



# Office of Inspector General County of Los Angeles

## **Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department**

**October to December  
2021**

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## INTRODUCTION

This report provides an overview of the Office of Inspector General's regular monitoring, auditing, and review of activities related to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department occurring between October 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021.<sup>1</sup>

## MONITORING SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT'S OPERATIONS

### Deputy-Involved Shootings

The Office of Inspector General reports on all deputy-involved shootings in which a deputy intentionally fired a firearm at a human, or intentionally or unintentionally fired a firearm and a human was injured or killed as a result. This quarter there were 13 incidents in which people were shot or shot at by Sheriff's Department personnel. Office of Inspector General staff responded to each of these deputy-involved shootings. Eleven people were struck by deputies' gunfire, five fatally.

The information in the following shooting summaries is based on information provided by the Sheriff's Department and is preliminary in nature. While the Office of Inspector General receives information at the walk-through at the scene of the shooting, preliminary memoranda with summaries, and by attending the Sheriff's Department Critical Incident Reviews, the statements of the deputies and witnesses are not provided until the investigation is complete. The Sheriff's Department does not permit the Office of Inspector General staff to monitor the on-going investigations of deputy-involved shootings, does not provide access to the full body-worn camera videos of deputies involved in the incident, and does not comply with lawful requests for documentation of these investigations.

**Santa Clarita:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 3, 2021, at approximately 3:31 p.m., Santa Clarita Sheriff's Station deputies responded to a family disturbance call. The reporting party was a mother who stated that her son, a white man, was suicidal, armed, and had made statements indicating he would confront the deputies when they arrived at the location.

When deputies arrived, they noticed a man peering out of an open upstairs window, holding a long gun. The deputies took a position east of the location and ordered the man to drop the weapon. Approximately fifteen minutes after the deputies' arrival, the man pointed the gun at them and one of the deputies fired one round

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<sup>1</sup> The report will note if the data reflects something other than what was gathered between October 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021.

from a rifle. The man retreated, reappeared, and again pointed the gun at the deputies, at which time each deputy fired one round from a rifle.

A rescue team made entry into the location and found the man unresponsive with a gunshot wound to his upper torso. The man was pronounced dead at the scene.

According to the Sheriff's Department, the Mental Evaluation Team was called to the scene, but the shooting occurred prior to their arrival.

At the time of the shooting, Santa Clarita deputies had not yet been outfitted with body-worn cameras. The shooting was partially captured by home security cameras, portions of which were shown at the Sheriff's Department's Critical Incident Review.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

In developing their tactical plan, did the deputies consider the information that the man was suicidal and was looking to confront deputies upon their arrival? Did the deputies create distance and position themselves so that they could safely wait for the Mental Evaluation Team without engaging the suspect? Did the deputies consider evacuating nearby neighbors to minimize the risk to civilians from a shooting either by the suspect or deputies?

**Century:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 5, 2021, at approximately 8:41 a.m., Century Sheriff's Station deputies responded to a California Highway Patrol (CHP) request for assistance on the 105 freeway in Paramount. CHP officers were detaining a Hispanic man at gunpoint while he sat inside a parked vehicle that he had allegedly taken in a carjacking. Although it is not known when this information became known to the deputies and officers, the suspect was also the named suspect in a murder investigation.

When Sheriff's deputies arrived, the man was outside of the vehicle pacing on the freeway holding a handgun. Several commands were given by CHP officers to drop the firearm, but the man refused to comply. The man raised the firearm and fired an unknown number of rounds in the direction of officers and deputies. Two Sheriff's deputies returned fire, firing a total of nineteen rounds, and CHP officers fired an unknown number of rounds at the suspect. A CHP officer was struck in the face by a bullet fragment and was treated and released. The suspect's weapon, a

Polymer80 9mm handgun<sup>2</sup> was recovered at the scene. The male sustained several gunshot wounds to the upper torso. He was transported to St. Francis Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead.

The shooting was captured on body-worn cameras. Portions of the video were shown at the Sheriff's Department's Critical Incident Review. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether the camera that was activated was done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Were the CHP and the Sheriff's Department able to communicate on the same frequency? In the ten to fifteen minutes the suspect was on the freeway was there a tactical plan developed? Was the Special Enforcement Bureau requested? Which agency had operational command of this incident?

**Temple City:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 9, 2021, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Temple City Sheriff's patrol units received a stolen vehicle alert from a license plate recognition system in the city of Rosemead.

As part of a canvassing effort to locate the vehicle, a sergeant drove into the Walmart where he saw a vehicle matching the description of the reported stolen vehicle. The sergeant detained the Hispanic man sitting in the driver's seat at gunpoint. The man exited the vehicle but refused to comply with the sergeant's commands. The man reached into the vehicle and the sergeant saw a shiny object in his hand. From his patrol car, the sergeant shot at the man one time but did not hit him.

Following the shooting, the man hid behind another parked vehicle. Additional units responded to the location and the man was taken into custody without further incident. A firearm was later recovered from under a vehicle.

At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff's Department showed portions of the body-worn camera video. The video shown does not appear to show the man's actions prior to and leading up to the shooting due to the angle from which it was recorded. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General

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<sup>2</sup> Polymer80 produces kits that can be purchased online for consumers to use to assemble a fully functioning handgun. Law enforcement refers to these guns as "ghost guns" because they do not have a serial number and are therefore not traceable. (See Winton, Richard, "City sues 'ghost gun' maker Polymer80; LAPD says more than 700 seized weapons are tied to its parts," *Los Angeles Times*, February 17, 2021. Accessed January 28, 2022. <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-02-17/ghost-gun-maker-polymer80-lawsuit-los-angeles>)

with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General is not aware whether all body-worn cameras were properly activated as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

*Areas for Further Inquiry*

Did the sergeant call for backup prior to engaging the suspect? When was the body-worn camera activated? When the sergeant shot at the man, he was seated in his patrol car attempting to detain him; is this consistent with Sheriff's Department training and best practices?

**Pico Rivera:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 10, 2021, at approximately 4:53 p.m., two deputies were on patrol when they observed a Hispanic man walking in the middle of the street in Whittier. The deputies pulled alongside the man and noticed that the man had an extended firearm magazine protruding from his pants pocket. The driver deputy attempted to detain the man at gunpoint. The man then produced a handgun, from his pants pocket, at which time the driver deputy fired two rounds striking the suspect. A loaded Polymer80 9mm handgun was recovered at the scene along with a loaded 9mm magazine. The suspect was pronounced dead at the scene.

One deputy was a trainee and hence, was not yet outfitted with a body-worn camera. The other deputy had his body-worn camera on, but because he was behind an open car door the camera did not capture the shooting. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General cannot opine on whether the camera that was activated was done so as required by Sheriff's Department policy. There was video obtained from a home security camera.

The Office of Inspector General representative who responded to the scene of the shooting was not permitted to view the deceased from the same vantage point as Los Angeles County District Attorney (LADA) personnel. Our Inspector was approximately 50 feet from the decedent, while LADA personnel were permitted to view the decedent at a closer vantage point.

*Areas for Further Inquiry*

Was the manner in which the deputies approached the suspect consistent with Sheriff's Department training and best practices?

**Temple City:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 19, 2021, the Temple City Sheriff's Station received a call of a disturbance at an auto repair business in the city of Rosemead. The caller reported that a person at his repair shop stated that he was wanted for "murder," and was threatening to blow up the shop if work on his vehicle was not performed. After being asked numerous

questions, the caller became frustrated and hung up but called back multiple times to report that deputies were not yet on scene. The two deputies assigned to the call were not told by the dispatcher about the caller's statement that the suspect said that he was wanted for murder. The deputies arrived approximately one hour and twenty minutes after the initial call.

Upon arrival, the deputies obtained a brief statement from the automotive shop owner who told them the man threatened to "burn the place down" and that he was wanted for murder. One deputy approached the front driver's side of a Mazda where the suspect was seated while the other deputy approached the front passenger side to speak with the woman passenger. While the deputies were interacting with the suspect, he suddenly opened the driver's side door and exited the vehicle, removing a handgun from his waistband area as he did so. The deputy standing next to the driver side door shot one time at the man, hitting him in the back. The suspect was transported to a hospital and was listed in stable condition.

At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff's Department showed portions of the body-worn camera video. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General is not aware whether all body-worn cameras were properly activated as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

What was the reason for the delay in responding to the call for service? Were there other calls for service or incidents that were of a higher priority? Why weren't the responding deputies informed by the dispatcher about the suspect stating he was wanted for murder? Given that the deputies were informed by the shop owner that the suspect claimed to be wanted for murder, was the tactical approach consistent with Sheriff's Department training or law enforcement best practices? Was the dispatcher's interaction with the reporting party consistent with Sheriff's Department training and best practices? Did the dispatcher contribute to the delay in the deputies responding?

**East Los Angeles:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 21, 2021, at approximately 10:12 a.m., undercover Narcotics Bureau deputies in plain clothes were assisting a Narcotic's Team with a search warrant at a suspected illegal marijuana dispensary. While walking away from the location, the two undercover deputies were approached by the two male occupants of a Black Honda Civic who stopped and asked them where they were from, a common question by gang members to determine gang affiliation. They responded with "nowhere" and continued walking. The vehicle made a U-turn, stopped, and the passenger exited the car, produced a handgun, and fired two to three shots at the deputies. The deputies returned fire. The vehicle fled out of the deputy's sight. It is unknown if

either of the suspects were hit. Neither deputy was injured. The Sheriff's Department conducted a search of the area but were unable to locate the vehicle and/or suspects.

Because the deputies were working in undercover capacity, neither of them had body-worn cameras. In addition, the Narcotics Bureau has not been outfitted with body-worn cameras. There were several surveillance cameras in the area that captured portions of this incident, which were shown at the Critical Incident Review.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Was there a Sheriff's Department team in the immediate area with eyes on the undercover deputies to provide protection?

**Palmdale:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on October 23, 2021, at approximately 9:39 p.m., Palmdale Sheriff's Station deputies responded to a call of an assault with a deadly weapon. The informant stated he was inside the residence with the suspect, a white man. The man had pointed his handgun at the informant, and the informant had left the home. The informant reported hearing one gunshot.

Deputies received additional information from the reporting party that the man was inebriated, angry and suicidal. The man apparently was barricaded inside the upstairs master bedroom of the location and was still armed.

When assisting deputies arrived, they contained the location and gave verbal commands for the man to exit the location. The Mental Evaluation Team was notified and enroute, as were deputies from the Special Enforcement Bureau.

Shortly after the deputies arrived on scene, they reported seeing a muzzle flash from an upstairs window. Four deputies fired a total of 15 rounds toward the window. The man eventually surrendered.

The man sustained a minor abrasion to his hand, which was determined to be a result of broken glass caused by rounds striking the window. A 9mm handgun was located inside the residence, along with two magazines. Two casings were recovered near the window where the deputies reported seeing the muzzle flash.

At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff's Department showed portions of the body-worn camera video. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General is not aware whether all body-worn cameras were properly activated as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Did the deputies position themselves in a way that put them at a tactical disadvantage and place themselves in danger? Should the deputies have waited for the arrival of the Mental Evaluation Team prior to calling the man out of the location? What was the estimated response time for the Mental Evaluation Team? Did all the deputies at the scene turn on their body-worn cameras in compliance with Sheriff's Department policy? Were the body-cameras worn in a manner consistent with Sheriff's Department policy and/or best practices? Does the Sheriff's Department have a policy regarding the wearing of tactical vests over body-worn cameras?

**East Los Angeles:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 12, 2021, at approximately 3:00 a.m., East Los Angeles Station received a call for service regarding a suspicious person at a gas station. A deputy responded and spoke to a Hispanic man. The man spoke only Spanish, and the deputy did not speak Spanish. Despite the inability to communicate with the man, the deputy was satisfied that he had rectified the situation and left a short while later, another call came into the Sheriff's Department describing the same suspicious party at the same location, who was now lighting paper on fire and throwing it at the gas pumps. The original responding deputy returned to the location and parked behind a Chevrolet Tahoe next to which the man he had encountered earlier was standing with a Hispanic woman.

The deputy sat in his patrol car, pointed his gun at the suspect and ordered him to walk over to the car and put his hands on the patrol car hood. The man put his hands on his head and did not move. The deputy exited his car, holstered his weapon, and approached the man. As the deputy attempted to grab the man's hands, he spun around and reached down with both hands to grab the deputy's holstered firearm. The deputy pushed down on his weapon in an attempt to hold it in the holster. While struggling with the man, the deputy saw the woman had armed herself with a knife and was approaching them with it raised over her head, pointing it in his direction. The woman swung the knife and stabbed the deputy in the face. The deputy retrieved his backup revolver from his left front pant pocket and shot at the man and woman three times.

The man sustained a gunshot wound to the chest. He was transported to the hospital, where he was listed in critical condition. The woman sustained a gunshot wound to the head and pronounced dead at the scene. The deputy sustained a stab wound to the face. He was transported to the hospital, where he was treated and released.

At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff's Department showed portions of the body-worn camera video. During the altercation, the deputy's body-worn camera

fell off; thus, the shooting was not captured on video. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General is not aware whether all body-worn cameras were properly activated at each encounter, as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Was there body-worn camera video from the first encounter between the man and the deputy? How did the deputy determine that he resolved the first call for service? Why did the deputy approach the male and female alone without waiting for backup to arrive? What caused the body-worn camera to dislodge in this incident?

**Santa Clarita:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 12, 2021, at approximately 7:23 p.m., two deputies from Santa Clarita Sheriff's Station were patrolling the area near Newhall Avenue and the 14 freeway when they observed a black SUV with a Hispanic man in the driver seat. The deputies attempted to stop the car to investigate whether the driver was under the influence because he was driving erratically, but the man failed to stop.

The deputies pursued the vehicle onto the 14 freeway and then onto residential streets after the suspect exited. As the pursuit continued, the Santa Clarita Sheriff's Station watch commander directed units to enter surveillance mode because a Sheriff's Department helicopter was following the suspect vehicle from above, thus allowing the deputies to avoid engaging in a high-speed chase through residential streets.

The helicopter crew advised that the suspect vehicle entered an RV resort by ramming the front gate with the vehicle. The man then stopped his vehicle and exited but entered a second vehicle shortly thereafter. As the pursuing deputies and assisting units arrived at the front gate of the location, they exited their patrol cars and continued communication with the airship overhead in efforts to establish a containment. The man then drove toward the front gate of the location and drove over a pedestrian bridge, where a civilian was able to avoid being hit by the vehicle. According to the Sheriff's Department, the man accelerated his vehicle toward the deputies and three deputies shot a total of 21 times into the vehicle at the man.

The man fled the RV park in the vehicle at a high rate of speed and collided with a guard rail a short distance away. Following the collision, the man exited his vehicle and fled on foot and attempted to hide at the bottom of an embankment, where he was detained by deputies.

The man sustained two gunshot wounds to the torso and minor injuries sustained from the traffic collision. He was transported to the hospital, where he was treated for non-life-threatening injuries. He was released from the hospital and medically cleared for booking. No deputies were injured during the incident.

Santa Clarita Station deputies are not yet equipped with body-worn cameras; thus, none of this incident was captured on body-worn camera video. The RV Park did have some surveillance cameras which caught portions of what occurred. At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff's Department showed some of this video.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

The RV park had two sets of entrances in and out of the location, did the deputies attempt to contain both entrances or only one? When the deputies shot at the moving car, were all the shots within policy and tactically sound?

**South Los Angeles:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on November 21, 2021, at approximately 2:00 p.m., deputies from the Transit Bureau were seated in their respective marked black and white patrol cars near the Rosa Parks Station. They were approached by a Los Angeles Metro patron who told them a man had just been shot on the upper platform at the location. Deputies responded to the platform on foot. As they reached the top of a stairwell, they saw a Hispanic man jump down onto the tracks. The suspect turned toward the deputies and fired a single gunshot at them. Two deputies returned fire, firing a total of eight rounds at the man.

The suspect sustained gunshot wounds to the head, hand, abdomen, and shoulder. He was transported to the hospital, where he underwent surgery but succumbed to his injuries.

While investigating the incident, deputies discovered an unidentified man lying unresponsive on the platform. The man had a single gunshot wound to the head and was pronounced dead at the scene. Investigators later learned the victim had been talking on the phone when the suspect approached the man from behind and shot him in the head, apparently without any warning or provocation. The suspect then walked over and stood near the top of the stairwell until the arrival of deputies, making no attempt to flee.

The deputies involved in this incident are part of the Transit Bureau of the Sheriff's Department. Transit Bureau received body-worn cameras at the end of October putting them in the 90-day probationary training period established by Sheriff's Department policy in order for deputies to become accustomed to turning on the cameras as required. None of the deputies involved turned on their body-worn

cameras prior to the shooting. The incident was caught on metro station cameras. The video captured by those cameras was shown at the Critical Incident Review.

**Whittier:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 15, 2021, at approximately 4:40 a.m., members of the Special Enforcement Bureau (SEB) executed a high-risk search/arrest warrant in the city of Whittier relating to an assault with a deadly weapon investigation involving a handgun. Deputies announced their presence and ordered the individuals within the location to open the door. When no one opened the door, the deputies forced entry into the location. As the deputies were preparing to make entry, a Hispanic man produced a firearm and pointed it at the deputies. Two deputies shot at the man; one deputy shot once and the other shot two times.

The man sustained a gunshot wound to the head and was treated at the scene by SEB Emergency Services Detail paramedics. He was subsequently transported to the hospital, where he was listed in critical condition.

The man was identified by investigators as the individual wanted in the search warrant for the assault with a deadly weapon investigation. A semi-automatic 9mm handgun was recovered from the scene.

SEB personnel have not been outfitted with body-worn cameras.

**Norwalk:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 18, 2021, at approximately 7:46 p.m., Norwalk Sheriff's Station deputies were in the parking lot of a hotel in Norwalk and conducted a license plate check of a vehicle, which indicated it was used in a shooting. A Hispanic man was in the driver's seat of the car. The man proceeded to drive out of the parking lot. The deputies initiated a vehicle pursuit, which led them from surface streets to the Interstate 5 freeway, then back to surface streets in the city of Downey. The man was able to elude deputies but they later located the car and resumed the pursuit.

While attempting to turn on one of the surface streets, the man lost control of his vehicle and collided with another vehicle. The man exited his vehicle and fled on foot. Deputies initiated a short foot pursuit and located him on a front porch where the man pulled out a firearm and pointed it at the deputies. Two deputies shot a total of seventeen times at the man.

The suspect was found to be wearing body armor and was in possession of three handguns, including a loaded Polymer80 handgun, a loaded revolver, and an unloaded 9mm handgun.

The man sustained numerous gunshot wounds to his torso. He was taken to the hospital, where he was listed in fair condition.

At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff's Department showed portions of the body-worn camera video. The Sheriff's Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General is not aware whether all body-worn cameras were properly activated as required by Sheriff's Department policy.

#### *Areas for Further Inquiry*

Were all body-worn cameras activated in compliance with Sheriff's Department policy?

**Carson:** The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 29, 2021, at approximately 12:59 p.m., Carson Sheriff's Station deputies responded to a call regarding a family disturbance. The caller stated that she needed assistance with her daughter, a Black woman, who was armed with a knife and gun. During the call, the dispatcher heard arguing in the background and woman state that the only way she was leaving the location was in a "body bag." The dispatcher contacted the Mental Evaluation Team (MET), which responded that they were enroute to the scene.

Prior to the MET's arrival, two Carson Station deputies arrived on scene and contained the location. They conducted call-outs for anyone inside the residence to step out. As the deputies were taking cover behind a Sheriff's patrol SUV, the mother exited but stopped in between the home and the patrol car. The deputies continued to call out to the mother and the suspect, and her stepfather exited the home. Two other Carson deputies arrived on scene and took cover behind parked cars across the street from the home. The deputies continued to call out to the parents to move away from the suspect. The stepfather moved a few feet away from the suspect. The suspect pointed the gun two times at two of the deputies who had taken cover behind the patrol vehicle, but they did not shoot at the suspect because the suspect's mother was in the line of fire. The suspect then pointed the firearm at the deputies across the street from the home by the parked cars. These two deputies shot a total of nine times at the suspect.

The suspect sustained three gunshot wounds to her upper body. She was taken to the hospital, treated, and has since been released. The shooting happened before the MET arrived on the scene.


An unloaded revolver was recovered at the scene along with a 14-inch-long kitchen knife.

At the Critical Incident Review, the Sheriff’s Department showed portions of the body-worn camera video. The Sheriff’s Department has not provided the Office of Inspector General with access to its body-worn camera videos; thus, the Office of Inspector General is not aware whether all body-worn cameras were properly activated as required by Sheriff’s Department policy.

*Areas for Further Inquiry*

What was the MET’s estimated time of arrival? Would it have been preferable to wait before beginning any call-outs? How would the MET have handled this situation? Was the proximity of the suspect to her family members considered when the deputies fired their weapons?

Comparison to Prior Years



**District Attorney Review of Deputy-Involved Shootings**

The Sheriff’s Department’s Homicide Bureau investigates all deputy-involved shootings in which a person is hit by a bullet. The Homicide Bureau submits the completed criminal investigation of each deputy-involved shooting that result in a person being struck by a bullet and which occurred in the County of Los Angeles to

the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (LADA) for review and possible filing of criminal charges.

Between September 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021, the LADA issued five findings on deputy-involved shooting cases involving the Sheriff's Department's employees.

- In the June 7, 2020, fatal shooting of Jarrid Hurst, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated October 18, 2021](#), that deputies Carlos Jover and Nathan Abarca acted lawfully in self-defense and in defense of others.
- In the July 3, 2019, fatal shooting of Rickie Starks, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated October 28, 2021](#), that deputies Edwin Barajas and Taylor Ingersoll acted lawfully in self-defense and in defense of other. The memorandum also stated that Mr. Starks was not struck by deputy gunfire but rather from gunfire attributed to a suspect.
- In the June 6, 2019, non-fatal shooting of Edtwon Stamps, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 8, 2021](#), that deputies Michael Lee and Quang Huynh acted lawfully in self-defense and in defense of others, and that Mr. Stamps succumbed to injuries from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
- In the April 19, 2021, fatal shooting of Richard Lugo, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 8, 2021](#), that deputies Michael Alburez and Vincent Fratianne acted lawfully in self-defense and in defense of others.
- In the November 15, 2020, fatal shooting of Sam Conner, the District Attorney opined in a [memorandum dated November 8, 2021](#), that deputies Raymond Johnson and Matthew Seno acted lawfully in self-defense, in defense of others.

## Homicide Bureau's Investigation of Deputy-Involved Shootings

For the present quarter, the Homicide Bureau reports that 16 shooting cases involving Sheriff's Department personnel are open and under investigation. The oldest case the Homicide Bureau is still actively investigating is an April 23, 2021, shooting that occurred in the jurisdiction of Century station. For further information as to that shooting, please refer to the Office of Inspector General's report titled *Reform and Oversight Effort: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, April to June 2021*.<sup>3</sup> The oldest case that the Bureau has open is a 2016 shooting in Compton, which is with the LADA's office awaiting a filing decision.

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<sup>3</sup> [Reform and Oversight Effort: Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, April to June 2021](#)

This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported it sent three cases involving deputy-involved shootings to the LADA for filing consideration.

### **Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau**

The Sheriff's Department's Internal Criminal Investigations Bureau (ICIB) reports directly to the Division Chief and the Commander of the Professional Standards Division. ICIB investigates allegations of criminal misconduct committed by Sheriff's Department personnel in Los Angeles County (misconduct alleged to have occurred in other counties is investigated by the law enforcement agencies in the jurisdictions where the crimes are alleged to have occurred).

The Sheriff's Department reports ICIB has 82 active cases. This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reports sending 11 cases to the LADA for filing consideration. The LADA is still reviewing 28 cases for filing. The oldest open case which ICIB has submitted to the LADA for filing consideration is a 2018 case, which was presented to the LADA in 2018 and is still being reviewed.

### **Internal Affairs Bureau**

The Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) conducts administrative investigations of Department policy violations by Sheriff's Department employees. It is also responsible for responding to and investigating deputy-involved shootings and significant use-of-force cases. If the LADA declines to file a criminal action against the deputies involved in a shooting, IAB completes a force review to determine whether Sheriff's Department personnel violated any policies during the incident.

Administrative investigations are also conducted at the unit level. The subject's unit and IAB determine whether an incident is investigated by IAB or remains a unit-level investigation based on the severity of the alleged policy violation(s).

This quarter, the Sheriff's Department reported opening 110 new administrative investigations. Of these 110 cases, 38 were assigned to IAB, 59 were designated as unit-level investigations, and 13 were entered as criminal monitors. In the same period, IAB reports that 76 cases were closed by IAB or at the unit level. There are 408 pending administrative investigations. Of those 408 investigations, 261 are assigned to IAB and the remaining 147 are pending unit-level investigations.

### **Civil Service Commission Dispositions**

There were seven final decisions issued by the Civil Service Commission this quarter. Of those seven, five sustained the Sheriff's Department's discipline and the

other two reduced the Sheriff's Department's discipline of discharge to either a 15-day or a 30-day suspension in lieu of discharge.

### **The Sheriff's Department's Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems**

The Sheriff's Department reports it deployed its Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) four times between October 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021. The UAS was deployed on October 11, 2021, to assist Walnut Sheriff's Station with an armed barricaded suspect. The UAS was utilized to view into uncovered windows from the exterior and to fly in the interior to identify the location of the suspect. The suspect was not located.

On October 21, 2021, the Sheriff's Department's Special Enforcement Bureau responded to a location in Palmdale. The Sheriff's Department had received a call regarding an armed suspect barricaded in an apartment with a victim whom the suspect had kidnapped. The UAS was utilized to locate and identify the suspect and victim's locations inside the second story apartment by looking through the windows and sliding glass door. The suspect eventually surrendered and the victim was found to be physically unharmed.

On December 8, 2021, the Sheriff's Department's Special Enforcement Bureau responded to assist Lost Hills Patrol to search for an armed suspect in a large rural area. Due to the thick brush, darkness, and fog, an airship was not available, so the UAS was utilized to search for the location of the suspect in conjunction with a tracking canine. The suspect was not located.

On December 17, 2021, the Sheriff's Department's Special Enforcement Bureau responded to assist Lancaster Station with an armed suspect who shot over thirty rounds through the roof of his home. The suspect ultimately barricaded himself in his residence. The UAS was utilized to view into the windows of the location in an attempt to locate the suspect. The suspect was eventually taken into custody.

## **CUSTODY DIVISION**

### **Pregnant People in Custody at Century Regional Detention Facility (CRDF)**

At the November 14, 2017, Board of Supervisors meeting, Supervisor Hilda Solis requested that the Inspector General to report back with information on the services provided to pregnant people in custody at CRDF. Since the Office of Inspector General's February 2018 report titled, *Services and Programs Offered to Pregnant Prisoners and Mothers*,<sup>4</sup> the Office of Inspector General has continued to

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<sup>4</sup> [2-2-18 OIG Report Back on Pregnant Prisoners.pdf \(lacounty.gov\)](#)

monitor gender responsive programming offered at CRDF and reproductive justice issues, including the provision of bottled water and prenatal diets, access to programs, access to unstructured out-of-cell time for large muscle exercise, support during labor and delivery, and visitation with newborns. Over the past several months, the Office of Inspector General has received complaints from pregnant people in custody and their loved ones regarding prenatal diets and access to bottled water, unstructured out-of-cell time for large muscle exercise, access to programs, and issues with releases. On December 30, 2021, the Sheriff's Department reported a total of 15 pregnant people in custody at CRDF.<sup>5</sup>

### *Bottled Water and Prenatal Diets*

Prior to 2018, the Sheriff's Department did not provide bottled water to pregnant people in custody and required them to purchase it themselves or drink from facility water fountains and sinks in their cells. While the Office of Inspector General was preparing its 2018 report, the Sheriff's Department began providing four bottles of water (16.9 oz. each) with prenatal diets. In November 2021, the Office of Inspector General and the Sybil Brand Commission notified CRDF leadership that several pregnant people in custody complained that bottled water was missing from their meals and oftentimes the four bottles provided were insufficient, forcing them to go without water until their next meal was delivered. In response, CRDF has now begun to provide each pregnant person with six bottles of water per day (two with each meal) meeting the daily recommendation for water intake for pregnant people.<sup>6</sup>

Prenatal diets are prepared based on a daily caloric goal and the Sheriff's Department offers diabetic, kosher, and vegetarian options that can be prescribed to pregnant people by a Correctional Health Services (CHS) medical provider. Vegan diets are not offered. Pregnant people in custody report that they do not receive enough fruits and vegetables and fear that the amount of bread in their diet is excessive. CRDF dietitians and the Director of Women's Health report that the Sheriff's Department makes every effort to meet the calorie and nutrition requirements for each meal but explained that supply chain issues in recent months have required them to make substitutions that may have less nutritional value. The Sheriff's Department also cites staffing shortages as impacting food services operations and resulting in fewer hot meals being served.

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<sup>5</sup> As previously reported in the Office of Inspector General's *Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department – April to June 2021* report, the number of pregnant people in custody in 2021 fluctuated between 12 and 36, and on October 15, 2021, there were 31 pregnant people in custody.

<sup>6</sup> The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Nutrition During Pregnancy. Available at: <https://www.acog.org/womens-health>. Retrieved January 7, 2022.

The Sheriff's Department and CHS should evaluate current meal plans and food services operations and ensure that the dietary needs of each pregnant person in custody, and of each person in custody system wide, are being met. They should ensure that calorie requirements are met through the provision of meals that are nutritionally balanced regardless of staffing, supply chain, COVID-19, or other limitations. The Sheriff's Department should offer pregnant people in custody more fresh fruits and vegetables and ensure that they are not required to consume more than a few slices of bread each day in order to meet daily calorie needs.

### *Unstructured Out-of-cell Time for Large Muscle Exercise*

In pregnancy, physical inactivity and excessive weight gain are recognized as independent risk factors for maternal obesity, gestational diabetes, and other complications.<sup>7</sup> The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' *Physical Activity Guidelines for Americans* recommends at least 150 minutes of moderate intensity aerobic activity per week during pregnancy and the postpartum period.<sup>8</sup> Sheriff's Department records indicate that from September 1, 2021 to November 30, 2021, average out-of-cell time offered in the CRDF module that housed the majority of pregnant people was 205 minutes per week.<sup>9</sup> In addition to aerobic exercise, out-of-cell time is the only opportunity many people in custody, and pregnant people in this module specifically, have to shower, make phone calls, order commissary, exchange linens, and socialize. Several pregnant people in custody reported that some deputies assigned to their module allowed additional out-of-cell time designated specifically for walking in the "outdoor recreation" area of the module.

CRDF leadership and Custody Services Division (CSD) executives report that additional out-of-cell time for large muscle exercise is neither optional nor dependent upon specific facility personnel. It is a requirement that has been clearly communicated to facility personnel, but which executives acknowledge is not being followed consistently. The Office of Inspector General can confirm that leadership has communicated and regularly reiterates out-of-cell requirements to facility personnel, however, the Office of Inspector General is not aware of specific efforts to hold personnel accountable for failures to comply with out-of-cell requirements facility-wide.

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<sup>7</sup> Physical Activity and Exercise During Pregnancy and Postpartum Period, Committee Opinion Number 804, April 2020. Available at: <https://www.acog.org/clinical/clinical-guidance/committee-opinion/articles/2020/04/physical-activity-and-exercise-during-pregnancy-and-the-postpartum-period>. Retrieved January 9, 2022.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. *Physical Activity Guidelines for Americans*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: DHHS; 2018. Available at: <https://health.gov/paguidelines/second-edition/>. Retrieved January 7, 2022.

<sup>9</sup> Data was generated from a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Electronic Uniform Daily Activity Log Report that showed the activities provided to people in custody housed at CRDF.

On December 23, 2021, following a positive COVID-19 test of a person in custody, a module housing five pregnant people in custody was placed on quarantine status. On December 24, 2021, the Office of Inspector General received reports from family members of pregnant people stating that they were only being allowed out of their cells for approximately 25 minutes each day. The Office of Inspector General shared the allegations with facility leadership and CSD and CHS executives and recommended that CRDF leadership ensure adequate opportunities for large muscle exercise while the pregnant people in the module were on quarantine. On December 27, 2021, CRDF leadership researched and reported that despite the Office of Inspector General's recommendation and the Captain's specific direction to personnel, pregnant people in the module received inadequate out-of-cell time for at least the first three days of the quarantine. CRDF leadership has again committed to ensuring that pregnant people in custody receive sufficient out-of-cell time, however, the Office of Inspector General is unaware of any specific efforts to hold personnel accountable for failures to comply with the specific directive regarding this quarantine.

CRDF leadership expressed that they may better meet the needs of the pregnant population by housing them in one module together where staffing would be more consistent so that deputies can ensure the needs of pregnant people are met. The Office of Inspector General's 2018 report highlighted instances in which housing all pregnant people together limited access to various programs that earn credits toward early release. CRDF leadership reported that they are working with Gender Responsive Services (GRS) to ensure that available programs are accessible to all pregnant people in the general population.

### *Access to Programs*

In 2018, the Office of Inspector General reported that CRDF offered seven programs that were designed specifically for pregnant people and people with children in custody including the Lactation Program, Adults Bonding with Children (ABC) Program, Families & Criminal Justice Miracle Project, Harriet Buhai Center for Family Law, Gender Responsive Rehabilitation Program, Mama's Neighborhood, and Women's Integrated Services Program (WISP). The Sheriff's Department and CHS report that since March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has limited the availability of programs, as well as the number of outside providers entering CRDF. Specifically, CHS reports that the Lactation Program is still available, and the Sheriff's Department reports that WISP continues to provide services and release planning to people in custody with non-violent charges.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> The Sheriff's Department reported that on December 30, 2021, 10 of the 15 pregnant people in custody were assigned to WISP.

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ABC Program offered weekly contact visits between people in custody and their children under the age of 12. Due to the pandemic, GRS staff were required to identify alternatives for people in custody at CRDF to visit with their children. In May 2021, through a partnership with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), people in custody who have children in the DCFS system can attend virtual home visits with social workers. Although this program is currently limited to people in custody whose children are in the DCFS system, there are otherwise few restrictions for participation based on charges, classification, or housing location, potentially allowing for more participants. The program currently has 18 participants, and GRS staff are exploring ideas to expand the program to include people in custody whose children are not under the care of DCFS.

### *Release of Pregnant People from Custody*

As previously reported, the Office of Inspector General continues to monitor the Sheriff's Department's and CHS' efforts to limit the number of pregnant people confined in its facilities and provide adequate care to those who remain in custody.<sup>11</sup> The Sheriff's Department cites several reasons related to criminal charges or the procedural status of each person's criminal case that preclude pregnant people from release. The Sheriff's Department also cites barriers outside of the Sheriff's Department control, such as rigid placement criteria for many Community Based Organizations (CBOs), that are prohibitive of timely placement and release.

On December 24, 2021, the Office of Inspector General received a complaint regarding a pregnant person in custody who was approximately 34 weeks pregnant, sentenced for a non-violent offense, and who was eligible for release to a CBO. The Sheriff's Department reported to the Office of Inspector General that the release process for this pregnant person had stalled initially due to an error on the part of Sheriff's personnel. Once the error was discovered, it was quickly corrected and release personnel-initiated protocols for release to a CBO. However, consistent with Sheriff's Department's reports, due to rigid criteria for acceptance, the pregnant person was declined by several CBOs before finally being accepted to a program and released on December 30, 2021. As of January 10, 2022, two of the fifteen pregnant people in custody at CRDF on December 30, 2021, have been released.

The Office of Inspector General has confirmed that the CSD executives responsible for processing the release of pregnant people in custody are committed to this effort and have developed appropriate mechanisms to support releases. The issues

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<sup>11</sup> [Reform and Oversight Efforts - Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department - July to September 2021.pdf \(lacounty.gov\)](#)

raised here necessitate the release of pregnant people in custody as a highest Sheriff's Department priority. In addition to ensuring continued vigilance on the part of release personnel, the Sheriff should exercise all available avenues and authority to release as many pregnant people in custody as possible. The Office of Inspector General has previously recommended a legal analysis of the Sheriff's authority to release people in custody and reiterates that recommendation here, specifically given the above-described barriers meeting nutritional, and exercise needs of some pregnant people in custody. The Sheriff's Department should immediately begin to hold personnel accountable through its progressive discipline system when they fail to comply with leadership directives regarding out of cell time. If failures to comply are the result of systemic or greater operational deficiencies that render compliance impossible, they should be identified and remedied. As always, the Office of Inspector General appreciates the CSD's transparency and responsiveness to its requests for information, as well as its receptivity to Office of Inspector General recommendations.

### **Programming Opportunities at CRDF**

The Office of Inspector General continues to monitor CRDF's efforts to provide meaningful opportunities for people in custody to participate in therapeutic and rehabilitative programming. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has limited CRDF programs both in capacity and offerings, programming opportunities offered to people in custody include academic classes, life skills courses, vocational training, in-custody job placement, and therapeutic groups and activities. In addition to any therapeutic benefits programs provide, many of these programs allow people in custody to earn time credits for early release. While CRDF staff is in the process of formalizing policies and procedures governing participation in these programs, people in custody may request participation if they can be appropriately housed in the programming modules<sup>12</sup> and have not received a write up<sup>13</sup> in the preceding 30 days.

The Prisoner Personnel Office oversees credit earning jail employment opportunities offered to people in custody at CRDF, while Gender Responsive Services (GRS) oversees programming opportunities at CRDF. GRS was created pursuant to Board motion, *Building a Gender-Responsive Criminal Justice System*, passed on February 12, 2019.<sup>14</sup> In addition to overseeing programming, GRS partners with

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<sup>12</sup> For example, if a person in custody was housed in a medical unit receiving treatment and unable to be housed in a programming module, they would be unable to participate in programming.

<sup>13</sup> The Sheriff's Department disciplines people in custody for breaking jail rules and tracks the discipline in the Inmate Reporting and Tracking System ("IRTS").

<sup>14</sup> Los Angeles County, Motion by Supervisors Sheila Kuehl and Mark Ridley-Thomas, *Building a Gender-Responsive Criminal Justice System*, February 12, 2019, Board Agenda Item # 9, at: [http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/sop/1051856\\_021219.pdf](http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/sop/1051856_021219.pdf) (accessed on January 10, 2022).

outside organizations to expand services, secure grant funding to expand programming, and participate in numerous initiatives to promote the safety and wellbeing of people in custody at CRDF. The civilian Director of GRS has substantial expertise and has contributed significantly to GRS's implementation and development. The Sheriff's Department reports that the GRS Director is currently the only fully funded position in the unit and that the five additional GRS staff members, who are responsible for providing services to people in custody, are on loan from another Sheriff's Department bureau.

In November 2021, Office of Inspector General personnel met with Priscilla Ocen, Chair, Sheriff's Civilian Oversight Commission and Cheryl Grills, Chair, Sybil Brand Commission for Institutional Inspections regarding allegations that people in custody were being deprived of credit earning programming opportunities based on race. In mid-November and mid-December, the Office of Inspector General requested and received data from the Sheriff's Department, reporting the number of people in custody at CRDF by race/ethnicity and the number of people in custody in the programming modules at CRDF by race/ethnicity. Office of Inspector General personnel analyzed this data through calculating percentages of people housed at CRDF by race/ethnicity, and percentages of people engaged in programming<sup>15</sup> at CRDF by race/ethnicity. Percentage comparisons for both the mid-November data and mid-December data showed:

- White<sup>16</sup> and Hispanic people were overrepresented in programming when compared to the CRDF population.
- Black people were underrepresented in programming when compared to the CRDF population.
- "Other" races/ethnicities were equally represented when compared to the CRDF population.

It is important to note that the data discussed here represents programming opportunities at two single points in time, generated one month apart, and alone does not suggest that disproportionate racial/ethnic representation in programming opportunities has been a pervasive issue at CRDF.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, there are other potential explanations for disproportionate racial/ethnic representations in CRDF

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<sup>15</sup> Programming data counted people in custody by race/ethnicity housed in five credit-earning programming modules at CRDF, including: three credit earning employment modules, one Start program module, and the sole EBI flagship module.

<sup>16</sup> Race/ethnicity categorizations reflect those utilized by the Sheriff's Department when reporting demographic data.

<sup>17</sup> The Office of Inspector General staff is working with GRS staff to track people in custody at CRDF who both enroll in and complete EBI programming. Although the conclusions reported above are verified, exact percentages will require updated data.

programming, including institutional behavior and security classification, criminal charges, interest in or knowledge of programming opportunities, custody classifications, and COVID-19 related capacity issues. The Office of Inspector General will continue to track and analyze CRDF credit earning programming and demographic data to determine whether initial findings reflect a trend of underrepresentation and identify any potential contributing factors.

The Office of Inspector General will continue to work with CRDF and GRS leadership to monitor programming opportunities at CRDF. GRS staff has worked closely with Office of Inspector General staff to address these allegations and has demonstrated a strong commitment to further inspect and ameliorate programming concerns at CRDF. The Office of Inspector General will provide additional analysis on these and other Sheriff's Department efforts in its next quarterly report.

### **In-Custody Deaths**

Between October 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021, 11 individuals died while in the care and custody of the Sheriff's Department. Of these 11 decedents, one died at CRDF, one died at Twin Towers Correctional Facility (TTCF), one died at Palmdale Station Jail, and eight died in hospitals to which they had been transported.

Office of Inspector General staff attended the CSD Administrative Death Reviews for each of the 11 in-custody deaths.

The following summaries, arranged in chronological order, provide brief descriptions of each in-custody death:

On October 6, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC Medical Center (LAC+USC) after being transported from North County Correctional Facility (NCCF) on September 6, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On October 9, 2021, an individual died at Martin Luther King Jr. Community Hospital after being transported from CRDF on October 8, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On October 12, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from TTCF's Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) one hour prior, for a higher level of care after experiencing a medical emergency.

On October 25, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from NCCF on October 15, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On November 8, 2021, an individual at the Palmdale Station Jail was reportedly discovered during what was described as a suicide attempt. Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene.

On November 12, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from TTCF's CTC on October 25, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On December 1, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from TTCF's CTC on October 27, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On December 11, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from TTCF's CTC November 25, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On December 23, 2021, an individual died at LAC+USC after being transported from TTCF's CTC on September 29, 2021, for a higher level of care.

On December 27, 2021, an individual at TTCF was reportedly discovered unresponsive during a Title-15 safety check<sup>18</sup>. Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene.

On December 29, 2021, an individual at CRDF was reportedly discovered unresponsive during a Title-15 safety check. Emergency aid was rendered, paramedics were called, but the individual was pronounced dead at the scene.

### **Access to Scenes of In-Custody Deaths**

The Office of Inspector General previously reported that Sheriff's Department Homicide Bureau representatives (Homicide) had withheld important details about in-custody deaths during administrative death reviews (Death Reviews) that may have hindered the timely identification and correction of systemic deficiencies.<sup>19</sup> However, because the Office of Inspector General responds to death scenes, typically receive thorough briefings, and are able to view the bodies of people who die in the jails, the Office of Inspector General was aware of the details withheld at Death Reviews and therefore reported that the Office of Inspector General access to information was not being limited. In subsequent Death Reviews since the Office of Inspector General's report was submitted, Homicide has been more transparent in disclosing investigative details.

Unfortunately, following a recent death of a person in custody, Homicide denied the Office of Inspector General access to the scene and to viewing the body of the decedent located in the hallway outside the decedent's cell. When Office of Inspector General personnel arrived at the housing area where the death occurred, they were notified by Homicide that they would not be permitted to walk upstairs to a second-floor tier where the body of the decedent was located and were instead

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
<sup>18</sup> Title 15 Minimum Standards for Local Detention Facilities are regulations set by the State of California. Title 15 requires regular safety checks of people in custody at designated intervals.

<sup>19</sup> [Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department - April to June 2021.](#)

required to remain downstairs. The rationale initially provided by Homicide was that walking upstairs and onto the tier might contaminate the death scene. Because initial reports clearly indicated that the person died inside a cell and was only removed from the cell to the hallway as a matter of first responder protocol, the death scene would have been contained to a relatively small area and Homicide’s rationale was unnecessarily conservative. Following intervention by the CSD Assistant Sheriff, Office of Inspector General personnel were ultimately permitted to walk upstairs closer to the scene but were denied access to view the decedent’s body. The Assistant Sheriff has assured the Office of Inspector General that this was an isolated incident and that the Office of Inspector General will have full access to in-custody death scenes, including access to viewing the bodies of decedents, going forward. The Office of Inspector General will continue to monitor death scenes and report any failures to provide full access.

### Comparison to Prior Years

The following chart provides a comparison of the number of in-custody deaths and whether the death was classified as a non-homicide, suicide, or homicide for the period of January 1, 2013, to the present:



In 2021, there were 45 non-homicides, 9 suicides, and 1 homicide. The number of in-custody deaths the Office of Inspector General reports may vary slightly from historical data provided by the Sheriff’s Department because the

Sheriff’s Department identifies in-custody deaths by custody status and the location of an individual’s death.<sup>20</sup>

### Office of Inspector General Site Visits

The Office of Inspector General normally conducts site visits and inspections at Sheriff’s Department custodial facilities to identify matters requiring attention. Since the Los Angeles County Safer at Home Order issued on March 19, 2020, the Office of Inspector General has limited site visits. In the fourth quarter of 2021, Office of Inspector General personnel completed 48 site visits to the Inmate Reception Center (IRC), CRDF, TTCF’s CTC, Men’s Central Jail (MCJ), NCCF, Pitchess Detention Center (PDC) North, and TTCF. Office of Inspector General staff have been monitoring the Sheriff’s Department’s and CHS’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic and following up on concerns raised by the public. As part of the Office of Inspector General’s jail monitoring, Office of Inspector General staff attended 99 CSD executive and administrative meetings and met with division executives for 85 monitoring hours related to COVID-19, uses of force, in-custody deaths, as well as general conditions of confinement.

### Taser Use in Custody

The Office of Inspector General compiled the number of times the Sheriff’s Department has employed a Taser in custodial settings from January 2018, through December 2021. The numbers below were gathered from the Sheriff’s Department’s *Monthly Force Synopsis*, which the Sheriff’s Department produces and provides to the Office of Inspector General each month.<sup>21</sup>

<b>Month</b>	<b>Number of Times a Taser was Employed</b>
January 2018	5
February 2018	2
March 2018	7
April 2018	7
May 2018	0
June 2018	4
July 2018	6
August 2018	7
September 2018	3
October 2018	5
November 2018	3

<sup>20</sup> For instance, a death in the field during an arrest would be considered an in-custody death because of the person’s custodial status even though the individual was not in a custodial facility.

<sup>21</sup> The Office of Inspector General is not opining on whether the use of the Taser in each of these incidents was permissible under the Sheriff’s Department’s policies and/or if the Taser was employed lawfully.

<b>Month</b>	<b>Number of Times a Taser was Employed</b>
December 2018	1
January 2019	9
February 2019	9
March 2019	5
April 2019	4
May 2019	1
June 2019	2
July 2019	6
August 2019	9
September 2019	6
October 2019	3
November 2019	6
December 2019	5
January 2020	5
February 2020	3
March 2020	3
April 2020	4
May 2020	3
June 2020	5
July 2020	1
August 2020	3
September 2020	4
October 2020	3
November 2020	3
December 2020	6
January 2021	4
February 2021	8
March 2021	3
April 2021	5
May 2021	3
June 2021	11
July 2021	5
August 2021	4
September 2021	3
October 2021	6
November 2021	3
December 2021	4

### **Use-of-Force Incidents in Custody**

The Office of Inspector General monitors the Sheriff’s Department’s use of force incidents, institutional violence<sup>22</sup>, and assaults on Sheriff’s Department or CHS personnel by people in custody. The Sheriff’s Department reports the following numbers for the uses of force and assaultive conduct within its CSD (the Sheriff’s Department is still verifying the accuracy of the reporting of incidents that occurred subsequent to June 2021):

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<sup>22</sup> Institutional violence is defined as assaultive conduct by a person in custody upon another person in custody.

Use of Force Incidents:

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2018	546
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2018	592
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2018	530
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018	452
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2019	501
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2019	478
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2019	525
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2019	431
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2020	386
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2020	274
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2020	333
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2020	390
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2021	373
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2021	430

Assaults on Personnel:

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2018	144
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2018	173
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2018	131
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018	115
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2019	122
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2019	132
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2019	164
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2019	136
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2020	131
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2020	91
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2020	111
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2020	140
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2021	143
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2021	145

Incidents of Institutional Violence:

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2018	871
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2018	905
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2018	988
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018	881
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2019	769
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2019	794
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2019	858
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2019	709

1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2020	717
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2020	496
3 <sup>rd</sup> Quarter of 2020	560
4 <sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2020	753
1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter of 2021	745
2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter of 2021	698

## HANDLING OF GRIEVANCES AND COMMENTS

### Office of Inspector General Handling of Comments Regarding Department Operations and Jails

The Office of Inspector General received 123 new complaints in the fourth quarter of 2021 from members of the public, prisoners, prisoners' family members and friends, community organizations and County agencies. Each complaint was reviewed by Office of Inspector General staff. Sixty-five of these complaints were related to conditions of confinement within the Department's custody facilities, as shown below:

Complaint/ Incident Classification	Totals
Personnel Issues	24
COVID	11
Medical	8
Living Condition	7
Mental	4
Dental	2
Showers	2
Classification	1
Commissary	1
Food	1
Mail	1
Property	1
Telephone	1
Other	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>

Thirty-seven complaints were related to civilian contacts with Department personnel by persons who were not in custody.

Complaint/ Incident Classification	Totals
Improper Tactics	6
Neglect of Duty	5
Discourtesy	5
Service	4

Improper Search, Detention, Arrest	3
Response Time	2
Force	2
Harassment	2
Discrimination	2
Off Duty Conduct	1
Dishonesty	1
Policy	1
Other	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>

Twenty-one complaints were not about the Department or Department personnel and were referred to the appropriate agency or the complainant was directed to seek legal advice.

### Handling of Grievances Filed by People in Custody

The Sheriff’s Department has not fully implemented the use of tablet computers (tablets) in its jail facilities to capture information related to requests, and eventually grievances, filed by people in custody. Currently, there are a total of 165 installed iPads. There are 31 iPads at CRDF, 49 iPads at MCJ, and 85 iPads at TTCF. The Sheriff’s Department reports that all upgrades and connectivity issues have been resolved at CRDF and MCJ and the iPads are currently available for use. The Sheriff’s Department reports that moving to Windows based tablets is under consideration in order to rectify compatibility issues and other connectivity concerns. The Sheriff’s Department reports that people in custody have accessed the iPads to obtain information on 265,198 occasions between October 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021. The Office of Inspector General continues to recommend that the Sheriff’s Department pursue full implementation of tablets throughout the CSD.

As reported in the Office of Inspector General’s January 2018 *Reform and Oversight Efforts: Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department* report, the Sheriff’s Department implemented a policy restricting the filing of duplicate and excessive grievances filed by people in custody.<sup>23</sup> The Sheriff’s Department reports that between October 1, 2021, and December 31, 2021, 13 people in custody were restricted from filing 38 grievances under this policy. The Office of Inspector General continues to raise concerns about the quality of grievance investigations and responses, which likely increases duplication and may prevent individuals from receiving adequate care while in Sheriff’s Department custody.

<sup>23</sup> [See Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Custody Division Manual, 8-04/050.00, Duplicate or Excessive Filings of Grievances and Appeals, and Restrictions of Filing Privileges.](#)

## Sheriff's Department's Service Comment Reports

Under Sheriff's Department policies, the Sheriff's Department accepts and reviews comments from members of the public about departmental service or employee performance.<sup>24</sup> The Sheriff's Department categorizes these comments into three categories:

- External Commendation: an external communication of appreciation for and/or approval of service provided by the Sheriff's Department members;
- Service Complaint: an external communication of dissatisfaction with the Sheriff's Department service, procedure or practice, not involving employee misconduct; and
- Personnel Complaint: an external allegation of misconduct, either a violation of law or Sheriff's Department policy, against any member of the Sheriff's Department.<sup>25</sup>

The following chart lists the number and types of comments reported for each station or unit.<sup>26</sup>

INVESTIGATING BUREAU/STATION/FACILITY	COMMENDATIONS	PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS	SERVICE COMPLAINTS
ADM : CENTRAL PATROL ADM HQ	0	0	1
ADM : CW SRVS ADM HQ	2	0	0
ADM : NORTH PATROL ADM HQ	2	1	0
AER : AERO BUREAU	1	0	0
ALD : ALTADENA STN	0	1	1
AVA : AVALON STN	1	0	0
CEN : CENTURY STN	6	9	3
CER : CERRITOS STN	4	2	0
CMB : CIVIL MANAGEMENT BUREAU	13	3	5
CNT : COURT SERVICES CENTRAL	2	4	1
COM : COMPTON STN	2	4	0
CPB : COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP BUREAU	1	0	0
CRV : CRESCENTA VALLEY STN	5	1	0

<sup>24</sup> See [Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, Manual of Policy and Procedures, 3-04/010.00, "Department Service Reviews."](#)

<sup>25</sup> It is possible for an employee to get a Service Complaint and Personnel Complaint based on the same incident in question.

<sup>26</sup> This data was provided by the Sheriff's Department from its Performance Recording and Monitoring System on January 5, 2022, and reflects the data provided as of that date.

<b>INVESTIGATING BUREAU/STATION/FACILITY</b>	<b>COMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS</b>	<b>SERVICE COMPLAINTS</b>
CSB : COUNTY SERVICES BUREAU	3	6	1
CSN : CARSON STN	6	5	2
CST : COURT SERVICES TRANSPORTATION	0	1	0
DSB : DATA SYSTEMS BUREAU	0	0	1
ELA : EAST LA STN	2	4	0
EST : COURT SERVICES EAST	1	5	0
FCC : FRAUD & CYBER CRIMES BUREAU	3	0	0
HOM : HOMICIDE BUREAU	1	0	2
IND : INDUSTRY STN	4	3	6
IRC : INMATE RECEPTION CENTER	2	1	0
LCS : LANCASTER STN	8	16	6
LKD : LAKEWOOD STN	3	6	0
LMT : LOMITA STN	6	2	0
MAR : MARINA DEL REY STN	0	3	0
MCJ : MEN'S CENTRAL JAIL	1	1	0
MLH : MALIBU/LOST HILLS STN	11	7	2
MTL : METROLINK	1	1	0
NAR : NARCOTICS BUREAU	0	3	0
NCF : NORTH CO. CORRECTL FAC	1	0	0
NWK : NORWALK REGIONAL STN	6	9	3
OSS : OPERATION SAFE STREETS BUREAU	2	0	0
PKB : PARKS BUREAU	3	0	0
PLM : PALMDALE STN	22	21	1
PRV : PICO RIVERA STN	0	3	2
SCV : SANTA CLARITA VALLEY STN	17	8	1
SDM : SAN DIMAS STN	5	4	0
SEB : SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT BUR	1	0	0
SIB : SHERIFF INFORMATION BUREAU	1	0	0
SLA : SOUTH LOS ANGELES STATION	2	5	1
SO : PITCHESS SOUTH FACILITY	0	0	1
SSB : SCIENTIFIC SERV BUREAU	3	0	0
TEM : TEMPLE CITY STN	9	7	1

<b>INVESTIGATING BUREAU/STATION/FACILITY</b>	<b>COMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>PERSONNEL COMPLAINTS</b>	<b>SERVICE COMPLAINTS</b>
TSB : TRANSIT SERVICES BUREAU	0	1	0
TT : TWIN TOWERS	0	3	1
WAL : WALNUT/SAN DIMAS STN	7	4	1
WHD : WEST HOLLYWOOD STN	4	6	4
WST : COURT SERVICES WEST	2	0	0
<b>Total :</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>47</b>

## **CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON JAIL VIOLENCE UPDATES**

### *CCJV Recommendation 3.12: The Department should purchase additional body scanners*

The Sheriff's Department continues to operate body scanners at MCJ, CRDF, PDC North, PDC South, NCCF, and IRC.

According to the Sheriff's Department's records, from October 1, 2021, to December 31, 2021, no persons in custody refused to go through the body scanners across all applicable facilities.