. The outstanding request is an April 18, 2025 request for additional materials responsive to a subpoena duces tecum (SDT) that was served in October 2024 and included a request for all documents and information relating to any Sheriff's Department surveillance of any County oversight officials; this follow-up request was made after it came to the Inspector General's attention that surveillance of a County oversight official was conducted but information relating to that surveillance, ***including notes and an audio digital tape of an interview***, were not provided. Although the SDT was served on October 1, 2024, no notes have been provided regarding the work of two peace officers alleged to have engaged in surveillance.

The Sheriff's Department responded regarding this outstanding request when it was referenced in the Office of Inspector General's report for the third quarter of 2025 with the following statement:

Due to the April 2025 request for additional materials, the Department requested that County Counsel retain outside counsel to conduct a thorough and independent review of the materials produced and assist the Department in locating any additional materials responsive to the document request. The request to hire counsel was made soon after the April 2025 OIG request, and counsel was ultimately retained in July 2025 and continues to work on this matter.

Outside counsel provided information to the Office of Inspector General on September 6, 2025, stating that in comparing the documents received by the Office of Inspector General in response to the SDT to the documents produced to them, there

implemented by the previous administration. A policy on Penal Code section 13670 had not been implemented at the time the deputies engaged in the misconduct. The firing of the deputies per this policy is discussed in the Office of Inspector General's Report, [Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Legal Compliance: Deputy Gangs](#) (February 26, 2024) at pages 18 to 21. The Los Angeles Times reported on the firing of the two deputies: Keri Blakinger and Alene Tchekmedyan, [A bowling alley, a boozy fight and allegations of a new deputy gang in Los Angeles](#) (January 11, 2024) and Keri Blakinger, [Sheriff's Department announces long-awaited policy banning deputy gangs](#) (September 18, 2024).

were 2,934 documents that appear not to have been provided to the Office of Inspector General.⁵⁰ Counsel indicated that the 2,934 documents would be provided to the Office of Inspector General.

After multiple inquiries by Office of Inspector General staff as to the status of providing the documents, on January 21, 2026, counsel sent an email communication that they were reviewing the documents. The email stated:

We were asked by LASD to compare its records of prior productions to OIG with the materials OIG provided us as having been produced by LASD and we have verified that all of the documents LASD initially determined to be responsive have been produced. Currently, we are reviewing additional materials recently collected by LASD for responsiveness and privilege.

No particular privilege was identified in the response. The Office of Inspector General is unaware of any privilege that would allow for these documents to be withheld. The Chief Deputy, Inspector General sent a response to counsel stating:

I am not sure what the basis would be to withhold any documents from the Office of Inspector General on the basis of a privilege, other than possibly attorney-client privilege for communications with counsel retained at the expense of Sheriff Luna or Sheriff Villanueva. As special counsel to the Board of Supervisors, any opinion from County Counsel can, and should, be shared with us. I do know that the Department employed Constitutional Policing Advisers who are attorneys, but those attorneys are not counsel for the Department and thus any communications including those advisers are not privileged. If you could provide an explanation, we would greatly appreciate it. Is there any explanation as to why you received a greater number of documents you received than OIG was given? It's hard to imagine that there are 2,934 documents protected by a privilege.

As far as non-responsive documents, we are requesting those documents, as we want to review them to see why the Department would give you non-responsive documents when the ask was for the documents responsive to the OIG subpoena.

⁵⁰ The Office of Inspector General provided the documents it received in response to the SDT to outside counsel.

In a subsequent communication, outside counsel clarified that they were reviewing the 2,934 documents to determine whether they were responsive to the subpoena and not duplicative of the approximately 6,000 documents produced previously by the Sheriff's Department and reiterated that the documents would also be reviewed for the applicability of any privilege.⁵¹

Because no additional materials have yet been provided, it is unknown whether the records provided to outside counsel include the notes or audiotape that were referred to by Department members. The SDT for these records was made pursuant to the Office of Inspector General's authority under state and County laws. The establishing ordinance for the Office of Inspector General, Los Angeles County Code section 6.44.190, as amended, states the following:

As part of the Board of Supervisors' duty to supervise the official conduct of County officers under Government Code section 25303, the Office of Inspector General ("OIG") is created in the Department of the Board of Supervisors to promote constitutional policing and the fair and impartial administration of justice, and to facilitate the Board of Supervisors' responsibility without obstructing the Sheriff's criminal investigative function. The OIG's scope includes matters relevant to the policies, procedures, practices, and operations of the Sheriff's and Probation departments (collectively, the "Departments"). In accordance with Government Code section 25303, ***the OIG shall have access to all Departments' information; documents; materials; facilities; and meetings, reviews, and other proceedings necessary to carry out the OIG's duties under this section.*** (Emphasis added.)

An inquiry by the Office of Inspector General into surveillance of County officials is clearly within the purview of the Office of Inspector General's oversight function as delegated by the Board of Supervisors and expressed in the County ordinance.⁵² The

⁵¹ In its letter responding to this report, the Department notes that it has "undertaken all reasonable efforts to identify responsive material." It should be noted that OIG executive staff were informed by a then-member of the Sheriff's Department's command staff that a current employee had notes. Those notes are not in the materials provided to us, nor has anyone at OIG received an explanation as to why the notes of that employee were not provided or even if someone asked the employee for the notes.

⁵² Subsection G of the ordinance states that the OIG shall have the authority to undertake an inquiry and audit or perform monitoring at the request of the Board of Supervisors, the COC, or the POC, or the Sheriff or the CPO, ***or on its own initiative.*** (Emphasis added.)

only limitation is that the Office of Inspector General may not obstruct any Sheriff's Department criminal investigative function. It is difficult to imagine that receiving and reviewing documents could obstruct a criminal investigation, but even if it were possible, that reason for noncompliance has not been asserted. The Office of Inspector General continues to request that these documents be provided pursuant to the lawful SDT.

CUSTODY DIVISION

Jail Overcrowding

As previously reported by the Office of Inspector General, overcrowding in the Los Angeles County jails continues to jeopardize the ability of the Sheriff's Department to provide habitable, humane, and safe conditions of confinement as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.⁵³

The Los Angeles County jails have a Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) total rated capacity of 12,404.⁵⁴ According to the Sheriff's Department Population Management Bureau Daily Inmate Statistics, as of December 31, 2025, the total population of people in custody in the Los Angeles County jails was 12,236. As of September 30, 2025, the total population of people in custody in the Los Angeles County jails was 12,797.

The table below shows the daily count of people in custody, according to the Population Management Bureau Daily Inmate Statistics, at Men's Central Jail (MCJ), Twin Towers Correctional Facility (TTCF), Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF), Pitchess Detention Center – East (PDC-East), Pitchess Detention Center – North (PDC-North), Pitchess Detention Center – South (PDC-South), and North County Correctional Facility (NCCF) on the last day of the previous four quarters. On these dates, three facilities (MCJ, PDC-North, and NCCF) that together account for more than half the Department's jail capacity operated over the BSCC rated capacity.

⁵³ See *Fischer v. Winter* (1983) 564 F. Supp. 281, 299 (noting that while overcrowding may not be unconstitutional in itself, overcrowding is a root cause of deficiencies in basic living conditions, such as providing sufficient shelter, clothing, food, medical care, sanitation, and personal safety).

⁵⁴ The total rated capacity is arrived at by adding the rated capacity for each of the County jail facilities: MCJ 3512, TTCF 2432, CRDF 1708, PDC-East 926, PDC-North 830, PDC-South 782, and NCCF 2214. Some portions of the jail facilities are not included in the BSCC capacity ratings. When referring to the jail facilities, this report includes only the BSCC rated facilities. The rated capacity has not been recently updated and does not take into account the pandemic, understaffing, or the deteriorating physical plant of MCJ, meaning that the current safe capacity of the Los Angeles County jails is certainly substantially lower than the rated maximum.

Facility	BSCC Capacity	Facility Count			
		3/31/2025	6/30/2025	9/30/2025	12/31/2025
MCJ	3512	3793	3441	3751	3609
TTCF	2432	2314	2433	2403	2309
CRDF	1708	1418	1416	1496	1414
PDC-East	926	11	7	17	11
PDC-North	830	1286	1373	1348	1321
PDC-South	782	423	546	640	611
NCCF	2214	3010	3148	3142	2961

Availability of Menstrual Products in the Los Angeles County Jails

On June 25, 2024, the Board of Supervisors (Board) passed a [motion](#) requesting the Sheriff's Department and directing the Office of Inspector General, Sybil Brand Commission, and the Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission to review and report back on policies related to the availability and accessibility of menstrual products in the Los Angeles County jails, in light of recent legislation, and directing the Office of Inspector General to include status on the availability and accessibility of menstrual products in its quarterly reports to the Board, until further notice.⁵⁵

In its initial [report](#) to the Board, staff from the Office of Inspector General detailed the availability of pads, tampons, and panty liners for menstruating individuals. In September 2025, the Sheriff's Department began piloting menstrual cups for incarcerated workers and students in dedicated housing modules.⁵⁶ In response an

⁵⁵ See [Penal Code, § 4023.5\(a\)](#). ("A person confined in a local detention facility shall be allowed to continue to use materials necessary for personal hygiene with regard to their menstrual cycle and reproductive system, including, but not limited to, sanitary pads and tampons, at no cost to the incarcerated person."); [Cal. Code Regs., tit 15, § 1265](#). ("Each menstruating person shall be provided with sanitary napkins, panty liners, and tampons as requested with no maximum allowance."); Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Manual, [§ 6-15/010.00 Inmate Clothing, Bedding, and Personal Hygiene](#). ("All menstruating inmates shall have ready access to sanitary napkins, panty liners, and tampons."); Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 5-16-040 Distribution of Personal Care Items](#). ("Each menstruating inmate housed at CRDF shall be provided with sanitary napkins, panty liners, and tampons. All feminine hygiene products shall be readily available in a common space within each module or pod setting."); [Penal Code, § 3409\(a\)](#). ("A person incarcerated...who menstruates or experiences uterine or vaginal bleeding shall, without needing to request, have ready access to, and be allowed to use, materials necessary for personal hygiene with regard to their menstrual cycle and reproductive system, including, but not limited to, sanitary pads and tampons, at no cost to the person.").

⁵⁶ Incarcerated persons participating in the Conservation Work Program are housed in module 1700, while those enrolled in education services offered by Gender Responsive Services are housed in module 3600.

incident⁵⁷ noted in the Office of Inspector General's last report on the availability of menstrual products, the Sheriff's Department revised CRDF Unit Order # 6-01-00 on searches and trained reception personnel in December 2025.⁵⁸ Reception personnel are responsible for conducting searches of incarcerated workers after the completion of their work shift and all people in custody returning to CRDF following off-site transportation. Under the revised unit order, custody personnel must allow menstrual cup users access to a toilet prior to being searched in the reception area. Menstruating individuals must be given the opportunity to discard menstrual cup contents in the toilet, rinse the cup in the sink, and wrap it in a paper towel. In accordance with the former unit order, menstruating individuals are then required to enter the B-Scanner in the search area. Once the search is complete, menstruating individuals should be provided a new menstrual product or allowed to retain possession of their menstrual cup, and, if needed, one pair of underwear, and must be allowed to sanitize their hands.

The Sheriff's Department reported that it has not received any complaints regarding the revised process. However, incarcerated workers reported to Office of Inspector General staff that some reception deputies continue to request that they remove their menstrual cup in the search area after completing their work shift. One incarcerated worker reported being required to do so as recently as late December 2025. Another incarcerated worker claimed she was instructed to do the same, but she successfully advocated for access to a toilet. Other incarcerated workers stated that some deputies do not ask whether they are wearing a menstrual cup and acknowledged not self-disclosing to avoid possibly being asked to remove it in the search area.

Between October 1 and December 31, 2025, Office of Inspector General staff periodically verified the availability and accessibility of menstrual products at CRDF.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ In the incident described, custody personnel instructed an incarcerated worker to remove her menstrual cup during a search conducted after she completed her work shift. The menstruating individual reported being denied access to a toilet and losing hold of the menstrual cup which resulted in the spillage of menstrual fluid on her legs, clothing, and the floor. The incident revealed deficiencies in the search process, which states: "[a]ll inmate workers shall be escorted to the CRDF Reception Center to be searched utilizing the B-SCAN at the end of the inmate worker's shift prior to returning to their housing location." (See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, § 5-23-010, Inmate Workers.).

⁵⁸ See CRDF Unit Order, # 6-01-00 *Protocol for Inmate Searches* (version obtained via email). CRDF reception personnel were trained on 12/10/2025 (PM shift) and 12/11/2025 (EM and AM shifts).

⁵⁹ Staff from the Office of Inspector General visited modules 3100, 3200, and 3400 (moderate observation housing), and 2200, 2300, and 2400 (high observation housing).

The need to resupply certain products was addressed with line personnel and resolved promptly.

Moderate and high observation housing. Office of Inspector General staff verified the inventory of menstrual pads, tampons and panty liners in all moderate observation and high observation housing modules visited during the reporting period.⁶⁰ Although the availability of menstrual products was consistent across housing units, accessibility and distribution practices varied.

In most high observation housing units, menstrual products were available in clear plastic bags tied to stair railings in common areas. As previously reported, incarcerated people in these housing classifications typically do not have access to common areas for most of the day, which may limit their ability to access menstrual products.

Additionally, when incarcerated persons access common areas in high observation housing units, their ability to access products may be further restricted depending on whether they remain handcuffed.

Moderate observation housing units previously employed the same method for making menstrual products available. During this reporting period, menstrual products in most moderate observation housing units were generally available in cardboard boxes set out in common areas. According to custody personnel, trustees, and some people in custody, the switch to boxes in these units, and in some instances the placement of boxes at the trustee table area, was implemented in response to reports that people in custody were hoarding products and removing the clear plastic bags previously used for distribution. Incarcerated persons reported mixed experiences with accessibility after this change. While many indicated no issues obtaining products, others expressed concern about having to request products from incarcerated workers, commonly referred to as trustees. This concern was particularly noted in moderate observation housing units where supply boxes were placed on, underneath, or behind the trustee table. The change reportedly took effect several months ago at the discretion of module personnel and trustees.

Some custody personnel, trustees and other people in custody described persistent misuse as primarily involving the use of menstrual pads to clean cells, cushion toilet seats, and cover vents. Custody personnel also expressed more serious concerns, including the potential for people in custody to conceal contraband inside menstrual

⁶⁰ See Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Manual, [§ 5-01/050.10 Housing for Mentally Ill Inmates](#). ("Moderate impairment. Generally requires moderate observation housing (MOH) in jail with mental health supervision; Significant impairment. Generally requires high observation housing (HOH) in jail with mental health supervision.").

products or pose safety risks for those on suicide precautions; however, they were unable to provide recent examples to substantiate these concerns. Hoarding was attributed by some to a belief that menstrual products are limited and may run out, while other people in custody reported needing additional products to manage longer cycles and heavier flows. As previously reported, the Sheriff's Department should avoid limiting access to menstrual products based on perceived reasonableness of need.

To address persistent allegations of hoarding and misuse, custody personnel should identify any underlying factors contributing to these reported behaviors. If hoarding stems from concerns about future product availability communicating that the products will always be available and having the products routinely available can alleviate these concerns. For concerns about misuse, having cleaning supplies, ensuring toilet seats are in working condition, and regulating the temperature will reduce using the products for non-menstrual uses. Providing clear information on inventory, ensuring access to necessary materials, and addressing other concerns is the responsibility of staff. Regardless of the underlying cause or whether the concerns are substantiated, a lack of ready access risks noncompliance with state law, the Board directive, and Sheriff's Department policy.

Recommendations. As previously recommended, along with the access to products in common areas, the Sheriff's Department should consider resuming cell-to-cell distribution of menstrual products to ensure ready access. Relying solely on either placing the products in common areas, whether in clear plastic bags or cardboard boxes, leaves access largely to the discretion of custody personnel and trustees. Combining cell-to-cell distribution with accessible products in common areas would improve access and support compliance with state law, the Board directive, and Sheriff's Department policy. Additionally, the Sheriff's Department should continue to re-brief custody personnel on the revised unit order on searches, monitor performance, and implement accountability for noncompliance.

Commissary Prices

Background

On July 9, 2024, the Board of Supervisors passed a [motion](#) directing the Sheriff's Department to report back on measures taken to ensure commissary prices in the Los Angeles County Jails are not excessive and remain comparable with prices for groceries and other retail outlets. The motion directed the Office of Inspector General to review the Sheriff's Department's report back and provide an assessment, which was issued on February 6, 2025, entitled [Report Back on People Over Profit: Fairness and Equity in Commissary Prices for the Los Angeles County Jails](#).

The motion also directed the Office of Inspector General to provide quarterly updates on the Sheriff's Department's progress on the removal of the profit mark-ups and reduction of prices on commissary items.

Title 15 Meetings with Keefe Commissary Network

As noted in previous reports, the vendor for commissary items and vending machines is [Keefe Commissary Network](#) (Keefe).

The contract requires Keefe to attend monthly Title 15 meetings the County convenes to present reports on commissary and vending sales trends and spikes, billing issues, complaints submitted by incarcerated people, machine maintenance and reliability, security concerns, and any other operational problems identified by the parties. The Office of Inspector General attended the Title 15 monthly meeting for November 2025, which included representatives from each custodial facility, representatives from phone services, and Keefe staff.

At the meeting representatives from the facilities presented concerns. For example, one facility needed hot pots, which were previously on back order. Keefe confirmed a large order was approved and that the order had been placed when the supply was noted to be low in the weeks prior to the meeting. Staff from another facility requested an update for maintenance requests for a broken vending machine and out-of-service phones. Preparations for the end of the year holiday sales were also discussed. The Department is set to receive invoices from Keefe that include sales figures during the holiday season in January 2026 and will share that information with the Office of Inspector General.

During the meeting, the representative from CRDF inquired about having hygiene kits, also called "fish kits," available for sale in vending machines to supplement stock supplies. The Department indicated they have historically found that hygiene and medicinal items are poor sellers in vending machines as indigent persons in custody are able to get the kits at no cost.

Ways of increasing stock supplies of hygiene kits should be explored. As previously reported, the Department does not always have hygiene kits readily available.⁶¹ The Department reported there was a tariff and shipping issue on the hygiene kits but is working with Keefe to reduce or eliminate delays. In addition to increasing stock and eliminating delays in shipment, the Office of Inspector General recommends

⁶¹ See Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Effort: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department January to March 2023](#) (June 7, 2023) at page 26.

the Department work with Keefe to identify options for purchasing hygiene kits from locations that do not have tariffs imposed as a way to reduce pricing.

The Inmate Welfare Commission (IWC) met in October and December 2025 where Keefe reported \$5,098.56 in sales for Indigent Hygiene Kits for September 1, 2025 - September 30, 2025, and \$6,278.21 for October 1, 2025 - October 31, 2025. It is not known what the estimated cost is for all kits to be provided free of charge, but the kits are necessary for basic hygiene. The Office of Inspector General continues to recommend the Department provide all incarcerated persons hygiene kits free of charge.⁶²

Vending Machine Installation

The Department is also still in the process of installing new vending machines with Keefe. The new vending machines are installed and operational at CRDF and the transition remains in progress at TTCF and PDC.

Kosher/Halal Menu Availability

Regarding the availability of updated Kosher/Halal menus discussed in the Office of Inspector General's report [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department – July through September 2025](#), the new menu has not yet been released. However, Keefe distributed Kosher/Halal item informational handouts during commissary operations in November and again in December 2025. The Department reports that the first change order to the new contract that will incorporate the Kosher/Halal identifiers into new menus remains in the approval process and will be completed before the end of January 2026. The Department directed Keefe to distribute additional handouts during January 2026 to ensure Kosher/Halal items continue to be readily identifiable to people in custody.

Jail Employment Opportunities at Century Regional Detention Facility

The Office of Inspector General continues to monitor Century Regional Detention Facility's (CRDF) efforts to provide meaningful opportunities for people in custody to participate in therapeutic and rehabilitative programming.

⁶² [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department – April through June 2025](#) (August 26, 2025) at page 34.

In 2021, the Office of Inspector General issued a finding of inequitable racial/ethnic representation of people in custody at CRDF participating in credit-earning jail employment through the Prisoner Personnel Office (PPO). The Office of Inspector General has monitored racial/ethnic representation of inmate workers since, and Black women continue to be consistently underrepresented.

The Sheriff's Department provided data from December 30, 2025, detailing the number of people in custody at CRDF engaged in credit-earning jail employment by race/ethnicity. A percentage comparison analysis displayed representation percentages similar to those reported in previous Office of Inspector General reports. Specifically, the data showed:

- Approximately 20% of Inmate Workers were White, compared to approximately 18% of the CRDF population.⁶³
- Approximately 15% of Inmate Workers were Black, compared to approximately 32% of the CRDF population.
- Approximately 61% of Inmate Workers were Hispanic, compared to approximately 46% of the CRDF population.
- Approximately 4% of Inmate Workers were "Other" race/ethnicity, compared to approximately 4% of the CRDF population.

In 2022, the Office of Inspector General [recommended](#) that the Sheriff's Department "implement a system that documents reasons for denial of PPO participation, documents reasons for elective non-participation, explore ways to promote PPO participation for eligible persons, and explore alternative ways of evaluating persons for PPO to provide equitable opportunity for participation." The Department reported that it has made efforts to implement these recommendations.

The Department reports that it changed the way that it is capturing data regarding PPO participation at CRDF. Consistent with Office of Inspector General recommendations, Population Management Bureau (PMB) tracks data documenting denial of PPO participation and reasons for elective non-participation.

The Department disqualification data details whether people in custody at CRDF were disqualified from participating in the PPO due to their criminal history, current charges, mental health level, institutional behavior, keep-away status, medical limitations,

⁶³ Race/ethnicity categorizations reflect those utilized by the Sheriff's Department when reporting demographic data.

participation in a program, or security level. The Department's data shows that, as of January 13, 2026, approximately 80 percent of people who were disqualified from participating in PPO were restricted from participation due to their criminal charges.

The Department refusal data tracks people in custody who refuse to participate in PPO by race/ethnicity. PMB reports that, if a person in custody refuses a work assignment, PPO tracks data to contact the person again within 30 days to re-offer a work assignment. PMB reports that while most people who initially refuse work assignments continue to refuse, a small number of people who initially decline work assignments decide to participate in PPO within 30 days of their initial refusal. The data tracking does not reflect a unique reason why people in custody refuse PPO participation and simply denotes that the person in custody was "not interested." However, PMB operations staff indicated that they will require PPO staff to document explicit reasons why people in custody refuse to participate in PPO in future data tracking. The Office of Inspector General is of the opinion that documenting specific reasons why people in custody decline PPO participation will assist in better identifying barriers to participation.

The Department reports that it has promoted participation in the PPO for eligible people in custody housed at CRDF. PMB reports that the PPO worked to increase participation by reviewing inmate request forms and conducting comprehensive screenings of the CRDF population to identify individuals who may be eligible for work assignments.

The PPO engaged directly with people during town hall meetings at CRDF to explain the PPO selection process, describe available positions, and offer adjusted positions where appropriate. Prior to PPO engaging in town halls, module deputies were responsible for notifying people in custody of PPO selection but were unable to follow up with people who refused work assignments. The Department reported that, by PPO interfacing with people in custody directly, the PPO has been able to better understand PPO participation refusals and potentially adjust PPO position offerings to increase participation in the program.

The Department has also developed posters, displayed below, which are posted across high-traffic areas at CRDF to educate people in custody about available assignments within PPO and how to apply to participate.



Finally, the Department reports that it explored alternative ways of evaluating people for PPO to provide equitable opportunities for participation. The Department reports that two charges, Penal Code section 243(e) and Penal Code section 273.5, both of which are crimes related to domestic violence, which previously resulted in automatic exclusion from participation in PPO, are now evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Although the Department acknowledges that this change did not result in a dramatic increase in PPO participation, the Department reports that changes in eligibility criteria will lead to individualized suitability determinations and may increase diversity amongst PPO participants.

The Office of Inspector General recommends that the Department continue to undertake these efforts. By tracking and analyzing refusal data, promoting PPO to eligible people, and continuing to refine eligibility criteria and make individualized determinations for participation in PPO, the Department will likely continue to see an increase in eligible workers and heightened diversity in PPO participation at CRDF.

In-Custody Deaths

Between October 1 and December 31, 2025, eight people died in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department. The Department of Medical Examiner's (DME) website currently reflects the manner of death for seven: five natural, one accidental, and one suicide.⁶⁴ For the remaining death, the finding is not available on the DME website.⁶⁵ One person died at MCJ, one person died at CRDF, one person died at TTCF-CTC, and five people died at hospitals after being transported from the jails. The Sheriff's Department posts the information regarding in-custody deaths on a [dedicated page on Inmate In-Custody Deaths on its website](#).⁶⁶

Office of Inspector General staff attended the Custody Services Division Administrative Death Reviews and the Correctional Health Services Mortality Reviews for each of the eight in-custody deaths. The following summaries, arranged in chronological order, provide brief descriptions of each in-custody death:

Date of Death: October 21, 2025

Custodial Status: Sentenced

On October 21, 2025, people housed in a multi-person cell at MCJ alerted custody staff that their cellmate was "man down." Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered

⁶⁴ During the time for what OIG refers to as the validation process, the time between when the draft report is sent to CHS and the Sheriff's Department and when the response is due to OIG, OIG staff continue to check for updates to the DME website. CHS also provides suggested corrections to the report. The information from the DME website and CHS was incorporated in the report prior to receipt of the formal letter response from the Sheriff's Department. Thus, some of the information noted in the formal response at the conclusion of this report was corrected prior to receipt of the letter from the undersheriff.

⁶⁵ In the past, the Office of Inspector General has reported on the preliminary cause of death as determined by the Medical Examiner, Correctional Health Services (CHS) personnel, hospital personnel providing care at the time of death, and/or Sheriff's Department Homicide investigators. Because the information provided is preliminary, the Office of Inspector General has determined that the better practice is to report on the manner of death. There are five manner of death classifications: natural, accident, suicide, homicide, and undetermined. Natural causes can include illnesses and disease and thus deaths due to COVID-19 are classified as natural. Overdoses may be accidental, or the result of a purposeful ingestion. The Sheriff's Department and Correctional Health Services use evidence gathered during the investigation to make a preliminary determination as to whether an overdose is accidental or purposeful. Where the suspected cause of death is reported by the Sheriff's Department and CHS, the Office of Inspector General will include this in parenthesis.

⁶⁶ Penal Code § 10008 requires that within 10 days of any death of a person in custody at a local correctional facility, the facility must post on its website information about the death, including the manner and means of death, and must update the posting within 30 days of a change in the information.

emergency aid, and CHS staff administered Narcan. The person died at the scene. Areas of concern include the emergency response and timely administration of Narcan. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.

Date of Death: October 22, 2025

Custodial Status: Sentenced

On October 21, 2025, a person in custody at CRDF was transported to Martin Luther King, Jr. Outpatient Center (MLK OPC) for a higher level of care. On October 21, 2025, the person was transferred from MLK OPC to Long Beach Medical Center where they were pronounced dead. Areas of concern include CHS's emergency response. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as accidental, and the cause of death as ruptured aortic dissection and hypertensive cardiovascular disease, and an "other significant condition" as methamphetamine abuse.

Date of Death: November 7, 2025

Custodial Status: Sentenced

On November 7, 2025, custody staff conducting Title 15 safety checks at CRDF found an unresponsive person in a single-person cell with a ligature around their neck. Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered emergency aid and administered Narcan. The person died at the scene. Areas of concern include the level of care provided by CHS clinicians in determining the decedent's suicidality. Preliminary manner of death: Suicide. The DME website reflects the manner of death as suicide, and the cause of death as ligature hanging.

Date of Death: December 5, 2025

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On December 5, 2025, custody staff distributing lunch at TTCF found an unresponsive person in a single-person cell. Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered emergency aid, and custody staff and CHS staff administered multiple doses of Narcan. The person was transported to Los Angeles General Medical Center (LAGMC) and was pronounced dead. Areas of concern include custody staff not activating body-worn cameras during Title 15 safety checks, CCTV video depicting the decedent falling in his cell not being shown during the preliminary death review, and why the decedent, who was booked into Sheriff's Department custody less than 24 hours prior, was not body

scanned or strip searched at the Inmate Reception Center (IRC).⁶⁷ Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease.

Date of Death: December 9, 2025

Custodial Status: Sentenced

On November 25, 2025, people housed in a dorm at MCJ alerted custody staff at a deputy booth of a “man down” within the dorm. Custody staff, CHS staff, and paramedics rendered emergency aid and custody staff and CHS staff administered four doses of Narcan. The person was transported to LAGMC and was pronounced dead on December 9, 2025. Areas of concern include the quality of Title 15 safety checks and the booth deputy’s potential nine-minute delay in requesting emergency aid after being notified of the “man down.” Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the causes of death as pulmonary thromboemboli and deep vein thrombosis of leg.⁶⁸

Date of Death: December 9, 2025

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On December 9, 2025, CHS staff were assessing a person housed at TTCF-CTC when he stopped breathing and had no pulse. CHS staff and paramedics rendered emergency aid and CHS staff administered two doses of Narcan.

Areas of concern include the emergency response. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website does not currently have a public record for this death.⁶⁹

Date of Death: December 10, 2025

Custodial Status: Pre-Trial

On December 10, 2025, custody staff and CHS staff returned to a person’s cell at TTCF after witnessing the person laying on the floor of the cell approximately 20 minutes prior. Custody personnel requested a nurse and gurney to transport the person to the Urgent Care Clinic (UCC). After the individual was transported to the UCC, custody staff requested fire/paramedics. CHS staff and paramedics rendered emergency aid, and the individual was transported to LAGMC where he was pronounced dead. Areas of concern include the emergency response, an inquiry as to why the individual was not

⁶⁷ In its formal response to this report, the Sheriff’s Department notes that the CCTV video was displayed during the second death review meeting.

⁶⁸ While the DME website notes both the manner and causes of death, the case status is noted as *open*.

⁶⁹ The public record for this death is not posted as the decedent’s next of kin has not been notified.

housed at TTCF-CTC for a higher level of care, adherence to policies regarding medication refusal, an unfulfilled referral to Addiction Medicine Services, and why the decedent, who was booked into Sheriff's Department custody less than 72 hours prior, was not body scanned or strip searched at IRC. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as diabetic ketoacidosis due to diabetes mellitus; other conditions: effects of fentanyl.

Date of Death: December 29, 2025

Custodial Status: Pre-Sentenced

On December 12, 2025, a person in custody with a pre-existing medical condition was transported from a medical appointment to LAGMC for a higher level of care. On December 29, 2025, the person was pronounced dead. Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the cause of death as complications of relapsed b-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia/lymphoma.

In-Custody Overdose Deaths in Los Angeles County Jails

On December 19, 2023, the Board of Supervisors [passed a motion](#) directing the Sheriff's Department to "[c]ollect and track data outlining narcotics recovery in county jail facilities to evaluate the efficacy of drug detection interventions and provide information to the OIG," and [s]trengthen existing policy on increasing and conducting more comprehensive searches of the belongings of staff and civilians who enter the facility, beyond visual inspections." The Board also directed the Office of Inspector General to report quarterly on the Sheriff's Department's progress on these mandates, including progress or any recommendations included in Office of Inspector General reports, as well as on the number of in-custody deaths confirmed or assumed to be due to an overdose, and on any additional recommendations related to in-custody overdose deaths.

Of the eight people who died in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department between October 1 and December 31, 2025, the medical examiner's final reports, including toxicology assessments, do not confirm that any person died due to an accidental overdose, but the effects of fentanyl were noted as other effects for the December 10, 2025 death summarized in the previous section. Toxicology results remain pending for one of the eight deaths and may indicate additional overdose deaths once completed. As of this report, the DME has confirmed that nine individuals have died due to accidental overdose through the third quarter of 2025.

Tracking and Improving Narcotics Intervention Efforts

With regard to the directive to the Sheriff's Department to track narcotics recovery and evaluate drug detection interventions, as previously reported the Sheriff's Department does not presently track narcotics detection in a format that allows data to be analyzed and reports that it does not have the capacity to build a mechanism to track narcotics seizure by drug detection mechanism, nor is it able to compile extractable data collected in the Los Angeles Regional Crime Information System (LARCIS) to evaluate the efficacy of drug detection intervention. Instead, the Sheriff's Department takes the position that constructing an all-encompassing jail management data system would best support the Sheriff's Department's efforts to track narcotics recovery and evaluate the efficacy of drug detection interventions. The Office of Inspector General continues to recommend that the Sheriff's Department examine ways to comply with the Board's directive by standardizing search procedures division-wide, improving reporting requirements for staff, and compiling data on detection interventions and seizures using existing technologies.

The Board's second directive requires that the Sheriff's Department "[s]trengthen existing policy on increasing and conducting more comprehensive searches of the belongings of staff and civilians who enter the [jails]." The Sheriff's Department previously reported that its current policy grants the Sheriff's Department broad authority to search staff and civilians entering the jails, so that no changes to existing policy are required to implement more comprehensive searches. The Sheriff's Department previously reported that it implemented more frequent unannounced and randomized staff searches beginning in May 2024.

The Office of Inspector General continues to engage with the Department to discuss potential ways to improve narcotics detection efforts, particularly as it relates to preventing and finding narcotics being brought in by employees of the Department, CHS, and professional employee visitors, such as independent contractors and vendors entering secured facilities. Some of these efforts further examined below include (1) training employees on narcotics detection, (2) conducting custody narcotics investigations, and (3) recruitment efforts as it relates to screening and background investigations for potential new hires.

Narcotics detection training. The Department trains its employees regarding narcotics prevention and detection. Search tactics are covered within the ninety-six-hour *Use of Force* training at the Academy. Jail Operations reinforces search of persons policy, including [Custody Division Manual \(CDM\) 6-07/010.00 Inmate Searches](#), which outlines how to search a person before placing them in a booking cell and provides guidance on identifying suspicious behavior. Deputies are trained in executing searches of people in

custody. Jail Operations continues to train deputies working in custody assignments on narcotics detection tactics, including looking for suspicious activity or considering any information they receive.

Deputies also respond to intelligence that a person in custody is returning from the medical unit or court with contraband. People in custody carry their property to and from court to ensure access to food, to prevent property from being stolen, or because they may be transferred to another facility or released directly from court. Deputies are aware that searches of people in custody returning to the facility are important safeguards for preventing the introduction of contraband. Court-assigned deputies can provide valuable assistance in foiling attempts to smuggle in contraband by detecting contraband before inmates are transferred back to jail facilities.

Fraternization by deputies, civilian employees, and other civilians in the facility with persons in custody may lead to relationships that cause deputies to turn a blind eye to misconduct or the presence of drugs or contraband or even result in a deputy or civilian with facility access agreeing to bring narcotics or contraband into custodial facilities.⁷⁰ The Department reports providing an annual four-hour ethics training that covers issues of inappropriate fraternization. The CDM prohibits deputies from associating with people in custody or the friends and relatives of incarcerated persons. The CDM also directs deputies not to perform any favors or accept any services from incarcerated persons or their loved ones and friends.⁷¹ Deputies are trained to report suspicious activity by a colleague to their supervisor.⁷² Regarding potential fraternization between deputies and the trustees they supervise, it was indicated that positions are rotated annually, sometimes every six months, to prevent close relationships. Typically, a deputy supervises three to four trustees working outside the facility at a time. Upon re-entry, these trustees are searched.

There are signs at the checkpoints used by these individuals to enter custody facilities regarding the use of clear bags and what items are prohibited inside the facilities, such as cellphones. As reported in the Office of Inspector General's report [*Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department – July to September 2025*](#), not every deputy or professional employee visitor is searched upon entry, searches are not

⁷⁰ The fraternization by an Office of Inspector General staff member was brought to OIG's attention by the Sheriff's Department. That person is no longer employed by the Office of Inspector General.

⁷¹ See [MPP 3-01/050.84 Fraternization and Prohibited Associations](#).

⁷² The Office of Inspector General encourages investigation of any suspicious activity by members of OIG staff, just as OIG would for investigations of Sheriff's Department employees or anyone with access to the jail facilities.

always thorough, and deputies and professional employee visitors may exit the custody facility and re-enter in the middle of a shift when there is no search operating at any point of entry.

When asked about tracking, the Department reported that it does not currently collect data on staff who are found attempting to bring items, even inadvertently, that are not permitted inside custodial facilities, such as cellphones. The Department further reported concerns that some deputies would complain to the employee unions about data collection and its potential use for disciplinary purposes. Data collection detailing the number of searches conducted that prevented prohibited items from being brought into facilities might assist with improving search techniques throughout the jail facilities.

Custody narcotics investigations.⁷³ As part of its narcotics prevention efforts, the Department also conducts narcotics investigations in custody. Sergeants and detectives are assigned to various custody investigative units to conduct these investigations.

The Office of Inspector General notes that although employees are trained in the academy and in annual ethics training to report to their supervisor any suspected criminal activity conducted by their colleagues, more tips may be generated if they were collected and investigated by an independent party rather than the tipster's chain of command. Deputies may have concerns about confidentiality, impartiality, or fear retaliation within their unit if they have concerns that any information they provide about potential misconduct will first be investigated by their supervisor. However, the Department notes that there are avenues that staff may utilize to report suspected misconduct, including a tip line that allows for anonymous reporting.

Recruitment efforts. Part of preventing narcotics from entering custodial facility is examining why employees engage in such conduct in the first place. Deputies, civilian employees, and other civilians with authorized access to jail facilities may have preexisting relationships with someone in custody such that they may be convinced to bring in contraband. Deputies and civilians may also be incentivized monetarily to bring narcotics into custody. Maintaining strict hiring standards and screenings to ascertain factors that indicate a possible propensity to engage in nefarious behavior, including financial issues, prior thefts, dishonesty, and domestic violence, which may increase the likelihood or risk that staff or others with access to the facilities will be susceptible to requests to smuggle in contraband.

⁷³ Based upon security concerns expressed by the Sheriff's Department, some information referred to in the Sheriff's response letter was deleted from this section.

The Department follows Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) guidelines regarding hiring requirements and background checks for potential new hires including standards under [Senate Bill \(SB\) 2](#) that went into effect January 1, 2022. A person cannot be employed as a peace officer if they have a felony conviction in any state or were convicted of an offense in another state that would be considered a felony in California.⁷⁴ [Government Code section 1031.1](#) and [Penal Code section 832.12](#) also require the Department to review personnel and misconduct files from previous employers to examine any disqualifying actions or pending issues.

The Department uses POST's [Background Investigation Manual](#) that includes background investigation "dimensions" to be considered in every peace officer background investigation that have been incorporated into [California Code of Regulations, Title 11 section 1953](#). The dimensions include screening for Integrity, Impulse Control/Attention to Safety, Substance Abuse and Other Risk-Taking Behavior, Stress Tolerance, Confronting and Overcoming Problems, Obstacles and Adversity, Conscientiousness, Interpersonal Skills, Decision-Making and Judgment, Learning Ability, and Communication Skills. These dimensions are meant to determine whether the candidate possesses the moral character and suitability for law enforcement duties. POST audits the background and pre-employment files twice a year.

The Department requests self-disclosure of illicit drug use and considers the time and distance from such usage. In terms of connections with friends or family who are gang affiliated or incarcerated, the Department asks about the extent of the applicant's contact with these individuals and advises them of the fraternization policy that applies if hired. Regarding financial issues, the Department reviews the applicant's credit report and tax returns, as well as tax returns for any business the applicant owns. Essentially, the Department looks for patterns of mismanaging money, taking into consideration that the pandemic impacted many businesses and increased bankruptcy filings. After the interview, a candidate will go through a standard polygraph test. If there are any discrepancies noted from the polygraph, the investigator will follow up with a discrepancy interview, followed by a specific polygraph test related to the discrepancy. It is at this stage that some candidates may be disqualified.

If the investigator passes the applicant, the packet will move on to the team Sergeant, followed by the Operations Sergeant, and lastly a three Lieutenant hiring panel. At any stage, additional interviews with the applicant may be requested. The entire panel must agree to pass the applicant for them to move on to a psychological assessment. The

⁷⁴ [Government Code § 1029](#).

Department contracts out psychological assessments and, if a person passes, they are then eligible to join the academy. If a person fails the psychological exam, leaves the academy, or is disqualified for any other reason during the process, they may re-apply to the Department after one year. There is an appeals process specific to failing the psychological exam, and one administered by the County's Department of Human Resources.

Department Search Statistics

As previously reported, the comprehensiveness of the searches varies across facilities as does the minimum requirement per week. The table below details the staff search practices at all jail facilities from October 1 to December 31, 2025. The data regarding the number of staff searches and searches with K-9 illustrated in the table was supplied by CSSB. CSSB extracted data on searches from the CWCL on January 6, 2026. K-9 data was obtained from the Custody Investigative Services (CIS) Searches of Custody Personnel Report on January 5, 2026. The Office of Inspector General was unable to verify the data provided by CSSB without additional information.

	Number of Staff Searches	Number of Staff Searches with K-9	Monthly Minimum Search Requirement ⁷⁵	Search Inside Security	Search Evasion Concerns	Where Searches Logged
Facility	Q4	Q4				
MCJ	77	13	Unable to Determine ⁷⁶	No	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
TTCF	71	4	Yes ⁷⁷	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report

⁷⁵ Each jail facility's unit order regarding staff searches was used to determine whether it met its minimum search requirement by month. Where the unit order is silent regarding the minimum search requirement, the Office of Inspector General was unable to determine if the requirement was met. Also, the jail facility must meet the minimum search requirement during each of the three months in the quarter in order to be found in compliance.

⁷⁶ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Orders, [§ 3-08-021 Security of Personal Property](#) does not describe a minimum number of searches per week, which makes it difficult to determine whether they met this requirement.

⁷⁷ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 3-08-010 Security of Personal Property](#). ("Watch commander shall ensure a minimum of two random searches are conducted each week of persons entering the secured area during their assigned shift").

IRC	60	6	Unable to Determine ⁷⁸	No	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
CRDF	116	2	Yes ⁷⁹	No	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
NCCF	119	0	No ⁸⁰	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
PDC-North	50	1	Unable to Determine ⁸¹	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report
PDC-South	40	1	No ⁸²	Yes	Yes	Watch Commander Log; Searches of Custody Personnel Report

Office of Inspector General Site Visits

The Office of Inspector General regularly conducts site visits and inspections at Sheriff's Department custodial facilities. In the fourth quarter of 2025, Office of Inspector General personnel completed 128 site visits, totaling 288 monitoring hours, at IRC, TTCF, CRDF, MCJ, Pitchess Detention Center North, and NCCF.

⁷⁸ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 5-23/006.00 Security and Searches of Person Property](#) does not describe a minimum number of searches per week, which makes it difficult to determine whether they met this requirement.

⁷⁹ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, § 3-01-090 Searches of Sworn Personnel, Custody Assistants, Professional Staff and their personal property-Approved by CSS 3/11/2024 ("The searches shall be conducted a minimum of once per week, per shift." [unit order obtained via email message]).

⁸⁰ NCCF did not meet its minimum search requirement in any month this quarter. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 07-145/10 Personal Property Searches](#). ("A minimum of four (4) random searches per shift per week of any personnel and/or official visitors shall be conducted at the discretion of the watch sergeant.").

⁸¹ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, [§ 3-06-010 Security of Personal Property](#) does not describe a minimum number of searches per week, which makes it difficult to determine whether they met this requirement.

⁸² PDC-South did not meet its minimum search requirement in December 2025. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Custody Division Unit Order, § 3-02-080 *Searches of Sworn Personnel, Custody Assistants, Professional Staff and Their Property on the Facility*. ("The searches shall be conducted at a minimum of once per week, per shift.").

As part of the Office of Inspector General's jail monitoring, Office of Inspector General staff attended 124 Custody Services Division (CSD) executive and administrative meetings and met with division executives for 159 monitoring hours related to uses of force, in-custody deaths, Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) compliance, restrictive housing, and general conditions of confinement.

Use-of-Force Incidents in Custody

The Office of Inspector General monitors the Sheriff's Department's use-of-force incidents, institutional violence, and assaults on Sheriff's Department or CHS personnel by people in custody.⁸³ The Sheriff's Department most recent force report is for use-of force-incidents in custody through the second quarter of 2025. [This report](#) and reports for prior quarters may be found on the Sheriff's Department website's transparency section under the page for use of force.

Sheriff's Department's Service Comment Reports

Under its policies, the Sheriff's Department accepts and reviews comments from members of the public about departmental service or employee performance.⁸⁴ The Sheriff's Department categorizes these comments into three categories:

- External Commendation: an external communication of appreciation for and/or approval of service provided by the Sheriff's Department members;
- Service Complaint: an external communication of dissatisfaction with the Sheriff's Department service, procedure, or practice, not involving employee misconduct; and
- Personnel Complaint: an external allegation of misconduct, either a violation of law or Sheriff's Department policy, against any member of the Sheriff's Department.⁸⁵

The Sheriff's Department has a [complaints dashboard](#) that can be sorted by date range, with options to narrow the results by practice area (such as Patrol or Custody), rank, or station or unit.

⁸³ Institutional violence is defined as assaultive conduct by a person in custody upon another person in custody.

⁸⁴ See [Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Manual of Policy and Procedures, § 3-04/010.00, Department Service Reviews](#).

⁸⁵ It is possible for an employee to get a Service Complaint and Personnel Complaint based on the same incident.

Sheriff's Department's Response

The Sheriff's Department was provided with a draft of this report and sent a letter in response, which is incorporated on the following pages. Some of the comments from the Sheriff's Department resulted in edits to the report. Most of these edits are referenced in the sections to which the edits.



OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

HALL OF JUSTICE

ROBERT G. LUNA, SHERIFF



February 24, 2026

Eric D. Bates, Interim Inspector General
Office of Inspector General
County of Los Angeles
312 South Hill Street, Third Floor
Los Angeles, California 90013

Via Electronic Submittal

Dear Interim Inspector General Bates:

**RESPONSE TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT,
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT EFFORTS: LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT, OCTOBER THROUGH DECEMBER 2025**

On February 13, 2026, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) provided the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department with a validation draft of its report titled *Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, October through December 2025*, and requested a response by February 24, 2026 ("Draft Report"). We thank the OIG for the opportunity to comment on the Draft Report.

The Draft Report was distributed to the Department units responsible for the subject areas addressed in the report. Following a thorough review, the Department determined that, due to the amount of comments received, it is appropriate to respond in letter form to address certain statements that may benefit from clarification or additional context, provide corrections where necessary, and identify areas where the Department's position or understanding differs from that described in the Draft Report.

The following sections address the specific areas identified during our review.

211 WEST TEMPLE STREET, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012

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Taser Tracking Use Section:

The OIG report states that “The Sheriff’s Department Body-Worn Camera Unit tracks only Taser 10 usage, while the Department’s dashboard tracks all Taser usage” (Draft Report at 8-9). However, the statistics presented in this section of the report reflect only Taser 10 activity rather than all conducted-energy weapon (CEW) usage across the Department. More specifically, the figures provided, such as total field uses, effectiveness rate, patrol vs. custody deployment, and signal activations, are all specific to the Taser 10 rollout and do not represent the full scope of Taser use in the Department, in that those numbers do not include other approved CEWs (e.g., X26/X26P). To avoid misinterpretation of the data, the Draft Report should clarify this issue and either list all Department-wide usage, distinguish between Taser 10 specific data and non-Taser 10 usage, or explicitly state that the statistics provided are limited to the Taser 10 project.

Rosas Compliance

The Draft Report recommends that “the Sheriff’s Department review the report by Bloomberg Law and consider opinions of use-of-force experts to assess whether it would be a better practice to ban use of the Wrap” (Draft Report at 11, footnote 13).

The Department is always willing to review the reports and opinions of others and has done so in the past. The Department and federal monitors have worked on this issue, and will continue to engage to ensure “proper use of the WRAP Restraint” (Draft Report at 11).

While open to evaluating alternative views, the Department is currently focused on ensuring proper use of the device rather than imposing a ban. This approach is because the WRAP restraint remains a critical tool for de-escalation and the prevention of escalating physical force. In high-tension custodial environments, an agitated or combative individual poses a continuous threat of injury to themselves and staff. Without the WRAP restraint, deputies would be forced to maintain manual pressure or body weight on the person resisting, to prevent kicking or thrashing. By safely immobilizing the lower extremities and securing the individual in a seated, upright position, the device WRAP can effectively end the “struggle” more quickly than traditional prone-restraint methods with less force and injury than the alternative.

It is also important to note that the Department’s use of the WRAP is governed by rigorous safety protocols that exceed basic manufacturer guidelines and

specifically target the prevention of medical distress. A core requirement of Department training is that the individual is kept in an upright, seated position to mitigate the risk of positional asphyxia. Per CDM Section 7-03/050.00, any inmate placed in a WRAP restraint is never left unobserved. Staff are required to maintain constant line-of-sight monitoring to identify any signs of respiratory distress or changes in consciousness. Furthermore, a mandatory medical assessment by qualified health professionals must be conducted when the device is applied to ensure that any physiological stress is addressed by clinicians.

Transparency and accountability are embedded in the application process through the mandatory use of a WRAP log, which serves as a formal record of the intervention. This log tracks the exact time of application, the specific staff members involved, the justification for continued retention, and the results of periodic checks performed while the inmate remains restrained. While the Department acknowledges the concerns raised by outside reports and will continue to review all perspectives, the practical reality of custody operations requires tools that manage violent behavior while minimizing force. When applied in accordance with the Department's strict administrative and medical guidelines, the WRAP remains a safe and effective alternative for protecting the lives of both staff and those in our care.

Next, the Draft Report discusses the issues related to head strikes. It states that in 7 out of 15 cases determined to involve head strikes, "the Department concluded the actions of staff were objectively reasonable and within Department policy in all seven cases" (Draft Report at 12, citing the Monitoring Panel's Fifteenth Report). The Department recognizes that the OIG is citing the monitoring report for this section of the Draft Report. However, the Department conducted a review of the seven head strike cases determined by the Monitors to be non-compliant during the Fifteenth Reporting Period and the Department, in fact, found two of the seven head strike cases out of policy. One case led to an administrative investigation, and the other to additional training for the involved personnel. In the remaining five head strike cases, the Department ensured that involved personnel, including supervisors, received additional training and/or received documented counseling via Performance Log Entries.

The Department will continue to review these cases and work with the monitors to ensure our practices improve in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.

The Draft Report cites the monitoring report and states that unlike other law enforcement agencies, only Department Chiefs are permitted to request an administrative investigation (Draft Report at page 12, citing the Monitoring Panel's Fifteenth Report).

This characterization does not accurately reflect Department policy. Manual of Policy and Procedures Section 3-04/020.05, Initiation of Administrative Investigations, provides that upon receipt of a personnel complaint, or notification of a personnel incident involving possible misconduct, a unit commander or higher-ranking executive may order an administrative investigation. Such investigations may be conducted by the concerned unit at the direction of the unit commander or by the Internal Affairs Bureau. Only a division chief or division director may request an administrative investigation by the Internal Affairs Bureau. Accordingly, while administrative investigations conducted by the Internal Affairs Bureau require a request from a division chief or division director, unit commanders also have the authority to order administrative investigations conducted at the unit level.

Sheriff's Department's Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities

The Draft Report states, "While the Sheriff's Department has policies that limit cooperation with federal authorities on immigration enforcement, data collected by the Sheriff's Department is sometimes transferred to the federal government and such data may have the effect of assisting immigration authorities without the intent to do so" (Draft Report at 13).

The Department does not proactively transfer data to federal immigration authorities and operates in compliance with the California Values Act, Senate Bill 54, which limits cooperation with federal immigration enforcement activities. To the extent federal entities obtain access to data, such access occurs pursuant to lawful process, statutory authority, or other legally authorized mechanisms.

As a result, the Department requests that the statement that data "*is sometimes transferred to the federal government*" be clarified to avoid misinterpretation, since it suggests affirmative sharing by the Department in violation of California law.

Clarifying this distinction would ensure the report accurately reflects current practice and the Department's adherence to governing law and policy.

Automatic License Plate Readers

In reference to the Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) data retention period, the OIG recommends that the Department conduct a study to determine the optimal retention period, focusing on maximizing investigative value while ensuring that images outside the effective use period are deleted (Draft Report at 17).

The Department will continue reviewing case data related to ALPR use in investigations to assess the effectiveness of the revised two-year retention period. The updated policy reflects a deliberate reduction from 5 years, while preserving the investigative and evidentiary value of ALPR data.

The Department recognizes the need to balance investigative capability with privacy considerations. Based on existing safeguards, audit protocols, and compliance measures, the two-year retention period reflects that balance. Retention practices will continue to be evaluated to ensure the Department does not unnecessarily retain data while maintaining the ability to use information that may be critical to investigations.

Public Records Act Requests and Deputy Exemption List Section

Approximately four pages of the Draft Report focus on the California Public Records Act and the Department's process of identifying employees for whom "there is a specific, articulable, and particularized reason to believe that disclosure of the record would pose a significant danger to the physical safety" of the involved peace officer under California Penal Code section 832.7 (Draft Report at 18-22). The Draft Report proceeds to describe the Exemption Management System (EXMAN) and how it was used to identify exempt employees and makes recommendations for improvement (Draft Report at 21-22).

The EXMAN system is no longer in use by the Department. The Department has created a new system called "COVERT" (Confidential Operators Verified Enrollment and Roster Tracking system). It has done so with the advice of counsel, in creating a system that requires a more detailed explanation of the "specific, articulable, and particularized" reason warranting an exemption from non-disclosure. The system has not yet launched, pending testing of the technological system. The newly-developed process, which includes internal verification and counsel's review of the specific justifications for non-disclosure, appears to address the OIG's recommendation that the Department:

“ensure accuracy and sufficient particularity of the potential threats pursuant to statutory and case law. Review of the documentation and justifications provided by Department members should also be conducted on a regular basis and not just when a CPRA request is submitted for specific information.”

(Draft Report at 21-22). A demonstration of the system can be provided to the OIG upon request.

While the Draft Report refers to some exemptions, the report fails to reference Assembly Bill 1178, which was approved by the Governor on October 11, 2025, and requires courts to consider redacting or withholding confidential records from all duly sworn officers working an undercover assignment in the past 24 months from public disclosure.

It is also important to note that records related to ongoing and active investigations are exempt from disclosure (Draft Report at 18), and that safety concern exemptions are not limited to sworn personnel but can include professional staff members of the Department (Draft Report at 19, Section Title).

Law Enforcement Gang Update Section

The Draft Report provides a summary of the Department's response to the question:

“Has the Sheriff's Department identified any group that meets the definition of a law enforcement gang under California Penal Code section 13670? If so, please provide the name of any such group and any documentation reporting the existence of such group or its members to POST.”

(Draft Report at 22-23).

Contrary to the statement made in the Draft Report, the Department never stated that “no such group has been identified” (Draft Report at 22). Instead, the Department attempted to respond to the specific question posed, namely whether, under California Penal Code section 13670, such a group has been identified. The Department then responded that the Code section does not require the identification of a specific group. However, in that same response, the Department also provided the OIG a list of pending administrative investigations and a table of individuals against whom allegations of

involvement with a law enforcement gang, subgroup, and/ or clique have been made. Those tables list the subgroup associated with the allegation when such a group was identified. This establishes that, contrary to the implication made in the Draft Report, the Department does in fact investigate the existence of such groups. However, it is not necessary for a group name to be part of an allegation and, in fact, many allegations are made without a group name associated with the conduct. The Department investigates all allegations, regardless of whether a group is named or not, as is required by section 13670. The importance in doing so is based on the fact that some groups may be unnamed or could easily change any name previously used to avoid detection. As Penal Code section 13670 states groups "may" identify themselves by name but also may not. Therefore, the Department takes a broad approach to investigation of such allegations.

As stated in the Department's two efforts to respond to a question that was framed in a challenging manner, and as acknowledged in the OIG report, the Department is not required by law to name groups. Instead, the Department is required to, and remains committed to, investigating allegations of patterns of behavior that violate the law or the principles of professional policing by any group of employees, regardless of a label. If employees are found to have violated MPP 3-01/050.82 and/or MPP 3-01/050.83, and they belonged to a named group, that group would therefore be identified.

The Draft Report emphasizes the Department's naming of groups, stating:

"While the Department may not be **required** by law to identify groups by name, if such groups use an identifying name, the Department **should** identify the group **by name**."

(Emphasis in Original, Draft Report at 22). The OIG report correctly states that the Department discharged two deputies found to have violated MPP 3-01/050.83, and that both had tattoos associated with the Industry Indians. The discharge demonstrates that when conduct is found to be associated with a named group, it is identified and punishment is imposed on the individuals involved. As also noted in the Draft Report, the Sheriff and Undersheriff have also spoken publicly about various groups.

All of these facts demonstrate that the Department can and does identify the names of specific groups when the evidence establishes such a group by name. However, nothing in the statute requires naming a group or limits investigations to named groups. The Department takes a much broader reading of the statute than the OIG, and will continue to investigate all allegations of

gangs, cliques, or groups that engage in prohibited behavior. Any suggestion to narrow the scope of the statute or Department policy to named groups is contrary to the mission of eliminating such groups from the Department.

Outstanding Requests to the Sheriff's Department Section

The Draft Report, as with several past reports, has a section entitled "Outstanding Requests to the Sheriff's Department (Draft Report at 23-26). This section describes efforts by the Department to locate materials that may exist that are responsive to a subpoena issued by the OIG. As noted in the Draft Report, the Department hired outside counsel to review the materials, assist in locating any additional materials, and produce any additional materials identified.

The Department hired, at great expense, outside counsel to assist in the review and production of subpoenaed material in an effort to establish that the Department had undertaken all reasonable efforts to identify responsive material. The Department did this due to concerns about the actions undertaken in the last administration and suspicions that additional materials exist. The OIG now calls into question the work of that outside counsel.

Outside counsel has stated that "we have verified that all of the documents LASD initially determined to be responsive have been produced. Currently, we are reviewing additional materials recently collected by LASD for responsiveness and privilege" (Draft Report at 24).

Counsel will continue and complete their work and will produce any additional materials determined to be responsive. At that point, the Department will consider the matter concluded as it will have gone to great lengths to identify responsive materials to the subpoena.

In-Custody Deaths

The Draft Report also discusses in-custody deaths (Draft Report at 36-39). A number of the descriptions of the death investigations are outdated. For ease of review, the Department provides the following summary and requests that the appropriate updates be included in the final published report.

Draft Report Page	Draft Report Page	Department Comment
36	“Between October 1 and December 31, 2025, eight people died in the care and custody of the Sheriff’s Department. The Department of Medical Examiner’s (DME) website currently reflects the manner of death for six: four natural, one accidental, and one suicide. For the remaining two deaths, one finding has been deferred by the DME and one is not available on the DME website.”	The DME website for the remaining two deaths shows the manner of death as natural.
37	“Areas of concern include custody staff not activating body-worn cameras during Title 15 safety checks, CCTV video depicting the decedent falling in his cell not being shown during the preliminary death review...”	The CCTV video footage was subsequently displayed during the second death review meeting.
36-37	“Areas of concern include the quality of Title 15 safety checks and the booth deputy’s nine-minute delay in requesting emergency aid after being notified of the ‘man down.’ Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website reflects the manner of death as natural, and the causes of death as pulmonary thromboembolic and deep vein thrombosis of leg.”	The use of the phrase “deputy’s nine-minute delay” suggests that there was an actual nine-minute delay. However, it has not been determined exactly when Department members were made aware of a “man down.” We respectfully request re-phrasing to “potential” nine-minute delay. Further, the DME website indicates the case status as open. As a result, the manner of death, as listed, is a preliminary result only.

38	"The DME website does not currently have a public record for this death."	The final autopsy report has been received, and the manner of death was natural, due to arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease.
38	Preliminary manner of death: Unknown. The DME website does not currently reflect the manner of death, and the cause of death is deferred.	Per the DME website, the manner of death is natural due to diabetic ketoacidosis and diabetes mellitus. The case status is open.

Tracking and Improving Narcotics Intervention Efforts

The Draft Report provides an overview of the Department's tracking and narcotics intervention efforts (Draft Report at 39-42). The Department wishes to address several issues in this section of the Draft Report.

First, the Draft Report states that the Department:

"does not presently track narcotics detection in a format that allows data to be analyzed and reports that it does not have the capacity to build a mechanism to track narcotics seizure by drug detection mechanism, nor is it able to compile extractable data collected in the Los Angeles Regional Crime Information System (LARCIS) to evaluate the efficacy of drug detection intervention. Instead, the Sheriff's Department takes the position that constructing an all-encompassing jail management data system would best support the Sheriff's Department's efforts to track narcotics recovery and evaluate the efficacy of drug detection interventions."

(Draft Report at 39).

For clarification, it is important to note that tracking does occur. The tracking is decentralized and unit/facility-specific, rather than centralized/aggregated in a single, queryable system for Department-wide analysis or efficacy. LASD requires entry of all narcotics seizures into LARCIS for prosecution tracking and PRELIMS for evidence tracking. Additional details are captured in unit-specific or intervention-specific systems (cell searches in CARTS, contraband watches in e-LOTS, staff searches in watch commander logs, and Custody Investigative Services Unit [K-9, mailroom, OSJ, and OCTF] recoveries on internal spreadsheets. This provides information at the individual unit/facility

level where day-to-day operations and oversight occur and permits data to be analyzed.

The Department agrees that an easily queryable system that provides immediate information is necessary to enable Department-wide analysis, trend identification, and the evaluation of the efficacy of specific drug-detection interventions across all facilities and units. Therefore, the Department maintains its position that constructing a comprehensive, integrated jail management data system remains the most effective long-term solution. Such a system would 1) consolidate data from disparate sources into one platform, 2) incorporate standardized, extractable fields for detection mechanisms and outcomes, 3) enable real-time querying, dashboards, and analytics to evaluate intervention performance holistically, and 4) support data-driven decisions on resource allocation, policy refinements, and compliance with Board directives.

Second, with respect to Narcotics Detection training, the Draft Report provides:

“Deputies will also respond to intelligence that a person in custody is returning from the medical unit or court with contraband. People in custody carry their property to and from court to have access to food and to prevent property from being stolen or going missing from their housing unit while they are away in court.”

(Draft Report at 40). We respectfully request that the OIG add the following to the final sentence above “and because they may be released directly following court proceedings or transferred to another facility.” The inclusion of this phrase provides a more comprehensive explanation as to why people take property to court.

Third, in that same section, the Draft Report states:

“Fraternalization by deputies with persons in custody may lead to relationships that cause deputies to turn a blind eye to misconduct or the presence of drugs or contraband or even result in a deputy agreeing to bring narcotics or contraband into custodial facilities. The Department reports providing an annual four-hour ethics training that covers issues of inappropriate fraternization. The CDM prohibits deputies from associating with people in custody or the friends and relatives of incarcerated persons.”

(Draft Report at 40-41).

The Draft Report improperly limits the fraternization concern to “deputies.” In a correctional environment, the risk of fraternization is not limited to sworn personnel, but is a concern as to every person who is in contact with the inmate population. We are all aware of an unfortunate situation involving a staff member of your agency who was, apparently, engaged in a romantic relationship with an inmate in 2025. The Department raises this not to highlight this one issue, but to underscore that everyone is susceptible to improper fraternization, whether they are sworn or civilian, and whether they are employed by the Department or another agency. We suggest referring to all personnel rather than limiting this concern to “deputies.”

Next, the Draft Report states:

“the Department reported that it does not currently collect data on staff who are found attempting to bring items, even inadvertently, that are not permitted inside custodial facilities, such as cellphones. The Department further reported concerns that some deputies would complain to the employee unions about data collection and its potential use for disciplinary purposes. Data collection detailing the number of searches conducted that prevented prohibited items from being brought into facilities might assist with improving search techniques throughout the jail facilities.”

(Draft Report at 41).

The Department tracks personnel searches and captures data such as the time and duration of the search, the number of personnel searched, the number and type of items confiscated, the names of the supervising personnel involved, and whether K-9 was involved. The Department handles inadvertent possession (e.g., personal use or lawfully possessed, but inadvertently brought to the facility) and purposeful smuggling differently.

When contraband is smuggled, a criminal investigation is initiated. Complaints to labor unions do not dictate investigative outcomes, nor do they interfere with criminal investigations. The Department’s primary mandate is the safety and security of the jail environment, and employee grievances do not stop the Department from pursuing policy violations.

Significantly, the Draft Report contains a lengthy section that provides a blueprint of specialized investigative tactics that could be exploited (Draft Report at 42). The Department respectfully requests that the four paragraphs that describe internal investigations be removed.

Finally, the Draft Report states:

“that although employees are trained in the academy and in annual ethics training to report to their supervisor any suspected criminal activity conducted by their colleagues, more tips may be generated if they were collected and investigated by an independent party rather than the tipster’s chain of command. Deputies may have concerns about confidentiality, impartiality, or fear retaliation within their unit if they know any information they provide about potential misconduct will first be investigated by their Supervisor.”

(Draft Report at 42).

The assertion that internal reporting is limited to a “chain of command” structure is incorrect. It is important to clarify that the Custody Investigative Service (CIS), the entity referenced in drawing this conclusion, is not a personnel investigation unit. The CIS’s primary mandate is the security of the facility and the investigation of crimes committed by the incarcerated population. Investigations into potential staff misconduct are the purview of the Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) or the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB). These bureaus operate independently of a deputy’s immediate unit-level chain of command, to ensure impartiality and to prevent the very retaliation or “blind eye” scenarios described in the Draft Report.

It is important to note that the Department provides employees with several secure and confidential avenues to report misconduct, allowing them to bypass their direct supervisors entirely. Staff members are encouraged to utilize the 1-800-698-TALK (8255) tip line, which allows for completely anonymous reporting 24 hours a day. This system ensures that information regarding criminal activity or policy violations reaches the appropriate investigative bureau (IAB or ICIB) without the tipster’s unit or supervisors knowing. By offering these high-level, centralized reporting options, the Department maintains a robust system of accountability that prioritizes confidentiality and professional integrity over local unit dynamics.

Similar to feedback provided as to other sections of the Draft Report, the Recruitment Efforts section continually focuses on the deputy hiring process, suggesting that only deputies could be bringing narcotics into the custodial environment (Draft Report at 43). Employees of other county agencies have been identified as having brought narcotics inside the jails, and any recommendation made about the recruitment and hiring process should include all personnel who have access to the custodial environment.

Conclusion

While this is a lengthy response to the Draft Report, the Department takes the OIG reports seriously as they are a public presentation of the status of the Department's efforts in several areas. We recognize that these are complex reports for your office to compile and that many communications occur in the months prior to their publication. At the same time, the Department presents the above comments in an effort to ensure a complete presentation of the issues and to avoid misunderstandings with your office and the public.

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Commander Ernie Bille at (323) 307-8358.

Sincerely,

ROBERT G. LUNA, SHERIFF


APRIL L. TARDY
UNDERSHERIFF